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Preface 
This volume is the product of a workshop held at the 61st Rencontre Assyr-
iologique Internationale (RAI) in Geneva and Bern on 22–26 June 2015. I 
would like to thank the organizers of the Rencontre for accepting my appli-
cation for the workshop, foremost Mirko Novák and Sabine Ecklin, for 
their encouragement and help.  
Most of the articles in this volume are expanded and revised versions of 
papers presented at the morning panel during the workshop “Visualizing 
Emotions and Senses in the Ancient Near East”, which I organized to-
gether with Ainsley Hawthorn (Yale University) and Anne-Caroline Rendu 
Loisel (University of Geneva). An unpublished article by Othmar Keel, 
which he wrote in the 1990s, has been added to the volume. Wolfgang 
Zwickel, who was also present at the workshop, agreed to revise and reprint 
an earlier published article of his own. Karen Sonik accepted my invitation 
to contribute her thoughts on the subject of emotion in Mesopotamian art, 
while John Baines in his epilogue comments on the volume from the per-
spective of Egyptian art. I am very grateful to all the authors for their huge 
effort. 
I would also like to offer my thanks to all contributors to the workshop 
for their constructive and well-focused presentations and to everyone for 
participating and further stimulating the discussion during and after the 
Rencontre, especially to Irene Winter. It was a very fruitful interdiscipli-
nary conversation and I am excited to present some of its most important 
results in this volume. 
The workshop at the Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale was fi-
nanced by the Promotion Fund for Early Career Researchers at the Univer-
sity of Bern (Nachwuchsförderungs-Projektpool der Mittelbauvereinigung 
der Universität Bern). The Berne University Research Foundation and the 
Reformed Churches of the Cantons Bern-Jura-Solothurn funded the print-
ing costs for the volume. 
As editor of this volume, I am especially grateful to Christoph Ueh-
linger, senior editor of the series Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis, not only for 
accepting this volume for publication in this series and for his help 
throughout the editing process, but also for his many supportive sugges-
tions and his expertise in improving the text. I would also like to sincerely 
thank Andreas Wagner, who encouraged and enabled me to organize the 
workshop during my time as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of 
Bern on the Swiss National Science Foundation-funded research project on 
“Emotions in the Old Testament”. 
VIII AUTOR 
And last but not least I am very grateful to Marshall Cunningham, who 
helped me in the editing of the English articles. 
Sara Kipfer, Heidelberg / Bern 2017 
Visualizing Emotions in the Ancient Near East 
An Introduction 
Sara KIPFER 
1. Some Introductory Remarks 
The generally held scholarly opinion was – or perhaps still is – that ancient 
Near Eastern art does not represent any emotion.1 Indeed, visualizations of 
emotions are elusive: the depicted faces in Assyrian reliefs are homogenous 
and stereotyped,2 figurines from the southern Levant keep a straight face, and 
Egyptian images3 are to a large extent standardized. In many images the repre-
sentation of emotions or feelings seem to be dispensable.4 However, these ob-
servations should not blind us to the fact that many depictions represent situa-
tions and groupings of motifs that are highly emotional: the depiction of ritual 
mourning, erotic scenes, aggression and violence, triumph and joy. The main 
questions are as follows: What connection do those images have with emotion? 
How can we analyze them? And finally: What do we learn from them about 
ancient Near Eastern concepts of emotion? In any case, it will not be possible 
to investigate emotions as such, but only their dispositions, dramaturgy, and 
accompanying, observable evidence.5  
                                                     
1  See e.g. Schroer 2002a: 1080: „Auch die Darstellung von Affekten spielt mit Ausnahme 
ritualisierter Trauergesten in der ao. Kunst keine Rolle.“ Similarly Nunn 2009: 134-35 
summarizes: “Natürlich hat es Emotionen gegeben, sie wurden aber nicht in Gesichts-
zügen gezeigt. Ein kurzer Blick reicht, um festzustellen, dass die Gesichtsausdrücke al-
ler abgebildeter Götter und Menschen gleich sind: kein Lachen, keine Freude, keine Be-
kundung von Bewunderung oder Staunen, kein Weinen, keine Angstgefühle, keine 
Trauer. Dass dies so ist, hängt mit der Stellung des Individuums in der altorientalischen 
Gesellschaft zusammen. Nicht das Individuum Mensch zählt, sondern seine soziale Stel-
lung.“ For more examples from the history of scholarship in the area, see also Cornelius 
in this volume. 
2  See e.g. Larsen 2001: 277: “Instead we must conclude that an artistic convention is at 
play here, one that apparently prohibited the exposure of feelings in terms of open, facial 
expressions, even such positive ones as aggressiveness or righteous anger.” 
3  For an overview on “Gefühlsbewegungen” in ancient Egypt, see Altenmüller 1977. 
4  See Keel in this volume. 
5  See Böhme 1997: 536. Hammer-Tugendhat / Lutter 2010: 9 state: „Als (Kultur-) Wis-
senschaftlerInnen haben wir es daher immer mit Repräsentationen zu tun, seien sie 
sprachlich, visuell oder akustisch, seien sie gegenwärtig oder historisch. Emotionen sind 
immer nur näherungsweise bzw. ‚übersetzt‘ zugänglich und können nicht von ihrer kul-
turell geformten Vermittlung abgelöst werden.“ See also Schnell 2015: 18-23. 
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1.1. What are emotions? Some reflections on the object of study and the 
difficulties of a definition 
What are emotions? Are they universal and part of the conditio humana, the 
human condition, and thus also inherent in people of the ancient Near East, 
or are they bound to a very strict cultural concept and thus not older than the 
term “emotion”? To what extent are emotions shaped historically and social-
ly? Are they restricted to the “inner” feelings of an individual, or are they 
also closely connected to the body6 and comprehensible in rituals and behav-
iors of the collective?7 None of these questions can be answered fully and 
this is not the place to give a generally applicable definition.8 Most of the 
articles in this volume use their own definitions following their disciplinary 
approaches.9 However, in raising these questions it becomes obvious not 
only that it is impossible to analyze emotions as such but also that it is very 
difficult to gather evidence of their visual, literary, linguistic, material etc. 
representations in the ancient Near East. I am not the first to point out this 
dilemma: It can be taken for granted that people in the ancient Near East had 
                                                     
6  Böhme 1997: 534 states a shift in meaning: „Die Herkunft des Wortes Gefühl aus dem 
eigenleiblichen Spüren aber wahrt den Zusammenhang von Gefühlen mit dem Leiblichen 
auch dann noch, wenn Gefühle zunehmend als seelisches Erlebnis verstanden wurden. 
‚Seelisch‘ waren eher die inneren Repräsentanten (die ‚Vorstellungen‘) der leiblichen Ge-
fühle, während heute das Verhältnis umgekehrt ist: ‚Emotionen‘ sind primär innere (seeli-
sche) Abläufe, die von körperlichen Symptomen (wie Herzklopfen, Schamröte, weiche 
Knie) ‚begleitet‘ werden. Beides zusammen, die seelisch-körperlichen Emotionsabläufe 
werden behaviouristisch oder handlungstheoretisch als ‚Verhalten‘ oder ‚Interaktion‘ ver-
standen, wodurch der Konnex von Gefühl und Leiblichkeit endgültig zerrissen ist. Dabei 
ist die Grundbedeutung von ‚Emotion‘, das von lat. motus, mofio herrührt und auch hier 
vor allem körperliche Bewegung meint, verlassen.“ Wierzbicka 1999: 2 states: “The Eng-
lish word emotion combines in its meaning a reference to ‘feeling’, a reference to ‘think-
ing’, and a reference to a person’s body.” 
7  See e.g. Schnell 2015: 133-139. 
8  See e.g. Otto / Euler / Mandl 2000: 11: “Es ist ein weit verbreitetes Missverständnis, 
dass eine wissenschaftliche Erforschung der Emotion mit einer genauen Bestimmung 
des Gegenstandsbereiches zu beginnen hat. Eine solche exakte Bestimmung würde vo-
raussetzen, dass man das zu untersuchende Phänomen bereits in all seinen Erschei-
nungsformen und Ausprägungen genau kennt.“ This fact, however, does not mean that 
the search for a metalanguage should be given up lightly. The question of metalanguage 
and an operational definition of “emotion” is a key issue in emotion research, as 
Wierzbicka 2010: 379 has demonstrated. See the discussion between Izard 2010, 
Wierzbicka 2010, and others. 
9  See e.g. Wagner-Durand and Cornelius in this volume. See also Kruger 2015: 396-401. 
So far there is no consensus about the definition of emotion. See Schnell 2015: 33: „Jede 
Wissenschaftsdisziplin erschafft also den Gegenstand, nach dem sie sucht. Emotionen 
werden als psychophysiologische Prozesse, soziale Interaktionen, kognitive Aktivitäten, 
Praktiken, Handlungsbereitschaften, u.a. definiert. Es gibt nicht Emotionen an sich, son-
dern bei der Suche nach den Emotionen schaffen zugleich wir den Untersuchungsgegen-
stand – sogar die Hirnforschung agiert so, weil sie die beobachteten neutralen Prozesse 
interpretieren muss.“ See also Otto / Euler / Mandel 2000, 11-18; Schiewer 2014: 13-14. 
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emotions since these are more or less “universal”. At the same time, we are 
faced with a gulf of thousands of years separating us from the past we are 
studying, as well as a vast difference in cultural traditions and physical reali-
ty.10 From this perspective it seems hardly possible to learn about ancient 
emotion. The appropriateness of applying the modern concept of emotions to 
antiquity has rightly been questioned. It is clear that specific methods and 
tools for the analysis of representations of emotions and concepts of emotion 
are needed.11 And it is crucial to keep in mind that emotions always occupy a 
position within a field of multiple tensions (Spannungsfeld): biopsychological 
continuities and cultural variation, collectivism and individualism, body and 
mind, universalism and relativism, essentialism and constructivism, inward-
ness (feelings) and outward appearance (gestures).12 
Not only is the object of research to a great extent unclear, the terminolo-
gies that have been used in research are also manifold.13 What makes it espe-
cially difficult is that no general term for emotion has been identified in Su-
merian, Akkadian, or Biblical Hebrew. The term “emotion” as it is normally 
used today is an invention of the Enlightenment.14 Nevertheless it cannot be 
eliminated from the current debate. In cultural studies – where the “emotional 
                                                     
10  See e.g. Larsen 2001: 276: “As Assyriologists we are faced with a gulf of thousands of 
years separating us from the past we are studying, as well as a vast difference in cultural 
traditions and physical reality, so imposing our own categories on the statements we are 
trying to interpret is likely to lead us astray in many instances. The attempt to understand 
the individuality of the ancients, their intentions, fears and emotions is hazardous, in par-
ticular when we are dealing with a society like that of Mesopotamia, where we find ‘no na-
tive self-appraisal.’ [Oppenheim 1967: 57] On the other hand, this is our task.” 
11  E.g. Wagner 2012: 36: “Für die Erforschung historischer Emotionen können wir daher 
nicht so vorgehen, dass Theoreme und methodische Mittel, die aus der gegenwarts-
bezogenen Forschung zu Emotionen stammen, einfach nur auf die historischen Texte 
angewendet werden – was übrigens schon bei der Benennung und Eingrenzung von 
Emotionen anfängt.“ See also Schnell 2015: 18-23. 
12  See e.g. Lutz / White 1986: 405-436. 
13  Böhme 1997: 528 speaks of a “Begriffsdilemma”. See also Hammer-Tugendhat / Lutter 
2010: 10-11. 
14  See Dixon 2012. Campe / Weber 2014: 2 stated: “It was only in the course of the eight-
eenth century, however, that the concept of interiority became firmly related to emotion-
ality and thus central to understanding individual existence. This historical moment is a 
turning point both for the semantics of interiority and for the understanding of emotion.” 
Lasater, forthcoming, draws the conclusion: “I want to suggest that any effort to locate 
‘emotions’ in the Hebrew Bible or the ancient Near East is comparable to hunting the 
snark. If we want our hunt to be successful, we will turn away from ‘the emotions’ and 
toward something more like the psychological taxonomy that the emotions displaced in 
the late-modern period: namely, the taxonomy of ‘passions and affections.’ ‘The emo-
tions’ are simply not to be found in the Hebrew Bible or in the historical contexts behind 
its emergence. [...] Expecting to find ‘the emotions’ before the modern period is anach-
ronistic.” I would argue however, that it is important to look for “concepts of emotion” 
(e.g. expressions of inner and outer body parts, interdependencies of rationality, inten-
tionality, normative evaluations) in the ancient Near East first, and only then to search 
for the corresponding “labeling” (e.g. “feelings”, “passion”, “affection”, “emotion” etc.).  
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turn”15 has been proposed – and in the subfield of history known as “emo-
tionology”16 the term is used as an umbrella designation for many different 
interpretations and disciplinary approaches. However, it is important to keep 
in mind that the term is anachronistic and that our understanding of “emo-
tion” is not identical with what was experienced in the ancient Near East.17 
1.2. How are emotions referred to in texts? Some insights from textual 
analyses about concepts of emotion in the ancient Near East 
Until recently, knowledge about the conceptualization, ritualization, etc. of 
emotions in the ancient Near East was very limited. Investigations of Biblical18 
and ancient Near Eastern texts generally19 demonstrated that in the ancient 
Near East emotions are often not simply seen as something interior of the 
body, but rather as reflecting external circumstances.20 Emotions are something 
coming from outside into the human body, “attacking” and “affecting” some-
one. In a few cases they are even related to demons.21 The analysis of texts 
further demonstrates that activities, behaviors, and practices are closely linked 
to what are generally called “emotions” today.22 It can be assumed that emo-
tions in the ancient Near East cannot be reduced to “inner feelings”; rather, 
they also include action and are therefore constitutive and essential for the plot 
in narratives.23 The same emotions can be commanded or forbidden in legal 
                                                     
15  For an overview, see e.g. Schnell 2015: 15-18; Hammer-Tugendhat / Lutter 2010. 
16  See Stearns / Stearns 1985: 813-836. Stearns / Stearns introduced the term “emotion-
ology” to distinguish the collective emotional standards of a society from the emotional 
experiences of individuals and groups. 
17  See Cornelius in this volume and Mirguet 2016. 
18  E.g. Gillmayr-Bucher 2010; Kruger 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2015; Kipfer 2016; Strawn 
2012; Wagner 22011. The topic is especially popular in Biblical Studies, as the program 
unit „Bible and Emotion“ at the Society of Biblical Literature and the research group 
“Emotions and the Biblical World” at the European Association of Biblical Literature 
demonstrate. 
19  E.g. Jaques 2006; Larsen 2001. 
20  This is also true on a more general level. See e.g. Campe / Weber 2014: 1: “The notion 
of interiority and its central role in our understanding of emotional life and individuality 
are phenomena that belong to classical Western modernity. From antiquity to early mo-
dernity, affects or passions were mostly conceived of either as external physiological 
forces that act on a passive subject and provoke it to engage in certain actions or as sce-
ne-like situations in which the affected person responds to an ensemble of other actors 
under specific circumstances.” 
21  See Steinert 2014: 527.530-31 and Kipfer 2016: 67. James 2013: 825 summarizes: “In 
general, though, biblical writings conceptualize emotions of all kinds as uncontainable 
forces expressed in and through the human body.”  
22  Concerning the close connection of emotions to causes, see e.g. Wagner 2012: 59-60: 
“Emotionen und ihre Bindung an Gründe”. 
23  Mirguet 2016: 463 comes to the conclusion: “First, a lexical inquiry has shown that 
Biblical Hebrew words that are usually translated by emotional terms, such as love or 
 VISUALIZING EMOTIONS IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 5 
contexts.24 They thus play an important part in the whole moral system. Con-
trol over emotions is frequently prescribed in Mesopotamian wisdom litera-
ture.25 In some behavioral omina („Verhaltensomina“) every expression of 
strong emotions is seen negatively.26 
1.3. How are emotions referred to in texts and images? Some consider-
ations about intermediality27 
Hitherto images have rarely been analyzed for their emotional content.28 
However, analysis of ancient Near Eastern images is fundamental for a better 
understanding of texts and concepts of emotion in general.29 On the one hand, 
images can function as a corrective of preconceptions about emotions in an-
cient Near Eastern texts. On the other hand, texts can help us to better under-
stand images and their concepts of emotion. I would like to demonstrate this 
                                                                                                                          
fear, exceed our emotional realm, as they also include actions, ritual gestures, and physi-
cal sensations. I thus suggest that Biblical Hebrew does not organize human experience 
by delimiting a strictly emotional dimension comparable to ours.” 
24  See e.g. Chan 2012: 325-326: “The decision to include activities, behaviors, and practices 
associated with happiness acknowledges that, for many cultures, sentiments and perfor-
mance are often inseparably linked. That is to say, many cultures do not view joyful be-
havior merely as an epiphenomenal expression of a subjective emotional state as is the 
case in many Western countries. One example must suffice: in the OT, both ‘love’ and 
‘joy’ can be commanded in legal contexts, which suggests that something more than just 
internal (and subjective) affect states are in mind – or, perhaps better, in practice.” 
25  See Jaques in this volume. See also Steinert 2012: 113-117. Wagner 2012: 58 specifies 
concerning the Hebrew Bible: “Ein Ideal, Emotionen pauschal ‘unter Verschluss’ zu 
halten, wird im A.T. nicht erhoben, weil es, so meine These, nicht der grundsätzlichen 
Denkmöglichkeit über Emotionen entspricht. Postulate gegen Einzelemotionen dienen 
nur dem Eindämmen der (teils negativen) Folgen der Einzelemotionen, nicht dem Ein-
dämmen von Emotionalität überhaupt.“ 
26  See Steinert 2012: 115. 
27  See e.g. Keel 1992; Schroer 2006: 9-11. 
28  E.g. Zwickel 2012 and in this volume; Staubli 2015: 253-258. For a cognitive approach, 
see Strawn 2014: 91-134. 
29  See e.g. Böhme 1997: 535: “Um den historischen Wandel von Gefühlen und ihres Erle-
bens zu verstehen, ist man auf Zeugnisse angewiesen, welche lesbar sind als die Spuren 
dieses am eigenen Leib Gewahrwerdens von Gefühlen. Dabei ist die historische Anthropo-
logie der Gefühle nicht auf schriftliche Quellen des Gefühlslebens vergangener Kulturen 
eingeschränkt, sondern sie stützt sich auch, sofern der Bezug auf das Spüren am eigenen 
Leib gewahrt bleibt, auf Musik, Bilder, Filme, Architekturen, Landschaften, selbst auf 
Dinge und Geräte.“ See also Hammer-Tugendhat / Lutter 2010: 9: „Unterschiedliches 
Quellenmaterial lässt sich daraufhin befragen, wie Emotionen Ausdruck verliehen wird 
und wie die Weisen, Emotionen zu empfinden, eingeübt werden. Hier geht es also um kul-
turelle Modelle und Muster, die nicht starr sind, sondern in ihrem sozialen Gebrauch ‚ver-
körpert‘, aber auch gestaltet und verändert werden und die damit ihrerseits beeinflussen, 
was und wie wahrgenommen und empfunden wird.“ 
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on three different levels, namely: a) facial expression,30 b) gestures and body 
posture, and c) image and motif constellation. 
a) Facial expression 
There are texts which implicitly or explicitly relate “facial expressions” to 
different emotions: in Akkadian texts the face (panu) can be worried, disturbed 
(adāru),31 angry (baʼāšu),32 friendly, pleasant (banû),33 dark (ekēlu),34 or happy, 
radiant (namāru).35 In some cases the change of mood is expressed by a change 
in color of the face and sometimes the emotions even causes a change in the 
configuration of the face.36 Similar expressions are attested in the Hebrew Bi-
ble: One can “loosen one’s face” (ַינָפ הְָבזֶעֶא Job 9:27), making one’s face 
“bold” ( ָהֶינָפ ָהזֵעֵה Prov 7:13) or “sad” ( ב־יִכּםִינָפּ ַֹער  Eccl 7:3); sometimes it is 
even possible to read sympathy or antipathy from someone’s face (Gen 
31:2.5).37 Does this mean that more is described in words than can be seen in 
images?38 If one uses the Microsoft Project Emotion API39 for an empirical 
experiment, some astonishing results are produced. According to this Emotion 
Recognition program, the plaque showing a nude female (clay, Isin-Larsa peri-
od, 2000-1800 BCE, Tell Asmar, Oriental Institute Museum, Chicago, 
A 17891) displays 98,3% happiness and its face is only 1,7% neutral. The nude 
                                                     
30  See Hassin / Aviezer / Bentin 2013. 
31  For examples see CAD, A/1 103-104. 
32  For examples see CAD, B 5. 
33  For examples see CAD, B 91. 
34  For examples see CAD, E 64. 
35  For examples see CAD, N/1 213.216. 
36  For more examples see e.g. Jaques 2006: 82-83; Mayer 2010: 308-309.311-314 et al. 
I am very grateful to Nicholas Postgate for mentioning the disc of Yaijdun-Lim to me. 
In this inscription, Yaijdun-Lim announces that he had “removed the hi-ip-pí of the 
Banks of the Euphrates”. Dossin (1978: 252) rendered: “j’effaçai les blessures des rives 
de l’Euphrate”. Similar expressions can be found in two other Mari texts which use the 
phrase hippam ša panī nasāhum (“to remove the hippi of the face”); see Dossin 1978: 
252. According to Nicholas Postgate (pers. comm.), the phrase means “to remove the fa-
cial lines of distress”, and that when Yaijdun-Lim talks of the Banks of the Euphrates, 
he means that he was banishing the signs of distress among “(the population of) the 
Banks of the Euphrates”. See Nicholas Postgate: http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/-mjw65/ 
cda/lemmata.htmlb under hippum, viewed on 03.12.2015. For further discussions see 
Heimpel 1998: 67. 
37  See for more examples Johnson 21964: 41-46; Simian-Yofre 1989: 634-635; Gruber 
1980. 
38  See also Brunner 1984: 277-279. 
39  For more information about this project, see: https://www.microsoft.com/cognitive-
services/en-us/emotion-api/documentation: “The Emotion API beta takes an image as an 
input, and returns the confidence across a set of emotions for each face in the image, as 
well as bounding box for the face, from the Face API. The emotions detected are happi-
ness, sadness, surprise, anger, fear, contempt, disgust or neutral. These emotions are 
communicated cross-culturally and universally via the same basic facial expressions, 
where are [sic] identified by Emotion API.” 
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goddess holding lotus flowers and lions (horse frontlet, ivory, Neo-Assyrian, 
ca. 9th-8th century BCE, Nimrud, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 
61.197.5) displays 68,8% neutral emotions, 10,3% sadness, 10,4% surprise, 
3,5% happiness, and 4,9% fear. By contrast, the so-called “Queen of the 
Night” (clay, Old Babylonian, 19th-18th century BCE, southern Iraq, British 
Museum, London, 2003,0718.1) gets 86,8% neutral and only 11,7% happi-
ness. These examples are chosen at random and should not be used to prove 
some specific emotion in ancient Near Eastern Art.40 However, because the 
program detects facial expression in ancient Near Eastern art, the generally-
held opinion that no facial expressions are depicted should be called into 
question.41 
b) Gestures and body posture 
Gestures and body posture are even more relevant for a reevaluation of emo-
tion concepts in the ancient Near East.42 Both can be related to emotion in texts 
and images.43  
It has long been observed that mourning rites,44 joyful festivities,45 as well as 
aggression,46 erotic scenes and sexual practices47 were not only described in 
                                                     
40  The Emotion Recognition program unfortunately gives no result for the figurine of a 
fertility goddess (Revadim, Late Canaanite period, 13th century BCE Clay, Israel Muse-
um, Jerusalem, IAA 1982-219). See Cornelius and Schroer in this volume. Generally, I 
admit that there is a relatively high error rate, which means that the emotion can be de-
tected on only a few plaques, figurines, sculptures, ivories etc. In some cases the pro-
gram is also unreliable: Nefertiti (limestone and stucco, Amarna, 18th Dynasty, ca. 1340 
BCE, Egyptian Museum, Berlin, ÄM 21300) shows different emotions: 90,8% neutral in 
one photograph, but 56,6% neutral and 41,5% happiness in another, dependent on angle 
of view and light. 
41  For more information about the relation between facial expression and emotion see e.g. 
Ekman 22007 or Freedberg 2014. The question whether emotions can be recognized 
from faces is, however, debated. See e.g. Schnell 2015: 234: “Denn die einschlägige 
Forschung zur Frage, inwieweit Emotionen an Gesichtsausdrücken abgelesen werden 
können, hat erstens konstatiert, dass ‘nicht alle verbal benennbaren Emotionen in einen 
charakteristischen mimischen Ausdruck übersetzt werden’ können, zweitens festgestellt, 
dass ‘die Übersetzung der Gesichtssprache in die Wortsprache eher schwierig’ ist.” 
(quotations taken from Schmidt-Atzert 2000: 33). 
42  McNiven 2000: 125 came to the conclusion for Greek art (especially painted pottery in 
the 6th and 7th century): „Lacking for facial indicators of emotion, we have to look at 
the other aspects of body language, especially to gestures […], in order to ‘read’ the 
emotional content of the image. Gestures are used to display a wide range of expres-
sions, often in contexts where the circumstances are known, and, therefore, reasonable 
conclusions concerning the emotions being displayed can be drawn.“ 
43  See e.g. Bonatz 2002: 146-148; Dominicus 1994. 
44  See e.g. Keel 21985: 319-320; Schroer 2002b; 2009: 299-321; 2011: 83-102; Volokhine 
2008. See Cornelius in this volume. 
45  See e.g. Keel 21985: 335-339. 
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texts but also depicted in visual art. Gestures such as raising or bowing one’s 
head,48 both mentioned in texts and shown in images, may help us to get a 
fuller picture of emotional concepts. Generally speaking, “[g]estures and 
ritual actions are forms of nonverbal communication that can be literary 
ciphers for emotions.”49 This basic assumption concerning gestures is not 
without its problems since gestures are not universal but rather connected to 
particular cultural, social, religious etc. contexts.50 In some cases the same 
gesture may stand for different emotions in different cultures.51 The “clap-
ping of hands” is a good example to demonstrate how body language is 
shaped culturally and can only be understood by carefully analyzing texts 
and images. In her study on this topic, Fox points out that in many cultural 
contexts this gestures stands for “joy and approval”. In the Assyrian con-
text, however, the clapping of hands may also be understood as a gesture of 
anger and anguish.52 This makes it obvious that images play an important 
part when analyzing the larger context of ancient concepts of emotion.53 
Images may help in understanding ancient Near Eastern concepts of emo-
tion because they refer directly to the human body as a medium of communi-
cation.54 And even if representations of the human body do not disclose interi-
or feelings that are objective, visible, and comprehensible, they still have their 
own meaning and their own value.55 The visually represented “body” is never 
simply an imitation or a reflection of the physical body but is shaped by cul-
tural tropes.56 In the ancient Near East emotions were also directly linked to 
                                                                                                                          
46  See e.g. Berlejung 2005; Bahrani 2008. One impressive example from Egypt that was 
not previously mentioned shows a quarrel between two girls. See Limestone, pigment, 
Late Period, 26th Dynasty, ca. 650 BCE, Luxor, Tomb of Mentuemhet, inspired by the 
much earlier tomb of Menna, Oriental Institute Museum, Chicago, OIM 18828. 
47  For an overview on erotic art in the ancient Near East, see Pinnock 1995, who concludes: 
“It becomes clear that a subject, apparently so simple and easy to single out when it influ-
ences human feelings strictly linked with morals and social orders, becomes quite difficult 
to interpret when one observes, as in this instance, the material evidence of distant cul-
tures.” (Pinnock 1995: 2531). See also Assante 2000, Wiggermann 2010: 419-426 (§ 6. 
Visual representation), and Cornelius in this volume. See also Cooper 1983: 378 “Icono-
graphic representations of kissing”. 
48  See e.g. Steinert 2012: 198-200; Beuken 1993: 274-275. 
49  James 2013: 825. 
50  See Wagner-Durand in this volume. 
51  See Bojowald 2015: 131-140. 
52  Fox 1994: 49-60. See also Calabro 2014. 
53  Assumptions such as „[d]as Darbieten der gehobenen Brüste impliziert wahrscheinlich 
auch Stolz“ (Schroer 2016: 137) are not helpful; they need to be documented. 
54  See e.g. Belting 2001. See also Winter 1989; 1996. For classical antiquity see the vol-
ume by Bodiou et al. 2006. Assmann 2009: 80-81 even speaks of “equivalence” of im-
age and body in Egypt. 
55  See Keel in this volume. 
56  See e.g. Bahrani 2001, 40: “It must be stressed that in visual imagery, the body is never 
simply an imitation or a reflection of a physical body. Instead, it serves to represent the 
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bodily reactions and expressed through metonymies, as textual analysis 
demonstrates. 
c) Image and motif constellation 
Finally, it is important to analyze the iconographic function within a system 
of signs (Zeichensystem) to learn more about concepts of emotion from 
images. Style, layout, and composition are important components of the 
image; they too need to be analyzed if one is to understand more about 
emotion concepts of emotion.57 Metaphors, such as the dove which can be 
understood as a manifestation of mutual affection, or a drinking cup which 
can have different connotations of salvation and disaster, are important 
codes whose interpretation contributes to a better understanding of emotion 
concepts.58 Features of the composition of figures, such as scale, say more 
about their relation and implicitly about dominance and weakness, power 
and impotence.59 In some cases texts are directly added to images without 
necessarily corresponding to their emotional content.60 In any case, texts aid 
our understanding of the cultural, religious, and symbolic context of imag-
es. Only then can images be appreciated as important sources for under-
standing more about the emotion concepts in the ancient Near East and 
about anthropology in general.61 
1.4. How are emotions referred to images? Some insights from visual anal-
yses into concepts of emotion 
There is a very strong link between images and emotions:62 Images may rep-
resent emotions visually as well as evoke some sort of emotions in the be-
holder, even if they do not depict them directly.63 Bahrani, for example, de-
fines “speaking images”.64 One could state that images “produce” emotions. 
The affective content in pictures cannot simply be reduced to the viewer’s 
                                                                                                                          
body as well as an entire range of cultural tropes [...].” See also Asher-Greve 1997; 
Assante 2010; Nunn 2009; Kipfer / Schroer 2015; Rautman 2000 et al. 
57  See Keel 21985: fig. 68. The whole image can be understood as a “narrative” of what 
happened after the death of Akhenaten’s daughter, including the expression of mourn-
ing. 
58  See e.g. Schroer in this volume. See also Bonatz 2002: 151-155. 
59  See e.g. Bonatz 2002: 142-148. 
60  See e.g. Bonatz in this volume. 
61  See e.g. Belting 42011: „Bild-Anthropologie“; Porada 1995. 
62  See e.g. Gombrich 1960 and his Psychology of Pictorial Representation. 
63  See Wagner-Durand in this volume. 
64  Bahrani 2014: 196-97. 
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projections; it is inherent in images.65 Here it is fundamental to acknowledge 
that every “image” is more than just a piece of art: Votives are part of a rela-
tionship of exchange with the gods, lions, and sphinxes can protect the own-
er, etc. There is a large variety of deeds which have or might have been done 
with images: acts of blessings, cultic purifications, libations, erection, and 
destruction, throwing away or burying.66 It’s hard to think of how images 
would be made without a purpose, having a clear message for a specific 
public. To better understand the emotions that images may have evoked in 
the beholder it is important to collect as much information as possible about 
their find context.67 Only within the proper context is it possible to recon-
struct their “emotional content”. 
2. Overview of This Volume 
The primary concerns of the present volume are as follows: What can we 
learn about emotional concepts and the perception of emotion in the ancient 
Near East from visual art? Which gestures (Gesten und Gebärden), body pos-
tures, and motif constellations are used to express emotions? How do emo-
tions such as “grief”, “joy”, “fear”, “love”, “anger” relate to social behavior, 
actions, and ritual practices that show up in ancient Near Eastern figurative 
art? Is it even possible to speak about emotions looking at ancient Near East-
ern art or must images be reduced to displaying behaviors? And, last but not 
least, what is the function of emotion in ancient Near Eastern visual and textu-
al communication,68 and how does it relate to the ancient Near Eastern under-
standing of the human, gender, body, agency, etc.?69 
                                                     
65  See Krois 2011: 233-251 in his article “Experiencing Emotion in Depictions. Being 
Moved without Motion?” p. 246-247: “The affective content in pictures cannot be the 
result of the viewer’s projections or deliberate act of empathy. Neurologists explain 
that it is not possible to tickle yourself because the brain distinguishes expected from 
unexpected sensations, canceling out incoming redundant information. Similarly, you 
cannot consciously scare yourself by making a sudden loud noise. But a picture can 
surprise even the one who made it. The myth of Pygmalion in all its variations plays 
upon that fact.” 
66  See e.g. Wagner-Durand 2014: 39-40. 
67  See e.g. Bonatz 2011: 287-312; 2002: 137-162. 
68  Gillmayr-Bucher 2010: 279-280 states that emotions should not be isolated as interior 
psychological processes but as social and communicative phenomena. 
69  E.g. Keel 21985: 308: “Psychological concepts usually characterize parts of the body or 
particular features closely linked to the body or particular features closely linked to these 
parts of the body. Thus, npš means throat, breathing, living being, life, desire; ’p means 
nose, snorting, anger; rḥm means womb, and in the plural compassion; kbwd means 
weight, (impressive) appearance, splendor, distinction; g’wn means height, loftiness, 
pride. In view of this tendency, it is not surprising that the (inner) relation of man to God 
is also viewed in terms of distinct manifestations and fixed postures, gestures, and ac-
tions.” 
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With its multidisciplinary and multifaceted approach, the present vol-
ume addresses different aspects of a difficult, and until now largely unex-
plored topic. The book is divided into two parts: The first part presents an 
overview of the visualization of emotion in the ancient Near East, focusing 
on different aspects such as facial expression, gestures, and body posture. 
Some of the articles deal only with Mesopotamian art while others include 
Egyptian and Levantine material. The period addressed ranges from the 
third millennium BCE to Hellenistic times. The second part is more theo-
retical and consists of reviews from different perspectives, namely compar-
ative methodology, linguistics, and art history. 
Part I: Facial Expression, Gestures and Body Posture – Different Aspects 
of Visualizing Emotions (Case Studies) 
The first two articles are concerned primarily with portraiture and the ques-
tion of inwardness and the absence of facial expression. The volume opens 
with a previously unpublished article written by Othmar Keel in the 1990s 
(Porträts altorientalischer Herrscher? Individualität oder Rolle). In his 
introduction he points to the importance of the study of physiognomy in the 
19th century, demonstrating how Schopenhauer and his contemporaries 
(among them H. A. Layard) were convinced by its informative value. Until 
the 20th century, scholars related ancient portraits of kings to biblical texts 
in the search for the rulers’ “identity”. From the present perspective it is 
obvious that portraits from ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia do not show an 
individual physiognomy: only inscriptions, stylistic analyses etc. help to 
identify a ruler depicted in a particular image. Portraits thus have a non-
individual physiognomy, representing rather an idealized image related to 
the social role of the ruler. Not only is individualization absent in these por-
traits, so also is the expression of mood and emotional disposition (Ge-
mütsstimmung) (34-37). Assyrian reliefs in particular do not show any facial 
expression. This did not prevent Paul-Émile Botta in 1843 from ascribing 
specific “feelings” to the figures in the reliefs. In some cases, emotions can 
at most be deduced from posture. The case of Egyptian art is similar, al-
though more realistic portraits may occur at certain periods (37-41).70 Keel 
concludes with the notion that although the portraits do not show an indi-
vidual physiognomy and feelings, they do show us how the ruler represented 
himself and in which social role and function he wanted to be seen. 
Likewise Dominik Bonatz, in the first part of his article (Der stumme 
Schrei. Kritische Überlegungen zu Emotionen als Untersuchungsfeld der 
altorientalischen Bildwissenschaft), points to physiognomy in the 19th centu-
ry. He refers to Carl Huter, who developed a psycho-physiology that under-
                                                     
70  For a recent summary of the debate in Egyptian art see Laboury 2009 and 2010. 
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stood the body as a mirror of inner feelings. Although this method is strongly 
criticized, physiognomy still plays an important part in studies about the an-
cient history of the body (“Studien zur antiken Körpergeschichte” 56). Bonatz 
uses Huter’s theory to demonstrate that it is problematic to apply a pattern to 
analyze ancient body language. First, such a pattern is not “bildwissen-
schaftlich fundiert” (is not grounded in the theory of images); second, it de-
rives from Eurocentric conceptions of body and image; and third, it does not 
consider the images in their historical context as a point of departure for the 
argument (57-58). Huter’s theory is, however, useful in demonstrating that the 
portraits in Assyrian reliefs exhibit very stereotyped faces. They reflect 
strong conventions and do not show any trait of character (Charakter-
eigenschaft) or emotion. Although the faces do not show any emotion, this 
should not keep us from seeking emotional gestures (emotionale Gestik). In 
the second part of his article, Bonatz therefore analyses different gestures 
on Assyrian reliefs and reassesses them in relation to emotional content. 
Only a few images are considered, but in every case the Assyrian enemies 
show emotions while the Assyrians do not. The victims’ gestures reflect 
emotions such as fear, despair, powerlessness, and they therefore have a 
clear function in the visual narrative. In the third part of his article, Bonatz 
analyses the significance of texts and images in Assyrian reliefs with regard 
to what they say about emotions. He suggests that emotions were men-
tioned in the describing texts but not in the reliefs themselves. He con-
cludes that the Assyrian ideology of images (Bildideologie) did not leave 
any space for the venting of emotions. 
Elisabeth Wagner-Durand, in her response to Dominik Bonatz (The Visu-
alization of Emotions – Potentials and Obstacles: A Response to Dominik 
Bonatz), stresses the importance of a definition that accounts for what emo-
tions are and what they are not. Relying on a working definition from psy-
chology, she sees emotion as a “current psychological state of an individual, 
possessing a distinct quality, intensity, and duration” (78). According to her 
approach, it should not, however, be ignored that emotions form social 
practices and that they were in some way inherent in images. Bodily as-
pects and sociocultural effects of emotions “should lead us to look at the 
diversity, not at the simplicity, of human emotional display in ancient cul-
tures” (80). She finally underlines the argument put forward by Bonatz that 
images – although not shown directly – evoke emotions and that they have 
to be understood in their human cultural and social specificity (81). The 
study of emotions on the basis of ancient visual art faces a number of ob-
stacles: What triggered a certain emotion in a specific social-historical con-
text? Which emotions are socioculturally relevant (“hypercognized”), and 
which are irrelevant (“hypocognized”)? What ambiguities exist between 
text and image, and how can we “translate” them? What are the reasons for 
such a strong social and ideological control over displaying facial (micro-) 
expressions of basal emotions that are claimed to be universal? How can 
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we understand culturally shaped body language and its emotional value? 
And finally, to what extent were emotions stylized or conventionalized in 
visual art? Wagner-Dunand emphasizes the importance of the study of 
emotions and their visualizations in ancient cultures. She admits, however, 
that we are not yet able to understand the ways and mechanisms of emo-
tions and their visualizations in ancient Mesopotamia. Therefore, she 
claims that special methods should be developed “to gather more and more 
data as well as to discuss examples and hypotheses that might be tested 
over the course of time” (91). 
The articles by Izak Cornelius, Silvia Schroer and Wolfgang Zwickel 
focus more generally on gesture, rituals, and customs to express emotions, 
but also address body parts and facial expressions from a broad spectrum of 
ancient Near Eastern and Egyptian art. 
Wolfgang Zwickel’s article (The Iconography of Emotions in the Ancient 
Near East and in Ancient Egypt) is a slightly revised and enlarged version of 
an earlier published piece.71 At the beginning Zwickel states that it is “easier 
to express emotion by language than by iconography” (95).72 Zwickel there-
fore focuses especially on the problems of identifying emotion in ancient 
images. The obstacles can be summarized as follows:73 1) Images generally 
do not show an individual and thus a “real” person, but they depict a stereo-
type, an ideal face and body. 2) Gestures used to express a specific emotion 
are different from gestures through which we express the same emotion to-
day. 3) Official representations of kings do not show any emotion but rather 
are meant to provoke emotions in the beholder. 4) There is only a very lim-
ited number of “private” items (e.g. drawings but also cylinder or stamp 
seals), and even fewer depict emotions. A number of things can explain this, 
including the small size and the poor quality of those objects. Zwickel then 
mentions some possible examples that represent emotions such as joy, 
fear/despair, love/sympathy, among others, and concludes that there are more 
kinds of emotions in ancient art than one would suspect at first sight. How-
ever, their visual rendering through gestures and symbols often seems foreign 
to us. From those examples Zwickel draws some social- and gender-relevant 
conclusions, namely that in “official art” (depictions of kings, etc.) no facial 
expression can be detected, while “private” artefacts (especially animals) 
sometimes impressively show the ability of ancient artists to express emo-
tions in images. Concerning gender differences, Zwickel stresses that emo-
tions such as joy and mourning are more often connected with women than 
with men in visual art. 
Izak Cornelius (“The eyes have it and the benign smile” – The Icono-
graphy of Emotions in the Ancient Near East: From Gestures to Facial 
Expressions?) takes Zwickel’s article as a starting point and presents a 
                                                     
71  See Zwickel 2012. 
72  For a critique of this position see Staubli 2015: 253-254. 
73  See also Wagner-Durand in this volume. 
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short overview of the current state of research on history of emotion. He 
discusses the main problems facing the field, namely definitions, identifica-
tion, and the application of modern terminology to the ancient world when 
talking about emotions in the ancient Near East. His second section focuses 
on gestures expressing joy, mourning, fear/despair and love/sympathy. 
Cornelius points to some consensus in research that emotions might have 
been expressed by gestures. In the third section, he approaches the much 
debated topic of facial expressions. Following the theory of Paul Ekman, he 
pays special attention to the eyes, the mouth, and the nose of human beings. 
Stressing that meaning is very often in the eye of the beholder, he cites 
many examples where emotions were – intentionally or unintentionally – 
read from renderings of faces. He concludes that there might be tendencies 
towards the representation of emotions in the visual material of the ancient 
Near East and, at least in some cases, “there are some faces depicting some 
sort of emotion” (142). 
Silvia Schroer focuses in her response (Kulturelle Rollen – keine Ge-
fühle! Eine Response zu Izak Cornelius) on two aspects. First, she stresses 
that images showing mourning or dancing people do not represent emotions 
such as sadness, grief, or joy, but rather deal conventionally with emotions 
and represent their cultural expression. According to Schroer, we cannot talk 
about the biopsychological dimension of emotions in ancient Near Eastern 
Art, but only about culturally-shaped customs related to affects. In her se-
cond thesis, Schroer states that facial expressions are nonexistent in ancient 
Near Eastern art („Altorientalische Kunst verzichtet auf die Mimik, so 
möchte ich hartnäckig behaupten, vollständig“ 151). However, the reason 
for this is not obvious. There is no doubt that artists were able to represent 
emotions, as depictions of animals show. In contrast to human bodies, the 
postures of animals were able to communicate something inward to the out-
side (152-153).74 Schroer further states that texts and images had different 
agendas in the ancient Near East. 
Part II: Comparative Methodology, Linguistics, and Art Historical Anal-
yses – Theoretical Reflections on Visualizing Emotions 
The second part of this volume contains theoretical articles from different 
disciplines that shed new light on the study of emotion in ancient Near East-
ern art.  
Florian Lippke (Analyzing Emotions in Ancient Media: Between Skepti-
cism and Conceptual Autonomy („Eigenbegrifflichkeit“) argues on a more 
philosophical level for strong scepticism when considering depiction of emo-
tions in general, but at the same time opts for broadening the iconographic 
dataset in order to gain a deeper understanding of emotionally-characterized 
                                                     
74  See also Zwickel 2012 and in this volume. 
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concepts in the ancient world. While there has been a long scholarly discus-
sion on whether or not emotions are depicted in ancient pictorial sources, 
recent studies opt in a cautious manner to prefer “gestures” and “habitual-
ized actions” as labels for a given image. As a consequence of this argu-
mentation one might assume that no emotions at all were depicted. By chal-
lenging this position Lippke achieves more productive results through tak-
ing into account non-human attestations in pictorial sources that bear emo-
tionally laden content. However, as a general corrective the model of 
“Eigenbegrifflichkeit” (Benno Landsberger, conventionally rendered in as 
“conceptual autonomy”) is to be introduced into iconographic discourse in 
order to highlight the difficulties of applying a certain label to attestations 
in media from distant worlds. Anachronistic fallacies have to be avoided, 
and this can be achieved by integrating “conceptual autonomy” into metho-
dological approaches. 
Based on her earlier studies on emotion in Sumerian and Akkadian lan-
guages, Margaret Jaques (The Discourse on Emotion in Ancient Mesopota-
mia: A Theoretical Approach) approaches the topic from a linguistic per-
spective. She starts with some methodological reflections and stresses the 
differentiation between an emotion and the (meta-)language used to de-
scribe it, as well as the importance of “norms of expression” (188). Gener-
ally speaking, Jaques distinguishes two different categories of emotion in 
Mesopotamian texts: “conventional expressions”, which “do not convey 
real emotions but rather formal appropriate expressions of feelings on spe-
cific occasions” and “non-conventional expressions”, focusing on a single 
character in a given narrative context. Emotion can be used as a moral, 
aesthetic, or legal evaluation of reality or to describe the character of a lit-
erary figure (189). The contexts are thus either collective, external and ritu-
alistic, or individual and internal (190). She then discusses different Akka-
dian and Sumerian terms for emotions, their frequency, semantics, and 
historical, literary, and social contexts, concluding that understanding emo-
tions always involves the study of communication in a social context (197). 
Based on the complex network of grammatical, syntactic, and stylistic con-
structions, she argues for a connection between different concepts of emo-
tions (e.g. “love”, “hate”, “joy”), although there is no umbrella term for 
emotions in Sumerian and Akkadian. 
Andreas Wagner finally (Emotionen in Text, Sprache und materialen 
Bildern: Eine Skizze aus Sicht der Metaphernanalyse) describes metaphor 
analyses as an important instrument for reconstructing mentalities (“Menta-
litäten”). Referring to the history of ideas as described by Hermann Schmitz 
and Hartmut Böhme, as well as metaphor analyses by Zoltán Kövecses,75 he 
demonstrates that the container metaphor plays an important role in the 
modern western concept of emotions (e.g. EMOTION IS A FLUID IN A CON-
                                                     
75  See e.g. Kövecses 1999; 32007. 
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TAINER). Andreas Wagner therefore speaks of a “western pattern” (210-
212; 216).76 He further assumes that the same mentalities which can be found 
in conceptual metaphors influence not only verbal but also visual images. On 
the bases of some modern images (comic, photorealistic images, paintings etc.) 
he comes to the conclusion that the emotional concept of the body as a con-
tainer can also be found in visual representations. In the ancient Near East the 
relation between the person/body and emotion is different, and similar im-
ages are absent. Nevertheless he argues that it is important to include visual 
images in further research,77 since they express similar conceptual metaphors 
and are therefore helpful in exploring cognitive-epistemic structures (217).78 
The two final papers comment on the rest of the volume by taking up dif-
ferent arguments, reflecting on the nature of the problem, and thinking about 
future questions, methods, and outcomes. 
Karen Sonik (Emotion and the Ancient Arts: Visualizing, Materializing, 
and Producing States of Being) takes the account of Enkidu’s death and 
Gilgamesh’s response as the starting point of her reflection, arguing that the 
                                                     
76  The concept EMOTION IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER certainly belongs to the 
“most typical conceptual metaphors that characterize emotions” (Kövecses 22010, 108). 
For the emotion “anger” Kövecses 2015 stated that the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS 
PRESSURE IN A CONTAINER “is a near-universal metaphor” (89). The assumption 
of a “body-based constructionism” (Kövecses 32007) is, however, highly debated, and 
there is no consensus how far this conception of metaphor is based on predominantly 
universal bodily experience or on relative cultural experience. Geeraerts & Grondelaers 
(1995, 153-179) assumed that the metaphor concept EMOTION IS A FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER does not derive from bodily experience but is connected to the humoral 
theory of Galen. Geeraerts (2015, 21) recently claimed that in “the present context, the 
crucial feature of this story is the necessity of incorporating the history of ideas into the 
analysis of metaphorical expressions. Regardless of whether the ANGER IS THE 
HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor is exclusively based on the hu-
moural theory or whether it is a combination of the humoural theory and a physio-
logical impulse, a proper understanding of conceptual metaphors implies an awareness 
of the cultural and scientific traditions that may have influenced the language.” For 
more information about the conceptualization of the body as a container in the ancient 
Near East, see Kipfer / Schroer 2015. 
77  As an example see e.g. Keel 1984, who uses a slightly different concept of metaphor and 
does not concentrate only on emotion. See also Strawn 2014: 127: “The suggestion pro-
ceeds from the judgment that the iconography of fear demonstrates once again that the ar-
tistic evidence is helpful in considering what might be called not simply visual aspects of 
culture, but visual thinking – that is, the making of meaning in non-textual ways and how 
that impinges on meaning-making in textual ways.” For example, the analyses of the 
metaphor concepts HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN could be very interesting for fur-
ther iconographic analyses. 
78  It has long been stated that not only different types of context (“situational context”, 
“discourse context”, “conceptual-cognitive context”, und “bodily context”) play a very 
important role in the analysis of metaphors (see e.g. Kövecses 2015: 189), but also more 
generally the modality-independent cognitive structures. Lakoff / Johnson (1999: 57) 
stress that “not all conceptual metaphors are manifested in the words of language. Some 
are manifested in grammar, others in gesture, art or ritual”. See also Müller 2008 on 
verbo-gestural metaphors and on verbo-pictorial metaphors. 
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nascent study of emotion in the ancient Near East “is a fruitful pursuit, with 
very rich and compelling source material on which to draw” (222). Delving 
into the substantial corpus of research exploring emotion in the ancient and 
classical worlds, she suggests three promising directions of enquiry: 
1) Comparative study may offer “insight into the numerous theoretical, 
methodological, and other obstacles that have already been encountered, 
deliberately or unthinkingly ignored, or successfully navigated in the at-
tempt to delineate emotions – and their materializations – in other foreign 
cultural contexts” (234). 2) The present volume – according to Karen Sonik 
– underscores the need to construct detailed, multifaceted, and meticulously 
explored models of a comprehensive system of emotion in ancient Mesopo-
tamia. And 3) with specific respect to future work on images/objects/ 
artworks and emotions, two different areas of research need to be distin-
guished, namely “the emotional ‘content’ of artworks” and “the emotions 
evoked by artworks” (236, a point also emphasized by John Baines).  
John Baines (Epilogue – On Ancient Pictorial Representations of Emotion: 
Concluding Comments with Examples from Egypt) reflects on limitations and 
possibilities in analyzing emotions in pictorial compositions. Discussing some 
examples in Egyptian art he concludes that indications of emotions can be 
found in the body and in groupings, rather than in the face (271). Further, 
he argues that the tension between personal emotion and performance does 
not apply and that it will not be possible to give a meaningful answer to the 
question of whether “depicted figures might be understood as experiencing 
feelings or as only displaying them” (275). It remains important, however, 
to ask whether feelings are thought of as being present in images. Depic-
tions of emotion are part of the wider presentation of experience and of the 
ordered cosmos, so that work “on how emotion is represented thus offers one 
of many ways into interpreting conceptions of world order” (278). 
With its broad variety of disciplinary aspects and positions, the present 
volume both sheds new light on an important topic and offers valuable 
perspectives for future research. 
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Facial Expression, Gestures and Body Posture: 








Porträts altorientalischer Herrscher? 
Individualität oder Rolle 
Othmar KEEL 
Ich habe in den 90er Jahren viel Zeit und Energie in ein geplantes Werk 
mit dem Arbeitstitel “Die Verwendung altorientalischer Bilder durch die 
Bibelwissenschaft” investiert. Es sollte drei Hauptteile umfassen: erstens 
Bilder mit Bezug zur Ereignis- und Personengeschichte, zweitens Bilder mit 
Bezug zu Institutionen wie z. B. Tempel oder Königtum und drittens Bilder 
zur Geschichte religiöser Konzepte wie sie in Symbolen und Visionen the-
matisiert werden. Von diesen Vorarbeiten, Entwürfen und ausgeführten 
Kapiteln sind schlussendlich nur wenige Teile publiziert worden. 1992 
erschien im Anchor Bible Dictionary eine Skizze des ganzen geplanten 
dreiteiligen Werkes, 1994 ein Beitrag mit einigen Beispielen für die Versu-
che, schon im 4. Jh. n. Chr. in antiken Bildwerken biblische Gestalten zu 
entdecken. 1997 zeigte ich in einem Aufsatz, in welchen altägyptischen Bild-
werken Bibelwissenschaftler des 19. Jh. Szenen der biblischen Ereignisge-
schichte fanden oder zu finden meinten. 1994 publizierten Ch. Uehlinger 
und ich eine Analyse der Darstellung des israelitischen Königs Jehu auf 
dem schwarzen Obelisken Salmanassars III. Der hier veröffentlichte Bei-
trag sollte den ersten Teil des dreiteiligen Werkes abschliessen. Dabei wird 
die gängige Praxis diskutiert, biblische Werke mit den Köpfen von altorien-
talischen Herrschern, die in der Bibel genannt werden, zu illustrieren.  
Ich bin Silvia Schroer und Sara Kipfer sehr dankbar für ihre Initiative, 
einen weiteren Teil dieses umfangreichen, weitgehend im Manuskriptform 
verbliebenen Unternehmens der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu machen.1 
1. Einführung: Physiognomik und Porträt 
Als Ausgangspunkt mögen ein paar Sätze von Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-
1860) dienen. Sie geben Überzeugungen wieder, die zur Zeit, als die altori-
entalische und die ägyptische Ikonographie wieder zugänglich wurden, 
selbstverständlich und Allgemeingut waren und wissenschaftlichen Er-
kenntnissen zum Trotz bis heute zu finden sind:  
                                                     
1  Dieser Beitrag wird im grossen Ganzen auf dem Stand von 1998 veröffentlicht. Neuere 
Literatur wurde nur in Ausnahmefällen eingearbeitet. 
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„Dass das Äussere das Innere darstellend wiedergebe und das Antlitz das 
ganze Wesen des Menschen ausspreche und offenbare, ist eine Vorausset-
zung, deren Apriorität, und mithin Sicherheit, sich kundgibt in der, bei jeder 
Gelegenheit hervortretenden allgemeinen Begier, einen Menschen, der sich 
durch irgend etwas, im Guten oder Schlimmen, hervorgethan, oder auch ein 
ausserordentliches Werk geliefert hat, zu sehn , oder, falls Dieses versagt 
bleibt, wenigstens von Andern zu erfahren, wie er  aussieht ; daher dann 
einerseits der Zudrang zu den Orten, wo man seine Anwesenheit vermuthet, 
und andererseits die Bemühungen der Tageblätter, zumal der englischen, 
ihn minutiös und treffend zu beschreiben, bis bald darauf Maler und Kup-
ferstecher ihn uns anschaulich darstellen und endlich Daguerreʼs  Erfin-
dung, eben deswegen so hoch geschätzt, diesem Bedürfniss auf das Voll-
kommenste entspricht. Ebenfalls prüft, im gemeinen Leben, Jeder Jeden, 
der ihm vorkommt, physiognomisch und sucht, im Stillen, sein moralisches 
und intellektuelles Wesen aus seinen Gesichtszügen im voraus zu erkennen. 
Dem Allen nun könnte nicht so seyn, wenn, wie einige Thoren wähnen, das 
Aussehen des Menschen nichts zu bedeuten hätte, indem ja die Seele Eines 
und der Leib das Andere wäre, zu jener sich verhaltend, wie zu ihm selbst 
sein Rock.“2 
Wie Schopenhauer und andere Zeitgenossen war auch H. A. Layard, der 
Ausgräber von Nimrud, vom informativen Wert der Physiognomie über-
zeugt.3  Johann Caspar Lavater (1741-1801) schien für diese Auffassung 
eine solide Grundlage geschaffen zu haben.4 Kritiker Lavaters wie Fried-
rich Just Riedel (1742-1785), der der Ansicht war, die physiognomischen 
                                                     
2  Schopenhauer 1977: 689. Ganz so optimistisch, wie die einleitenden Sätze vermuten las-
sen, bleibt Schopenhauer allerdings nicht, wenn er zum Schluss kommt, dass intellektu-
elle Fähigkeiten in der Physiognomie leichter erkennbar seien als moralische. Seine kur-
ze Abhandlung schliesst mit dem Satz: „Demnach steht es so, dass wir, physiognomisch 
urtheilend, uns leicht für einen Menschen dahin verbürgen können, dass er nie ein un-
sterbliches Werk hervorbringen; aber nicht wohl, dass er nie ein grosses Verbrechen 
begehn werde“ (ebd.: 696). 
3  Bei der Beschreibung seiner frühen Abenteuer in Luristan bemerkt A. H. Layard, der 
Ausgräber von Nimrud, immer wieder, dass er den hinterlistigen, ehrlichen, grausamen 
etc. Charakter der Leute, die ihm begegneten, sofort auf ihrem Gesicht ablesen konnte 
(Layard 1887: passim). 
4  Die wichtigsten dieser Werke sind: Lavater 1772 und Lavater 1775-1777. Zur mentali-
tätsgeschichtlichen Stellung Lavaters vgl. Gleitner 1996: 357-385 und Borrmann 1994: 
121-131. Gleitner sieht als Hintergrund für das grosse Bedürfnis nach Physiognomik in 
der zweiten Hälfte des 18. und im frühen 19. Jh. die grossen Migrationsbewegungen, die 
durch die Industrialisierung ausgelöst wurden, bei denen man sich oft unter Menschen 
befand, die man nicht kannte, und über die Bescheid zu wissen man ein grosses Bedürf-
nis hatte (vgl. dazu Anm. 3 zu Layard in Luristan). Gleitner sieht bei Lavater ein ähnli-
ches Bemühen am Werk wie bei Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), der der Unehr-
lichkeit der Rede, der Praxis, sich nicht zu geben, wie man ist und nicht zu sagen, was 
man denkt, mittels des Zugriffs auf die (vermeintliche) Evidenz der Körpersprache be-
gegnen wollte. Zum Umfeld Lavaters vgl. weiter: von Arburg 1997: 33-69. 
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„Gesichtstheorien“ produzierten, was sie zu beobachten vorgeben,5 und 
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742-1799), von dem das Diktum stammt: 
„Wir urteilen stündlich aus dem Gesicht, und irren stündlich“,6 wurden 
nicht nur von Schopenhauer als „Thoren“ apostrophiert. Layard fand – dem 
Bedürfnis der Zeit entsprechend – auf den Lachisch-Reliefs die Physiog-
nomie der Juden in schlagender Weise dargestellt: „The captives were und-
oubtedly Jews, their physiognomy was strikingly indicated by the sculp-
tures“.7 Was er damit meinte, ist nicht klar. Meinte er damit die Ähnlichkeit 
der „Judäer“ von Lachisch mit Juden, die ihm persönlich bekannt waren? 
Dann wäre die Aussage angesichts der Vielfalt physiognomischer Typen in 
der weltweit verbreiteten religiös-kulturell bestimmten Grösse „Juden“ 
grotesk. Glaubte er vielleicht, dass die assyrischen Künstler die „Judäer“ 
durch physiognomische Charakteristika von anderen Völkern unterschieden 
hätten, wie die Ägypter Nubier, Libyer, Asiaten und andere Völker8 als 
solche charakterisierten? In diesem Falle wäre die Aussage, soweit ich se-
he, falsch. Die assyrischen Flachbilder unterschieden die vorderasiatischen 
Völker von den Philistern im äussersten Südwesten des Reiches bis zu den 
Leuten aus Gilzanu im Nordosten nicht durch bestimmte physiognomische 
Züge; einzig die Nubier machen eine Ausnahme.9 Meinte Layard mit „phy-
siognomy“ vielleicht die ganze Erscheinungsweise inklusive der Tracht, 
dann hätten wir einen sehr weiten Begriff von „Physiognomie“.10 Einige 
Sätze lassen vermuten, dass die Antwort in dieser Richtung zu suchen ist. 
So wenn er schreibt: „The vanquished people [die Judäer und Judäerinnen] 
were distinguished from the conquerors by their dress [...]“.11  Vielleicht 
verwendete er den Begriff „physiognomisch“ aber auch einfach als Mode-
                                                     
5  Riedel 1787: 263. 
6  Lichtenberg 1972: 283. Vgl. zu Riedel und Lichtenberg: Gleitner 1996: 357f. und 380. 
Zu Lichtenberg: Borrmann 1994: 131-134. 
7  Layard 1853: 153. 
8  Helck 1977: 315-321. Typische Gesichts- und Körpermerkmale, vor allem Haartrachten, 
werden unterschieden. Deutlichstes Unterscheidungsmerkmal ist aber auch in Ägypten 
die Kleidung. 
9  Vgl. zum Problem der Völkercharakterisierung und zur Identifikation von Nicht-
Assyrern auf neuassyrischen Reliefs Wäfler 1975; zu den Darstellungen von Nubiern 
ebd. 103f. mit Anm. 519 sowie Albenda 1982: 5-23. Onasch 1994 beschränkt sich auf 
die Texte und geht auf die einschlägigen Reliefs nicht ein. 
10  Lavaters Physiognomie beschränkte sich durchaus nicht auf das Gesicht, wenn seine 
berühmten Schattenrisse, mit denen er seine Traktate illustrierte, in der Regel auch nur 
dieses zeigen. Grundsätzlich aber hält er fest: „In so fern ich von der Physiognomik als 
einer Wissenschaft rede – begreifʼ ich unter Physiognomie alle unmittelbaren Äusserun-
gen des Menschen. Alle Züge, Umrisse, alle passive und active Bewegungen, alle Lagen 
und Stellungen des menschlichen Körpers: alles wodurch der leidende oder handelnde 
Mensch unmittelbar bemerkt werden kann, wodurch er seine Person zeigt – ist der Ge-
genstand der Physiognomik“ (Lavater 1984: 210). Lavater bezieht hier das, was wir 
Körpersprache nennen, in seine Untersuchungen mit ein. Die Tracht ist aber auch bei 
dieser weiten Definition nicht einbegriffen. 
11  Layard 1853: 149. 
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wort, das ausdrücken sollte, wie interessant er es fand, den durch die Bibel 
so berühmt gewordenen Judäern und Judäerinnen auf einem Relief aus der 
Zeit um 700 v.Chr. zu begegnen, auch wenn er nur aufgrund der Beischrift, 
die ihm verriet, dass die Stadt Lachisch ist,12 und aufgrund der Bibel, aus 
der er erfuhr, dass Lachisch zu Judäa gehörte, wusste, dass es sich bei den 
Angegriffenen um Angehörige dieses Volkes handelt. Die ganz besondere 
Bedeutung der Lachisch-Reliefs beruhte für Layard darauf, dass sie die 
Darstellung eines Königs, einer Stadt und eines Volkes enthalten, mit deren 
Namen wir dank der heiligen Schrift vertraut sind.13  
Diese Art von Interesse, das auch Schopenhauer anspricht, dürfte der 
seit Layard und Wilkinson geübten Praxis zugrunde liegen, in biblischen 
Werken aller Art immer wieder Darstellungen Ramsesʼ II., Merneptahs, 
Sargons II., Sanheribs, Dariusʼ und anderer aus der Bibel bekannter oder 
mit ihren Überlieferungen in Zusammenhang gebrachter Herrscher zu re-
produzieren. Eine besonders umfangreiche Galerie dieser Art findet sich in 
der während der letzten 40 Jahre wahrscheinlich am meisten benützten 
Bildersammlung zum Alten Testament, in James B. Pritchards „The An-
cient Near East in Pictures. Relating to the Old Testament“ unter dem Titel 
„Royalty and Dignitaries“ (Chapter V).14 Sie enthält nicht weniger als 88 
Nummern. Im 1969 erschienen Ergänzungsband kommen noch fünf weitere 
dazu.15 Das Element „Royalty“ könnte dahingehend interpretiert werden, 
dass es dabei um das „Königtum“ geht. Da aber in rund 30 Fällen nur Köp-
fe, hauptsächlich Statuenköpfe, abgebildet werden, liegt der Akzent nicht 
auf Funktionen, die der König wahrzunehmen, oder auf Rollen, die er zu 
spielen hat. Da auch nicht gezielt Haartracht oder Kronentypen illustriert 
werden, sondern offensichtlich die durch Beischriften gesicherte Identität 
der Dargestellten die Auswahl bestimmt hat, geht es um Physiognomie. 
Denn was kann die Darstellung des Gesichts einer Person, mit deren Na-
men wir vertraut sind und die wir deshalb gerne auch sehen möchten, ande-
res leisten, als uns mit ihrer Physiognomie bekannt zu machen?  
Bevor wir uns der Frage zuwenden, welchen Erkenntnisgewinn eine sol-
che Bekanntschaft bedeutet, müssen wir die Frage beantworten, ob der Alte 
Orient realistische oder gar naturalistische Porträts kannte, die uns verläss-





                                                     
12  Layard 1853: 152. 
13  Layard 1853: 152: „This highly interesting series of bas-reliefs contained, moreover, an 
undoubted representation of a king, a city, and a people, with whose names we are ac-
quainted, and of an event described in Holy Writ.“ 
14  Pritchard 1954: No. 376-463. 
15  Pritchard 1969: No. 817-821. 
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2. Porträttypen – Altes Ägypten und Mesopotamien 
In seiner wichtigen Studie zum antiken Bildnis umschreibt Ernst Buschor 
Porträts als „Darstellungen bestimmter Personen, die ein Erdenleben ge-
führt haben, Darstellungen, die bestrebt sind, ihrem Gegenstand eine ge-
wisse Dauer zu verleihen.“16 Er unterscheidet drei Haupttypen. Den ersten 
bezeichnet er als „Namungs-“ oder „Daseinsporträt“.17 Dieses enthält keine 
individuellen physiognomischen Züge, sondern stellt wie ägyptische De-
terminative nur die Gattung dar. Mit „Daseinsporträt“ soll die Funktion 
betont werden. So ist z.B. das berühmte Sitzbild Djosers18 nicht für Be-
trachter geschaffen, sondern um dem Toten „Dasein“ zu verleihen, um ihm 
den Empfang von Opfergaben zu ermöglichen usw. „Namungsporträt“ aber 
besagt, dass das Bild nur durch die Beschriftung mit einem Namen indivi-
dualisiert wird. Beide Bezeichnungen sind m.E. nicht besonders glücklich. 
Beide gehen auf das Bild als solches, darauf, was dargestellt ist, nicht ein. 
Mir scheint der Ausdruck Rollenporträt geeigneter, das Gemeinte zu be-
zeichnen. Im Falle Djosers geht es zwar darum, einem bestimmten Toten 
einen Leib zur Verfügung zu stellen, einem Individuum Dauer zu verleihen. 
Das ist die Funktion des Bildwerks. Seiner Art nach aber stellen dieses und 
ähnliche Porträts eine Rolle dar, „das fast visionäre Bildnis eines Herr-
schers“,19 genauer des ägyptischen Königs, charakterisiert durch seine typi-
schen Attribute.  
Der König ist auf ägyptischen Tempelreliefs oder assyrischen und persi-
schen Palastreliefs aufgrund seiner Attribute20 und seiner Stellung in der 
Komposition jeweils mit Leichtigkeit zu erkennen. Aber ohne Beischrift, 
Stiluntersuchungen und andere ähnliche Mittel, die mit der individuellen 
Physiognomie nichts zu tun haben, ist nicht festzustellen, um welches Indi-
viduum es sich handelt, ob um Tiglatpileser III. oder Sargon II. Irene Win-
ter charakterisiert diese Art von Porträt im Falle von Herrschern mit Recht 
als „identification via attributes appropriate to rulership.“21 Und sie 
schliesst daraus: „What we have here may not be ʻa portrait of the kingʼ in 
modern terms; but it is certainly ʻthe portrait of a kingʼ. And let there be no 
confusion: by the beard and attributes, it is ʻthe portrait of an Assyrian 
kingʼ.“22 Winter findet die Bestätigung dieser Interpretation in der assyri-
schen Bezeichnung eines Bildes dieser Art als ṣalam šarrūtīya „Bild mei-
nes Königtums“.23 Schon Hammurapi hatte das Bild an der Spitze seiner 
                                                     
16  Buschor 1960. Vgl. dazu Assmann 1990: 17. 
17  Buschor 1960, 36ff.56ff. 
18  Lange / Hirmer 1967: Abb. 16-17. 
19  Schäfer 1936: 24. 
20  Vgl. dazu Moscati 1963: 52-60. 
21  Winter 1997: 374. 
22  Ebd.: 374. 
23  Eba.: 374. 
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berühmten Rechtssammlung als ṣalmīya šar mīšarim „Mein Bild (als) Kö-
nig der Gerechtigkeit“ bezeichnet.24 Die Rolle „König der Gerechtigkeit“, 
die er einnahm, nicht seine Individualität sollte gezeigt werden.  
Den Gegenpol zum „Rollenporträt“ bildet das realistische oder gar natu-
ralistische Porträt, das Buschor als „Spiegel-“ oder „Modellporträt“ be-
zeichnet.25 „Spiegelporträt“, weil es eine Ähnlichkeit zwischen Vorbild und 
Abbild zum Ziel hat, wie sie der Spiegel liefert; „Modellporträt“, weil es 
sich nicht an einem vorgegebenen Typus oder an einem Ideal, sondern an 
einem konkreten Modell orientiert. Wo dessen charakteristische Züge ge-
treu wiedergegeben werden, kann man von einem realistischen, wo auch 
individuelle Hässlichkeiten wie Runzeln, Warzen, Haarbüschel etc. nach-
gebildet werden, von einem naturalistischen Porträt reden. Manche möch-
ten überhaupt nur in diesem Falle von Porträt reden, so wenn Claude 
Vandersleyen definiert: „Von einem ,Porträtʻ ist dann die Rede, wenn die 
Darstellung eines menschlichen Wesens genügend genau und charakteris-
tisch ist, so dass jede Person, die das Modell kennt, diese wiedererkennen 
kann.“26 
Zwischen diesen beiden Polen des Rollenporträts und des naturalisti-
schen Porträts steht das in vielfältigen Abstufungen realisierte, von Buschor 
als „Erscheinungs-“ oder „Schauungsporträt“27 bezeichnete idealisierte 
Porträt. „Erscheinung“ und „Schau“ betonen die geistigen Komponenten 
der Ausstrahlung, Wahrnehmung und Begegnung, die ein solches Bild von 
einer blossen naturalistischen Maske unterscheiden. Gegen die Bezeich-
nung „idealisierendes Porträt“ hat Tonio Hölscher geltend gemacht, dass 
„das Ideal die selbstverständliche Grundlage der Menschendarstellung“ 
war; der Begriff suggeriere, am Anfang hätten naturalistische Porträts ge-
standen, die dann idealisiert worden seien. In Wirklichkeit hätte – mindes-
tens in Griechenland – das, was hier als „Rollenporträt“ bezeichnet wird, 
am Anfang gestanden.28 Man kann den Ausdruck „idealisierendes Porträt“ 
aber auch auf das Modell statt auf eine andere Porträtart beziehen, was mir 
ohnehin näher zu liegen scheint, und dann trifft die Kritik Hölschers nicht. 
Die Gründe, die in Griechenland zwischen 460 und 450 v.Chr. zu realisti-
schen individuellen Porträts geführt hätten, seien politischer und historio-
graphischer Art gewesen: „Die bedeutende Person sollte in ihrer geschicht-
lichen Einmaligkeit festgehalten werden.“29 Das suggerierte das neu ge-
wonnene Selbstbewusstsein der Kaufleute und Gewerbetreibenden, die 
                                                     
24  Ebd.: 366. 
25  Buschor 1960: 14ff.128ff. 
26  Vandersleyen 1982: 1074. 
27  Buschor 1960: 25ff.100ff. 
28  Hölscher 1971: l6f. Vgl. auch Gauer 1968: 177. Die Entwicklung geht vom Generellen 
zum Individuellen und nicht umgekehrt: „We learn to particularize, to articulate, to 
make distinctions where before there was only an undifferentiated mass“ (Gombrich 
51977: 86). 
29  Hölscher 1971: 21. 
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„den Realismus als Form der Überwindung der Verunsicherung ihres neuen 
gesellschaftlichen Status ergreifen, da eben im Realismus die durch ihre 
neue banausische Lebensweise erworbene Individualität ihren angemesse-
nen Ausdruck findet.“30 Das entspricht ganz dem, was Jan Assmann beo-
bachtet hat, wenn er feststellt, dass die Kunstwissenschaft das Porträt häu-
fig im Zeichen des Gegensatzes von Individualität und Idealität behandle. 
Den Gegensatz zu Individualität bilde aber nicht Idealität, sondern Kollek-
tivität, den zu Idealität nicht Individualität, sondern Realismus. Stärker 
kollektiv geprägte Kulturen bringen idealisierte oder gar Rollenporträts 
hervor, individuell geprägte realistische Porträts.31 
Eine andere und ältere Wurzel realistischer Porträts als das wachsende 
Selbstbewusstsein des Individuums, das im 6. und 5. Jh. auch in Israel fest-
zustellen ist (vgl. Ez 18; Jer 31,29f.), hat man im Totenkult vermutet. In 
den zu Plastiken umfunktionierten Menschenschädeln des Neolithikums, 
die zuerst bei den Grabungen von Kathleen Kenyon in Jericho Aufsehen 
erregt haben, sind beim Bemühen, ein Individuum (zum Nutzen der Ge-
meinschaft!) über den Tod hinaus zu erhalten, Leichenkonservierung und 
plastische Nachbildung kombiniert eingesetzt worden.32 Es dürfte kein Zu-
fall sein, dass zuerst in Ägypten, wo die Leichenkonservierung in der Mumi-
fizierung Spitzenleistungen erzielte, auch Plastiken zu finden sind, die man 
als realistische Porträts deuten kann. Das hat Jan Assmann weiter ausge-
führt. Er hat festgestellt, dass die ägyptische Plastik fast ausnahmslos als 
Porträtkunst einzustufen ist: 
„Denn gegenüber der in die Zehntausende gehenden Masse der Darstellun-
gen ,bestimmter Personenʻ treten die Götterbilder, Tier- und Dienerfiguren 
ins Unbedeutende zurück. Diesen eigentümlichen Befund gilt es sich vor-
weg in seiner ganzen Besonderheit klar zu machen. Die ägyptische Kunst, 
darin sehe ich ihre Einzigartigkeit, ist fast durchwegs ,eponymʻ, d.h. jedes 
Kunstwerk steht in Beziehung zu einem Namen, allerdings nicht dem des 
Künstlers, sondern dem des Auftraggebers, der auch der Dargestellte ist. Es 
handelt sich daher, jedenfalls in der Regel, wo nicht um Selbstporträts, dann 
doch um selbstveranlasste Porträts, die ganz ausgesprochen das Ziel verfol-
gen, ,ihrem Gegenstand eine gewisse Dauer zu verleihenʻ. Hinter jedem 
                                                     
30  Metzler 1971: 367. 
31  Assmann 1990: 17. 
32  Zu den Funden von Jericho sowie den später bekannt gewordenen von Tell Ramad 
(Syrien) und Beisamun (Galiläa) vgl. Kenyon 41979, 34-39 mit P1. 20-27. Ausgrabun-
gen in ʽAin Ghazal (Jordanien) haben weitere solche mit Ton bearbeitete Schädel, die 
hier als Köpfe für grosse Statuen dienten, zutage gefördert; vgl. Rollefson 1984: 185-
192; Tubb 1985: 117-143. Für unseren Zusammenhang ist interessant, dass die Ausgrä-
ber von ʽAin Ghazal angesichts der Gleichartigkeit der Plastiken das Bedürfnis nach 
Individualisierung empfanden und den einzelnen Statuen Namen wie Amos, Micha, 
Fatma, Astarte usw. gaben. Eine kurze Diskussion der Schädel aus Jericho in Bezug auf 
die Thematik „Repräsentation, Rolle und Individualisierung“ findet sich bei Gombrich 
51977, 93f. 
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selbstveranlassten Porträt steht der Wunsch seines Auftraggebers nach Dau-
er, nach Todesüberwindung, nach Fortdauer in einem unvergänglichen Me-
dium. Die verschiedenen Formen, in denen dieser je individuelle Wunsch 
nach Fortdauer seinen Ausdruck findet, fasse ich unter dem Begriff der 
,monumentalen Selbstthematisierungʻ zusammen.“33  
Die Frage des Porträts in der ägyptischen Kunst ist denn auch mehrmals 
monographisch behandelt worden,34 während für Mesopotamien eine solche 
Untersuchung aus einer wohl richtigen Intuition heraus nie ernsthaft in 
Angriff genommen worden ist.35 Der von Eckhard Unger formulierte Satz: 
„Eine Porträtkunst hat es in Mesopotamien niemals gegeben“36 ist zwar für 
das 3. und die erste Hälfte des 2. Jahrtausends v.Chr. gelegentlich bestritten 
worden,37 nicht aber für jene Epochen, die uns hier besonders interessieren. 
3. Darstellung von Gemütsstimmungen 
Vielmehr ist aufgefallen, dass bei neuassyrischen Skulpturen und Reliefs 
nicht nur Ansätze zur Individualisierung gänzlich fehlen, sondern auch ein 
anderer Bereich der Physiognomik, nämlich der der Gemütsbewegungen, 
gänzlich ignoriert wird, obwohl Situationen extremster Schmerzen, so 
wenn Opfer des assyrischen Imperialismus bei lebendigem Leibe geschun-
den werden, oder solche sprichwörtlicher Freude, etwa das Beutemachen 
(vgl. Jes 9,2), geschildert sind.38 All diese Situationen der Schmerzen und 
Freuden werden dargestellt, ohne dass ein Widerschein davon auf den Ge-
sichtern derer erscheint, die sie erfahren.39 Für die Funktion dieser Bildper-
sonen waren die Gemütsbewegungen, die nach unserem Empfinden von 
einer individuellen Person fast nicht zu trennen sind, entbehrlich, offenbar 
so entbehrlich wie das Alter oder die Gemütsstimmung des Königs oder der 
                                                     
33  Assmann 1990: 17f. 
34  Vgl. Schäfer 1936; Vandersleyen 1982: 1074-1080 mit Literaturangaben, denen vor 
allem Roeder 1925: 33-43; Buschor 1960: bes. 53-85 und Altenmüller / Hornbostel 1982 
hinzuzufügen sind. Seither besonders Spanel 1988; Assmann 1990: 17-44; Bolshakov 
1990: 89-142; Assmann 1996: 55-81; Bianchi 1997: 34-48. Zur Frage des Realismus 
bzw. der Ähnlichkeit vgl. besonders Baines 1985: bes. 15-17 und Müller 1988: 1-9. 
35  Vgl. Moscati 1963: 64. Buschor 1960 behandelt auf den S. 53-85 zwar die Frage des 
„Porträts“ in der ägyptischen, nicht aber in der mesopotamisch-vorderasiatischen Kunst. 
36  Unger 1927: 43; vgl. ebenfalls Unger 1927: 237. 
37  Vgl. Opitz 1928-1929: 149 Anm. 1; Moscati 1963: 67f. 
38  Vgl. Ussishkin 1982: 84-87. Julia Asher-Greve (1989: 181) macht darauf aufmerksam, 
dass die Feinde auf den neuassyrischen Reliefs im Gegensatz zu denen auf den vorder-
asiatischen Monumenten des 3. und 2. Jahrtausends immerhin eine durch Tracht und 
Besitz (z.B. Kamele) geschaffene Identität haben und nicht mehr als amorphe Masse 
(nackt) dargestellt werden. 
39  Vgl. Andrae 1954-1959: 246f. 
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Dame bei Schachbrettfiguren.40 Die Funktion dieser Reliefs war es einer-
seits, den Taten der assyrischen Könige Dauer zu verleihen (Memorialfunk-
tion) und andererseits, einen gewissen Propagandaeffekt zu erzielen.41 Den 
Felsreliefs und Stelen, die als „Hoheitszeichen“ besonders an den Grenzen 
des Reiches geschaffen wurden, wo die Anerkennung der assyrischen Herr-
schaft nicht gesichert war, kam zudem magische Bedeutung zu.42 Ein und 
dasselbe Relief konnte beide oder alle drei Funktionen wahrnehmen. In 
allen Fällen ging es offensichtlich um das Königtum, um die Rolle, und 
selbst dem Auftraggeber und Rollenträger war diese offensichtlich wichti-
ger als seine Individualität und seine Gemütsstimmung geschweige denn 
die der anderen Beteiligten. Für das 19. Jahrhundert mit seinem Interesse an 
der Darstellung von Gemütszuständen war das Fehlen jeder Art von Ge-
mütsausdruck allerdings so befremdlich, dass Paul-Émile Botta, der 
1843/44 als erster assyrische Reliefs ausgegraben hat43 und die Kunst dieser 
Reliefs zu würdigen versuchte, schlicht nicht anders konnte, als in ihnen 
eine adäquate Darstellung des jeweils zu erwartenden Gemütsausdrucks zu 
finden. In einem Brief aus Mossul von 2. Juni 1843 schreibt er von einem 
Relief, das eine Stadteroberung darstellt: „the attitudes of the small figures 
are perfect, and their heads, scarcely an inch in size, have, in all cases, an 
appropriate expression.“ Im Brief vom 24. Juli 1843 steht: „[…] and the 
heads, still preserved, of some of the conquerors, have an air of satisfied 
superiority admirably portrayed.“44 Wer angespannt auf etwas wartet, wird 
es früher oder später sehen. Wenn auf neuassyrischen Reliefs Gemütsstim-
mungen gesehen werden, dann höchstens, indem man sie aus den Körper-
haltungen deduziert, in denen bestimmte Figuren dargestellt sind. In diesem 
Sinne kann Layard sagen: „The haughty monarch [Sanherib] was receiving 
the chiefs of the conquered nation [Juda], who crouched and knelt humbly 
before him.“45 Das haughty „übermütig, stolz, überheblich“ und humbly 
„bescheiden, demütig“ werden nicht durch die Gesichtszüge ausgedrückt, 
sondern sie werden aus der Haltung herausgelesen. 
Was Ägypten betrifft, so ist, um mit der Darstellung von Gemütsstim-
mungen zu beginnen, das Ergebnis praktisch identisch. Unter den zahlrei-
                                                     
40  Vgl. Gombrich 51977: 102: „The test of the image is not its lifelikeness but its efficacy 
within a context of action“; vgl. ebd. 94. Zur Wirksamkeit der Bilder vgl. Freedberg 
1989. 
41  Gerade von daher scheint mir die Funktion allein bei den assyrischen Reliefs in Bezug 
auf das Dargestellte bzw. das Nicht-Dargestellte keine restlos befriedigende Erklärung 
abzugeben. So hätte z.B. der Schmerz der Feinde und die Freude der Sieger Wesentli-
ches zum Propagandaeffekt assyrischer Reliefs beitragen können; obwohl funktional be-
deutsam, sind solche Inhalte in diesen Bildern aber nicht dargestellt worden. Es bleibt 
ein Rest von zur Tradition gewordenem Zufall. 
42  Vgl. dazu Uehlinger 1997: 301-315. 
43  Fagan 1979: 85-96; Lloyd 1980: 94-100; McGovern / McGovern 1986: 109-113. 
44  N.N. Translation of M. Bottaʼs Letters 1850: 49 und Plate XXV.  
45  Layard 1853: 150. 
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chen Darstellungen von Klagefrauen, die Marcelle Werbrouck gesammelt 
hat, wird die Trauer normalerweise durch stereotype Gesten wie die der 
Hände vor dem Gesicht, auf dem Kopf u.ä. zum Ausdruck gebracht.46 Eher 
selten wird die Trauer durch ein paar Tränen, das Stöhnen und Klagen 
durch den halb geöffneten Mund angedeutet.47 Die von Stereotypien (z.B. 
mandelförmige Augen) geprägte Darstellungsweise verhindert eine konse-
quente Darstellung des Schmerzes durch den Gesichtsausdruck. Aus-
schliesslich durch bestimmte Gesten wie z.B. die erhobenen Arme, oder 
durch Attribute wie z.B. den Lotos, an dem man riecht, aber nie durch Mo-
difikationen der Gesichter wird, soweit ich sehe, in der ägyptischen Kunst 
die Freude ausgedrückt. 
Die Darstellung durch Gesten entspricht der Rollengebundenheit der 
Trauer (bei den professionellen Klagefrauen) oder der Freude (bei Teilneh-
mer/innen eines Gastmahls). Diese Rollengebundenheit des Ausdrucks ist 
auch bei der Königsplastik zu beachten. Hier finden wir allerdings Fälle, 
wo die Rollenkonformität nicht nur durch die vorgeschriebenen Gesten, 
sondern durch die Modifikation der Gesichtszüge ausgedrückt wird. Die 
von uns als sorgenvoll, melancholisch oder energisch gedeuteten Gesichts-
züge vieler Königsbildnisse der 12. Dynastie sind nicht individuell – jeden-
falls nicht nur individuell – zu verstehen, denn die Gaufürsten und hohen 
Beamten derselben Dynastie schauen ebenso „sorgenvoll“, „ernst“ und 
„energisch“ in die Welt wie die Herrscher dieser Periode.48 Schon lange hat 
man die „Stimmung“ dieser Gesichter mit der „Lehre König Amenemhets 
I.“49 in Beziehung gebracht,50 in der der einsame König völlig desillusio-
niert von der Schlechtigkeit und Undankbarkeit der Menschen spricht und 
ständige Wachsamkeit fordert. Jan Assmann macht im Anschluss an Hein-
rich Schäfer51 darauf aufmerksam, dass dieser Text nicht allein steht, son-
dern einer Gattung angehört, zu der etwa auch die „Lehre für Merikare“, 
die „Klagen des Oasenbewohners“, das „Gespräch eines Mannes mit sei-
nem Ba“, die „Mahnworte des Ipuwer“ und weitere Werke zu rechnen 
sind:52  
                                                     
46  Werbrouck 1938: passim. 
47  Werbrouck 1938: Fig. 33.36.70. Vgl. auch Mekhitarian 1954: 115.122.128.130.144. Lei-
der belegen Dieter Wildung und Sylvia Schoske (1984: 184) die generelle Aussage 
nicht: „Frauendarstellungen sind es, in denen der ägyptische Künstler Emotionen sicht-
bar macht, bei den Trauernden, den Tanzenden, den Liebenden“. Es kann sich aber im 
Hinblick auf die genannten Emotionen nur um ihre Darstellung durch stereotype Gesten 
handeln und nicht um Veränderungen im Gesichtsausdruck, also um Physiognomie im 
weitesten Sinn. 
48  Ein grosser Teil des Materials findet sich bei Evers 1929. Vgl. auch Wildung 1984; 
Habachi 1985. 
49  Helck 1969; Blumenthal 1984: 85-107 und Blumenthal 1985: 104-115. 
50  Wilson 1951: 132. 
51  Schäfer 41963: 29f. 
52  Lichtheim 1973: 139-192. 
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„Diese Texte versuchen, einen neuen Begriff von Weisheit zu formulieren 
und zu füllen, im Sinne eines Wissens, das sich nicht nur auf die positive 
kosmo-sozio-politische Ordnung der Dinge bezieht, sondern darüber hinaus 
um ihre grundsätzliche Gefährdetheit weiss; eines Wissens, das seine eigene 
Begrenztheit sowie die grundsätzliche Offenheit der letzten Fragen in den 
Blick bekommen hat. […] Die Bildnisse der Beamten bekennen sich zu der-
selben Weisheit und Weltsicht, wie sie in den Altersbildnissen Sesostrisʼ III. 
ihren explizitesten, gültigsten und daher modellhaften Ausdruck gefunden 
hat. Die Altersbildnisse dieses Königs spielen in der Kunst dieselbe Rolle, 
wie die Lehre Amenemhets I. in der Literatur: sie wirken als Ausgangs-
punkt einer Reihe sich an ihnen orientierender Werke.“53  
Verschiedene Zeiten haben verschiedene Idealvorstellungen gepflegt. Im 
Neuen Reich wich das Ideal der Sorge und der Energie weitgehend dem 
einer strahlenden jugendlichen Schönheit.54 
4. Realistische Porträts in Ägypten? 
In Ägypten finden wir, wenn wir von den Königs- und Beamtenporträts des 
Mittleren Reiches absehen, ebenso wenig Gemütsstimmungen ausgedrückt 
wie in Vorderasien. Aber auch bei jenen handelt es sich – genau genommen 
– ja weniger um Darstellungen einer Gemütsstimmung, die als solche in der 
Regel dem Wechsel unterworfen ist, als um solche einer Lebenshaltung. 
Hingegen scheinen wir es in Ägypten immer wieder nicht nur mit Rollen-
porträts, die in Vorderasien die Norm sind, sondern mit idealisierenden und 
teilweise sogar mit realistischen Porträts zu tun zu haben. Allerdings ist es 
gar nicht so einfach, wenn wir die Person nicht gekannt haben und uns 
weder eine Totenmaske noch Fotos zur Verfügung stehen, festzustellen, ob 
ein bestimmtes Porträt als realistisches zu verstehen ist. 
Der Einfluss gesellschaftlicher Konventionen bleibt nicht bei den Ge-
mütsregungen (ernst, lächelnd, natürlich) stehen. Er reicht noch weiter. Im 
                                                     
53  Assmann 1990: 29. 
54  Das lässt sich auch in unserer Kultur beobachten. Beim Blättern in den Fotoalben einer 
Familie, die einen längeren Zeitraum abdecken, kann man sehen, dass es vor dem Krieg 
üblich war, sich auf Fotos ernst zu geben. Im arabisch-palästinischen Raum liess man 
sich noch lange nach dem Krieg nur mit ernstem und strengem Gesicht fotografieren, 
auch wenn man unmittelbar vor der Aufnahme noch ausgelassen gescherzt hatte. „On a 
picture you have to look strong!“, erklärte mir ein Palästinenser. Bei uns wurde es nach 
dem Krieg unter amerikanischem Einfluss üblich, auf Fotos lächelnd zu erscheinen. 
Heute hat man sich natürlich, ungezwungen zu geben, weder speziell freundlich noch 
speziell ernst. Über individuelle Freundlichkeit, Strenge oder Natürlichkeit sagen solche 
Bilder nichts aus. Biographisches ist ihnen nicht zu entnehmen. Zur kulturellen Ge-
prägtheit nicht nur der zur Schau getragenen Gemütsstimmung, sondern auch der Physi-
ognomie im engeren Sinne vgl. die interessanten Ausführungen von Borrmann 1994: 
212f. 
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Mittleren Reich kann man feststellen, dass der Einfluss der Königs- auf die 
Beamtenplastik nicht nur den Ausdruck, sondern auch die Gestaltung der 
Augen und des Mundes mitbeeinflusst. Wenn in Amarna nicht nur der Kö-
nig, die Königin und ihre Töchter, sondern auch zahlreiche Beamte mit 
einem weit ausladenden Hinterkopf dargestellt werden,55 dann mag dieser 
Zug vielleicht den König charakterisiert haben, aber bei den Höflingen 
kann er kaum realistisch gemeint sein. Es ist in diesem Zusammenhang die 
banale Tatsache zu bedenken, dass starke Backenknochen, melancholische 
Mundwinkel, ein vorspringendes Kinn, eine Adlernase etc.56 nur mässig 
stichhaltige Beweise dafür sind, in einem bestimmten Kopf ein realistisches 
Porträt zu sehen. Erstens können diese Züge, wie gesagt, auf eine einfluss-
reiche Person (den König) oder ein berühmtes normativ gewordenes Bild 
einer solchen Person zurückgehen. Zweitens ist nicht zu übersehen, dass 
ein einigermassen sorgfältig gearbeiteter Kopf ganz einfach bestimmte 
Züge haben muss. Es gibt z.B. nur beschränkte Möglichkeiten, einen Hals 
zu gestalten. Auch ohne bestimmte normative Vorbilder können künstleri-
sche Konventionen entstehen, den Hals oder die Augen so und nicht anders 
zu machen. Wo aber bei einer in Bezug auf Zeit, Raum und Funktion sehr 
kohärenten Gruppe wie den sogenannten Ersatzköpfen der 4. Dynastie aus 
Giza ganz verschiedene Typen belegt sind, geht man mit Recht davon aus, 
dass diese Verschiedenheit dem Realismus dieser Porträts zugute zu halten 
ist. „Ohne jeden Zweifel kam es dem ägyptischen Künstler darauf an, bes-
ser gesagt war es sein Auftrag, die individuellen physiognomischen Züge 
des Grabherrn abzubilden, um ihnen im Medium des Steins Dauer zu ver-
leihen.“57 
In der Königsplastik der 4. Dynastie scheinen realistische und idealisie-
rende Porträts nebeneinander zu stehen. „Zwar finden sich auch hier sehr 
realistische Bildnisse, besonders von Mykerinos, dessen individuelle Eigen-
heiten – ein viel zu kleiner Kopf, stark unter dem Oberlid vortretende 
Augen, der Mund mit schmaler Ober- und schwerer Unterlippe sowie die 
sich nach unten verbreitende Kopfform – auf seiner Bostoner Statue gerade-
zu schonungslos wiedergegeben sind.“58 Bei anderen Königsbildnissen der 
4. Dynastie, besonders bei Chefren aber auch bei weiteren Statuen Mykeri-
nosʼ ist der Realismus zugunsten einer Idealisierung gemildert. Stärker als 
individuelle realistische Züge treten da die Majestät des Königtums in Er-
scheinung.59 Vor allem gegen Ende des Mittleren Reiches finden wir dann 
wieder realistische Porträts, die sich diesmal aber mit dem Willen verbin-
den, expressiv eine Lebenshaltung zum Ausdruck zu bringen, die um die 
                                                     
55  Vgl. beispielsweise Davies 1903: Pl. 6.14.23.30 usw. 
56  Vgl. Moscati 1963: 61-64; Vandersleyen 1982: l077f. 
57  Assmann 1990: 20. Zusätzlich zu den bei Assmann abgebildeten Beispielen vgl. Junker 
1941: 113-121; Smith 1946: Pl. 6-10.14-15; Assmann 1996: 55-81. 
58  Assmann 1990: 22 und Abb. 8. Vgl. Smith 1946: Pl. 13b. 
59  Lange / Hirmer 1967: Abb. 30-33.139-142. 
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Schwierigkeiten und die Anstrengungen weiss, die damit verbunden sind, 
eine menschenwürdige Ordnung zu gestalten und aufrecht zu erhalten. 
Die Königsplastik des Neuen Reiches ist, ausser in der Amarnazeit, in 
der 18. wie in der 19. Dynastie stark vom Willen geprägt, ein jugendlich 
zeitloses Königsbild zu präsentieren. Mit diesem Bestreben verbindet sich 
bald mehr, bald weniger der Wunsch nach individuellen Zügen. Besonders 
ausgeprägt scheint letzterer bei Amenophis III. gewesen zu sein.60 Im Ge-
gensatz zu früheren Perioden scheint sich in der 18.-20. Dynastie eine ein-
malige Kontrollmöglichkeit anzubieten, individuelle Züge in der Königs-
plastik zu verifizieren. Von einer ganzen Reihe von Herrschern dieser Peri-
ode haben wir leidlich erhaltene Mumien zur Verfügung.61 Der Vergleich 
von Mumien und Bildwerken führt allerdings nur zu sehr partiellen Ergeb-
nissen, weil der Schädel die Gesichtsform nur in beschränktem Umfang 
determiniert und bei Mumien die Weichteile oft zerdrückt sind und vom 
Kopf oft nicht viel mehr als der Schädel erhalten ist.62 Dazu kommt, dass 
eventuelle Porträts einen anderen, z.B. jugendlicheren Zustand festhalten 
können als die Mumie. Dennoch ergibt sich z.B. bei Thutmosis III. und bei 
Sethos I. eine ganz leidliche Übereinstimmung zwischen Porträts einer- und 
Mumie andererseits.63 In den Porträts der 25., der nubischen, Dynastie, 
wirken Einflüsse der alterslosen Königsdarstellungen der 4. und 5. Dynas-
tie und der Tradition der Nubierdarstellungen zusammen.64 Die 26. Dynas-
tie zieht das Idealbild des jugendlich oder zeitlosen lächelnden Herrschers 
dem realistischen Porträt vor. Das Interesse ägyptischer Künstler bzw. ihrer 
Auftraggeberinnen und Auftraggeber an realistischen Zügen ist aber auch 
in der Folgezeit immer wieder neu zu beobachten.  
Ein interessantes Beispiel bietet Darius I. Seine Darstellungen im persi-
schen Stammland sind der vorderasiatischen Tradition entsprechend reine 
Rollenporträts. Das gilt auch für die frühen Darstellungen dieses Perser-
königs, der gleichzeitig der zweite Herrscher der 27. ägyptischen Dynastie 
war, am Amun-Tempel von Hibis. Aus den letzten Jahren seiner Herr-
schaft, nachdem er Ägypten besucht hatte, finden sich aber am selben 
Tempel zwei Darstellungen, die als realistische Porträts gewertet werden 
können (Abb. 1; nur dieses ist einigermassen intakt erhalten).65 Auch sonst 
finden sich in der Perser- und der Ptolemäerzeit Rollen- bzw. idealisierende 
neben realistischen Porträts.66 
                                                     
60  Müller 1988: 31-45; zu prächtigen Farbaufnahmen der Skulpturen dieses Herrschers vgl. 
Delange 1993. 
61  Partridge 1994. 
62  Schäfer 1936: 13; Harrison 1966: 95-119, bes. 113-116. 
63  Spanel 1988: 2 Fig. 1-4. 
64  Russmann 1974: 11-24, bes. 23f. 
65  Gropp 1990: 45-49 und 56-60. Abb. 15 auf S. 60 ist unsere Abb. 1. Die Zeichnung bietet 
leider nur einen Ausschnitt, genau den, den das Foto bietet, das der Zeichnung zugrunde 
liegt. 
66  Bothmer / Riefstahl 1960; Kyrieleis 1975. 
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Als Hinweis auf das Vorhandensein realistischer Porträts in Ägypten 
ist ergänzend zu den Produkten der bildenden Kunst zuerst von Hellmut 
Brunner auf einen Passus im Sonnenhymnus des Tja-nefer67 hingewiesen 
worden. Der Passus lautet: 
„Du hast alles Seiende gebaut als Werk deiner Hände, 
du bist es, der ihre Gestalten erschaffen hat, 
indem jedes einzelne (wʽnb) ihrer Gesichter unterschieden ist von seinem 
Nächsten (ṯnw r sn.nw.f). 
Denn du hast differenzierte Gesichter erschaffen (jw qmȝnk ḥrw ḏsrw).“68 
Das Nebeneinander von Rollen- und realistischen Porträts von Darius I. 
illustriert einen Sachverhalt, der für die ganze Zeit altägyptischer Geschich-
te gelten dürfte. Man hatte zu keiner Zeit Bedenken, neben mehr oder we-
niger stark individualisierenden, realistischen auch idealisierende und sogar 
reine Rollenporträts zu verwenden. Eine ganze Reihe handfester Daten 
belegen das: 
–  Der König konnte im Bildtyp des Sphinx ohne weiteres anstelle seines 
menschlichen Körpers einen Löwenleib annehmen.69 
–  Bei manchen Herrscherdarstellungen lässt sich nachweisen, dass sie 
Werke von Vorgängern ganz genau kopieren liessen. Manchmal hat es 
sich dabei um einzelne Statuen gehandelt, wie bei Amenophis I., der für 
seinen Totentempel Statuen Mentuhoteps II. kopieren liess.70 Manchmal 
betraf das ganze Szenen, wie im berühmten Fall des libyschen Häupt-
lings,71 der angesichts seiner Frau Chutjotes und seiner Söhne Usa und 
Uni von Pharao Sahure (5. Dyn., um 2500 v.Chr.) bzw. von Unas (Ende 
der 5. Dyn., um 2360 v.Chr.), von Pepi I. bzw. Pepi II. (6. Dyn., zwi-
schen 2300 und 2150 v.Chr.)72 und von Pharao Taharqa (25. Dyn., 690-
664 v.Chr.)73 erschlagen wird. Hätten wir nur einen Beleg für diese Sze-
ne, würden wir sie für individuell, realistisch und historisch nehmen. Da 
es unsinnig ist anzunehmen, jeder libysche Fürst von der Zeit Sahures 
bis zu der Taharqas (d.h. über knapp 2000 Jahre hinweg) hätte eine Frau 
gehabt, die Chutjotes hiess und zwei Söhne, von denen der eine Usa und 
der andere Uni hiess, können wir diese Bilder nicht einfach als Darstel-
lungen eines historischen Ereignisses verstehen. Zweifellos besiegte ir-
gend einmal in der Geschichte Ägyptens ein König einen libyschen 
Fürsten und erschlug ihn in Gegenwart seiner Frau und seiner Söhne. 
                                                     
67  Theben Grab Nr. 158; wahrscheinlich Zeit Ramsesʼ III. 
68  Brunner 1984: 278. 
69  Vgl. Coche-Zivie 1984: 1139-1147; Schweitzer 1948; Hassan 1951; Dessenne 1957; 
Demisch 1977. 
70  Wildung 1984, 17-20. Vgl. dazu auch Myšliwiec 1985: 151f. und Schoske 1985: 214f. 
71  Wilson 1956: 439-442. 
72  Leclant 1980: 49-54 und Pl. II. 
73  Macadam 1955: 63-65 und Pl. IXa-b und XLIX. 
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Diese Tat wurde dann ein Teil der (möglichen) Rollen des Königs, und 
in der Folge fühlten sich immer wieder einmal ein ägyptischer Pharao 
verpflichtet, denselben Sieg mit allen seinen Details zu vergegenwärti-
gen, als ob er selbst ihn errungen hätte, „Geschichte als Fest“,74 Ge-
schichte als im Bild inszeniertes Mysterienspiel. 
– Die Pharaonen haben nicht nur Bildwerke ihrer Vorgänger kopieren las-
sen. Manche Könige (und Beamte) haben Statuen und weniger häufig 
Reliefs ihrer Vorgänger ganz einfach übernommen, den Namen, der ur-
sprünglich dastand, weggemeisselt und ihren eigenen an dessen Stelle 
gesetzt.75 So hat z.B. Ramses II. massenweise Statuen aus Memphis und 
aus Totentempeln des Mittleren Reiches in die von ihm erbauten Delta-
städte bringen, die ursprünglichen Namen wegmeisseln und durch seine 
eigenen ersetzen lassen.76 Gelegentlich wurden die Gesichtszüge, aber 
auch andere Details etwas modifiziert und den herrschenden Gepflo-
genheiten (nicht unbedingt der Physiognomie des Herrschers!) ange-
passt.77 
Angesichts dieser und ähnlicher Tatsachen neigen manche Forscher und 
Forscherinnen zur Ansicht: „Die ägyptische Kunst hat zu keiner Zeit, auch 
nicht in der Ära Echnatons, veristische oder realistische Zeugnisse hervor-
gebracht.“78 Wir sind gewohnt, alle nicht eindeutig ornamentalen oder abs-
trakten Bilder anzuschauen, „als ob sie Photographien oder Illustrationen 
wären, und sie als Widerschein einer tatsächlichen oder imaginären Wirk-
lichkeit zu sehen.“79 Wir neigen dazu, Bilder aus der Vergangenheit als 
historische Bilder zu betrachten. Aber als solche lassen sich altorientalische 
Bilder nur sehr beschränkt verstehen, jedenfalls dann, wenn wir Geschichte 
als Ereignisgeschichte, als Historie verstehen, die durch Personen- und 
Ortsnamen, durch Individuen und Daten gekennzeichnet ist. Unser Bedürf-
nis nach historischem Wissen in diesem Sinne, unser Bedürfnis, zu wissen, 
wie es wirklich war, lässt uns laufend vergessen, dass der Alte Orient – das 
alte Ägypten miteingeschlossen – stärker an Rollen und der Darstellung 






                                                     
74  Vgl. Hornung 1966. 
75  Helck 1986: 905f. 
76  Vgl. Eaton-Krauss 1984: 110; Kitchen 1982: 120f.177f. 
77  Vgl. Spallanzani 1964: 27-45. 
78  Schlögl 1986: 89; vgl. auch Buschor 1960: 53f. Bei letzterem besteht allerdings der Ver-
dacht, er habe das realistische Porträt in Ägypten seinem evolutionistischen Konzept, 
das Porträt sei „Zug um Zug durch Untergliederung des Allgemeinbildes“ entstanden, 
geopfert. Assmann 1990: 20 Anm. 17. 
79  Gombrich 51977: 105. Vgl. auch Frankfort-Groenewegen 1972: passim. 
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5. Porträts in der Bibel genannter Herrscher 
In dem schon genannten Abschnitt „Royalty and Dignitairies“ in James B. 
Pritchards „The Ancient Near East in Pictures. Relating to the Old Testa-
ment“80 sehen manche Seiten aus, als ob sie zu einer modernen Enzyklopä-
die mit Fotos historischer Persönlichkeiten gehören würden. Da fehlt kaum 
einer der Herrscher, die in der Geschichte Israels eine Rolle gespielt haben 
sollen oder in der Bibel namentlich erwähnt werden. Da ist der Kopf 
Echnatons (No. 412), der als erster Vertreter eines radikalen Monotheismus 
gilt. Da sind die „Porträts“ Ramsesʼ II. (No. 420), welcher oft als Pharao 
der Unterdrückung identifiziert wurde, und Merneptahs, des Pharaos der 
„Israel-Stele“ (No. 423), in dessen Regierungszeit man den Auszug aus 
Ägypten angesetzt hat. Da sind die Köpfe Tiglatpilesers III. (No. 445; vgl. 
2Kön 15,l9.29; 2Kön 16,7.10) und Sargons II. (No. 446), die das Nordreich 
Israel vernichtet haben. Da ist das „Porträt“ des glücklosen Gegenspielers 
der Assyrer, des Pharaos Taharqa (No. 424; vgl. 2Kön 19,9) usw. 
Diese Porträtgalerie, in einem seriösen Werk eingerichtet, suggeriert al-
lein durch die Zusammenstellung und den Ausschnitt (Kopf, Gesicht), dass 
wir es hier mit realistischen Darstellungen historischer Persönlichkeiten zu 
tun hätten. Eine Legende wie die zu No. 419 kann aber aufmerksame Lese-
rinnen und Leser stutzig machen: „Statue of Tut-ankh-Amon usurped by 
Hor-em-heb“. Das klingt wie „Foto von John F. Kennedy, hier für Richard 
Nixon verwendet“.  
Expliziter und deutlicher als in Pritchards Handbuch wird der Bezug 
zwischen diesen Porträts, die zum Teil reine Rollenporträts sind, und der 
biblischen Geschichte in weniger anspruchsvollen Werken hergestellt. So 
finden sich die „Porträts“ Ramsesʼ II., Merneptahs, Tiglatpilesers III., Sar-
gons II. und Taharqas auch in Werner Kellers „Und die Bibel hat doch 
recht. In Bildern“.81 Ein Kommentar wie: „Grimmig und voll unbändigen 
Willens, so hat ein assyrischer Künstler Tiglatpileser III. porträtiert“ oder 
„Das war Sargon II., der Eroberer der Hauptstadt des Nordreiches Israel, 
dessen Porträt uns mit diesem Kalksteinrelief über mehr als zweieinhalb 
Jahrtausende erhalten blieb“82 suggerieren, dass wir eine Art Fotos vor uns 
hätten. Dabei sind sich alle Kenner und Kennerinnen darin einig, dass es 
kaum etwas Schematischeres gibt als die Darstellungen neuassyrischer 
Herrscher.  
Das Bild eines altorientalischen Herrschers, der in der Bibel eine ganz 
prominente Rolle spielt, fehlt allerdings in dieser Galerie: dasjenige 
                                                     
80  Pritchard 1954: No. 376.463. 
81  Keller 1963: 83.l29.222.227.247. Zu diesem erfolgreichsten biblischen Sachbuch des 20. 
Jh. vgl. Keel 1997: 51 mit Anm. 3f. Eine fast identische Galerie wie bei Werner Keller 
ist schon bei Riehm 21894: I 56-58; II 1391.1693.1699, und bei anderen Autoren des 19. 
und 20. Jh.s zu finden. 
82  Keller 1963: 222 und 227. 
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Nebukadnezzars, des Zerstörers des ersten Tempels. In älteren Werken, die 
in der 2. Hälfte des 19. oder zu Beginn des 20. Jh. entstanden sind, wurde 
unter dem Stichwort „Nebukadnezzar“ häufig eine kreisrunde Kamee (ge-
schnittener Halbedelstein mit erhabenem Relief) abgebildet (Abb. 2).83 Die 
Kamee trägt eine dem Rand entlang laufende neubabylonische Inschrift: 
ana dAMAR.UTU (Marduk) UMUN(bēlī)-šú 
dAG-NIG.DU-ŠEŠ (Nabû-kudurri-uṣur) LUGAL (šar) TIN.TIRki (Bābili) 
ana TIN(balāṭī)-šú BA(iqīš) 
„Dem Marduk, seinem Herrn, hat Nebukadnezzar, der König von Babylon, 
(dies) für sein Leben geschenkt.“84 
Das Zentrum der Kamee nimmt ein nach links gerichteter, behelmter Kopf 
ein. In dem 1908 erschienenen 4. Band des „Dictionnaire de la Bible“ wird 
die Kamee zum Stichwort „Nabuchodonosor“ abgebildet. Der Text sagt: 
„Eine Kamee des Berliner Museums stellt ihn uns bartlos vor, mit einem 
sehr feinen Profil, mit einer Physiognomie ohne Härte, mit einem Helm auf 
dem Kopf, (der) verschieden (ist) von dem der ninevitischen Monarchen, 
deren Porträts wir besitzen.“ Es folgt die Transkription und Übersetzung 
der Legende. Abschliessend wird bemerkt: „Leider ist die Arbeit eher grie-
chisch als babylonisch, und wenn die Kamee echt ist, dann frägt man sich, 
ob sie nicht einen Fürsten des gleichen Namens, aber aus einer jüngeren 
Zeit, darstellt.“85 
1908 hätte man es besser wissen können. Es gab damals bereits eine 
breite Literatur zu dieser Kamee, in der eindeutig festgestellt worden war, 
dass es sich ursprünglich um ein Votivauge (aus Onyx)86 gehandelt hat, das 
Nebukadnezzar in einen Tempel gestiftet hatte. Das Votivauge entspricht 
einem vielfach belegten Typus.87 Sein bildloses Zentrum wurde erst nach-
träglich in der Renaissance mit dem behelmten Kopf versehen,88 der also 
mit Nebukadnezzar nichts zu tun hat.89 
                                                     
83  Vgl. z.B. Riehm 21894: 1082; Ball 1899: 206; Jeremias 31916: 539 Abb. 247 mit 
Anm. 2. 
84  Langdon 1912: 202f. Nr. 38a. Vgl. Borger 1967: 283; Berger 1973: 150-158. 
85  Pannier 1908: 1443 Fig. 391: „Un camée du musée de Berlin nous le représente im-
berbe, d’un profil très fin, d’une physiognomie sans dureté, coiffé dʼun casque, fort dif-
férent des monarques ninivites dont nous avons les portraits [...]. Malheureusement le 
travail est grec plutôt que babylonien, et si le camée est authentique, on se demande sʼil 
ne représente pas quelque prince de même nom, mais d’époque plus récente.“ 
86  Milchig und dunkelbraun bis schwarz gestreifter Achat (Quarz). 
87  Vgl. Furtwängler 1913: 140-142; Langdon 1912: 42f.; Sollberger 1954 : 237-240. 
88  Furtwängler 1913: 140f. 
89  Einige Verwirrung hatte der Umstand verursacht, dass neben dem Original aus Onyx 
schon im 18. Jh. eine Kopie aus dunkler Glaspaste bekannt war. Das Original befand 
sich vor 1760 im Besitz eines gewissen Priors Vaini in Rom; von dort kam es über den 
Grossherzog der Toskana nach Florenz, wo es vom Konservator der Sammlung, Magli-
avini, unter der Nr. 2919 inventarisiert worden war. Die Kopie wurde 1760 von Johann 
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6. Was verrät uns die individuelle Physiognomie? 
Die altorientalischen Bildwerke gewähren uns bei den neuassyrischen Kö-
nigen keinen Zugang zur Physiognomie einzelner Herrscher. Sie bieten uns 
kein Bild individueller Persönlichkeiten, sondern ein Bild der Rolle. Bei 
den ägyptischen Pharaonen dürften uns in einzelnen Fällen einzelne indivi-
duelle Züge überliefert sein. Da wir aber stets auch mit idealisierenden und 
konventionellen Zügen rechnen müssen, haben wir nur einen gebrochenen 
und unsicheren Zugang zu individuellen Physiognomien. Was wäre der 
Gewinn eines individuellen Porträts? Zwar geistert immer noch die Lava-
terʼsche Vorstellung herum, das sei bedeutsam, „weil das Aussehen eines 
Menschen seine Persönlichkeit“ widerspiegle.90 Die neuere Experimental-
psychologie ist da mehr als skeptisch und liegt weitgehend auf der Linie 
der Lavater-Kritiker Riedel und Lichtenberg.91 Eine kritische Betrachtung 
der Situation ergibt etwa folgendes Bild:92 Die antiken Physiognomiker, 
Lavater93 und Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869)94 haben den Körper als Ganzes 
als Symbol eines geistigen Prinzips verstehen wollen. Aber H. G. Fischer95, 
Gerhard Kloos96 und andere haben darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass die 
genannten Autoren in der praktischen Durchführung ihrem theoretisch 
ganzheitlichen Ansatz nicht gerecht wurden, sondern weitgehend wie jene 
vorgingen, die körperliche Merkmale als Symptome, als Zeichen für un-
sichtbare psychische Eigenschaften auffassen und sie dann mosaikhaft zu 
einem Charakterbild zusammensetzen. So wurde z.B. aus der Umfangsent-
wicklung bestimmter Körperregionen – etwa Kopf, Brust, Bauch – sowie 
den sichtbaren Erhebungen und Vertiefungen, z.B. am Schädel, auf den 
entsprechenden Entwicklungsgrad der darunter liegenden Organe – Gehirn, 
Atmung, Verdauung – und Hirnareale geschlossen. In einem zweiten Deu-
tungsschritt wurden den Organen nach einer vorgefassten Meinung Eigen-
schaften zugeordnet, die meist aus den physiologischen Funktionen der 
Organsysteme deduziert wurden. In einem dritten Schritt wurden dann die 
äusseren Zeichen, z.B. hohe Stirn, mit dem dahinter verborgenen Hirnteil, 
dem z.B. Verstand und ethisches Urteil zugeordnet worden sind, in Bezie-
                                                                                                                          
Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768) in seiner „Description des pierres gravées du feu 
Baron Stosch dédiée à son Eminence Monseigneur le Cardinal Alexandre Albani par M. 
lʼAbbé Winckelmann Bibliothécaire de son Eminence” (Florenz 1760), 28 Nr. 126 be-
schrieben. 1765 kaufte Friedrich der Grosse die Sammlung Stosch, und so kam die 
Glaspastenkopie nach Berlin. Vgl. zur Geschichte Menant 1885: 79-86; Menant 1888: 
142; zur Inschrift Schrader 1880: 293-298. 
90  Müller 1988: 40. 
91  Siehe oben Anm. 5 und 6. 
92  Ich folge hier weitestgehend Lüdemann 1980. 
93  Siehe oben Anm. 4. 
94  Zu Carus vgl. Borrmann 1994: 151-155. 
95  Fischer 1934. 
96  Kloos 1951. 
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hung gesetzt. Ein sehr verbreitetes populärwissenschaftliches Buch dieser 
Art ist Amandus Kupfer „Grundlagen der praktischen Menschenkenntnis 
nach Carl Huters Psycho-Physiognomik“.97 Auf wissenschaftlicher Ebene 
fand noch am ehesten das Modell der biologischen Totaltypen Aufnahme, 
vor allem das der Konstitutionstypen, vertreten etwa von Ernst Kretschmer 
„Körperbau und Charakter. Untersuchungen zum Konstitutionsproblem 
und zur Lehre von den Temperamenten“.98 Aber selbst hier ergaben expe-
rimentelle Nachprüfungen einen insignifikanten Prozentsatz der Überein-
stimmung zwischen Körperbau und Temperament. Jene Modelle, die gar 
einzelne Erscheinungselemente wie Nasenformen u.ä. zu deuten bean-
spruchten, haben sich bei experimentellen Nachprüfungen überhaupt nicht 
bewährt. Die populäre und weitherum praktisch geübte Deutung der Physi-
ognomie hat also keinerlei zuverlässige Basis. Vielmehr hat sich in der 
Wissenschaft Schopenhauers Meinung durchgesetzt, es bestehe kein ver-
lässlicher Zusammenhang zwischen Erscheinung (Physiognomie) und We-
sen (Charakter) eines Menschen.99 Heute schenkt die Psychologie ihre 
Aufmerksamkeit deshalb eher der Eindrucksanalyse und dem Problem der 
Urteilsbildung. Wichtig ist ihr, Strategien aufzudecken, nach denen sich 
Urteilsbildung vollzieht, und Regeln für die Eindrucksverwertung zu fin-
den. So gesehen wird Physiognomik zu einem Thema der Sozialpsycholo-
gie, nämlich der Personwahrnehmung. Der Mensch ist nicht gläsern, der 
Körper nicht durchsichtig auf Charakter und Intelligenz. Zahlreiche Expe-
rimente haben gezeigt, dass es nicht möglich ist, sich vor eine Schulklasse 
oder eine Geschäftsbelegschaft hinzustellen und aufgrund des blossen An-
schauens zu sagen, wer intelligent ist oder wer welchen Charakter hat. Es 
ist so, wie der eingangs zitierte Riedel sagte: Die physiognomischen „Ge-
sichtstheorien“ produzieren, was sie zu beobachten vorgeben.  
Bleibt die Frage, warum jemand in bestimmten Körpereigentümlichkei-
ten bestimmte Eigenschaften ausgedrückt sieht. In einem sehr interessanten 
Essay zeigt Norbert Borrmann über diese experimentellen Ergebnisse hin-
aus auf, dass Physiognomik in einer Kulturphase, in der die Zeitwahrneh-
mung die Raumwahrnehmung überrundet und sich das wissenschaftliche 
und künstlerische Interesse vom Bild weg der abstrakten Formel zugewandt 
hat, jede Ausdruckswissenschaft, jede Gestaltpsychologie heute im Abseits 
operiert.100 Wir sind oder scheinen mindestens Lichtjahre vom mittelalterli-
chen und antiken „omnis mundi creatura sicut liber et pictura“ entfernt zu 
sein. Die Welt ist uns kein Bild einer höheren Ordnung mehr, sondern ein 
System von Energien, von denen gilt, sie in den Griff zu bekommen. Nicht 
mehr die Schau, sondern die Bewirtschaftung der Welt nimmt alle Auf-
merksamkeit in Anspruch. 
                                                     
97  Kupfer 261976. 
98  Kretschmer 221955. 
99  Vgl. besonders Frijda 1965: 351-421. 
100  Borrmann 1994: 210. 
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Trotz dieses doppelt negativen Ergebnisses (wir haben in Vorderasien 
keine und in Ägypten nur in beschränktem Masse realistische physiogno-
mische Züge, und aus diesen Zügen kann nicht auf bestimmte Persönlich-
keitseigenheiten geschlossen werden) bleibt das von Schopenhauer in dem 
eingangs angeführten Zitat ausgedrückte Bedürfnis bestehen, berühmte und 
berüchtigte Menschen zu sehen. Dieses Bedürfnis besteht für viele Men-
schen auch im Hinblick auf die in der Bibel genannten Grössen. Ebensowe-
nig wie durch eine Verdrängung der Sexualität die Sexualität aufgehoben 
wird, kann das Leugnen physiognomischer Annahmen den Physiognomen 
in uns töten. Jeder physiognomiert, und jeder wertet, indem er oder sie phy-
siognomiert. Selbstverständlich resultieren diese Bewertungen nicht immer 
aus objektiven Bemühungen, sondern häufig aus subjektiven Neigungen 
und Interessen, weshalb der Physiognomik auch, unabhängig vom Grad der 
Wissenschaftlichkeit, den man ihr zuspricht, moralische Ablehnung, Ängs-
te, Ressentiments entgegentreten. Die Physiognomik enthält zweifelsohne 
Atavistisches. Lavater irrte, als er sie zur Beförderung der Menschenkennt-
nis und sogar der Menschenliebe empfahl. 
Auch wenn der Körper wenig oder nichts, jedenfalls nichts objektiv 
Fass- und „naturgesetzlich“ Beschreibbares über sein Innenleben preisgibt, 
er hat seinen eigenen Wert, seine eigene Bedeutung. Der Körper ist ein 
wesentlicher Teil des Menschen, und wenn ein unbedarftes geistiges Leben 
in einem prachtvollen Körper oder ein reiches geistiges Leben in einem 
ausdruckslosen oder verkrüppelten Körper sich abspielt, so ist auch das 
interessant und berechtigtes Objekt menschlichen Wissensdranges. Die 
grossen Nachschlagewerke (bis zu Wikipedia) kommen diesem bleibenden 
Interesse entgegen, indem sie nach Möglichkeit alle bedeutenden Persön-
lichkeiten auch abbilden, sei es mit Hilfe einer Plastik, eines Kupferstichs 
oder eines Fotos. Die Betrachter und Betrachterinnen solcher Bilder begnü-
gen sich meistens damit festzustellen: So hat der, so hat die also ausgese-
hen! Oder: So hätte ich mir den oder die nicht vorgestellt! Häufig wird auch 
emotional reagiert. Der oder die wird als sympathisch oder unsympathisch 
wahrgenommen.101 Wenn der intuitiv gewonnene Eindruck argumentativ 
erhärtet wird, dann meist mit Hilfe von Daten, die aus der Biographie des 
oder der Beurteilten gewonnen sind. Bestimmte Einzelzüge des Porträts 
werden dann aufgrund derselben als Ausdruck von Sinnlichkeit, Willens-
kraft, Grausamkeit usw. interpretiert. Aber eine solche Betrachtungsweise 
ist – wie gesagt – bei den meisten altorientalischen Porträts nicht nur inso-
fern verfehlt, als ihr die moderne Experimentalpsychologie jeden objekti-
ven Wert abspricht, sondern auch insofern, als dem Alten Orient im Allge-
meinen eine Porträtkunst im engeren, realistischen Sinne unbekannt war 
und sie höchstens in Ägypten sporadisch gepflegt worden sein mag. 
                                                     
101  Kaum jemand verliebt sich aufgrund der Stimme. Normalerweise führt eine visuelle Be-
gegnung in diesen emotional, aber häufig nicht nur emotional, sondern auch von korrek-
ten Intuitionen in den Charakter des oder der Erwählten geprägten Zustand. 
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Dennoch ist die Verwendung altorientalischer Herrscherdarstellungen 
nicht sinnlos. Über die (nicht berücksichtigte) individuelle Physiognomie 
hinaus zeigt uns ein Porträt, ob ein Rollen-, ein idealisiertes oder ein realis-
tisches Porträt, wie sich eine bestimmte Person inszeniert hat bzw. insze-
niert wurde. Das sagt durchaus etwas über diese Person aus. Die Bilder 
sollten nur nicht willkürlich auf das Gesicht beschränkt werden, sondern 
uns das Bild so vorführen, wie es vom Auftraggeber bestellt wurde. Dann 
nämlich haben wir ein Bild Ramsesʼ II. oder Sanheribs, wie er sich selber 
sah oder wenigstens sehen wollte und wie er sich seiner Umgebung, seinen 
Höflingen und Untertanen präsentieren liess und wie diese ihn wahrzuneh-
men hatten. Damit haben wir in den allermeisten Fällen zwar keinen Zu-
gang zu individuellen Persönlichkeiten und zur Ereignisgeschichte im en-
geren Sinne. Aber wir haben einen Zugang zur Rolle, die sie spielten und in 
den Augen ihrer Umwelt wohl auch zu spielen hatten und auch spielen 
wollten. Irene Winter hat gezeigt, wie sich assyrische Herrscher analog zu 
den Texten, in denen sie sich als Richter und Priester, als Jagd- und 
Kriegshelden präsentieren, auch auf den Reliefs in diesen Rollen haben 
darstellen lassen.102 Wir gewinnen einen Zugang zum Faktum, dass den 
Trägern und Trägerinnen dieser Rollen und ihren Zuschauern und Zuschau-
erinnen die Rollen wichtiger waren als die Personen, die sie spielten. Kritik 
verdient – und das sei hier nochmals unterstrichen – einzig die übliche Pra-
xis der Sachbücher zur Bibel, dass häufig nur der Kopf dieser alt-
orientalischen Selbstdarstellungen gezeigt103 und der Körper weggelassen 
wird. Damit verstümmelt man in vielen Fällen die Selbstaussage jener Bil-
der. 
Indem man Körperhaltung und Inszenierung weglässt, frustriert man ei-
ne heutige Wahrnehmungsweise, denn „Akzeptanz findet unser (bzw. der) 
Körper als Mitteiler von Informationen in der Gegenwart vorrangig in der 
Bewegung. Nicht der Körper selbst als raumhaftes Gebilde soll gewertet 












                                                     
102  Winter 1997: 360-362. 
103  Das ist leider auch bei unserer Abb. l der Fall. 
104  Borrmann 1994: 212. Vgl. Fehr 1979; Magen 1986; Dominicus 1994. 
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Abb. 1. Ein Porträt des Königs Darius I. im Hibis-Tempel, Ägypten.  
Zeichnung Hildi Keel-Leu. Vgl. Gropp 1990: 60, Abb. 15. 
Abb. 2. Kreisrunde Kamee. Vgl. z.B. Riehm 21894: 1082. Ball 1899: 206;  
Jeremias 31916: 539 Abb. 247 mit Anm. 2. 
\\l 
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Der stumme Schrei – Kritische Überlegungen  
zu Emotionen als Untersuchungsfeld  
der altorientalischen Bildwissenschaft 
Dominik BONATZ 
Teil I 
Die schlechteste Sachlage ist, wenn Wissenschaft anfängt, sich mit Kunst zu 
betreffen. (Paul Klee) 
 
Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts entwickelte und prägte der Autodidakt Carl Huter 
(1861-1912) seine Lehre der Psycho-Physiognomik und Kallisophie (ethi-
sche Schönheitslehre). In Anlehnung an Johann Caspar Lavaters (1741-
1801) Theorie der Physiognomik propagierte Huter die Psycho-Physiogno-
mik als die primäre Wissenschaft, denn seiner Auffassung nach ist alles 
reale Erkennen zunächst an das Äußere der Dinge gebunden, so dass nie-
mand unmittelbar in das Innere schauen kann, sondern stets auf das Äußere 
angewiesen ist. 
Für die Emotionsforschung birgt diese Lehrauffassung Huters einen 
wichtigen Ansatz, welcher sich mit der Sichtbarkeit und Lesbarkeit von 
Emotionen befasst: das Äußere als Spiegel und Ausdruck innerer Gefühle.  
In Huters Lehre – nach seinem frühen Tod weitergeführt und zusam-
mengefasst von Amandus Kupfer (1879-1952, s. Kupfer 1963; 1964) – 
bildet das Empfinden die oberste Weltenergie, aus der alle Kraft hervorge-
gangen ist. Aus Empfinden entsteht das Sehnen, Wünschen und Wollen, 
das Bewusstsein. Der Wille wurzelt also im Empfinden.  
Das Empfinden steuert das Naturell des Menschen und dieses Naturell 
lässt sich gemäß Huter durch vergleichende Beobachtung der Gesichts-, 
Kopf-, und Körperform wie auch der Mimik, Gestik und Verhaltensweisen 
von Personen herauslesen. Huters physiognomische Körperkonstitutions-
lehre umfasst eine ganze Reihe von menschlichen, aber auch tierischen und 
pflanzlichen Naturellen, so das harmonische Naturell, das disharmonische 
Naturell, das Ernährungsnaturell, das Bewegungsnaturell und das Empfin-
dungsnaturell, wobei es zu Vermischungen zwischen diesen Grundnaturel-
len und Unternaturellen (wie dem Verbrecher- und Mephistonaturell als 
Unternaturell des disharmonischen Naturells) kommen kann. 
Mit frappierender Eindeutigkeit identifiziert Huter seine Menschennatu-
relle auch in der antiken Porträtkunst, wobei seine Nähe zu Winkelmann 
unverkennbar ist. Beispielhaft hierfür ist die Beschreibung einer Porträt-
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Statue des jugendlichen Kaiser Nero, die Amandus Kupfer in seinem Buch 
über die Lehre Huters zur Beschreibung des disharmonischen Naturells her-
anzieht: „Dem Körperbau des disharmonischen Naturells fehlt die edle 
Schönheit und Ausgeglichenheit und natürliche Elastizität der Formen. […] 
Man betrachte nur den versteiften Hals, der die erbliche Belastung verrät, 
ferner das hammerartige Kinn, das unschöne Gesicht, den niederen und 
breiten Schädel, das häßliche Ohr, das ochsenfellartige Haar – in allem liegt 
schwerste Disharmonie und Entartung, man könnte fast glauben, die Kari-
katur einer menschlichen Gestalt vor sich zu haben“ (Kupfer 1963: 72). 
Unzweifelhaft sind die Bildwissenschaften – auch die archäologischen – 
in der Beschreibung und Deutung porträthafter Bildnisse andere Wege ge-
gangen, haben sie laut Ingrid Weigel (2012: 6) ihr Interesse auf „Ansichten 
vom Gesicht jenseits der ausgetretenen Pfade der Physiognomie“ erweitert. 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte sind daher ebenso früh in der deutschen Vorder-
asiatischen Archäologie und Assyriologie vertretene Behauptungen, dass 
sich Volkszugehörigkeiten aus den physiognomischen Merkmalen mesopo-
tamischer Rundplastik herauslesen lassen und demnach Sumerer eine 
„kurzhalsige Nation mit fleischigen Nasen“ darstellten und Semiten an 
ihrer „hohen Stirn und semitischen Nase“ erkennbar seien (Meissner 1915: 
24, 39). 
Trotz berechtigter Kritik bleibt die Physiognomik Bestandteil von Stu-
dien zur antiken Körpergeschichte (z.B. Winter 1996 [2010]; Thommen 
2007; Vogel 2009; Nunn 2011), und auch Huters Psycho-Physiognomik hat 
den Weg in die Gegenwart gefunden. Die Methode hat heute zahlreiche 
Anhänger, das in Zürich angesiedelte Carl-Huter-Institut bildet in der Tra-
dition der Huterschen Hochschule unterschiedliche Interessenten in der 
Psychophysiognomik aus und wirbt um deren weltweite Anerkennung als 
natürliches Selbstfindungsverfahren. 
Ich möchte daher kurz bei Huter verweilen und seine Studien zum 
menschlichen Gesicht, genauer dem Untergesicht, zum Anlass nehmen, um 
daran einen kritischen Vergleich zu den uns überlieferten altorientalischen 
(insbes. assyrischen) Gesichtsartefakten anzustellen. Unter Gesicht verstehe 
ich dabei nicht nur das lebendige Gesicht, vielmehr auch die Maske, die ein 
Gesicht von sich produziert. Diese Differenzierung ist relevant für jedwede 
Bildbetrachtung, denn insbesondere im Bild, also dem was wir gemeinhin 
als ein Porträt bezeichnen, entsteht zwangsläufig eine Maske, hinter der das 
„echte“ Gesicht zurücktritt (Belting 2014: 29). 
Amandus Kupfer stellt bei Huters Psycho-Physiognomie des Unterge-
sichts folgende Merkmale heraus (vgl. Abb. 1): 
„Aus der Art der Gefühle (Mundregion) und aus der Art des Tatlebens 
(Kinn und Unterkiefer) ergibt sich die Einstellung eines Menschen gegen-
über der Mitwelt, also sein nach außen gerichtetes Benehmen. Dieses 
kommt an der von Huter bezeichneten feinen Einbuchtung zwischen Unter-
lippe und Kinn zum Ausdruck. Ist die Wölbung unter der Unterlippe schön 
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und geschwungen, so ist der Mensch ein Freund von edler Lebensart und 
gutem Benehmen. Wölbt sich aber diese Partie hart und unschön, so ist das 
Gegenteil der Fall. 
Aus der Art der Gefühle (Mund) und dem Charakter (Nase) ergibt sich 
die Art der Einschätzung und Einstellung der eigenen Persönlichkeit, also 
Bescheidenheit, Aufmerksamkeit, gütige Neigung und die entgegengesetz-
ten Eigenschaften: Egoismus, Selbstgefallen, Unaufmerksamkeit, Härte, 
Grausamkeit.“ (Kupfer 1963: 63-64) 
Da es sich dem Naturellschema von Huter/Kupfer zufolge um eine universale 
Beobachtung handelt, müsste sich eine an diesem Schema angelehnte prak-
tische Übung im Erkennen der im Untergesicht wirkenden Kräfte zum Bei-
spiel auch auf assyrische Bildwerke übertragen lassen. Bei der Gegenüber-
stellung mit der Untergesichtspartie eines bartlosen assyrischen Hofbeam-
ten (Abb. 2) träten demnach eindeutig positiv wirkende Kräfte zutage, näm-
lich „edle sinnliche Triebe und aristokratische Lebensart“, worüber es bei 
Huter/Kupfer ferner heißt: „dieses Untergesicht hat ein feines Gewebe, den 
schön geformten Unterkiefer und weichgeschwungene Lippen; man erkennt 
daran, dass die Geisteskraft Helioda und das damit sympathisierende, fein-
plastische Formen hervorrufende Od überwiegt. Der Mann mit dieser Bil-
dung des unteren Gesichts ist ritterlich im allgemeinen und in der Liebe ge-
gen das weibliche Geschlecht. Er tut einem Weib nie absichtlich Böses und 
vergilt ihm selbst Böses mit Gutem und Heroismus“ (Kupfer 1963: 63-64). 
Nun ist der zum Vergleich herangezogene Kopf aus der Zeit Assurnasir-
pals II. (883-858 v. Chr.) kein Einzelstück, unzählige assyrische Gesichter, 
vollplastisch oder im Relief, könnten uns weitere Auskünfte über die „assy-
rische Wesensart“ geben. Allein dass diese in der Mehrzahl bärtige Gesich-
ter sind, die ausdrucksstarke Kinnpartie also durch ein „höfisches“ Attribut 
kaschiert wird. Nichtsdestoweniger, die feinplastischen Formung des Ge-
sichts und die feingeschwungenen Lippen müssten bei all diesen Bildnissen 
für die gleiche edle Wesensart sprechen. Zieht man noch die gleichbleibend 
große und tendenziell geradlinige Nase hinzu, käme man zu einem weiteren 
positiven Urteil. Sie zeugt nach Huter/Kupfer von Verstand, Willens- und 
Tatkraft. „Je feiner und edler die Entwicklung, je schöner und edler bildet 
sich die Nase, – hier liegt das Geheimnis der Schönheit“, schreibt Kupfer 
(1963: 115) und liefert damit unwillentlich ein Plädoyer für die Rehabilitie-
rung der gemeinhin als brutal und aggressiv verschrienen Assyrer.  
Allerdings liegt es diesem Beitrag fern, eine Neubewertung assyrischer 
Selbstrepräsentation vorzunehmen. Die gewollt problematische Analogie 
zu Huters Psycho-Physiognomie verschafft mir vielmehr die Gelegenheit, 
auf die Gefahren hinzuweisen, die zwangsläufig entstehen, wenn Raster zur 
Ergründung antiker Körpersprache angesetzt werden, die erstens nicht 
bildwissenschaftlich fundiert sind (auch wenn sie wie im Fall der Physiog-
nomie visuell orientiert sind), zweitens aus einer eurozentrischen Körper- 
und Bildauffassung resultieren und drittens nicht den eigentlichen Bildbe-
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stand und seinen zeitgenössischen Kontext als Ausgangspunkt der Argu-
mentation wählen. 
So lohnt es sich, noch einmal auf die Darstellung assyrischer Gesichter 
zu fokussieren. Hierfür liefert das Naturellschema Huters aufgrund seiner 
starken Formalisierung ein praktisches Vergleichsinstrument, um aufzuzei-
gen, dass es in der Physiognomie dieser Gesichter keine Abweichungen 
gibt. Sie sind eindeutig stereotyp und unterliegen gestalterischen Konven-
tionen, die es schlichtweg ausschließen, dass darin menschliche Charakter-
eigenschaften und Emotionen zum Ausdruck gebracht wurden (vgl. Nunn 
2011: 126, 134). Der Beweis hierfür ist einfach: Die Gesichter der darge-
stellten Figuren ändern sich über Zeit und Raum nicht, sie behalten in allen 
unterschiedlichen Handlungszusammenhängen ihren gleichen, formal ver-
einheitlichten Ausdruck (Abb. 3). Es finden sich darin keine Gefühls-
regungen wie Freude, Zorn, Hass, Schmerz, Trauer oder Melancholie. Da-
mit ist nicht gesagt, dass sie ausdruckslos seien. Ihnen eignet im Gegenteil 
ein sehr strenger Ausdruck, der im Betrachter zwar unterschiedlich starke 
Emotionen hervorzurufen vermag, aus der Sicht des Dargestellten aber ein 
gleichbleibendes Merkmal des assyrischen Stils ist. Frontal betrachtet sind 
zum Beispiel die Gesichter eines assyrischen Königs und eines Lamassu, 
dem apotropäischen Türwächter neuassyrischer Paläste, völlig identisch 
(vgl. Abb. 4 und 5). Augenscheinlich handelt es sich dabei um eine inten-
dierte stilistische Ähnlichkeit, durch die die Nähe des Herrschers zu seiner 
übernatürlichen Schutzmacht zum Ausdruck gebracht wird, genauso wie 
sich in der Darstellung des Gottes in der geflügelten Sonnenscheibe 
(Abb. 6) die gleiche abbildhafte Beziehung offenbart. Nicht physiognomi-
sche Merkmale unterscheiden die verschiedenen Charaktere, sondern zei-
chenhafte Elemente wie Kleidung, Frisur, Attribute und Gesten (vgl. Winter 
1984). 
Ob bei der Begegnung zwischen Herrschern und Untergebenen und Un-
terworfenen, in den vielfältigen Schlacht- und Gewaltszenen, bei den Sie-
gesfeiern und Triumphszenen, bei den Statuen und Stelen, die den Herr-
schern vor den Symbolen seiner Götter zeigen – das Gesicht bleibt regungs-
los, obwohl hier Situationen geschildert werden, die starke Emotionen her-
vorgerufen haben müssen. Sie sind jedoch kein intendierter Gegenstand des 
bildnerischen Schaffens, genauso wenig wie die von Huter angesprochenen 
grundsätzlichen und durch unterschiedliche Lebensläufe geprägten Eigen-
schaften der Persönlichkeit eines Menschen bildlich thematisiert worden 
wären. Selbst hinter der vordergründigen Porträthaftigkeit assyrischer Herr-
scherdarstellungen steht nicht der Gedanke einer individuellen Persönlich-
keit, sondern ein Konzept der Repräsentation von Königtum und Herrschaft 
und göttlicher Ebenbildlichkeit (vgl. Winter 1997 [2010]; 2009). 
Assyrische Bildkunst ist allem voran Repräsentationskunst (Bonatz und 
Heinz, im Druck), was auch zu großen Teilen auf andere Gebiete und urba-
ne Epochen altorientalischer Bildkunst zutrifft. Wir müssen daher den In-
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tentionen der zeitgenössischen Bildauftraggebern Beachtung schenken, um 
zu verstehen, dass im Rahmen der ikonographischen Konventionen die 
Physiognomie von Gesichtern niemals die Darstellung von Emotionen ge-
golten hat. Huters Methodik mag zwar einen Referenzrahmen für die psy-
chologisierende Sicht auf die Physiognomie von zeitgenössischen Indivi-
duen liefern, als Instrument der bildwissenschaftlichen Betrachtung und der 
an Bildern interessierten Emotionsforschung taugt sie aber für das Altertum 
nicht. Sollten wir damit den Anspruch, Emotionen in der Ikonographie des 
Alten Orients zu erforschen, grundsätzlich ad acta legen oder gibt es andere 
Möglichkeiten, sich diesem Forschungsgebiet über bildliche Quellen zu 
nähern? 
Teil II 
Kunst gibt nicht das Sichtbare wieder, sondern macht sichtbar. (Paul Klee) 
 
Zweifellos bieten uns Gebärden als ein wichtiges Element der non-verbalen 
Kommunikation eine Möglichkeit, über die intendierte Sinnhaftigkeit emo-
tionaler Ausdrücke in der altorientalischen Ikonographie zu reflektieren. So 
liefert der im Übergang von der Späten Bronze- zur Eisenzeit entstandene 
Ahiram-Sarkophag aus der Nekropole von Byblos ein beredtes Zeugnis da-
für, dass die Darstellung von Emotionen Teil eines komplexen ikonogra-
phischen Programms sein kann. Im Rahmen einer Totenfeier erscheinen 
jeweils vier Frauen an den Schmalseiten des Sarkophags und stimmen mit 
eindeutigen Gesten zur Klage über den verstorbenen Herrscher im Haupt-
bild an der Seitenwand an: Zwei von ihnen schlagen sich mit den Händen 
an den Kopf, die anderen beiden fassen sich unter die Brust (Rehm 2004: 
49-51, Taf. 7, Abb. 8-10). Wir erkennen darin ein sehr expressives Bild 
starker emotionaler Trauer, das kulturell geprägt ist und seit der Antike bis 
in die Gegenwart von den Bildmedien aufgegriffen wird. 
Der Ahiram-Sarkophag ist jedoch trotz seiner ikonographischen Paralle-
len zur Sepulkralkunst in Ägypten, in der Ägäis und im syrischen Raum ein 
singuläres Monument. Um einen für unser Vorhaben ausreichenden Bildbe-
stand vor Augen zu haben, ist es daher erneut angebracht, auf das große 
ikonographische Repertoire assyrischer Bilder zurückzugreifen. Das histo-
risch-narrative Element der Darstellung und deren Einbettung in anschauli-
che Raum- und Zeitkonzepte ermöglichen dem Betrachter, damals wie 
heute, ein leichtes Wiedererkennen der hier geschilderten Ereignisse. Zur 
Unterstützung der Eindeutigkeit der Bildbotschaft verhilft eine differenzier-
te Gebärdensprache (Bonatz 2002: 146). Was und wieviel davon dem Be-
reich emotionaler Gestik zugeschrieben werden kann, sei hier kurz zusam-
mengefasst. 
Die im Corpus assyrischer Reliefarbeiten sichtbarste Geste emotionaler 
Gefühlsregung knüpft an die Darstellung auf dem Ahiram-Sarkophag an, 
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wenngleich ihr thematischer Hintergrund sich davon deutlich unterscheidet. 
In den Eroberungs- und Deportationsszenen der Reliefs Assurnasirpals II. 
(883-858 v. Chr.), also dem ältesten bildzyklischen Narrativ in einem neu-
assyrischen Palast, sind es vorweg Frauen der unterlegenen Seite, die sich 
angesichts des drohenden Unheils in einer vieldeutigen Gebärde der Ver-
zweiflung mit einer oder mit beiden Händen an den Kopf greifen (Abb. 7-
8). Vieldeutig heißt, dass hierin Gefühle von Schrecken und Angst, Trauer 
und Hoffnungslosigkeit zum Ausdruck gebracht sein können. Dies ist vor 
dem Hintergrund des geschilderten Ereignisses, das für die Betroffenen ein 
unmittelbares Grauen und den folgerichtigen Verlust von Freiheit, Sicher-
heit und womöglich dem eigenen Leben bedeutet, naheliegend und nach-
vollziehbar. Es ist das Tatsachenhafte, was in den assyrischen Bildern zur 
Sprache kommt. Nur bleibt zu überdenken, ob der Darstellung der Frauen 
in dieser Gebärde eine Intention zugrunde liegt, die vorrangig dem Erlebnis 
der Betroffenen Beachtung schenkt. Wenn eingangs bemerkt wurde, dass 
die assyrische Bildkunst Repräsentationskunst ist, so muss man bei der 
Einarbeitung dieses Details in ein assyrisches Bildnarrativ in erster Linie an 
die Intention der Bildauftraggeber denken. Was stellen die Frauen in ihrer 
Gebärde der Verzweiflung aus Sicht des Autors, nämlich des assyrischen 
Königs und der durch ihn verkörperten Staats- und unschlagbaren Sieger-
macht, wirklich dar? Dies ist die wesentliche Frage, um nach den Ursachen 
für die Darstellung von Emotionen auf diesem Gebiet altorientalischer 
Bildkunst zu forschen. Bevor ich jedoch diesen zentralen Punkt vertiefe, 
lohnt es sich, einen Blick auf ähnliche Darstellungen und deren Entwick-
lung bis ans Ende der neuassyrischen Zeit zu werfen. 
Nicht alleine Frauen verraten ihre Angst durch eine Gebärde der Hilflo-
sigkeit, auch Männer, die sich ergeben oder auf der Flucht sind, erheben 
häufig eine Hand schützend oder abwehrend vor den Kopf (Abb. 9). Auf 
einem Relief Tiglatpilesers III. (744-727 v. Chr.) findet sich dann bei einer 
Gruppe von Männern, die auf den Türmen stehend der Eroberung ihrer 
Stadt tatenlos entgegensehen, ein Repertoire an Gesten, das auch das Sich-
an-den-Kopf-Greifen beinhaltet (Abb. 10). Zwei dieser Männer und ein 
dritter, den ein Assyrer zu enthaupten im Begriff ist, erheben „flehentlich“ 
beide Hände. Die Gruppe verbildlicht, genauso wie die Frauen, Hilflosig-
keit und Verzweiflung, womit der Aspekt der Repräsentation an Deutlich-
keit gewinnt. Bezeichnend an dieser Szene ist zudem ihre Einbettung in 
eine Sequenz von Ereignissen: das Einbrechen der Mauern der Stadt durch 
schwere Kriegsmaschinerie, das Gemetzel unter den bereits ihrer Kleider 
beraubten Feinde der Assyrer am Fuße der Stadt und ihre Pfählung vor den 
Stadtmauern. Die einzigen Gegner, die in diesem Zerstörungschaos noch 
am Leben und demnach fähig zu emotionalen Gesten sind, sind die drei 
Männer auf den Stadttürmen. Sie repräsentieren als lebendige Zeugen die 
Unterlegenheit und Machtlosigkeit der Besiegten. 
Auch bei Sargon II. (721-705 v. Chr.) erscheinen Männer in gleicher 
Weise auf den Türmen einer eroberten Stadt, nur dass hier beide die Arme 
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in die Lüfte strecken, als wollten sie damit ihrer besonderen Hilflosigkeit 
Ausdruck verleihen (Botta und Flandin 1849-50: Taf. 64). Mit Sanherib 
(704-681 v. Chr.) jedoch ändert sich die thematische Konzeption an dieser 
Stelle des Bildnarratives. Die Männer auf den Türmen der eroberten Stadt 
Lachisch sind als aktive Verteidiger dargestellt, sie schießen mit Bogen und 
werfen mit Steinen auf ihre Angreifer, ohne diese allerdings zu treffen 
(Barnett, Bleibtreu und Turner 1998: Taf. 334, Abb. 430c). Gleiches findet 
sich auf allen anderen der von diesem Herrscher ins Bild gesetzten Stadt-
eroberungen, weshalb vermutet werden darf, dass dem Bild der noch wehr-
haften Verteidiger der Vorzug gegeben wurde, um die Stärke der Gegner 
anstelle ihrer Schwäche zu demonstrieren und somit die militärische Leis-
tung der Assyrer zu unterstreichen. 
Bei Assurbanipal (668-631 v. Chr.) tritt dann unter den Stadtverteidi-
gern erneut die Gebärde der Hilflosigkeit mit den hochgereckten Armen in 
Erscheinung. Sie erscheint analog zu Darstellungen in der Schlacht, worin 
fliehende Feinde mit rückgewandtem Körper beide Hände flehentlich von 
sich strecken (Barnett, Bleibtreu und Turner 1998:  Taf. 289, Abb. 381b). 
Darin lässt sich auch ein zeitliches Moment erkennen, der Augenblick der 
völligen Selbstaufgabe. 
Das semantische Feld der an diesen Beispielen aufgezeigten Emotionen 
reicht von panischen Reaktionen wie Angst, Verzweiflung, Schmerz bis hin 
zu Gefühlen der Ohnmacht, Hilflosigkeit und Schutzlosigkeit. Sie sind im 
Kontext der dargestellten Handlungen unausweichliches Moment der psy-
chischen Erfahrung und mit den Zeichen der Gebärdensprache auch effekt-
voll ins Bild gesetzt. Dennoch, der Auftrag dieser Bilder ist nicht, mensch-
liche Emotionen in extremen Lebenssituationen zu schildern. Wenn es darum 
ginge, wäre das Spektrum der möglichen Emotionen in der weitgefächerten 
Thematik assyrischer Bilder weitaus größer, als es die Darstellungen tat-
sächlich wiedergeben. Stattdessen wirkt ein Großteil der Bilder ausgespro-
chen emotionslos, auch wenn ihre Handlung auf starke emotionale Situati-
onen verweist. Deshalb ist anzunehmen, dass Emotionen nur dann ver-
bildlicht wurden, wenn sie der Repräsentation der assyrischen Macht dien-
ten. Bezeichnenderweise werden wir nicht fündig, wenn wir nach starken 
emotionalen Gebärden auf Seiten der Assyrer Ausschau halten. Allein die 
unterlegenen Gegner zeigen Emotionen. Sie werden dargestellt, weil sie in 
der Semiotik assyrischer Bilder ein Zeichen für die Schwäche der Anderen 
spiegelbildlich zur Stärke der Assyrer sind. In diesem Zusammenhang sind 
die assyrischen Kriegsreliefs Paradebeispiele einer maskierten Wirklich-
keit, die eindeutige Parallelen zur modernen Bildpropaganda aufweist. 
Es sind nicht viele altorientalische Beispiele, die sich zu diesem Thema 
finden lassen, und die hier angeführten stellen wohl die wenigen eindeutig 
für uns erkennbaren dar. Dennoch denke ich, dass es aufschlussreich sein 
kann, hierüber weiter zu forschen, eben aus dem Grund der Ursache für die 
Darstellung von Emotionen im Kontext repräsentativer Bildkunst. Wann 
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wurden sie dargestellt und warum? Anstelle eines weiteren Fazits möchte 
ich daher diesen Aufsatz mit einem Ausblick auf das Thema abschließen. 
Teil III 
Die Art und Weise, in der die menschliche Sinneswahrnehmung sich orga-
nisiert – das Medium, in dem sie erfolgt – ist nicht nur natürlich, sondern 
auch geschichtlich bedingt. (Walter Benjamin) 
 
Was im Rahmen dieses bildgeschichtlichen Diskurses bislang nicht berück-
sichtigt wurde, für die ikonographische Analyse jedoch unerlässlich ist, 
sind die schriftlichen Quellen, die ob explizit oder implizit mit den Bild-
zeugnissen in Verbindung stehen. Die Intermedialität von Bild und Text 
stellt insbesondere für den assyrischen Bereich ein hermeneutisches Kern-
problem dar. Beide Medien sind auf vielfältige Weise inhaltlich und formal 
miteinander verbunden, ob auf beschrifteten Bildmonumenten oder durch 
den indirekten Bild-Text-Bezug, wobei ihre Funktionen jedoch sehr unter-
schiedlich sein können und Homologien in der visuellen und textlichen 
Botschaft nicht automatisch gegeben sind (z.B. Russell 1999). Aus bild-
hermeneutischer Sicht stellt sich häufig die Frage, inwieweit Darstellungs-
momente und -aspekte durch schriftliche Zeugnisse erklärt oder überhaupt 
erst erkennbar gemacht werden. Hierunter fällt auch die Möglichkeit, nach 
Ausdrücken für Emotionen in den Texten zu forschen und diese in Relation 
zu den bildlichen Zeugnissen kritisch zu erfassen. 
Einen Ansatz hierfür bietet der Reliefzyklus Assurbanipals, der den 
Feldzug gegen den elamischen Feind Teumman und seine babylonisch-
chaldäischen Alliierten behandelt. Zu diesen Reliefs, die sowohl im Süd-
west-Palast als auch im Nord-Palast in Ninive angebracht waren, existiert 
ein umfangreiches Schriftwerk, das außer den Annalen auch sog. Beischrif-
ten umfasst, also kurze Szenenbeschreibungen, die zum einen gleich 
Sprechblasen in einem Comic-Strip direkt in die Bildhandlung eingebunden 
waren,  zum anderen aber auch als separate Texte auf Tontafeln archiviert 
wurden (Weidner 1932-33; Borger 1996). Womöglich stellen letztere 
schriftlich skizzierte Bildvorstellungen dar, von denen lediglich ein Teil bei 
der Ausführung der Reliefs umgesetzt wurde. Eine dieser Beischriften ent-
wirft folgendes Bild:  
„Ich, Assurbanipal, der König von Assyrien, zog mit dem abgeschnittenen 
Kopf Teummans, des Königs von Elam, den ich unter dem Beistande 
Assurs erlangt hatte, freudig in Ninive ein.“ (Weidner 1932-33: 13.44-46) 
Ein Relief mit Darstellung dieser Szene ist nicht bekannt, doch können ver-
gleichbare Triumphszenen des assyrischen Königs herangezogen werden 
(Abb. 11), um darüber zu befinden, ob die im Text erwähnte Freude des 
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Herrschers im Bild sichtbar wird. Explizit scheint dies zunächst nicht der 
Fall zu sein. Implizit bedeutet jedoch Freude ein Wort mit weiten Konnota-
tionen und kann der emotionale Ausdruck dafür sehr verschieden sein, 
weshalb in der triumphalen Würde und distanzierten Erhabenheit des assy-
rischen Herrschers im Bild auch ein tiefer Ausdruck seiner Freude gesehen 
werden könnte. 
Ähnlich verhält es sich mit der Inthronisation des elamischen Vasallen-
königs Ummanigash, eine demonstrative politische Handlung, die in Elam 
im Auftrag des assyrischen Königs durchgeführt wurde. Das Ereignis ist 
auf einem Relief aus dem Südwestpalast in Ninive dargestellt (Barnett, 
Bleibtreu und Turner 1998: Taf. 304-305): Der elamische Vasallenkönig 
wird von einem ranghohen assyrischen Soldaten an der Hand vor die sich 
unterwerfenden Elamer, darunter eine Gruppe von Musikanten, aus der 
Stadt Madaktu geführt. In der Beischrift zu dieser Szene heißt es:  
„Ummanigasch, der Flüchtling, den Diener, der meine Füße erfasst hatte, 
ließ auf meine Anordnung hin voll Freuden in das Land Susa und das Land 
Madaktu mein General (Abgeordneter), den ich ausgesandt hatte, einziehen 
und ihn Platz nehmen auf dem Throne Teummans, den meine Hände über-
wältigt hatten.“ (Weidner 1932-33: 17.11-14) 
„Voll Freuden“ sind mithin die Worte, die unsere Aufmerksamkeit verlan-
gen und bei denen es sich fragt, inwieweit sie in der bildlichen Darstellung 
zum Ausdruck gelangten. Zwar ist hier Freude weder aus den Gesichtern 
noch den Gesten den beteiligten Personen abzulesen, doch könnte sie als 
intendiertes Moment einer rituell-inszenierten Handlung verstanden werden 
und damit als ein reales Moment der zeitgenössischen Bildbotschaft. 
Das Ereignis, das der Zeremonie in Madaktu vorausgeht, ist die 
Schlacht am Ulai, in der Teumman besiegt und enthauptet wird (die Lei-
chen dieser Schlacht treiben im Fluss entlang des unteren Bildrands des 
Madaktu-Reliefs). Seine Kopftrophäe wird anschließend nach Ninive über-
führt und dort als Symbol des assyrischen Triumphes von Assurbanipal 
effektvoll in Szene gesetzt (Bonatz 2004). Hierzu berichtet eine der Bei-
schriften:  
„Nabu-damiq und Umbadara, die Vornehmen, die Teumman, der König von 
Elam, mit einer frechen Botschaft geschickt hatte und die ich in vollem 
Zorn über ihren Herrn vor mir zurückgehalten hatte, den Kopf Teummans, 
ihres Herrn, den man herbeigebracht hatte, sahen sie vor mir. Umbadara 
raufte seinen Bart, Nabu-damiq durchbohrte mit seinem eisernen Gürtel-
dolche seinen Leib.“ (Weidner 1932-33: 12.37-43) 
Das Ende dieser Szene beinhaltet zwei sehr starke emotionale Reaktionen 
seitens der ehemaligen Verbündeten Teummans, für die der Textautor auch 
starke, bildhafte Worte wählt. Leider findet sich hierfür kein entsprechen-
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des Relief, weshalb es nicht möglich ist, darüber zu entscheiden, ob Text 
und Bild kongruent sind, wenn es um die Beschreibung und Darstellung 
von Emotionen geht. Es existiert jedoch eine Darstellung aus der gleichen 
Ereignisserie, welche den gambuläischen König Dunanu zeigt, der bei der 
Prozession Assurbanipals nach Arbela den Kopf des Teumman um den 
Nacken gehängt bekommt (Abb. 12). In dieser Szene, in deren Hintergrund 
die Folterung von Gefangenen stattfindet, sieht man, wie ein anderer Gam-
buläer mit einer heftigen Geste auf Dunanu einwirkt, ihn anscheinend zu 
schlagen droht. Der konkrete Inhalt dieser Auseinandersetzung lässt sich 
ohne textlichen Bezug nicht benennen. Man erahnt jedoch, dass es sich um 
eine emotionale Überreaktion handelt, für die der Kontext der Szene genü-
gend Anlässe bietet und bei der sich die vorherige Beobachtung zu bestäti-
gen scheint, dass starke emotionale Reaktionen dann ins Bild gesetzt wur-
den, wenn sie zur Kennzeichnung der Schwäche und Ohnmacht von Fein-
den dienten. 
Seitens der Assyrer, geschweige denn des assyrischen Herrschers, sind 
vergleichbare heftige Gefühlsausbrüche nicht zu beobachten. Deswegen 
erstaunt es, in einer der Beischriften folgende Reaktion Assurbanipals be-
schrieben zu bekommen: 
„Den Kopf Teummans, des Königs von Elam: mit Dolchmessern die sehnen 
seines Gesichtes durchschnitt ich (Assurbanipal) und spie auf ihn.“ (Weidner 
1932-33: 11.35-36) 
Der Hass des assyrischen Königs auf seinen elamischen Feind, der in dieser 
symbolischen Handlung zum Ausdruck kommt, findet offensichtlich keinen 
Eingang in das Narrativ der Bilder. Kritische Stimmen mögen anmerken, 
dass hier eine archäologische Überlieferungslücke vorliegen könnte und 
wir tatsächlich nicht wissen, ob die Szene nicht doch dargestellt wurde. Ich 
halte dem jedoch dagegen, dass die assyrische Bildideologie keinen Raum 
für derart mächtige Gefühlsausbrüche des assyrischen Königs lässt. Was 
für die Nachwelt bleibt, ist ein allein im Text imaginiertes Bild, das sich 
aber mit vielen anderen Bildern vergleichen lässt, die uns real vor Augen 
stehen (Abb. 13): der stumme Schrei eines seines Körpers beraubten Ge-
sichts, das zur Maske geworden, nun mit durchtrennten Sehnen und be-
schmutztem Antlitz auch die letzten Züge seiner menschlichen Würde ver-
liert. Es ist der stumme Schrei der Gemordeten, Gequälten und Gedemütig-
ten. Ein Schrei, der bis heute wortlos verhallt, denn nichts von dem, was 
uns die assyrischen Bilder sichtbar machen, dient dem Respekt der mensch-
lichen Natur. Auf dieser Ebene der Bildanalyse erscheint die Darstellung 
von Emotionen als ausgesprochen emotionslos. Sie ist trügerisch in ihrem 
Schein, die Wirklichkeit zu präsentieren, und dafür umso bezeichnender in 
dem, was sie nicht zeigt. Dies ist das Kernproblem einer Emotionsfor-
schung, die sich kritisch dem Bereich des Alten Orients zuwendet und da-
bei die bildliche Evidenz vor Augen hat.  
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Abb. 1. Die im Untergesicht wirkenden Kräfte (nach Huter). Links: grobe, 
sinnliche Triebe und Kraft, rechts: edle sinnliche Triebe und aristokratische 
Lebensart (aus Kupfer 1963: 65, Fig. 8 und 9). 
 
 
Abb. 2. Königlicher Bediensteter, Nimrud/Kalhu, Nordwest-Palast, ca. 865-
860 v. Chr. (Foto: Simone Haack, British Museum, Detail von WA 118927). 




Abb. 3. Assyrische „Gesichter“, alle Nimrud/Kalhu, Nordwest-Palast, ca. 865-860 v. Chr. 
Von oben links: König (Foto: Simone Haack, British Museum, Detail von WA 124549) , 
Kronprinz (Foto: Simone Haack, British Museum, Detail von WA 124549), königlicher 
Bediensteter (Foto: Simone Haack, British Museum, Detail von WA 118928), königlicher 
Bediensteter (Foto: Simone Haack, British Museum, Detail von WA 118927), geflügelter 
Genius (Foto: Simone Haack, British Museum, Detail von WA 118876), König (Foto: 
Simone Haack, British Museum, Detail von WA 118928). 
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Abb. 4. Kopf eines geflügelten, menschenköpfigen Löwen, Nimrud/Kalhu, 
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Abb. 5. Assurnasirpal II. (883-858 v. Chr.), Nimrud/Kalhu, 
Tempel der Ištar Šarrat-niphi (Foto: Simone Haack, British 
Museum, Detail von WA 118871).  
 
Abb. 6. Assyrischer Hauptgott (Assur oder Schamasch) in 
der geflügelten Sonnenscheibe Nimrud/Kalhu, Nordwest-
Palast, ca. 865-860 v. Chr. (Foto: Simone Haack, British 
Museum, Detail von WA 124531). 
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Abb. 7. Deportation von Frauen aus einer eroberten Stadt. Nimrud/Kalhu, 
Nordwest-Palast, ca. 865-860 v. Chr. (Foto: Simone Haack, British Museum, 
Detail von WA 124552). 
 
 
Abb. 8. Frauen auf dem Turm einer belagerten Stadt. Nimrud/Kalhu, Nordwest-Palast, 
ca. 865-860 v. Chr. (Foto: Simone Haack, British Museum, Detail von WA 124552). 
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Abb. 9. Fliehende Feinde. Nimrud/Kalhu, Nordwest-Palast, ca. 865-860 v. Chr. (Foto: 
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Abb. 10. Eroberung einer Stadt. Nimrud/Kalhu, Zentralpalast, ca. 740-735 v. Chr. (British 
Museum, WA 115634+118903, aus Orthmann 1975: Abb. 214). 
 
 
Abb. 11. Triumphzug in Babylonien, Ninive, Nord-Palast, ca. 653-652 v. Chr. (British 
Museum, WA. 124946, aus Orthmann 1975: Abb. 239). 
 
 
72 DOMINIK BONATZ 
 
Abb. 12. Disput unter zwei gefangenen Gambuläern, Ninive, Südwestpalast, ca. 653-652 
v.  Chr. (British Museum, Detail von WA 124802, aus Barnett, Bleibtreu und Turner 1998: 
Taf. 312, Abb. 385c). 
 
 
Abb. 13. Abgeschlagene Köpfe von babylonischen Gegnern, Ninive, Südwest-Palast, ca. 
640-620 v. Chr. (Foto: Simone Haack, British Museum, Detail von WA 124825).  
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Visualization of Emotions – Potentials and Obstacles 
A Response to Dominik Bonatz 
Elisabeth WAGNER-DURAND 
1. Avant-propos1 
The anthropologist Catherine Lutz has written: “emotions are anything but 
natural”,2 which contradicts the idea that there are universal emotions that 
have only limited, controllable, and transcultural display. If we accept 
Lutz’s statement, then research on emotions in ancient and therefore for-
eign visual cultures might be even more challenging than one might expect. 
Thus, one has to look not only for any emotional display in the visual cul-
tures of the ancient Near East but also for their culturally specific under-
standing and their culturally specific triggers. 
Based on the assumption that emotions have a physiological basis and 
that their stimuli or catalysts, perceptions and displays are at least partly 
socioculturally determined (see Fig. 1), there are many obstacles to face. 
Before beginning the discussion of when, how, and why emotions material-
ize in visual cultures, however, we are left with the question of what we 
mean when talking about emotions. 
2. Definitions and Disagreements 
2.1. Emotions – a question of common sense? 
The term emotion, in contrast to words such as affection, passion, and de-
sire, has only been in use for two hundred years.3 Many seem to believe, 
however, that the understanding of emotion(s) is universal and that it has a 
common meaning. Recently, Reisenzein and Müller wrote that one may be 
deceived into believing that if one feels an emotion, one would know exact-
ly what this emotion constitutes: 
 
                                                     
1  This response should not be mistaken for a comprehensive introduction to emotion and 
archaeology or emotion and visual studies. The author neither strives for this nor feels in 
any way suited for such an attempt. This stated, a very good introduction to the issue of ar-
chaeology and emotion research can be found in Tarlow 2000 and more recently Tarlow 
2012. 
2  Lutz 1988: 5. 
3  For a history of the term emotion, see Dixon 2012. 




Fig. 1. Emotions – a tentative approach to visualizing their 
multifaceted character (by the author). 
„Man könnte meinen, wer selbst zum Beispiel Angst empfinde, wisse eo ip-
so, was Angst sei; mit dem Erleben von Angst sei ihm auch schon der Be-
griff der Angst gegeben. […] Im Übrigen wäre die Annahme, das Erlebnis 
bringe eo ipso den Begriff mit sich, für einigermaßen anspruchsvolle menta-
le Begriffe schon viel weniger plausibel.“4 
In this vein, many cultural scholars, such as Dominik Bonatz,5  tend to un-
derstand the term emotion broadly, avoiding distinct definitions. Whether 
Bonatz is hesitant to define the term or assumes that emotion has a com-
mon meaning, he is in very good company. By talking, for example, about 
despair and pain, he names both a mood and a sensation that could be dis-
tinguished from the range of emotions – a distinction that may be valid to 
                                                     
4  Reisenzein / Müller 2012: 9. Further, they wrote: “Freilich gehören Emotionswörter zum 
Vokabular von Menschen, die selbst Enttäuschung, Freude, Furcht und andere Emotio-
nen erleben. Daraus folgt aber nicht, man habe allein aufgrund des eigenen Erlebens 
auch Begriffe von Emotion, Enttäuschung, Freude, Furcht usw.” 
5  Bonatz in this volume. 
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some and insignificant to others. From a psychologist’s or neurologist’s 
point of view, however, we are not talking about the distinction between 
tomayto-tomahto, but tomayto-potayto, when discussing moods, sensation 
and emotions.6 To explain the hesitation about or even resistance to defini-
tions with respect to emotions, archaeologist Sarah Tarlow wrote of the 
‘risk of losing some of the richness of what emotion language means in 
everyday life’.7 Historians Rom Harré and W.G. Parrot considered the re-
strictive power of (mainly psychological) definitions, stating that ‘precision 
is good, but omission can be bad’.8 That may be especially true for histori-
cal and cultural scholars, who study specific historical contexts, cultures, 
and their emotional worlds. In an introduction to the psychology of emo-
tions, even psychologists W.-U. Meyer, A. Schützwohl, and R. Reisenzein 
stated that a strict definition might often be neither helpful, possible, nor 
needed.9 As much as I understand their position, however, it also prevents 
us from finding a common language and understanding. Even if we assume 
that we mostly talk not only about neuronal and bodily functions and pro-
cesses but also about perceived, reasoned, reflected, and asserted feelings 
and moods, we should state our awareness with respect to terminology 
about emotions. That by no means implies that we are restricted to those 
emotions defined by psychology or neurology, as long as we make our-
selves clear about the terminology we use. Mutual understanding is also 
necessary to maintain a dialogue between the humanities and other disci-
plines and to demonstrate that we have something to contribute to the re-
search on emotions. By considering definitions to be a helpful tool to en-
sure mutual understanding and by drawing on the strengths of our own 
fields, we might show how cultural and social settings influence emotional 
lifeworlds and their display, the latter being the focus of this workshop. 
To summarize, it can be said that a shared definition of the term emo-
tion, despite its discussed ambiguity, both in daily life and in scholarly 
discourse, essentially facilitates fruitful discussions on emotions and their 
display in ancient Near Eastern cultures. 
                                                     
6  Still, there is no consensus in psychology or related disciplines. Carrol Izard recently 
reviewed psychologists’ ideas of emotions and joined all the basic elements cited into 
one idea: “Emotion consists of neural circuits (that are at least partially dedicated), re-
sponse systems, and a feeling state/process that motivates and organizes cognition and 
action. Emotion also provides information to the person experiencing it, and may in-
clude antecedent cognitive appraisals and ongoing cognition including an interpretation 
of its feeling state, expressions or social-communicative signals, and may motivate ap-
proach or avoidant behavior, exercise control/regulation of responses, and be social or 
relational in nature” (Izard 2010: 367).  
7  Tarlow 2000: 713. 
8  Harré / Parrott 1996: 4. Further, “there is a tension between theorists’ need for clarity 
and their need not to stray too far from the everyday category they initially set out to ex-
plain.” 
9  Meyer / Schützwohl / Reisenzein 2001: esp. 23.  
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2.2. A selected working definition from psychology 
Despite their reluctance with respect to definitions, which may – at least 
partly – be caused by the abundance of psychological definitions that depend 
on crucial aspects such as stimuli, cognition, experience (affective aspect), 
behavior, function, and so on10, Reisenzein, Meyer, and Schützenwohl have 
provided a working definition that understands an emotion as a time-
limited, distinct incident (such as joy, sadness, anger, or fear) (see Fig. 2).11 
This must be a current psychological state of an individual, possessing a 
distinct quality, intensity, and duration. It tends to be object oriented and 
disposes of aspects of experience, physiology, and behavior.12  
 
Fig. 2. Defining aspects of emotions. Adapted from Meyer, 
Schützwohl / Reisenzein 2001: 24. 
Some aspects of this definition or other definitions influence our specific 
understanding of emotions and, in turn, their potential visualization. Thus, 
feelings could, for example, be distinguished from emotions by under-
                                                     
10  For an overview of psychological definitions until the early eighties see Kleinginna / 
Kleinginna 1981. A clear and plain introduction to the term emotion can be found in 
Uhrig 2015: 27-35. 
11  As well as envy, pride, surprise, pity, shame, guilt, jealousy, disappointment, and relief. 
12  Meyer / Schützwohl / Reisenzein 2001: 24. On pages 24-36, this definition is explained 
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standing them as the experience of emotions. Simplifying statements by 
neurologist A. Damasio’s remarks on the procedural links between emo-
tions and feelings, one could argue that in his opinion, emotions are not 
perceived until they are felt.13 Furthermore, and according to the definition 
given above, emotions have a distinct time frame that might, depending on 
its defined limits, exclude moods such as being in love, pathological condi-
tions such as being depressed, and distinct, long-term cultural (group) phe-
nomena such as the so-called German Angst.14 Moreover, emotions influ-
ence both physiology and behavior; both may be visually displayed. 
2.3. Disagreements: “Two households both alike in dignity”15 
Less surprising, there is no agreement on a definition of emotion, even 
among those cultural and anthropological scholars who offer definitions. 
Anthropologist and ethnologist Birgitt Röttger-Rössler16 and archaeologist 
Sarah Tarlow both describe two fundamental positions: Tarlow calls them 
the “biological essentialist” and the “social constructivist” position.17 The 
former basically holds to the idea of primary and basic emotions18 that are 
(evolutionarily) biological in nature, culturally influenced but not culturally 
determined.19 The latter pole is represented by those who strongly empha-
size cultural and social aspects of emotions.20 The two poles seem to have 
moved toward each other in recent years, suggesting that both approaches 
might be valuable for deepening our understanding of emotions.21 
                                                     
13  Damasio 1999: 283-284. Note that Damasio, who is concerned with the self and the 
proto-self, distinguishes between ‘having a feeling’ and ‘knowing a feeling’. Interesting-
ly, William James’ late 19th century’s theory on emotions stated that emotion are none 
other than the perception (i.e., the feeling) of the physical reaction released by a specific 
trigger. See Meyer / Schützwohl / Reisenzein 2001: 138. 
14  The literature on German Angst is broad. See, for example, Wierzbicka 1999: 123-167. 
15  Quoted from the first line of the Prologue of William Shakespeare’s The Tragedy of 
Romeo and Juliet. 
16  Röttger-Rössler 2004: esp. 7. Later on, in another context, Röttger-Rössler and others 
describe two approaches from biology and psychology: theories “of basic emotions that 
focus on innate biological mechanisms” and “theories focusing on appraisals – the so-
called appraisal theories – because these can be brought in to explain the cultural and 
semantic modification of biological emotional processes” Engelen et al. 2009: 23. These 
approaches can be compared to, but in my opinion, not equated with Tarlow’s two poles 
described above. 
17  Tarlow 2000: 714. 
18  The range and number of primary emotions whose functions are often seen in an evolu-
tionary perspective are still debated. 
19  Röttger-Rössler 2004: 7. 
20  For further examples of these poles, see Röttger-Rössler 2004; see also Tarlow 2000: 
715ff. 
21  See the volume edited by Markowitsch / Röttger-Rössler (2009), especially the contribu-
tion by Engelen et al. (2009). 
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2.4. Emotions as social practices 
With respect to the latter pole, anthropologist Michelle Z. Rosaldo once 
stated that “Feelings are not substances to be discovered in our blood but 
social practices organized by stories that we both enact and tell.”22 Further-
more, she stated that emotions are: 
“self-concerning, partly physical responses that are at the same time aspects 
of a moral or ideological attitude; emotions are both feelings and cognitive 
constructions, linking person, action, and sociological milieu”.23 
Well aware of Rosaldo’s contributions to the field, cultural psychologists 
Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama defined emotions as: 
“a set of socially shared scripts composed of various processes – physiolog-
ical, subjective, and behavioral – that develop as individuals actively (per-
sonally and collectively) adapt and adjust to their immediate sociocultural, 
semiotic environment. Emotions allow and foster this adoption and they re-
sult from it.”24 
Thus, emotions constitute social practices that we should incorporate in our 
research as cultural scholars, since those practices shape societies and are 
reshaped by them. These observations of the bodily aspects as well as the 
sociocultural nature of emotion should lead us to look at the diversity, not 
at the simplicity, of human emotional display in ancient cultures. By re-
fraining from prefabricated and non-art historical approaches, Dominik 
Bonatz follows such an approach.25 By recognizing gestures as one possible 
universal display of emotion, however, his approach also tacitly tends to-
ward the essentialist perspective.26 
3. On the Significance of Emotions: Any Agreements after All? 
Despite these fundamental incongruities, there are aspects one might agree 
upon. First, emotions are essential to human beings, to our self and con-
sciousness as well as to our decisions. Damasio stated that the self is (at 
least partly) shaped by our (bodily) feelings and the (conscious) reflection 
of the feeling.27 Whether one follows Damasio’s theory or not, one might at 
                                                     
22  Rosaldo 1984: 143. 
23  Levy 1983: 128. Levy cites Rosaldo’s (unpublished) conference organizing paper in his 
opening paper of the Ethos volume on shame and guilt. 
24  Kitayama / Markus 1994: 339-440. 
25  Bonatz in this volume. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Damasio 1999. 
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least agree on the importance of emotions in human decision making, 
whether conscious or not. After all, emotions affect all areas of human life, 
from politics to religion and from private matters to scientific research.  
Moving into the arena of visual culture studies, the second aspect one 
might agree upon – going admittedly in a different direction – is that emo-
tions and visual culture are strongly connected. Images potentially render 
emotions visible; they condense them and evoke them in human beings. 
Christiane Kruse writes that one function of images28 is the evocation of 
emotions.29 In this purpose of images lies one of their powers: they are able 
to elicit emotions and corresponding reactions in the observer. Alfred Gell 
spoke of distributed personhood and primary as well as secondary agents.30 
Taking the role and form of secondary agents, images are enabled to release 
emotions in humans. How and why these emotions are released depends on 
several factors: situation, intention, reception and so on. Some emotions 
evoked may be intended by those who created the images; some may grow 
out of the cultural and social foreignness of the particular images. In his 
talk Dominik Bonatz assumed that the Assyrian aladlammu sculptures (see 
Fig. 3) elicited emotions in the observer31. He further states that narrative 
visual situations must have evoked strong emotional reactions as well.32 
I strongly agree with both perspectives. Bonatz also questions the inten-
tionality of this effect, however, when he assumes that those emotions were 
not the intended objective of these images. In my opinion, one of the strong 
representational powers and impacts of Neo-Assyrian images is their inten-
tion to provoke emotions in the observer. 
Thus, images, as always, create a sphere of ambivalence. On the one 
hand, there is the potential to encapsulate emotions in visual media; on the 
other hand there is the visual crystallization of human cultural and social 
specificity. 
 
4. Obstacles to Face 
It is the visualization of emotions that we focus on in this workshop. With-
out a doubt, many will have objections to this research, and there are many 
obstacles we must overcome. To some obstacles we will not find an easy 
                                                     
28  Those functions encompass representation, communication, and reflection (plus several 
sub-functions, amongst them evocation of emotions and affects). See Kruse 2003: 42. 
One should note that she herself refers to paintings from 1100-1650. 
29  Subsumed under reflection and communication; see Kruse 2003: 42. 
30  Primary agents are “intentional beings who are categorically distinguished from ‘mere’ 
things or artefacts”, secondary agents are “arfacts, dolls, cars, works of art, etc. through 
which primary agents distribute their agency in the causal milieu, and thus render their 
agency effective” (Gell 1998: 20). 
31  Bonatz oral communication. 
32  Bonatz in this volume. 
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Fig. 3. Human-headed winged lion. Metropolitan Mu-
seum of Art no. 32.143.1–.2, www.metmuseum.org. 
 
solution. Still, that should not prevent us from engaging with the subject 
matter, and it does not preclude us from examining possible approaches and 
interpretations. Some of these obstacles will be discussed below. 
4.1. What releases emotions? 
First, we are faced with questions of what releases emotions, which emo-
tions are released, and what do we feel when an emotion is triggered? An 
often unexpressed human ethological assumption, of the very same tenor 
and attitude that Dominik Bonatz described and criticized in Carl Huter’s 
and Amandus Kupfer’s approaches,33 is that people tend to think that some-
                                                     
33  See Bonatz in this volume. 
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thing they fear is feared by others as well. Therefore, many assume that 
images or visualized situations that evoke fear in them did the same in an-
cient people (see Fig. 4). There are probably universal triggers for fear, 
such as facing death, but there might also be culturally specific and even 
individual catalysts:34 We know that the Semai fear many natural phenome-
na.35 While they might feel fear upon seeing a butterfly, which is under-
stood as a supernatural appearance predicting mischief,36 Europeans would 
rather experience the joy of nature, based on a romantic understanding of 
the world. Another example is the Maori, who – at least culturally – seem 
to be devoid of the concept of soldierly fear. They do believe that if a war-
rior feels or even worse, displays this kind of fear, this fear does not come 
from within the person but is brought in from the outside; it is inflicted on 
the warrior by some atua because of a tapu.37 
Thus, when we assume we can identify the expression of fear, whether 
in the face, in gestures, or in body movements, we must be aware that the 
primary assessment of the situation that triggered this display is our very 
own. Therefore, we need to check whether this is congruent with the emic 
view of the society that created the image. That may actually be the case 
with Assyrian society, of which we have the luxury of written sources relat-
ing situations that trigger emotions as well as emotions that were emically 
assumed to be noteworthy. Exactly this latter point is found in Dominik 
Bonatz’s notion that emotions may not have been displayed ad personam in 
Assyrian art except to reveal the weakness of the defeated enemy (see 
Fig. 4). 
4.2. ‘Hypercognized’ and ‘hypocognized’ emotions 
Once an emotion is triggered, we still do not know how it was perceived in 
antiquity or how it was felt, understood, and socially validated. In this vein, 
psychiatrist and anthropologist Robert Levy spoke of ‘hypercognized’ – 
socioculturally relevant – and ‘hypocognized’ – socio-culturally irrelevant or 
subdued – emotions, which differ from society to society.38 Thus, emotions 
                                                     
34  Research has shown that emotional reactions to so-called neutral stimuli can be condi-
tioned. In times when ethics were rarely an issue in psychological experiments, Watson 
and Rayner conducted their quite famous, but undoubtedly unethical experiment with 
baby/toddler Albert, conditioning him to experience fear when exposed to formerly neu-
tral stimuli. Meyer / Schützwohl / Reisenzein 2001: 79-86. 
35  Robarchek 1979. 
36  “Joking about or laughing at a butterfly angers Ngku and thus is an invitation to certain 
disaster. The dragonfly is so dangerous that one should not even mention its name or 
take notice of its presence.” Robarchek 1979: 558. 
37  Heelas / Strongman / Strongman 1996: 184; Plamper 2015: 4-5. 
38  Levy 1984: esp. 400-401. One marker of differentiation seems to be the common and 
socially agreed upon lexicon of the emotion in question. This lexicon can be very broad, 
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are socially negotiated. Family, society, politics and religions provide a cer-
tain framework in which emotions are understood and appraised on a mutu-
al basis. Some emotions gain more social significance than others. Others 
may be socially appraised as undesirable and therefore need to be sup-
pressed. While this social evaluation of emotions significantly shapes an 
individual’s experience, each person’s feeling of an emotion remains dis-
tinct. Thus, we should be aware that only those emotions visualized in im-
ages that are both verified as being on display and that consist of a specific 
expression can – at least emically – be understood. If that is not the case, 
they might get lost in translation.  
4.3. The written (and spoken) evidence 
Some societies develop very broad lexica for specific feelings that seem to 
be insignificant or even unknown to others.39 Thus, if we identify an emo-
tion visually displayed and tentatively label it in our language, we must be 
                                                                                                                          
arguing for a lively discourse about this emotion, or very narrow, hinting to its possible 
social suppression. 
39  See for example: Röttger-Rössler 2004; Ponsonnet 2014; Zhang 2014; and Levy’s no-
tion of hyper- and hypocognized emotions, among others. 
Fig. 4. Relief from a series of panels in Ashurbanipal’s North Palace in Nineveh, Room L: 
Or. Dr. VII, 29: original lost. Bedouin warriors in the already lost battle against the 
Assyrians: their gestures and postures are immediately and often unconsciously read with 
respect to a modern evaluation of the situation (Barnett 1976, pl. 32). 
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aware that there might be more to it and should look for the lexicon and 
semantics of the cultures investigated. That leads us to appreciate the over-
all importance of textual studies to build up the background knowledge 
needed to decode the images in question.40 Thus, the study of the emic lexi-
con of emotions is of utmost importance. If there are emotions we do not 
know of, we might have difficulties in understanding their visual display.41 
Also, as Dominik Bonatz rightly observes, certain texts deal with selected 
situations using a specific emotional vocabulary.42 The visual display, how-
ever, might not exactly correspond to these written accounts or might be 
distinct from our expectations. Thus, the visual expression of an emotion 
(Bonatz uses the example of joy) could be visualized not (only) in the dis-
play of the individual person, on his face or in his gestures, but in the over-
all presentation of a festivity, a specific ritual, or an event reserved for joy-
ful occasions. Bonatz also intriguingly refers to the intermediality between 
texts and images as well as their ambiguous relationships by linking epi-
graphs and images with respect to the representation of emotion.43 
4.4. More on culture and emotional display 
A culture’s lexicon and semantics might help us to overcome another obsta-
cle, already mentioned above: some emotions, such as the so-called basal or 
primary emotions – fear, surprise, joy/happiness, sadness, anger, contempt, 
disgust44 – might exist in every human being,45 but their display might be 
subdued or considered socially inappropriate to put on public display, 
whether on the face, in bodily movements, or in images. Those emotions 
                                                     
40  That by no means implies that we should exclude non-literate cultures from considera-
tions; the knowledge of a lexicon of emotions, however, makes it easier to study emo-
tions in different societies, whether ancient or modern. We still have to develop a dis-
tinct methodology to deal with this issue in non-literate societies. 
41  Thus, I consider the study of emotion in the written sources to be very important to get 
an insight into the emic emotional lexicon and its semantics. Needless to say, the texts 
should also be understood as socially and ideologically conventionalized sources. 
42  Bonatz in this volume. 
43  Bonatz in this volume. 
44  Ekman and Friesen once stated that there are six basal emotions; see, for example,  
Ekman / Friesen 1971: esp. 126. In the very beginning, interest was also included. See 
Ekman / Friesen 1971: 124. That assumption changed over time; currently, Ekman 
speaks of seven basal emotions; see, for example, Ekman 2010: 82. See the general de-
bate on basal emotions in Reisenzein 2000. 
45  While universal facial expression is considered to be one defining aspect of basic emo-
tions, “how many forms of expression are universal for one emotion” has not yet been 
studied (Engelen et al. 2009: 27). Also, the relation between expression and one distinct 
emotion seems to be in question: “They also have no one-to-one relation; that is, that 
there is no single specific form of facial expression for each emotion.” See Engelen et al. 
2009: 27. 
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might then not be hypocognized in the sense of being socially irrelevant; 
rather, they might be expressed, e.g. in written texts or by music, but not by 
the body of the person specifically experiencing this emotion. 
Again, Dominik Bonatz46 shares this point of view and states that fixed 
patterns, such as that of Huter’s psycho-physiognomy for understanding 
the visual display of body and emotion in cultures not our own, are deeply 
problematic. Admittedly, by applying Huter’s thesis to visual culture, 
Kupfer’s work47 is attractive on the first glance to researchers of ancient 
art; with respect to emotion and visual display, however, the works of 
Charles Darwin48, physician Theodor Piderit,49 and psychologists Friesen 
and Ekman50 rest on a much more solid scientific basis and a sounder 
methodological approach than Huter’s. The latter’s work also shows a 
strong judgmental character that is mirrored in Kupfer’s assumptions about 
ancient faces, as Bonatz vividly points out.51 
Even if we assume that emotions are on display that are somehow uni-
versal in their unconscious and pristine display, emotion’s visualization in 
Assyria, as stated by Bonatz and Zwickel alike,52 does not operate through 
facial expressions. On the contrary, these facial expressions seem stereo-
typed and emotionally indifferent. Despite overwhelmingly conventional 
facial expressions in the Neo-Assyrian reliefs, there are, however, at least 
two aspects that make me wonder whether we oversimplify things here. 
First, the faces displayed in narrative (pseudo-)historic accounts53 are most-
ly shown in profile (see Fig. 5), but to express emotions in the face it is 
much easier to use the en face. As such, it is an en face rendering that is 
used to display emotions in psychological studies. Second, the Assyrians 
put much effort into all of their images, into both their composition and 
their execution; thus, how can we believe that facial display did not matter 
to them? Many answers are possible. Maybe it was understood that the face 
was hard to read or that facial expressions could be deceiving with respect 
to emotions. Another solution is provided by Bonatz – namely, that emo-
tional display on the face is something the Assyrians wanted to deliberately 
control and suppress. 
                                                     
46  Bonatz in this volume. 
47  Kupfer 1920. 
48  Darwin 1872. 
49  Piderit 1989; cf. Schmidt-Atzert 1996: 13-14. 
50  Their publications are countless; see, for example, Ekman / Friesen 1971; Ekman 1994; 
Ekman 2003. 
51  Bonatz in this volume. 
52  Zwickel 2012 and in this volume; Bonatz in this volume. 
53  Presumably, these narrative images are those that potentially display emotional situa-
tions and emotions themselves. Assyrian sculpture in the round has no narrative context 
per se (except for potential narrative performances). Nevertheless, they might display 
emotions via postures, gestures, coloring and potentially also via facial expressions. 
Pride, for example, is a basic emotion, which could be considered here. 
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Fig. 5. Emotionless Faces!? a) Head of a beardless royal attendant; b) foreign groom in a 
tributary procession, both from Khorsabad, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, gift of John 
D. Rockefeller Jr., 1933, 33.16.2-1, 33.16.1 (OASC), www.metmuseum.org. 
Even if we agree that there are transcultural facial expressions, whether 
they are easy-to-read or more hidden, so-called facial microexpressions, un-
changed by socialization, it still seems questionable whether these expres-
sions would find any manifestation in visual media that were subject to 
such a strict process of social and ideological control as the Assyrian im-
agery. 
4.5. Emotional emblems/gestures/postures: signs of (non-verbal) communi-
cation 
Paul Ekman, who generally argues for basal emotions and their facial (micro-) 
expressions as universally valid and unconscious, understands some types 
of bodily expressions – for example so-called emblems – as culturally spe-
a 
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cific. Together with Friesen, he defines emblems as movements that “have 
a set of precise meanings which are understood by all members of a culture 
or subculture”.54 Thus, if we want to understand body language and its 
emotional value, we must release ourselves from our own values and so-
cialization, being aware of the otherness of a past society’s gestures and 
bodily expressions.  
In this vein, we may take a look at the clapping of hands discussed by 
Nili Fox. In many cultural contexts, this gesture communicates “joy and ap-
proval”.55 Fox, in contrast, points out one textual example from the reign of 
Esarhaddon56 in which, in her opinion, the clapping of hands stands for 
“rage”.57 She also describes a possible relation to ritual actions, and places 
two58 Neo-Assyrian reliefs in this context: One relief59 comes from Tiglath-
pileser III’s Central Palace (see Fig. 6), and shows four officials (and a 
lion-cloaked figure), probably in a war ritual context during the Babylonian 
campaign, clapping their hands. Fox considers this as a sign of anger and 
hostility as part of a war ritual.60 It seems not out of the realm of possibility 
that loud gestures of anger might be used in contexts of (war) rituals, possi-
bly to expel evil thoughts, to drive fear away, or to enhance bloodlust, as is 
the case in other cultures. 
Nonetheless, these observations on clapping hands may not be univer-
sally valid in Neo-Assyrian contexts. Natalie M. May refers to several set-
tings in which the triumphal ruler and army are accompanied or welcomed 
by women or officials clapping their hands.61 Under these circumstances, the 
gesture indicates approval and emphasizes the royal triumph. In this vein, she 
relates the overall situation to the “Assyrian war ritual” or – as she calls it – 
the “Assyrian field war ritual”62, first published by Karlheinz Deller.63  
                                                     
54  Ekman 2004: 39. For an older and more precise version see Ekman / Friesen 1972: 357. 
55  Fox 1995: 49. 
56  Fox 1995: 50 (transcription and translation of lines 55-62). I prefer the new edition by 
Leichty: (i 53) “I, Esarhaddon, who with the help of the great gods, his lords, does not 
turn back in the heat of battle, quickly heard of their evil deeds. I said ‘Woe!’ and rent 
my princely garment. I cried out in mourning, I raged like a lion, and my mood became 
furious. In order to exercise kingship (over) the house of my father I beat my hands to-
gether. I prayed to the gods Aššur, Sîn, Šamaš, Bēl, Nabû, and Nergal, Ištar of Nineveh, 
(and) Ištar of Arbela (i 60) and they accepted my word(s). With their firm ‘yes,’ they 
were sending me reliable omen(s), (saying): ‘Go! Do not hold back! We will go and kill 
your enemies.’” Leichty 2011: 13: Esarhaddon I, Col I. 53-62. 
57  Fox 1995: 50; she also cites examples where rage is expressed by beating the chest and 
striking the thigh. 
58  The first one refers to the throne room reliefs B5, Fox 1995: 56, see also May 2012: 
464-465, fig. 1a. 
59  Barnett / Falkner 1962: pl. I and II: series A: upper Register sl. 5a: Woburn Abbey: 123. 
60  Fox 1995: 58; Fox discusses earlier interpretations: ibid: 57. 
61  May 2012: esp. 464-465, 470-471, 476-484; She also refers to Fox’s second example. 
62  May 2012, 461. The ritual as such does not explicitly refer to clapping the hands, yet it 
mentions anger and joy. Cf. May 2012, 462 (translation of the ritual). 
63  Deller 1992. 
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Fig. 6. Relief Fragment from the Central Palace, Tiglath-Pileser III. From Barnett / Falkner 
1962, pl. I (Or.Dr. III). 
Dominik Bonatz posits that gestures in narrative Neo-Assyrian reliefs are 
recognizable via their visual context, in which they express a broad and in-
distinct array of emotions and moods. 64 This understanding, however, is 
based on the assumption that the ancient and modern appraisal of the de-
picted situations would be identical. Still, static visual representations, such 
as gestures of clapping the hands, present challenges for the interpreter. The 
production of noise by clapping hands can be interpreted in many ways: as 
approval, as joy, as anger, as aggression, and so on, depending on the con-
text and circumstances of its performance as well as its emic appraisal. 
4.6. Style as a cultural filter 
In the discussion during the workshop, Irene J. Winter rightly put forward 
the view that we should not dismiss style in our study of emotional display 
in the visual cultures of the ancient Near East.65 Winter also elsewhere puts 
forward that “subject matter must be given physical form in order to con-
vey itself visually”66 and that “only in the unity of ‘form-plus-content’ that 
a given work of art realizes its ontological identity.”67 In this respect, by 
knowing culturally and temporally specific styles, we might be able to peel 
                                                     
64  Bonatz in this volume. 
65  See also Winter’s work on “affective style”: Winter 2009. 
66  Winter 2009: 425. 
67  Ibid. 
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these layers of style off, avoiding misinterpretations, and to take a deeper 
look at how emotions might once have been displayed or, in contrast, how 
emotions might have been stylized or conventionalized. Further, Winter 
notes “that style is closely allied with the psychological stimulus known as 
‘affect’”. If that is correct, style must be become part of any consideration 
of emotional visual display. 
4.7. Back to the beginning: Identification does not equal understanding 
Any inference drawn from an identified, visually displayed emotion is diffi-
cult and culturally specific. Ekman gives an easy explanation for why read-
ing faces should not be overrated, since we do not always know what 
triggered the emotion. He cites the example of Othello who thinks that 
Desdemona’s despair and fear result from his murder of Cassio, not being 
aware that she fears her own unavoidable death by her insanely jealous 
husband.68 Thus, how far should we go? We might see joy, anger, or fear, 
but what does it imply: do we know why someone is afraid? Or with re-
spect to the discussion above, do we assume that someone is afraid because 
we might experience fear in that very same situation? We might perceive 
gestures of sadness and screaming, but does this communicate the true feel-
ings of those shown or how much the person mourned was appreciated? Or 
is it a social convention? Is the emotion we attribute to the mourners the 
very same emotion they had from the very beginning, or is it an emotion 
released by the powerful effect of a group? 
5. Summary I: Why Were Emotions Displayed? 
An important issue, discussed by Dominik Bonatz,69 is when and why emo-
tions were displayed. This issue encapsulates one of the core questions of 
the field of visual emotionology.70 The display of emotions is not always 
just about emotions themselves. As Bonatz states, in the case of Neo-
Assyrian art, it was not the main purpose of the Neo-Assyrian reliefs to 
visualize emotion in extreme situations.71 Therefore, the display of emo-
tions by gestures may first of all have been a vehicle of the representation 
of power. This comes close to an observation Zainab Bahrani made with 
respect to non-Assyrian women in Neo-Assyrian visual culture, an example 
Bonatz72 also is drawn to when he cites women’s gestures of despair. Ac-
                                                     
68  Ekman 2010: 81. 
69  Bonatz in this volume. 
70  For the term emotionology with respect to historical studies, see Stearns / Stearns 1985. 
71  Bonatz in this volume. 
72  Bonatz in this volume. 
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cording to Bahrani, these women were often depicted with postures and 
gestures of mourning73 symbolizing defeat, irreversibility, and the closure 
of war.74 Furthermore, Bahrani understands the involvement of women in 
warfare (hunting, protecting and caring for children) at a later date as the 
visual creation of an opposition between the passive female and the aggres-
sive male75 – thus, between dominant Assyrian warriors and effeminate 
defeated non-Assyrians. If that interpretation is correct, emotional display 
may have been used to increase both the narrative quality of the images and 
the invincibility of Assyrian kingship. Furthermore, there is surely more to 
it than just the increase of Assyrian reputation and fame; that, however, is 
one possibility why emotions may have been visualized in the apparently 
unemotionalized, (not to be mistaken with unemotional,) visual culture of 
Northern Mesopotamia. 
6. Summary II: Why Study Emotions and Their  
Visualization in Ancient Cultures? 
Subliminally, the question of why one should study emotions and their 
visualization in ancient cultures may have been answered here. From my 
point of view, hardly anything is more human and therefore worthy of an 
anthropologically driven study than emotions. Our tendency to think that 
triggers, display, experience, and validation of emotions may have been the 
same over millennia, however, needs severe reassessment. 
Used to a flood of images with displays of emotions ranging from over-
flowing joy to deepest grief, we must wonder why this was not the same in 
ancient cultures, why and when emotions were visualized in antiquity. 
The bad news is that we are not yet able to understand the ways and 
mechanisms of emotions and their visualization in ancient Mesopotamia. 
We are left to develop special tool boxes and to gather more and more data 
as well as to discuss examples and hypotheses that might be tested over the 
course of time. 
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The Iconography of Emotions  
in the Ancient Near East and in Ancient Egypt1 
Wolfgang ZWICKEL 
1. Introduction: Problems with the Interpretation  
of Emotions in the Iconography in Ancient Times 
The iconography of emotions was likely never a field of research for the 
Ancient Near East and Ancient Egypt. Only in the Lexikon der Ägyptolo-
gie can an article about emotions be found (Altenmüller 1977), in contrast 
to the Reallexikon für Assyriologie. In newer dictionaries for biblical stud-
ies like Das Neue Bibellexikon, the Anchor Bible Dictionary, the Calwer 
Bibellexikon or Herders Neues Bibellexikon no entry about emotions exists 
at all. In the Hebrew Bible we do not have a specific word meaning feel-
ings, emotions or affects in general. But certainly the ancient Israelites had 
feelings, as the people from ancient Mesopotamia or ancient Egypt did. We 
only have words in the Hebrew Bible for specific emotions. The main ques-
tion of my contribution shall be: Which kind of emotions could be ex-
pressed by art in ancient times? How did the ancient artists express these 
feelings? Since we have very few artistic representations from the area of 
Syria and Palestine, especially for the expression of emotion, I will mainly 
work with material from the neighboring areas of Egypt and Mesopotamia. 
Nevertheless, the artisans from Syria and Palestine lived in and shared the 
same cultural sphere. 
Normally it is easier to express emotion by language than by iconogra-
phy. This is the same for ancient times as for our period. Today the emotion 
“love” can easily be expressed by the symbol of a heart or of two hearts 
linked together, but also by the image of a kissing couple. While “love” is 
easy to be shown, “jealousy” is harder to be shown by iconographical sym-
bols. With the help of digital search engines like Google, pictures may be 
found as well. But a closer look on those pictures shows that the identifica-
tion of jealousy is not as certain as the identification of love. Some emo-
tions can easily be understood; others are more difficult and not clear 
enough for identification.  
                                                     
1  This is a revised and enlarged version of a paper which was originally published with 
the same title in Egger-Wenzel / Corley (eds.), 2012, 1-25. I thank the publisher for the 
permission to republish my article, and Dr. Ken Brown (Mainz) and Prof. Dr. John 
Baines (Oxford) for improving my English. 
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In ancient times the expression of emotions was even more complicated 
– at least for modern people who want to understand those pictures. There 
are several reasons for this problem: 
– For pictures from ancient times, and this is valid for Egypt, Mesopo-
tamia and the few pictorial documents from Palestine as well, faces are 
typically portrayed in a stereotyped way. The individual and real person 
is not shown at all, but a typical and ideal character. E.g., for Egypt it 
was not a problem that a pharaoh usurped the statue of his predecessor, 
removed the name and wrote its own name on it. The faces have no or 
nearly no individual elements and represent just a typical person of that 
period. Very often the view of the figures is not directed to any specific 
object, but to a point at the horizon, far away. Also the bodies of the 
persons are not presented in a normal, but in an ideal way. Individual 
features of the faces are – except of the time of pharaoh Akhenaten (ca. 
1353-1336 BCE) – rare. Only with the mummy portraits, which are cer-
tainly influenced by Roman portrait paintings, can individual and authen-
tic features be found in Egypt. On the other hand, Hellenistic drawings 
changed the iconography in the Ancient Near East, too, but those also 
are relatively late developments. Symbols and actions, connected to cer-
tain emotions, may not be understood today anymore, because there 
were changes in the symbolism in the course of the time, and likewise 
different cultures have different ways to express their symbols for emo-
tions.  
– In the Ancient Near East and in Ancient Egypt emotions are sometimes 
expressed by gestures, attitudes and movements. Those gestures are 
normally different from the gestures we use today to express emotions 
(for examples see below). And not all feelings and emotions can be ex-
pressed by iconography. Therefore for modern spectators it is some-
times very hard to understand those pictures in the same way as the art-
ist and the people in antiquity did.  
– Very often we only have an official repertory of pictures. The repre-
sentation of Egyptian or Mesopotamian kings does not have any space 
for emotions. Kings are to be shown in their power in glory. Such rep-
resentations do not offer emotions at all in the faces of the persons. But 
they provoke emotions in the persons regarding those pictures. Looking 
at the picture of an Assyrian king standing in his chariot, covered by an 
umbrella, dressed in his royal garments, provokes respect and humility 
in the viewer. This is the same with the Assyrian soldiers with strong 
and unnatural muscles. This can be considered as a signal to the viewer 
that he or she has to accept the power of the Assyrian army and not to 
fight against those soldiers. The picture itself does not show any emo-
tion, but the emotion happens in the viewer. He or she should be intimi-
dated by the power of the Assyrian army, and this is the aim of the artis-
tic representation.  
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– There is a distinctive difference between official and private art, at least 
in Egypt. All the aspects which were mentioned until now are connected 
with official drawings or reliefs. Even tomb paintings from Egypt have 
an official aspect, because the human beings represented there are not 
depicted as “normal” people, but as people who want to live in an eter-
nal world. The number of real private drawings is rather limited. Typical 
examples are the erotic papyrus Turin 55001 or the drawings of the 
workers settlement in Deir el-Medina (see below for further remarks).  
– Cylinder or stamp seals (often scarabs) are typical private items, but 
normally they are much too small to express emotions on faces. The 
format of the illustration limits the possibility of the artists to show any 
kind of feelings. Although we have an extremely high number of private 
relics, no depiction of emotions is possible.  
– Even on larger objects the depiction of emotions depends on the quality 
of the carvers or chiselers who work the reliefs. Only in the major artis-
tic centers like Egypt and Mesopotamia the artists were well trained. 
The quality of stone cutting in other regions (e.g. in Tell Halaf) was on a 
much lower level. 
2. Problems with the Identification of Emotions  
A short look in the psychological literature suggests that there is no consen-
sus at the moment about feelings and emotions. There exists an open list of 
different affects. I have no preference for any particular definition, but I use 
the term emotion or feeling in an encompassing and undogmatic way. 
Some of the emotions can be regarded as pairs with positive and negative 
expressions. Love is the opposite of hate, joy is the opposite of sorrow. 
Beside those pairs there are also some emotions of a rather neutral nature. 
The following list presents the main emotions and affects: 
Positive Neutral  Negative 
joy, joy of life surprise sorrow, sadness, grief, 
mourning 
 disappointment fear, despair 
 guilt  pain 
love shame anger, hate 
awe, gratitude courage, surprise anger, rage, 
disappointment, guilt, 
shame 
 duty jealousy 
  disgust 
 




interest indifference  
 pride, haughtiness  envy 
 stability  instability, chaos 
I selected four specific kinds of emotions which are represented in ancient 
Egyptian and Near Eastern iconography. Because there are thousands of 
pictures from this region from the pre-Roman period, I took some typical 
and general pictures to show the kind of representation of emotions.  
3. Examples for the Representation of Emotions in the  
Ancient Near East and in Ancient Egypt 
3.1. Joy 
If we would demonstrate joy today by a symbol, we probably would take 
advantage of a smiley. In ancient times the artists used dance and music to 
represent joy. Fig. 1, which is typical of the reign of pharaoh Akhenaten, is 
in a tomb at Tell el-Amarna. The time of Akhenaten is an atypical period in 
Egyptian art, and this picture is atypical for the representation of emotions 
in antiquity. This is the only period in the history of ancient Egyptian art, 
which showed individuality of normal persons and kings instead of the 
typical idealistic representation. Even if the faces of the seven dancers are 
very stereotypical, the movement is completely individual. The joy of life is 
expressed by the completely different movement and jumps of the dancers.  
Another kind of the representation of joy is music. Fig. 2 is the lower 
part of an Egyptian stele from Abydos from the time of Ramesses II. The 
dynamic of the last relief – typical for the Amarna period – is missing here. 
But the turning back of the faces makes the whole picture living and shows 
the joy of the women. Music was almost always a symbol for joy, in Egypt 
as well as in Mesopotamia (cf. Keel 51996, 316 fig. 452). This is also true 
for Palestine, where every kind of dynamic expressions and joy is com-
pletely missing. We only can assume that the musicians on a cultic stand 
from Ashdod (Fig. 3) will also symbolize joy.  
A particularly interesting group of Egyptian drawings are those on pot-
sherds and limestone flakes (generally termed ostraca), which were found 
in the workers village of Deir el-Medina (1300-1100 BCE; cf. Brunner-
Traut 1956). Some of them are just drafts of painters working in the Theban 
necropolis for large-scale decoration in the tombs. But there are also “pri-
vate” paintings with animals or gods and goddesses, which are completely 
different from the official reliefs and drawings. As one example the naked 
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goddess Astarte riding on a horse is presented here (Fig. 3a). This drawing 
on an ostracon is very dynamic. The face of Astarte seems to laugh, and 
evidently she is happy.  
3.2. Mourning 
Also for mourning, some typical pictures from different areas and periods 
can be found. Fig. 4 is part of a Book of the Dead of Hunefer from the time 
of Seti I (ca. 1285 BCE). While the people involved in the burial ceremony 
are represented in the stiff attitude typical of Egyptian art, the two women 
in front of the mummy clearly show emotions by lifting the hands up to the 
head in order to express sadness. Similar is the attitude in Fig. 5 from the 
tomb of Userhet in Sheikh Abd el-Qurna (19th dynasty). Here the mourn-
ing women put their hands on top of their heads. This likely does not repre-
sent the scattering of ash on the head, a ritual gesture mentioned very often 
in texts from the Hebrew Bible, but is rather a symbol for pain and sorrow. 
The mouth, half opened, symbolizes crying and groaning, connected with 
pain and sorrow. Depictions of mourning women may also be found on the 
Ahiram sarcophagus from Byblos (Fig. 6). Here the women undressed their 
breasts as a symbol of self-humbling and beat their hands on their head and 
belly. Similar gestures can be found on pottery stands from the Philistine 
territory which are influenced by Mycenaean culture (Fig. 7; cf. Dothan 
1982: 237-249).  
Sorrow and pain are represented in a particularly impressive manner on 
a Roman coin, dated to the year 70 AD (Fig. 8). To the left of the date-palm, 
which characterizes Judea, a Roman soldier is presented, who puts his foot 
on his helmet, which is no more needed after the destruction of Judea and 
Jerusalem. On the right side, a Judean woman is shown, sitting at the bot-
tom, the head leaning on her arm and mourning about the destruction of 
Jerusalem. This small picture, only 4 square centimeters, is a typical exam-
ple of how artists in the Roman period were able to show emotions.  
3.3. Fear, despair 
Fear and despair are not directly represented in Egyptian pictures, but ra-
ther superiority. The Egyptian pharaoh is presented on the pylons of tem-
ples holding his enemies by their hair (Fig. 9). The scale of the pharaoh is 
colossal in comparison with the other persons shown on the reliefs. There is 
no fear to be seen on any of the enemies’ faces. But the whole situation 
represented on the pylons can only be understood as a context in which the 
enemies would be afraid. Instead of showing this emotion on the faces, it is 
characterized by the difference in scale: the enormous pharaoh in contrast 
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with the smaller enemies. Emotions are not explicitly rendered, but they 
arise in the viewer when looking at that relief.  
Comparable are pictures showing the conquest of Canaanite cities (Fig. 
10; cf. Keel 1975). Again the figure of the pharaoh is greatly enlarged. The 
inhabitants of the conquered towns do not show fear on their faces. But by 
offering incense to the pharaoh, they recognize his majesty and power. This 
is contrasted by their inability to defend the city and to organize their inde-
pendence. Nevertheless, the pain of the experience to be conquered by the 
Egyptian army is presented by symbolic acts like the burning of incense.  
Even if a man was attacked and gored by a lion, the fear of the man is 
not shown on his face. Fig. 11 is a relief from the early Ptolemaic period in 
the lion temple in Musawwarat es-Sufra. The lioness shows resoluteness, 
the men’s desperate situation is only represented by the attitude of his 
body. Additionally he stretches his right hand in the air. Normally people 
are represented in Egyptian art standing upright. The winded attitude on 
this relief clearly shows the problematic situation of this man, not the stiff 
face. This is definitely not a gesture of prayer. The man looks in the direc-
tion of the lion and not, as usually in prayer depictions, in the direction of 
the (supposed) god. 
A raised right hand is found in a picture (Fig. 12) on a cylinder seal 
from Babylon dated to about 1800 BCE. A dragon, symbolizing chaos, tries 
to devour a man. The man’s uplifted hand symbolizes his cry for help, 
while the face seems to be rather apathetic, as far as this can be said about a 
seal image only 1.8 cm high. The raised hand seems to be a symbol for fear 
and a helpless situation in Egypt as much as in Mesopotamia. This symbol 
will hardly be understood by today’s viewers. 
In this context I will refer to a picture already discussed above (Fig. 10). 
Also in this relief the leader of the Canaanite town raises his hand. He holds 
a broken bow in his hand, which is worthless for military purposes. The 
parallels cited make it evident that the raised hand is a symbol of fear in 
this picture as well.  
A final picture in this group presents once again the raised hand as a 
sign of despair (Fig. 13). It is part of a late predynastic Egyptian palette 
dating about 3100 BCE. The bull likely symbolizes the political leader 
subjugating his enemies. Once again there is no emotion visible on the face 
of the man. Having fear can only be recognized by the general composition 
of the picture – and by the hand lifted up. If anyone looks at this picture it 
is natural to assume that this man is terrified. But the fear is not shown on 
the face of the man; it appears in the mind of the viewer, because he com-
pares automatically his own emotions with the emotions expected in the 
picture. And the fear is once again only shown in the iconography by the 
uplifted hand.  
An ivory plaque from Ugarit, dating to the 14th century BCE (Fig. 14), 
offers another aspect of fear, but it is nevertheless comparable to the other 
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pictures. Since it is relatively large (14 x 12.5 cm), the artist would have 
been able to present facial features, especially because ivory can more easi-
ly be worked than many materials. But neither the king of Ugarit on the left 
side with a sword in his hand, nor the enemy thrown down by him, has any 
facial features connected with this situation. If we separate the facial fea-
tures, they could be part of a peaceful banquet scene, too. Once again the 
general depiction offers some emotions. The king of Ugarit is at a larger 
scale, symbolizing his status as leader and victor. The weapon in his hand 
symbolizes his strength. And he holds the enemy – like the Egyptian pharaoh 
on the pylons of the temples – by his hair. The enemy is kneeling and raises 
his hands as a symbol of deference.  
Another limestone relief from the 5th dynasty (2480-2350 BCE) allows 
some additional observations (Fig. 15). It presents starved nomads. Their 
faces are mostly stereotypical, but the emaciated bodies, with individual 
ribs to be seen, are evidently a symbol of despair. Here too, the attitudes of 
the nomads show their hopeless situation. On the right side of the upper 
row a member of the community has to be supported, because he is no 
longer able to sit upright. In the lower row on the right and left sides women 
put their hands on their heads as a gesture of despair and sadness. Once 
again it is the general impression of the picture which creates emotions in 
the viewer, but not the features of the faces.  
In Egyptian art there is another possibility to express the hopelessness of 
a situation. This can be observed in the famous reliefs presenting the battle 
of the troops of Ramesses III against the Sea Peoples (Fig. 16). In the An-
cient Near East good feelings are generally connected with order, while bad 
feelings are connected with disorder and chaos. According to this system 
order is connected to one or several gods, who are responsible (together 
with the king) to establish, stabilize, preserve, and protect this order. This 
battle scene presents the Egyptian army in an order that is shown by the 
upright and parallel bodies of all the Egyptians. By contrast, the army of the 
Sea Peoples is in complete disorder. Their bodies are contorted and lying in 
opposite directions. Only in a divinely organized world can one feel good 
emotions. Once again the general composition of this relief awakes differ-
ent emotions in the mind of the viewer, although no emotions are present 
on the faces themselves.  
As we have seen, fear and despair of human beings is normally not rep-
resented through human facial expressions in Egyptian or Mesopotamian 
art. Nevertheless, the artists were well able to present emotions, but they 
only did so in the faces of animals (cf. for drawings on sherds and stones 
Brunner-Traut 1956). In the 5th dynasty mastaba tomb of Ti at Saqqara (ca. 
2350 BCE), a herd of cows is shown crossing a river (Fig. 17). A calf, 
which is not yet able to cross by itself, is carried on a man’s back. The face 
of this calf is horrified because of the unnatural and unusual situation, and 
evidently it is crying. Behind the calf the adult cows are presented crossing 
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the river as well, and the mother cow is easy to identify: she too is crying, 
while the two other cows enjoy the fresh water or are completely unin-
volved. For the Egyptian artist it was evidently possible to render those 
emotions of animals in a highly expressive manner.  
Another Egyptian relief, in the 6th dynasty mastaba of Mererukaat 
Saqqara, may be added (Fig. 18). Once again it clearly presents emotions 
on the faces of animals. The scene shows some hippopotamus harpooned 
during a hunting scene. The mouth of the hippos is widely opened, the 
tongue is rolled, and the eyes are enormous. You nearly feel as an observer 
that you can hear the cries of the hippos. Again we have a naturalistic scene 
presenting the emotions of the animals very clearly.  
The ability to present the emotions of animals in pictures is also attested 
in later times. A relief in the temple of king Seti I at Abydos presents the 
young king Ramesses II and a prince hunting a sacrificial bull (Fig. 19). 
The eyes of the prince and of the king face straight toward the horizon and 
hence look above the level of the bull. The attitude of the two bodies is 
idealized and not realistic for a hunting scene. The two men are depicted in 
the classic form of the human figure in Egypt. Completely different to the 
depiction of the two men is the presentation of the bull. You can observe 
the fear in his face.  
Even in Mesopotamia emotions could be presented in relation to ani-
mals (Fig. 20). Mesopotamian lions are a typical depicted symbol of disor-
der. Conquering a lion also means defeating disorder or at least being able 
to reduce it. Therefore it was one of the main duties of the kings to fight 
every year against lions that were kept in the royal gardens, and to kill 
them. By doing this, the king’s ability to maintain the divine order was 
symbolized. As in Egyptian reliefs, the eyes of king Ashurnasirpal II (883-
859 BCE) are fixed to the horizon, not looking toward the lion. Even the 
horses are not anxious because of the proximity of the dangerous animal. 
Completely different is the attitude of the lion. Running forward, he looks 
backwards. His eyes are concentrated on the fight against the king. The 
mouth is wide open, the animal is roaring. In his face his approaching death 
is clearly visible – in strong contrast to the faces of the horses, which are 
very stereotypical.   
Summing up, one may conclude that the emotions of human beings are 
normally not presented in their faces, neither in Mesopotamia nor in Syria 
nor in Egypt. Only sometimes fear may also be expressed by lifting up a 
human arm. Instead of facial features the emotions are often expressed by 
the general layout of the whole iconographical scene. This offers to the 
viewer different kinds of emotions. The traditional depiction of human 
faces normally allowed no emotional or individual expressions. The facial 
expressions simply had to be presented in an ideal and characteristic way, 
free of any emotion. But the absence of emotions on those pictures is not 
connected with an inability of the ancient artists to present them. On the 
 THE ICONOGRAPHY OF EMOTIONS IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST AND IN ANCIENT EGYPT 103 
contrary: Representing animals they are well able to express all kind of 
emotions on the faces.  
3.4. Love and sympathy  
Love and sympathy form the last group of emotions I want to present here. 
They can be expressed by a close bodily contact. Fig. 21 shows the tender-
ness between the god Osiris and the king Sesostris I. Fig. 22 shows the 
tender affectionate connection of a royal couple from Ugarit. On both pic-
tures the partners are looking each other into the eyes – the god and the 
king on the one hand and the couple on the other hand. Both partners have 
nearly the same height. Characteristic features in the faces are not presented, 
but the attitude – the embrace of the partner’s body by the arm, the holding 
of the partner’s hand or touching the shoulder and the arm of the partner – 
expresses a tender connection between both.  
In Egypt many statue groups of couples are attested, both seated side by 
side, sometimes of the same height, but sometimes with the women a little 
smaller than the man. Fig. 23, dating to the 4th dynasty, is a typical example 
of such a pairs. In this type of representation of a couple, both are looking 
at a distant point at the horizon. Although they do not look at each other, 
the close connection of the couple is indicated by the hand of the woman. 
While the man is depicted in a standard pose with the arms hanging by his 
side, the woman embraces his body with her right arm and puts her left 
hand on his upper arm. Their torsos do not touch. Nevertheless a great ten-
derness and love is shown by the attitude of holding another person in 
one’s arm. Again emotion is not symbolized by faces, but by posture. The 
presentation of a woman was evidently not so fixed in Egyptian art as that 
of a man.  
Only during the time of pharaoh Akhenaten was this strong artistic can-
on broken. In Fig. 24 Nofretete and Akhenaten sit opposite each other, 
looking at their partner. This composition symbolizes love and tenderness. 
Both partners are touched be the sunbeams of the sun god Aton. Both are 
playing with their children. One child sits on Nofretete’s lap, while the 
other one is held in Akhenaten’s arms. This natural scene of daily life has 
never been shown in Egyptian art before or after Akhenaten. The parents’ 
love of their children is represented by the close bodily contact. One child 
is kissed by the father; the other one speaks to the mother while pointing 
with her finger at the father. To present ordinary life in such a natural way 
is an innovation in Egyptian art. Artists of the time of Akhenaten presented 
a daily scene, which was normal in all families at any time before and after. 
They had no difficulity in depicting such a scene, which shows that they 
were likely trained in doing so, mainly only for exercises. In the official art 
besides the time of Akhenaten emotions could not be depicted in the same 
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way because this was illegitimate and not accepted. In order to show emo-
tions as well, the Egyptian artists searched for possibilities to express them 
in the context of the strict conventions narrow frame of normal art.  
Also in Assyrian art the presentation of love and tenderness is rather 
hidden. Regarding the famous relief Fig. 25 from the time of Ashurbanipal, 
there is no real contact between the couple of the banquet scene in the cen-
ter. The king does not look at his wife but at the horizon above her head. 
Likewise, she does not look in the eyes of her husband. Their connection is 
evident from their high-ranking position: he reclines on his divan, while she 
sits on her throne. Both are prestigious persons; the servants, right and left 
of the divan, pay respect to them. Both king and queen have the same hand 
pose: they are holding drinking bowls. Just one small detail in the picture 
may be understood as symbolizing love and sexuality: To the right and to 
the left of the divan stand two incense burners. Such incense burners were 
used in private houses in order to purify the room ritually after sexual inter-
course. It seems likely that the sexual connection between the couple is 
symbolized in this relief by the presence of those instruments.  
A quite different emotion is expressed incidentally in this picture. On 
the left side the head of an Elamite leader cut off by Ashurbanipal is hang-
ing in the tree. This is a signal to the viewer that Ashurbanipal is a proud 
and successful king, who is aware of his achievements and rules with great 
power. Once again this emotion is not directly expressed, but represented 
by a symbol: the decapitated head of an enemy exhibited as a trophy.  
The art of Syria and Palestine was always more provincial than that of 
Egypt or Mesopotamia. Typical reliefs representing care and love of chil-
dren can be found there, too. On an orthostat from Karatepe, dating to the 
8th century BCE, a woman is shown nursing a rather adult child (Fig. 26). 
Children were normally breastfed until the third year. This child is, if the 
representation is even remotely naturalistic, older than three years. There-
fore this picture does not represent the feeding of a child, but may be inter-
preted as a symbolic representation of care and love.  
Similar pictures may be found from Egypt. In Fig. 27 (cf. Keel 1992a) a 
tree presents a woman’s breast to a figure of a king. As in comparable ex-
amples, the tree represents a goddess offering food and beverage to an 
adorer. This symbolic representation shows the care and love of a goddess 
to the people praying to her. Once again no emotion is visible on the faces, 
but the emotion is represented by a symbolic gesture.  
Love and sexuality may also be represented by the symbol of a dove. 
Fig. 28 shows a goddess of love with doves, which are her symbolic attrib-
utes. In Fig. 29 (cf. Keel 1992b) a dove is flying from the goddess to a 
seated person, symbolizing her love for him. The dove as a symbol of love 
was still current in the middle of the second millennium CE, but is mostly 
lost in our time.  
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Sexuality and love are also shown on some cylinder seals with a god-
dess exposing herself. A typical representation is Fig. 30, where the naked 
fertility goddess is opposite to the weather god Baal approaching on the 
hills. Although the sexual connotation, symbolizing the insemination of the 
earth/goddess by the weather god, is more prominent in this cylinder seal, 
the scene is also a depiction of love and desire.  
Completely different depictions are found on a unique Egyptian papyrus 
(erotic papyrus Turin 55001). This papyrus, dated to the 12th century BCE, 
is composed of two separate sets of scenes: one showing a group of animals 
making music, the other depicting couples having sex in various positions 
(Omlin 1973). These sexual practices belong in a completely private atmos-
phere, which is hardly presented in other Egyptian papyri or drawings but 
is typical of Egyptian love songs. Especially the faces of the men, but also 
in part of the women, show voluptuousness through their open mouths (Fig. 
31; another non-official example: Brunner-Traut 1956, Tf. XX fig. 52). 
This is a private connotation of love which is normally not presented in 
official art. Comparable pornographic pictures are also present on (private) 
Mesopotamian cylinder seals (Fig. 32), but the small size of the cylinders 
does not allow them to render emotions.  
4. Summary 
This short overview has shown that more kinds of emotions are represented 
in ancient art than may at first be noticed. Emotions were represented dif-
ferently in antiquity than in modern times. Gestures, attitudes, and symbols, 
some of them very alien for us today, were used in ancient times to express 
emotions. Public images of grief and sorrow, but also pictures of animals 
and “private” artifacts, impressively show the ability of ancient artists to 
express emotions pictorially. But it was very unusual and out of order to 
present emotions on the faces of human beings, at least when they were of 
official status. The artists searched for other possibilities to express emo-
tions in the context of official art. Generally it seems that emotions, espe-
cially joy and mourning, were more often connected with women than with 
men. Modern viewers feel emotions when looking at many of those pic-
tures and reliefs. Those emotions are, however, not directly presented in the 
pictures themselves, but rather result from the general layout and composi-
tion of the pictures.  
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Fig. 1. Dancing women, Amarna, relief on a wall of Tomb no. 1, southern tombs, 14th 
century BCE (Keel 51996: 314 Fig. 449). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Women making music, stela from Abydos, 13th century BCE (Keel 51996: 315 Fig. 
450).  
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Fig. 3. Clay stand presenting musicians, Ashdod, 10th century BCE 





Fig. 3a. Riding Syrian Goddess, painted ostracon from Thebes, 14th century BCE 
(Brunner-Traut 1956: Tf. VIII, Fig. 16).  
108 WOLFGANG ZWICKEL 
 
Fig. 4. Mourning women, Papyrus of Hunefer, 14th century BCE (Keel 51996: 59 Fig. 76). 
 
Fig. 5. Mourning women, painting in the tomb of Userhet (no. 51) in Sheikh Abd el-Qurna, 
14th/13th century BCE (Keel 51996: 297 Fig. 428).  
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Fig. 6. Mourning women on the front of the Ahiram sarcophagus, ca. 1000 BCE, 
Byblos, today National Museum Beirut (Zwickel n.d. Fig. 408). 
 
Fig. 7. Mourning woman, 12th / 11th century BCE, likely from Tel 
Etun (Dothan 1972, Fig. 10B). 
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Fig. 8. Roman Iudaea Capta coin, 71 CE, Vespasian (Schefzyk / 
Zwickel 2010, title page). 
 
 
Fig. 9. Egyptian pharaoh fighting against enemies, depicted on the pylon of the temple of 
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Fig. 10. Ramesses II (1279-1213 BCE) figthing against a Canaanite town, relief 
from the northern wall of the temple of Beit el-Wali (Keel 51996: 91 Fig. 132a). 
 
Fig. 11. Relief from the Meroitic lion temple in Musawwarat es-Sufra, 3rd 
century BCE (Keel 51996: 75 Fig. 101).  
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Fig. 12. Cylinder seal, ca. 1800 BCE, today British Museum (Keel 51996: 62 Fig. 81). 
 
Fig. 13. Egyptian cosmetic palette, Archaic Period, ca. 3100 BCE, today in the 
Louvre (Keel 51996: 76 Fig. 105).   
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Fig. 14. Ivory plaque, Ugarit, 1400-1350 BCE, today 
National Museum Damascus (Keel 51996: 275 Fig. 403). 
 
Fig. 15. Famine relief, Saqqara, from pyramid causeway of Unas, Egyptian, 
5th dynasty (Keel 51996: 66 Fig. 88). 
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Fig. 16. Battle between Ramesses III and the Sea Peoples, Medinet Habu, 12th century 




Fig. 17. Man carrying a calf through water, Mastaba of Ti, Saqqara, 
5th dynasty (Lange / Hirmer 1967: Fig. 69).  
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Fig. 18. Harpooned hippos, mastaba of Mereruka, Saqqara, 6th 




Fig. 19. Ramesses II and a prince catching a bull, temple of Seti I in Abydos 
(Lange / Hirmer 1967, Fig. 224).  
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Fig. 20. Lion hunt, from Kalah/Nimrud, time of Ashurnasirpal II, 7th century BCE 
(Orthmann 1985: Fig. 205). 
 
 
Fig. 21. Relief from Karnak, Sesostris I, 
ca. 1900 BCE, now Cairo Museum 
(Keel 51996: 180 Fig. 274).  
Fig. 22. Ivory tablet from Ugarit, 1400-
1350 BCE, today National Museum 
Damascus (Keel 51996: 264 Fig. 387). 
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Fig. 23. Pharaoh Mykerinos and Queen Khamerernebti, 4th dynasty, 
Museum of Fine Arts Boston (Lange / Hirmer 1967: Fig. 41). 
 
Fig. 24. Pharaoh Akhenaten and Queen Nofretete playing with their 
children, today Egyptian Museum Berlin (Lange / Hirmer 1967: Fig. 184).  
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Fig. 25. King Ashurbanipal banqueting in the garden with the Queen, Ninive, today British 
Museum (Orthmann 1985: Fig. 247).  
 
 
Fig. 26. Goddess (?) with child, 
Karatepe, North Gate, late 8th century 
BCE (Orthmann 1985: Fig. 365). 
Fig. 27. Tree goddess, tomb of 
Tuthmosis III in the Valley of the 
Kings (Keel 1992: 96 Fig. 40). 
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Fig. 28. Naked Anatolian/Syrian goddess, Kültepe, around 
1700 BCE (Keel / Schroer 2004: 115 Fig. 69). 
 
Fig. 29. Cylinder seal, Old Syrian period (Keel / Schroer 2004: 113 Fig. 67). 
 
 
Fig. 30. Cylinder seal, Old Syrian Period (Keel / Schroer 2004: 21 Fig. 25). 
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Fig. 32. Cylinder seal from Latakia (Cyprus), Middle Syrian period (copyright: 
Seminar for Old Testament and Biblical Archaeology, drawing: N. Klostermann). 
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“The eyes have it and the benign smile” 
The Iconography of Emotions in the Ancient Near 
East: From Gestures to Facial Expressions?1 
Izak (Sakkie) CORNELIUS 
1. Introduction 
The so-called “Sumerian drinking song” expresses the joy of consuming 
beer: “I feel wonderful, my heart full of joy”.2 Visual sources depict people 
at banquets consuming alcohol (Selz 1983; Romano 2015), but the exhila-
ration cannot be easily discerned on their faces. 
Were such emotions expressed visually in ancient Near Eastern icono-
graphy, and if so, which emotions were depicted? Selected case studies 
from the corpus of Western Asian and Egyptian material will be included in 
this contribution, although the differences between the sources from these 
two regions should be kept in mind. 
Emotions form part of our daily lives and this has been true of humans 
throughout the ages. For this reason emotions are also expressed in art.3 
Darwin studied the expression of emotions in humans and animals – a pio-
neering, but a more biological approach (1872). However, emotions are 
both the products of nature and nurture; they are evolutionary and culturally 
constructed (cf. Prinz 2004b: 1).  
Part of the problem is defining what is meant by emotions (see most re-
cently Kruger 2015: 398ff.). Here one has to work not only with disciplines 
such as psychology and neurology, but also sociology and anthropology. 
Psychologists still differ about the definitions and the listing of all the dif-
ferent types of emotions (Ekman & Friesen 1975; Ekman 1999; especially 
Prinz 2004a and 2004b). There are more words for emotions than there are 
emotions (Ekman 1999: 56). This problem with terminology also applies to 
the ancient world. The “Big Six” are usually given as happiness, sadness, 
fear, surprise, anger and disgust. But Prinz (2004a and b) argued that the 
matter is more complex. Emotions are more than feelings and they involve 
                                                     
1  I want to express a special word of thanks to Sara Kipfer for the kind invitation and sup-
port in various ways to visit the wonderful city of Bern and attend the RAI. Also thanks 
to my research assistants Liani Swanepoel and Renate van Dijk-Coombes for their con-
tributions. 
2  http://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/cgi-bin/etcsl.cgi?text=t.5.5.a#; cf. Mander 2003-2004: 1-2. 
3  There are classics like “The Laughing Cavalier” (Hals), “Weeping Man” (van Gogh), 
“The Scream” (Munch), “Weeping Woman” (Picasso). 
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physiological changes in the body. According to psychologists emotions 
are embodied and have physical effects.4 You can smile because you are 
happy, but also because you are confused or embarrassed, or spiteful 
(Schadenfreude). Part of the problem is that some emotions might overlap; 
for example, “awe” includes fear but also fascination. “Love” can be caring 
motherly love or unbridled carnal lust. “Jealousy” involves anger, fear, 
sadness, and disgust (Prinz 2004b: 10). Emotions can blend, creating a 
different or a new emotion. Moreover, the expression of emotions differs 
from culture to culture – for example, showing emotions in Italy will differ 
from doing so in Japan. 
The same problem applies and in fact gets even worse when one tries to 
understand the emotions of ancient times, such as those of the people of the 
ancient Near East. There is always a danger that one can read 21st-century 
Western perceptions of emotions such as romantic love into the ancient 
sources (Tarlow 2000: 719, 720). 
Tarlow (2000) dealt with emotion and archaeology (also important for 
definitions and approaches to the issue). For the ancient Greek world there 
is the volume Unveiling Emotions (edited by Chaniotis 2012) with a metho-
dological article by Masséglia (2012; cf. also Schneider 2009). 
As far as the study of emotions in the ancient Near Eastern cultures is 
concerned, an overview of the literature is impossible, although there are 
studies such as the classic book by Gruber (1980), but these are more lim-
ited to the textual sources. Important in a general sense is the volume edited 
by Nitschke et al. (2009), with chapters by Zgoll & Lämmerhirt and 
Schroer & Staubli on Mesopotamia (cf. Jaques 2006, 2011; also Steinert 
2012) and the biblical world respectively. For ancient Egypt there is a dis-
sertation by Rueda (2003) on the heart (the centre of the emotions as in 
many other cultures), which also deals with the theory and the definition of 
emotions. In Egyptian hieroglyphs determinatives indicate emotions: e.g. 
A2 for love and D19 for anger. Schroer & Staubli deal in their books 
Körpersymbolik (1998) and Menschenbilder (2014: 157ff.) with emotions 
and also include illustrations (cf. 2007). Zwickel (2012 and in this volume) 
wrote on the iconography of emotions, the only study devoted to the theme. 
Although Gilgameš cried like a woman over Enkidu (George 2003: 
654f.), king Kirta in the Ugaritic epic cried himself to sleep (Hallo 1997: 
333; Niehr 2015: 242-243) and Aššurbanipal cried to Ištar (Zgoll & 
Lämmerhirt 2009: 459-460), the iconographical sources do not show kings 
crying. Can one even imagine an Assyrian king crying? There are also no 
portraits in the true sense of the word (Winter 2009 and Keel in this volume). 
The same applies to Egypt, where the pharaoh becomes sad (Simpson 2003: 
21, 76). 
                                                     
4  E.g. https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/body-sense/201204/emotional-and-physical- 
pain-activate-similar-brain-regions. 
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Deities also show emotions when they get angry or cry like Ereškigal 
and the god Anu, who laughed at Adapa (Hallo 1997: 387 and 449); the 
goddess cries in the Mesopotamian laments (Zgoll & Lämmerhirt 2009: 
455). 
In the Egyptian Contendings of Horus and Seth the sun god was furious, 
and saddened, and so Hathor exposed her private parts and her father the 
sun god laughed at her (Simpson 2003: 93-94; cf. Morris 2007). He can 
also be filled with lust (Manniche 2001: 481). The goddesses Isis and 
Nephtys are the wailing goddesses par excellence. Visually Isis, with the 
hieroglyph of her name on her head, is shown mourning her husband 
(Louvre Department of Egyptian Antiquities N 4130 = cf. IPIAO #800). 
Texts describe emotions, but as far as the Mesopotamian visual imagery 
is concerned, Nunn argued: “Natürlich hat es Emotionen gegeben, sie wur-
den aber nicht in den Gesichtszügen gezeigt. Ein kurzer Blick reicht, um 
festzustellen, dass die Gesichtsausdrücke aller abgebildeten Götter und 
Menschen gleich sind: kein Lachen, keine Freude, keine Bekundung von 
Bewunderung oder Staunen, kein Weinen, keine Angstgefühle, keine Trau-
er” (2009: 134-135). Berlejung (2007: 54) draws a similar conclusion: “Auf 
individualisierende Gesichtszüge legte man weder bei Menschen- noch 
Götterdarstellungen besonderen Wert.” 
The same applies to the Egyptian sources. The father of the study of 
Egyptian art, Schäfer already argued that “the eyes themselves never show 
emotion” (1986: 291).5 Simpson (1978: 22) was equally clear on this: 
These tendencies underline a significant feature of Egyptian art: a commit-
ment to representing and explaining things as they should be or must be 
ideally, as opposed to the impressions of a fleeting moment or the recording 
of emotions. Serenity and seriousness of purpose characterize the faces, and 
one looks in vain for traces of laughter or agony. In carved relief and in 
tomb painting there is a certain amount of characterization: the wailing and 
distraught professional mourners following the funeral procession, the 
gnarled herdsman, the joyful dancers, the famine-stricken enemies, the out-
landish physiognomy, physique and costume of foreigners, and even the 
suffering of wounded animals in the hunting scenes. Yet in all these cases 
the emphasis is on the explicative gestures of the figures rather than on faci-
al features and emotions. 
A stela containing the personal testimonial of an Egyptian artist named 
Irtisen (stela Louvre C14) contains the words: “I know … frightening the 
face of the guarded foreigners” (Barta 1970: 107). However, Barta is scep-
tical: “niemals lassen sich starke Gefühlsregungen, die zwangsläufig eine 
bestimmte Mimik oder Gebärde verlangen würden, ablesen” (1970: 114). 
                                                     
5  In the earlier German edition 1922: 241 he has “… fast nie”. 
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The question is therefore: are there emotions expressed in the visual 
sources, viz. iconography? Most iconographical sources depict kings and 
they were not supposed to show emotions, but convey power (Karlsson 
2016).6  
Another problem is that what looks like an emotion might only be an ar-
tistic style – for example, the way the eyes are depicted. Sometimes the find 
context is known, but it is more difficult to know who made the depiction 
or for which audience;7 sometimes it is only the (modern) observers who 
express emotions when viewing these images.8 So the whole method of ico-
nography and reading images should be addressed. But as shown by Ver-
bovsek (2015: 141-142) with regard to theories of emotional appreciation 
in the study of art (e.g. Funch 1997: 133-137, 270-271), art evokes emo-
tions in the beholder, but artwork can also be an expression of emotions. 
2. Gestures and Emotions 
Zwickel (2012: 2 and in this volume) argues that emotions are expressed by 
gestures/Gestik, as does Nunn: “Nicht Portrait oder Gesichtszüge drücken 
Emotionen aus, sondern äußere Merkmale, unter ihnen Haltungen und Ges-
tik” (2009: 135). The same is true of Egypt.9 
Gestures include body parts and body movements which might express 
emotions. This will be the first group of sources to be discussed; after that 
the attention will move to facial features, which is the most difficult and 
daring part. It has to be kept in mind that there are fewer sources for the 
region of the Levant.  
There is no detailed monograph on gestures in Western Asian iconogra-
phy;10 for Egypt there are articles by Altenmüller (1977: “Gefühlsbewe- 
gungen”) and Müller for the Old Kingdom (1937) and the detailed study by 
Dominicus (1994) on the Old and Middle Kingdom. 
First emotions and body gestures will be discussed. Zwickel (2012 and in 
this volume) collected the relevant sources, which will serve as point of de-
parture. This article will expand on the material he collected. As in Zwickel’s 
contribution, attention will be devoted to four basic emotions – joy, mourning, 
fear/despair, love/sympathy – and their visual representations. 
                                                     
6  As shown by Schneider (2009: 547, Abb. 4 and 577-579, Abb. 24), the politician Peri-
cles does not smile and in the official portraits of the presidents of the USA they are 
shown smiling only from Nixon onwards. See Keel in this volume.  
7  On art and communication see Suter 2000: 1ff. and Orthmann 2008. 
8  Cf. Zwickel 2012: 3 on images evoking emotions in the people who see them. 
9  Cf. Simpson 1978: 22 cited earlier on Egypt and Wilkinson 2001: 21. The Egyptologist 
Müller 1937: 57 wrote with regard to gestures: “durch die ein beseelter Organismus sei-
ne innere Vorgänge unwillkürlich oder willkürlich kundgibt”. In a study on gestures in 
the classical world Sittl already devoted attention to emotions (1890). 
10  Cf. Langdon 1919; Keel 1974; Cifarelli 1998; Bonatz 2002; Choksy 2002. 
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2.1. Joy 
 
Fig. 1. Steatite plaque, ca. 1700-1550 BCE, with victorious weather 
god and people dancing with joy, purchased in Israel (IPIAO #486). 
In ancient Egypt joy is usually expressed by joyful movements like dancing 
(cf. Meyer-Dietrich 2009) which was inspired by emotion and accompanied 
by music (Dominicus 1994: 167ff.). One can also refer here to the Egyptian 
hieroglyph A28. Hermann (1963) studied this gesture: Jubel bei der Audi-
enz. 
For the Levant there is a seal impression from northern Syria showing a 
seated ruler/deity with music and acrobatic dancing (Schroer & Staubli 
2009: Abb. 8) and a seal-amulet (IPIAO #486 = Fig. 1; Staubli & Schroer 
2014: Abb. 22g) with people dancing with joy when the victorious weather 
god appears; they even do somersaults.11 On other seal-amulets there might 
be erotic acts involved (cf. Keel 1996: Abb. 15-17). An ivory from Megiddo 
shows a musician and a dancing girl in Egyptian style (Schroer & Staubli 
2009: Abb. 13). 
In Mesopotamian art there are also scenes of joyful festivities with 
dancing and music (Collon 2003). The images mentioned of banquets sure-
ly included expressions of joy and one can almost imagine and hear the 
laughter, although the faces do not show smiles. Scenes of musicians show 
women and men clapping (Keel 1980b: Tf. XXVII; Suter 2000: 194, figs. 
19c, 19e), which also could have involved joy. 
  
                                                     
11  For the sake of convenience reference is made to illustrations in easily accessible collec-
tions like IPIAO and other sources. 
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2.2. Mourning 
 
Fig. 2. Egyptian mourners from tomb of Nespekashuti in Thebes (TT 312), 
26th Dyn. (650-630 BCE), New York (Schroer 2011: Abb. 2).  
Mourning is well known from ancient Egypt (Müller 1937: 111ff. and the 
monograph by Werbrouck 1938; Dominicus 1994: 58ff.) and often shown 
on wall paintings.12 The hair is loosened, the breasts are revealed, some are 
tearing their hair in bereavement, they throw dust on their heads, have their 
hands on their heads, some are overcome by sadness and sitting hunched on 
the ground.13 The scenes depict a ritual; they are exaggerated to show la-
menting emotions. A relief from the 26th dynasty (NY Brooklyn Museum 
52.131.3 = Tiradritti 2004: 117; Schroer 2011: Abb. 2 = Fig. 2) shows a 
group with convulsive movements. “The drama and emotion of this scene 
are unparalleled among the art of its time” (Tiradritti 2004: 117). Emotions 
are also present on the papyrus of Hunefer (IPIAO #802) and there are even 
wooden statues, clay figurines (Keel 2008: Abb. 70 = Schroer 2011: 
Abb. 1) and amulets of the mourning Isis (Millward 2012) as well as scenes 
on painted coffins (Rehm 2004: Abb. 49, 55-57). Schroer studied the icon-
ographical sources, but is sceptical about the emotions involved: “nicht 
weibliche Emotionalität, sondern weibliche Ritualverantwortung” (2011: 
91). Millward (2012: 1-2) is more positive in this regard and Meskell 
                                                     
12  E.g. the tomb of Userhet TT 51 = Keel 1980b: Abb. 76 and 428; the tomb of Ramose TT 
55 = Davies 1941: 25, Pls. XXIV-XXV and TT 181 = Davies 1925: 37ff., Pls. XIX-
XXII; Leclant 1980: Abb. 82-86. 
13  In the Hebrew Bible mourners sit on the ground as in Job 1:20, 2:12 and Lam. 1:1, 2:10, 
as is the case with the god Ilu in Ugarit (cf. Cornelius 2009: 253-255); on mourning cf. 
Anderson 1991; Pham 1999; Staubli & Schroer 2014: 182-185. Schroer & Staubli 2007: 
45: “Gefühle, die sich im Bauch somatisieren”. 
.. :·.· 
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(2002: 189-193) argues that in texts emotionality was not prized, but she 
talks of “emotive dances”, and refers to a relief that “attempts to show emo-
tion”, while “baring of the breasts was a sign of emotional distress”. 
Mourning is more typical of emotion expressed by women: “Die Klage 
ist in der Ikonographie dominant weiblich” (Staubli & Schroer 2014: 183), 
but men are also depicted as mourning (Vandersleyen 1975: Abb. 301). 
Kings do not cry, but there is a rare case from Amarna where the royal 
couple mourns over the death of a daughter, the king supporting his wife by 
holding her hand (Keel 1980b: Abb. 68a). There is also mourning in the 
tomb of Huya, who was an officer of queen Tiye (Davies 1905: 16-17, Pls. 
XXII-XXIII).14 
On scenes of cities besieged by the pharaoh a woman also laments with 
her hands on her head (Keel 1980a: Abb. 132a). Schroer (2011: 95-96, 
Abb. 3; cf. Bonatz in this volume p. 69, Figs. 7 and 8) argues that Assyrian 
war reliefs pre-eminently show women lamenting on the walls, as they are 
in despair. 
Levantine sources show the female mourners on the Ahiram sarcopha-
gus (Rehm 2004: 49-51; Zwickel 2012 and in this volume p. 109, Fig. 6), 
including clay figurines (Dothan 1982: 239, fig. 10). A clay anthropoid 
coffin from Lachish shows the Egyptian wailing goddesses Isis and 
Nephtys (Dothan 1982: 276-277, fig. 15; IPIAO #799). 
2.3. Despair/fear 
The stele of Irtisen mentioned above also refers to the “cringing of the soli-
tary captive” (Barta 1970: 107). Strawn (2014) has recently dealt with the 
iconography of fear and included smiting scenes from Egypt and adora-
tion.15 Cringing enemies are shown when the pharaoh smites the foreign 
enemy (Hall 1986), but the king shows no facial aggression nor is there any 
fear/despair on the face of the enemy. Strawn (2014: 117ff.) also includes 
material from the Levant. 
Zwickel included examples of the subjugated person lifting a hand as a 
sign of hopelessness (2012 and in this volume pp. 111-113, Figs. 11-14). 
One can add here the rebel Gaumata on the Behistun relief of the Achaeme-
nid king Darius I, with arms raised as an act of pleading (Garrison 2009: 
15, fig. 15 = Fig. 3). 
                                                     
14  Davies 1925: 39n2 wrote on the Ramesside model of mourning. 
15  The German word Ehrfurcht (awe) includes an element of fear (a basic emotion); on this 
motif in Egyptian art see Müller 1937: 90ff. and Dominicus 1994: 5ff. 
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Fig. 3. Gaumata on the Behistun relief of Darius I ca. 522-486 BCE 
(Garrison 2009: 15, fig. 15). 
Despair might be shown by the famous starving group of nomads (Zwickel 
2012 and in this volume p. 113, Fig. 15). Their situation is so hopeless that 
they eat their own lice. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Crying cow and calf from limestone coffin relief, tomb at Deir 
el-Bahari ca. 2046-1995 BCE Cairo CG 47267 (IPIAO #306). 
According to Zwickel, animals in despair or fear might cry (2012: 14-15; 
figs. 18-19 and in this volume pp. 102, 115, Figs. 18-19). In Egypt, the 
relationship between cow and calf is shown (Keel 1980a: 46ff.). For exam-
ple, on a relief on the sarcophagus of Kawit, wife of Mentuhotep, a cow 
might be shedding a tear (Keel 1980a: 48 with Abb. 6; Tiradritti 2004: 45); 
there is a similar example from Deir el-Bahari (IPIAO #306 = Fig. 4). The 
hippos in a hunting scene (Zwickel 2012 and in this volume p. 115, Fig. 18) 
might be showing fear, but they are also angry. 
Turning to Mesopotamia, the slain dying lioness in the hunt of Aššurba-
nipal (Barnett 1976: Pl. XIII) shows pain, but presumably also anger or 
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fear? On the Persepolis Apadana reliefs there is a lioness “clearly enraged 
to the point of great ferocity, she turns her snarling face around to monitor 
her two babies in the clutches of the last two ambassadors … Of all the 
animal gifts ... this is the only set that depicts an emotive narrative” (Root 
2002: 200). 
All these sources might indicate that human emotions are not normally 
represented by facial expressions, whereas it might be the case with ani-
mals (see similar conclusions of Zwickel and Lippke in this volume). 
2.4. Love or affection 
 
Fig. 5. Sumerian limestone statue of  a 
couple from Nippur ca. 2650-2550 BCE, 
Iraq Museum Baghdad excavation number 
7N161, unknown museum number (IPIAO 
#200). 
Fig. 6. Steatite scarab from Megiddo tomb 
of ruler and lady ca. 17th cent. BCE, Rocke-
feller Museum Jerusalem IAA 39-844 
(IPIAO #505). 
Lovers are shown in physical contact as on the ivory from Ugarit (IPIAO 
#957) or countless statues of Egyptian couples (Robins 1997: 73). 
Turning to Mesopotamian sources, there is a very charming Sumerian 
statue of a couple from Nippur (IPIAO #200 = fig. 5; Marchesi & Marchetti 
2011: Pl. 8A; Evans 2012: fig. 68). Another couple (headless) is from Mari 
(Aleppo 10104 = Margueron 2004: 281-282, fig. 268; Evans 2012: fig. 71). 
Parrot described them as “the ‘Embracing Couple’ … flesh-and-blood be-
ings moved by passions like our own” (1960: 128, #157).16 Evans wrote a 
very important book on early Mesopotamian sculptures, but warned against 
reading romantic love or marital bliss into what is merely a “collective 
dedication” including a female hand gesture (2012: 198-199 with fig. 70). 
These examples illustrate the problem stated at the beginning of this paper: 
                                                     
16  Cf. Kohlmeyer & Strommenger 1982: 75: “… umarmt sich liebevoll”. 
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one should be careful not to read modern perceptions of emotions (like 
21st-century romantic love) into the ancient artefacts. 
But perhaps the embracing couples represent not only dedication to the 
gods, but are also expressing devotedness to each other, shown by the 
closeness of the couple. 
Then there is divine love, studied by Ornan (2010), and represented by 
two examples: a Syrian cylinder seal (IPIAO #503) and a terracotta with 
Ningirsu and Bau as a couple (Louvre AO 58). 
Rulers might be without emotions, but on a scarab from Megiddo a ruler 
– wearing a garment with thick borders – is shown in close contact with his 
lady (IPIAO #505 = Fig. 6). More explicitly erotic material such as the 
Turin Egyptian erotic papyrus (Omlin 1973), the Babylonian terracottas 
(IPIAO ##494, 496, 504) and a couple in bed (Schroer & Staubli 2009: 
Abb. 5) could be included. A problem is ascertaining whether these scenes 
merely represent sexual activity or the emotion “love”. Meskell (2002: 127) 
seems to argue that the ancient Egyptians were not so different with regard 
to romantic love.17 With regard to Mesopotamia, Bahrani (2001: 53) argued 
that the people of Mesopotamia “believed sex to be a direct expression of 
love”. 
Depictions of the care and motherly love for children are known 
(Schwyn 2006), although no facial emotion is shown and these images are 
stereotypes in a male world. Mothers usually feed children or interact with 
them. A famous scene from Amarna shows the loving family with Akhena-
ten kissing his daughter (Zwickel 2012 and in this volume p. 117, Fig. 24), 
and another relief shows Nefertete kissing her daughter (Schroer & Staubli 
1998: Abb. 57). A couple reflects a “sense of intimacy” (Tiradritti 2004: 
78) and a statue shows the king kissing a female seated on his lap (Tiradritti 
2004: 83). The problem is that Amarna art is so enigmatic and unique that 
it does not represent the rule with regard to the visual representation of 
emotions. 
One can conclude that in light of the examples discussed above, emo-
tions could be depicted using gestures. 
3. Emotions and Facial Expressions 
A Greek figure (Schneider 2009: Abb. 15) depicts a laughing actor, the 
laughing being indicated not only by the face but by the whole body. How-
ever, no example of this is found anywhere in the ancient Near East. What 
about a laughing face? This section will attempt to take a step forward and 
enter more dangerous waters by revisiting the possibility that facial features 
                                                     
17  Cf. in this regard the Ramesside love songs and on “love as emotion” Fox 1985: 322ff. 
and Watterson 2013: 51; although Moers 2010: 689 emphasises the fictional character of 
these songs. 
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could express some emotions. The face is after all often considered a win-
dow to the soul (Masséglia 2012: 134). In our contemporary world one is 
used to emoticons/emojis when communicating with others.18 In comics 
emotions are also expressed, especially by the eyes as in Anime iconogra-
phy or other popular culture icons. 
Darwin (1872) already studied the facial expressions of humans and ani-
mals. Important in this regard is the work of psychologist Paul Ekman, 
already mentioned above, on emotions with regard to facial expressions. He 
identified seven basic emotions or what he calls universal expressions: hap-
piness, surprise, sadness, anger, fear, contempt and disgust. Happiness is 
physically expressed by a smile, by flexing the muscles at the side of the 
mouth, plus contraction of the muscles at the corner of the eyes.19 Sadness 
again is indicated by drooping eyelids and a slight pulling down of the cor-
ners of the mouth. 
For this reason attention will now be devoted to images representing the 
eyes, the mouth, and the nose. 
3.1. Eyes 
Eyes are messengers of love (Keel 1994: 71), but looks can kill. The gaze is 
something dynamic. What about the ancient Near East? Sometimes the eyes 
of statues are quite prominent. The rock crystal eyes of the statue of the 
Egyptian Rahotep (Russmann 1989: 18-19) were intended to last for eterni-
ty and to show he is alive, whereas the closed eyes of a defeated enemy 
show he is dead (Nelson 1929: 32; 1931: 15). 20 A blind harpist has closed 
eyes as in the tomb of Nakht (Davies 1917: Pl. XVII). This is also the case 
with the lady made of ivory from Kamid el-Loz and an ivory face (Hach-
mann 1983: cover, 88, 90, 111, 118). These examples indicate that ancient 
artists had the skill to represent the eyes quite vividly and even depict 
blindness. Are there then any examples of the eyes indicating emotions? 
The Egyptian mourning scenes mentioned above show women with 
tears in their eyes and eye makeup running down their cheeks (Davies 
1941: 25, Pls. XXIV-XXV = Fig. 7).  
                                                     
18  Emoticons are totally different from, for example, the signs in Egyptian hieroglyphs (cf. 
http://www.eloquentpeasant.com/2015/06/02/emojis-vs-hieroglyphs/). 
19  As shown by Schneider 2009: Abb. 1. 
20  On the eyes in Egyptian art see Schäfer 1986: 290ff. 
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Fig. 7. Egyptian mourners with tears from tomb of vizier Ramose (TT55, Sheikh 
Abd el-Qurna, Theban Necropolis) ca. 1411-1375 BCE  (Davies 1941: Pl. XXIV). 
In Western Asian art there are artefacts with prominent eyes, as inlays or 
painted. Neolithic skulls and statue heads from Jericho and Ain Ghazal 
were modelled with eyes of shell (IPIAO ##38-40). These were publicly 
exhibited to be observed (IPIAO 54, Abb. 8). The shells used for eyes make 
them appear to be alive, although the exact function and meaning are de-
batable (cf. Cauvin 2002: 108-115). 
The enigmatic “eye-idols” from Tell Brak (IPIAO #19621) might be re-
presentations of worshippers observing the divine in the temple. Wall 
paintings from Munbaqa show figures with raised hands and enormous 
eyes (Machule et al. 1986: Abb. 10). 
But the most impressive examples are statues from Tell Asmar (IPIAO 
##198-99 = Fig. 8) with eyes with enormous pupils. Frankfort (1939: 15, 
Pls. 1-6) had already reflected on the superhuman sized eyes as the centre 
of the composition. Jacobsen (1989) talked of the alluring eyes of the gods. 
Both Frankfort and Jacobsen identified these statues as deities (Jacobsen 
1976: 128 and 1989 = Ninurta), but most recent interpretations (Marchesi 
& Marchetti 2011: 140-141) opt for these being royal statues that were 
standing in the presence of the divine. Kramer (1968: 4) has already noted 
that “huge eyes symbolizing awed adoration … served busy worshippers as 
stand-ins”. Winter (2000: 36) understood the enlarged eyes of Early Dynas-
tic sculpture as the manifestation of an enhanced response to an awe-
inspiring divinity, a visible marker of affect. Or as in IPIAO I: 296: “schaut 
                                                     
21  See also Frankfort 1949. 
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mit großen Augen erwartungsvoll auf die Gottheit”, and recently Staubli & 
Schroer (2014: Abb. 31a-b): “erfreuen sich an ihrem Segen.” So the statues 
have enormous eyes maybe indicating the emotion of awe expressed by the 
worshipper in the presence of the deity. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Gypsum statue from Tell Asmar ca. 2650-2550, Iraq Museum  Baghdad 19752 (IPIAO 
#199) and close-up of face (drawing by Renate van Dijk-Coombes from Frankfort 1939: 
Pl. 3). 
Selz (2004: 194-195) argued that their bug-eyed appearance, often with 
dilated pupils, does not only reflect their “religious attentiveness” as shown 
by the scholars cited above, but may even be a sign of ecstasy and height-
ened awareness following the consumption of drugs and alcohol, a very 
practical interpretation of the large eyes. He does refer to the use of drugs 
and the fact that the figures are often holding cups. 
In spite of the fact that huge eyes are typical of the period and its artistic 
style, it is argued that these are worshippers and that the unnatural size em-
phasises the eyes for some reason and might reflect the emotion of awe in 
observing the deity. This interpretation differs from that of Evans (2012: 
107), who is sceptical about interpreting the eyes “as a reflection of the hu-
man body with its physiological functions and the human mind with its 
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emotional responses”. There is more to it than style; the eyes form the cen-
tre of the composition – in the words of Winter (2000): “The eyes have it.” 
Looking at material from the Levant, the first case study comes from 
Sahem in Jordan, published by Fischer (1997: 63, 126 = fig. 23, 165 = 
Pl. 32), who compares two ladies and then argues: “the one has a smiling 
almost euphoric face, the other a mixture of melancholy, responsibility and 




Fig. 9. Terracotta plaque figurine from 
Revadim near Ekron ca. 1250 BCE, 
Jerusalem Israel Museum IAA 82-219 
(IPIAO #828). 
Fig. 10. Albaster Egyptian “Gravi-
denflasche”, Tübingen 967 (drawing by 
Magna Cornelius from Brunner-Traut 
1970: Tafel 1). 
The next case study is perhaps of greater importance. Ornan (2007) studied 
a terracotta plaque from Revadim (IPIAO #828 = Fig. 9) – there are two 
other fragments, but these unfortunately show only the lower part of the 
body.22 She wrote: 
In the context of the non-realistic affinities of ancient Near Eastern imagery, 
the unique expressiveness of the woman’s face on the plaque from Revadim 
demands an explanation. Indeed, the agonizing properties conveyed through 
                                                     
22  Another fragment with two babies was found at Tel Burna (Shai 2015: 30). 
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the above noted down-curving eyebrows, lower lip, and the vertical ridges 
flanking the nose, may seem as a realistic portrayal of a woman in pain. 
However, since this facial countenance was also probably applied on the 
other two fragments, which were made in the same mould, I would regard 
this exceptional appearance as a conventionalized, generic expression for 
displaying a woman in a state of anxiety and distress. (223) 
Ornan also refers to Egyptian objects (Brunner-Traut 1970 = Fig. 10) which 
might represent a woman experiencing the pain of childbirth as indicated 
by the same downward slanting eyes. These are alabaster vessels with oil 
for pregnant women linked to the goddess Taweret. The face of the mortal 
woman is “ausdrucksvoll,” and “die Augengruben geben dem Antlitz etwas 
Leidvolles” (Brunner-Traut 1970: 36). The pain is clear on these objects. 
Does the Revadim lady (presumably an amulet for childbirth) with the 
slanting eyebrows perhaps show labour pangs, emotions of pain, anxiety 
and distress? The problem is that what looks like an “emotion” in the eyes 
of the terracottas might just be accidental, the end result when the clay figu-
rine was taken from the mould.23 
3.2. The smile 
When looking at the smile as an emotional expression, one must surely 
refer to the Mona Lisa of Leonardo da Vinci with its enigmatic, “benign 
smile” (someone has even argued she shows signs of high cholesterol24). 
Turning to the ancient Near East there is an exceptional ivory from Nimrud, 
the so-called “Mona Lisa of Nimrud”, as she has been called because of her 
similarly enigmatic smile (Pusch 1979: 33 = Fig. 11). In contrast is another 
ivory head, called the “Ugly Sister” with her austere face and a thin slit for 
a mouth (Mallowan 1966: I: 122ff., Pl. II, fig. 71; McCall 2008: 68, fig. 9-
h, 226, fig. 27-b). 
                                                     
23  As shown by Tadmor 1982: 157n15 with regard to the presumed “lion-faced” items 
from Tell Massad (near Beisan) published by Rachmani 1959: 184-185, Pl. XXIV: 1-3. 
Cf. also the figurines from Beisan (Rowe 1940: Pl. LXVIII:3), from Tel Harasim (Cor-
nelius 2004: 54, Pl. 5.55b) and Tell Zerā‘a (Vieweger & Häser 2007: 14-15, Abb. 10). 
Another comparison is not a terracotta plaque, but a bronze statuette from Tell Abu el-
Kharaz. The excavator Fischer described the face as that of a cat or lion, possibly related 
to Sekhmet or Bastet (1996; cf. IPIAO #914). However, as shown by Uehlinger (1997: 
114), the figure wears a short kilt, which makes it male. He also argued that the face is 
merely “a somewhat blurred execution”. 
24  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8444202.stm. 
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Fig. 11. “Mona Lisa of Nimrud”, ivory from a well in chamber NN of the North-West Pal-
ace of Ashurnasirpal II at Nimrud, Iraq Museum Baghdad, ca. 8th cent. BCE  (Pusch 1979: 
330). 
Parrot argued that in later Sumerian statues the smile became more promi-
nent (1960: 110, cf. fig. 140). Even Elamite heads might have a grinning 
expression, according to Alvarez-Mon (2005: 117). 
 
  
Fig. 12. Neolithic limestone mask from 
Duma near Hebron, ca. 8000 BCE, 
Israel Museum Jerusalem IMJ 82.2.71 
(IPIAO #41). 
Fig. 13. Terracotta mask of Humbaba, 
Mesopotamia ca. 18th cent. BCE, 
BIBEL+ORIENT Museum Fribourg 
VFig 2006.7 (Staubli & Schroer 2014: 
Abb. 29b). 
Depictions of smiling/grinning faces might even go back to very early 
stone “masks” 9,000 years ago in the southern Levant (IPIAO ##41-42 = 
Fig. 12; Hershman 2014). These masks resemble skulls and were presuma-
bly used as part of some ritual. But they still look both friendly and scary. 
0 0 e o 0 
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There are also clay masks with the grin of the monster Humbaba showing 
its teeth (Staubli & Schroer 2014: Abb. 29b = Fig. 13; cf. Carter 1987). 
Zgoll & Lämmerhirt (2009: 452) mentioned this as the only piece of icono-
graphic evidence for laughing (Baghdad M 65622 = Ascalone 2007: 152). 
From a mask in the British Museum with an inscription it can be argued 
that the artefact served a divinatory purpose (Ornan 2010: 235-236).25 
Showing the teeth with “Lachfalten” is typical of a grin. Phoenician masks 
have what has been called a “sardonic smile” (Aubet 2001: 248-249; Ciasca 
2001: 411-412 and Mazza 2001: 649). 
The figurine on the shard from Ramat Rahel (Cornelius 2015) has been 
described as showing a slight smile, which Geva (1981: 188) ascribed to 
Greek influence. 
Egyptian statues also have slight smiles, as some examples show. Thut-
mose III has a slight smile (Tiradritti 2004: 65). A head of Amenhotep III 
(BM EA7 = Tiradritti 2004: 75) has the lower lip curving “in a perfect shal-
low arc up to the open corners of the mouth, to produce the effect of a 
slight smile”.26  
Amarna art has already been described as unique and enigmatic. This is 
also clear on some statues of Akhenaten with their slanting eyes (more than 
only hieroglyphs) and grinning lips (Romano et al. 1979: 113-115, 120-
121). In his ushabtis he is shown in a more simplified way (Tiradritti 2004: 
83). The Third Intermediate Period statue of Meres-Amen (Tiradritti 2004: 
111) has a slight smile. 
It could be argued that hidden behind these smiling/grinning faces might 
be something tending in the direction of emotional expression. This re-
minds one of what is found in early Greek art (Schneider 2009: Abb. 7-9). 
Moving from smiling faces, there is the “pessimistic” face of Sesostris 
III with its grim expression (Aldred 1970: 43-45). Is this realistic, or only a 
specific trope of kingship (Berman 1996; Winter 2009: 259n12), the deeply 
concerned ruler? Or is this a naturalistic representation of sadness (Myśli-
wiec 2002: 234), another example of a possible emotion? 
3.3. The nose 
The last part of the face to be dealt with is the nose, which is sometimes 
prominent in ancient Near Eastern art.27 Neolithic heads have round eyes  
                                                     
25  An example from Kish has cut-out eyes which indicate it was worn as a mask (Carter 
1987: 362). For a giant Humbaba see Amiet 1977: fig. 441 and Howard-Carter 1983. 
26  From the BM online: 
 http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx
?objectId=111468&partId=1&searchText=EA+7+Amenhotep&page=1. 
27  Schroer & Staubli 2007: 46, Abb. 2 = Staubli & Schroer 2014: Abb. 25b discuss the 
stela of Esarhaddon from Zincirli with regard to the nose, but this is a ring through the 
lips and not the nose (Ornan 2007: 62, fig. 2). 
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Fig. 14. Basalt figurine from the Golan ca. 4000-3600 BCE, Jerusalem IAA 
87-6932 (IPIAO #82). 
and large noses (IPIAO ##43-44), and the much later clay figurines from 
Horvat Qitmit have large noses (Beck 1995: fig. 3). 
A group of 35 Chalcolithic-period figurines (37 cm high, average 25 
cm) are cylindrical, slightly bi-conically shaped and come from an area 
extending from northern Jordan up to the Upper Jordan Valley and the Golan 
Heights. They are made of basalt, hard to work with, but locally found. 
These have exaggeratedly large noses (ca. 8 cm), eyes, ears but no clear 
mouth, some might have beards (male figurines?) and even horns (deities 
or animals?). The top of the head is slightly hollowed out, creating a de-
pression or bowl (2 cm deep, diameter 17.5 cm) – presumably to hold offer-
ings (IPIAO ##82-83 = Fig. 14). They have been called pillar figurines 
because of their shape, or household altars because of the bowl on top. The 
objects were found in nearly every house, sometimes more than one. One 
was found on a pedestal facing the door. Epstein (1975, 1978, 1988, 1998) 
called them pillar figurines and more specifically household idols, associat-
ed with family religion to ensure fertility of the fields and flocks. Mazar 
(1992: 80) called these “personified fertility divinities”. Beck (2002: 225-
227) disagreed and talked of altars for offerings. Ibrahim & Mittmann 
(1998) argued these are not human heads, but stylized animal representa-
tions, referring to other material in the form of a bull and a ram (IPIAO 
#48). However, the animal horns are longer and the head tilted, and the 
noses are not all that prominent. These heads are rather human. Ossuaries, 
with human faces on the front (IPIAO #78-81) and prominent noses (and 
eyes and mouths) make for better comparative material. Even ivory figu-
rines have large noses (Epstein 1978: Pl. IV; IPIAO #74). So these figu-
rines could have been household altars representing an ancestor or spirit 
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called upon to protect the fields and flocks, and allowing an offering to be 
made on top. For Epstein the nose is a symbol of life, the breath of life 
(1978: 23). Uehlinger (2004: 89) states that the nose in the Semitic lan-
guages is not primarily a respiratory organ, but a means by which anger is 
expressed. So the spirits had to be pacified by offerings, the effect of paci-
fying obtained by offering agreeably smelling substances. 
 This is a rare example, but only included here to show that there might 
be more emotions “hidden” somewhere in the iconographic record. 
4. Conclusions 
It seems there is some consensus that emotions were expressed through 
body movements and gestures such as joy, sadness, fear and love. There are 
joyful movements and festivities (Fig. 1) visually expressing the emotion of 
joy. Sadness as an emotion is especially shown in scenes of mourning 
(Fig. 2). The rituals were performed by paid mourners, but nevertheless 
included emotions. Fear is especially expressed by the defeated enemy 
(Fig. 3). In animals there is a combination of fear and pain (Fig. 4). Love is 
shown by couples in an embrace (Figs. 5-6), as well as in depictions of 
mother and child. 
With facial features the issue becomes more difficult. Zwickel conclud-
ed: “But it was very unusual and out of order to present emotions on the 
faces of human beings, at least when they were of official status” (2012: 23 
and in this volume p. 105). This view is also expressed by Simpson with 
regard to Egypt and Nunn as far as Mesopotamia is concerned (see citations 
above). 
However, in spite of the fact that Egyptian art is idealised, working with 
roles and stereotypes and not usually representing portraits as is also true of 
Mesopotamian art, there might be exceptions. There are examples from 
early Egyptian art which are more realistic, like the famous statues of 
Hemiunu, Sheikh Beled and the dwarf Seneb with his family (Tiradritti 
2004: 6, 33, 34), not to mention the unique depictions in Amarna art.  
In the light of the sources depicting slanting eyes in pain, huge eyes in 
awe, happy smiling mouths and perhaps large angry noses, it is argued that 
there is more than meets the eye. 
Eyes are shown with tears in scenes of sadness (Fig. 7) and are huge to 
indicate prominence as well as adoration and awe (Fig. 8). Egyptian vessels 
show the pain of childbirth (Fig. 10), but it is unclear whether this is the 
case with the Levantine terracotta plaques (Fig. 9). 
Mouths with smiles might indicate a positive attitude of friendliness 
(Fig. 11), but a grin is more cynical (Fig. 13). If the nose is a means to ex-
press anger, this emotion might also be depicted in the images (Fig. 14). 
Meaning is in the eye of the beholder as much as in the artist’s/artisan’s 
original intent and this might be especially true when one searches for emo-
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tions in the visual material of the ancient Near East. The beholder in the 
past may have seen the same thing as the beholder in the present – or some-
thing completely different. Pictorial representation is, after all, a deeply 
personal experience evoking different emotions in different people. 
It is hypothesised that the examples studied do not depict the emotions 
of individuals, but rather stereotypes and roles. However, some of these 
might depict an emotion whether by eyes with tears, a slight smile or en-
larged eyes. One should not view/judge ancient Near Eastern iconography 
through 21st-century Western eyes and experiences, but it might be argued 
that the basic emotions have not changed across time and cultures (Ekman), 
as can be seen here, however fleetingly. 
So it is argued that perhaps there are some faces depicting some sort of 
emotion. At the very least there might be tendencies towards the represen-
tation of emotions in the visual material of the ancient Near East. This is 
the possibility that was explored. In the end more questions than answers 
remain which only an in-depth discussion and detailed analysis of the 
available sources might resolve. Any such study should be mindful of the 
complexity of the hypotheses surrounding the portrayal of emotion in the 
art of the ancient Near East. 
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Kulturelle Rollen – keine Gefühle! 
Eine Response zu Izak Cornelius 
Silvia SCHROER 
Izak Cornelius hat in seinem materialreichen Referat als Vertreterin der 
Ansicht mehrerer Generationen von AltorientalistInnen – und übrigens 
auch ÄgyptologInnen – zur Darstellung von Emotionen in der altorien-
talischen Kunst Astrid Nunn1 zitiert. Grundsätzlich schließe ich mich die-
sem Mainstream an. Es ist m.E. nicht nachzuweisen und höchst unwahr-
scheinlich, dass die vorhellenistische altorientalische Kunst die Darstellung 
von Emotionen intendierte. Da Izak Cornelius sehr differenziert und mit 
Beispielen gearbeitet hat, sehe ich mich nicht zur Gegenrede provoziert, 
sondern höchstens zu einigen Akzentuierungen und Ergänzungen, wobei 
ich zwei Gedanken etwas thesenartig heraushebe. 
 
 
1. These: Bilder, die beispielsweise klagende oder tanzende Menschen zei-
gen, stellen nicht die Emotionen als solche, z.B. Traurigkeit, Kummer, 
Freude dar, sondern immer den konventionsgesteuerten, kulturellen Um-
gang mit ihnen oder ihren kulturellen Ausdruck. Bei der Klage sind dies oft 
Rituale im Kontext von Bestattungen oder großen Katastrophen wie Städte-
eroberungen, bei der Freude beispielsweise Tanz und Bankett, nicht selten 
in einem kultischen Rahmen. 
Die Unterscheidung ist von Bedeutung: Wir reden nicht über die Affekte, 
die biologisch verankert sind. Nicht die innere Befindlichkeit von Men-
schen wird als solche und um ihrer selbst willen dargestellt, sondern es geht 
um den geformten, in kulturelle Bräuche eingebetteten Umgang mit Gefüh-
len oder mit Situationen, in denen diese sehr stark sind. 
Zur Verdeutlichung greife ich das Beispiel der Klage (vgl. dazu Schroer 
2002; 2009; 2011) insbesondere in der ägyptischen Ikonographie auf. Im 
Neuen Reich gibt es in den Gräbern eine Fülle von farbigen Malereien mit 
Darstellungen von Trauernden, oft Frauen in Gruppen (Werbrouck 1938). 
Auf ihren lehmverschmierten Gesichtern sind Tränen, manchmal sogar blu-
tige Striemen erkennbar, die Haare sind aufgelöst, die Kleider zerrissen, die 
Gesten deuten Verzweiflung an, indem die Frauen sich die Haare raufen, 
auf die Brust schlagen, sich krümmen oder zu Boden fallen (Abb. 1 = 
AOBPs 428). Solche Darstellungen rühren uns an, und man wird kaum 
                                                     
1  Vgl. den Beitrag von Cornelius 125. 
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bestreiten können, dass hier Emotionen im Spiel sind. Und trotzdem inten-
dieren diese Bilder nicht die Wiedergabe der Gefühle um ihrer selbst wil-
len, sondern sie interessieren sich für das Ritual. Es geht nicht um Indi-
viduen, sondern um gesellschaftlich festgelegte Rollen. Natürlich gibt es 
normalerweise einen Zusammenhang von Emotion und Ritual, er kann aber 
auch fehlen. Die Klagefrauen beispielsweise, die in Scharen an den Bestat-
tungsfeierlichkeiten auftraten, müssen nicht persönlich betroffen gewesen 
sein. Sie verhalten sich aber, wie es erwartet wird, sie führen die üblichen 
Klagegesten aus und wahrscheinlich schreien sie konventionsgemäß laut. 
Damit drücken sie aus, was das Kollektiv erfährt und empfindet und ani-
mieren zum gemeinsamen Klagen (vgl. Jer 9,17-22). Aber wieviel Emotion 
im Spiel ist, wissen wir eigentlich nicht. Die Darstellung von vielen Kla-
genden bezeugt bzw. will davon überzeugen, dass der Verstorbene eine 
wichtige und beliebte Person war, dass man ihn ehrenvoll und rite bestattet 
hat, sodass er einen sicheren Weg in die andere Welt hinüber gehen konnte. 
Die performative Funktion solcher Bilder ist dabei besonders wichtig. 
Nehmen wir ein anderes Beispiel aus dem Bereich der altorientalischen 
Kunst. Paardarstellungen der altbabylonischen Terrakottakunst, aber auch 
auf altsyrischen Rollsiegeln und einigen Stempelsiegeln (Abb. 2 = IPIAO 
2, No 505) betonen Intimität und Zuneigung zwischen Mann und Frau. 
Gewiss sind sie, insbesondere wenn die Partner nackt sind, erotisch. Eros 
hat immer mit Gefühlen zu tun, während Sex nicht notwendig etwas und 
oft wohl gar nichts mit Liebe zu tun hat. Emotionen sind also bei Paaren 
sicher im Spiel, aber wie sind sie eingeordnet? Paardarstellungen wirken 
auf uns selbstverständlich „emotional“, wir erkennen in ihnen Verliebtheit 
und Zärtlichkeit. Es kann aber sein, dass sie im antiken Kontext stärker 
Loyalität und Verbundenheit als die Affekte zum Ausdruck bringen sollten 
oder dass ihre Darstellung einen magisch-beschwörenden Zweck hatte. Die 
fliegende Taube, die bei einer Bankettszene zwischen den Partnern fliegt 
(Abb. 3 = IPIAO 2, No 498), stellt eine besondere Qualifikation der Bezie-
hung als erotischer Beziehung dar. Soweit ich sehe, ist dies die einzige 
deutlich symbolische Manifestation einer affektiven Zuwendung. Die Tau-
be ist als Attributtier der Liebesgöttinnen traditionell, auch wenn die Göttin 
selbst im Bild nicht erscheint, ein Symbol erotischer Liebe. In der Sprache 
des Hohenlieds (1,15; 4,1; vgl. 5,12) ist die Metapher „deine Blicke sind 
Tauben“ nicht von den Gefühlen und dem Ausdruck des Verliebtseins zu 
trennen.2 Die Liebeslieder des Hohenlieds und die Darstellungen auf Roll-
siegeln und anderen Bildträgern haben dennoch nicht dieselben Intentionen. 
Wenn Mann und Frau bei Bankettszenen aus demselben Gefäß trinken oder 
sich zuprosten, dann ist in der diskreten Verschlüsselung dieser Kunst auch 
die Vorfreude auf das geschlechtliche Zusammensein impliziert. Darge-
stellt sind jedoch keine verliebten Individuen, sondern Typen und Rollen, 
                                                     
2  Vgl. Keel 1984: bes. 53-62. 
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oft mythisch aufgeladen. Die Gefühle als solche sind dabei wohl kaum von 
primärem Interesse, wohl aber die Kraft und Auswirkung der erotischen 
Beziehung von Mann und Frau. 
Ein drittes Beispiel ist eine Art Gegenprobe. Ein Bereich, in welchem 
sich – nach unseren Erfahrungen und Annahmen – sehr viel Emotionalität 
abspielt, ist die Mutterliebe. Mutter-Kind-Darstellungen sind aber vor der 
Perserzeit in der altorientalischen Kunst zum einen überhaupt auffällig 
selten und zum anderen in keiner Weise gefühlsbetont. Es gibt Bilder mit 
stillenden Müttern oder Müttern mit Kleinkindern auf dem Arm, aber die 
Mutterliebe liegt im Nähren, Halten oder Tragen des – vermutlich männli-
chen – Säuglings allein, nie werden durch Gesten oder die Physiognomie, 
z.B. das Anschauen, Gefühle hervorgehoben. Wahrscheinlich ist das Inte-
resse dieser Bilder ganz auf die Mutter und ihren Status fokussiert, wobei 
Mutter und Kind eine starke Einheit bilden. 
2. These: Mimik ist in der altorientalischen Kunst inexistent. 
Unsere Smiley-Gesellschaft ist es, wie Izak Cornelius zu Recht unter-
streicht, gewöhnt, Emotion und Affekt sehr unmittelbar mit Gesichtern und 
der Physiognomie zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Das ist allerdings eine relativ 
junge Entwicklung. Die Hochzeitsfotos meiner Großeltern und sogar mei-
ner Eltern sind noch von einem unerschütterlichen Ernst im Gesichts-
ausdruck, ganz unabhängig vom an sich freudigen Anlass. Altorientalische 
Kunst verzichtet auf die Mimik, so möchte ich hartnäckig behaupten, voll-
ständig. Sie greift zur Gestik und zur Kontextdarstellung, um verschiedene 
Emotionen in den Blick zu rücken. Manche Affekte, z.B. Wut, werden 
wohl gar nicht dargestellt, möglicherweise sogar aus Besorgnis, dass etwas 
Dargestelltes „wirksam“ werden könnte. Die Angst der Feinde, wenn sie 
niedergeschlagen oder gefangengenommen werden, drückt sich nicht in 
ihren Gesichtern aus, sondern in den abwehrenden oder verehrend erhobe-
nen Händen. 
Dabei war man durchaus fähig, Physiognomie darzustellen, zumindest 
konnten ägyptische Kunsthandwerker die Gesichter von Nubiern und an-
deren Völkern als „afrikanisch“ kennzeichnen. In der Amarna-Zeit ist die 
Verfeinerung der Gesichtsdarstellungen sehr weit fortgeschritten. Man 
hätte von den künstlerischen Anforderungen her wohl auch ein bekümmer-
tes und ein lachendes Gesicht darstellen können, wollte das aber anschei-
nend nicht.3 Die ägyptische Plastik hat allerdings im Bereich der Königs-
                                                     
3  Wildung (1975: 259) vermutete, dass manche Hathorsistren bzw. Stelen, auf denen 
solche zu sehen sind, die Hathor als grimmige „Herrin des Schreckens“ zeigen, doch 
ließe sich der Beweis dafür wohl nur durch ein deutliches Nebeneinander oder den 
Wechsel von freundlichen und zornigen Hathorgesichtern oder sonst durch besondere 
Namensbeischriften zur Göttin erbringen. 
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porträts, wohl unter Einfluss des großen Interesses an einer exakten physi-
schen Erhaltung des Körpers im Totenkult, den Schritt vom Rollenporträt 
zum Individualporträt getan.4 Frontal dargestellte Gesichter spielen insbe-
sondere in der Ikonographie der Göttinnen eine bedeutende Rolle. Ohne 
dass Mimik im Spiel wäre, ist die Zuwendung des Gesichts zum Betrachter 
oder der Betrachterin als solche, d.h. als Geste, Ausdruck von Freundlich-
keit und Wohlwollen (Staubli/Schroer 2014: 196-198). Die Gesichter der 
zahlreichen Säulenfigürchen oder der ägyptischen Hathorkapitelle wirken 
auf uns freundlich, aber ein Lächeln, wie es in der griechischen Skulp-
turenkunst anzutreffen ist, gibt es nicht.5 Unsere sozialen Konditionie-
rungen und Betrachtungsgewohnheiten spielen uns beim Betrachten solcher 
Artefakte häufig einen Streich. Es täuscht, wenn Gesichter als schmerzver-
zerrt oder böse blickend empfunden werden. Tallay Ornans Vorschlag der 
Deutung des Figürchens von Revadim (Ornan 2007), auf den Izak Cornelius 
Bezug nimmt,6 geht in die Irre, was die Darstellung von Geburtsängsten 
oder -schmerzen betrifft. Eine Zwillingsgeburt war in der Antike und noch 
bis vor wenigen Jahrzehnten auch hierzulande unvorhersehbar. Geburts-
schmerzen waren kein Thema der antiken Kunst, nur die Hilfe der Hebam-
men beim Gebären wird beispielsweise in der zyprischen Koroplastik dar-
gestellt. Das Figürchen von Revadim stellt eine „Mutter alles Lebendigen“ 
dar, eine Göttin, die das Gedeihen der Pflanzen, Tiere und Kinder, also die 
ganze Fruchtbarkeit des Lebens schützt und fördert.7 Was immer sich – in 
unserer Wahrnehmung – in ihrem Gesicht spiegelt, es war höchstwahr-
scheinlich vom Kunsthandwerker gar nicht intendiert. 
Die Frage, die sich stellt und die schwer zu beantworten ist, bleibt die 
nach dem Grund für das eklatante Desinteresse der gesamten altorientali-
schen Kunst an menschlichen Emotionen und Mimik. Möglicherweise 
müssen wir es schlicht akzeptieren, dass die Agenda der Bilder eine andere 
ist als die Agenda der Texte8 und dass es starke künstlerische Konventionen 
gibt, die trotz sich wandelnder Kontexte und Möglichkeiten unverändert 
bleiben. In diesem Zusammenhang ist bisweilen der Vergleich mit der Tier-
welt von Interesse,9 weil hier leicht abweichende Konventionen zu be-
obachten sind. Um die Angriffsbereitschaft eines Stieres darzustellen, wird 
dieser in der darstellenden Kunst bereits seit den Monolithen des Göbekli 
Tepe in der Türkei (10./9. Jahrtausend v. Chr.) mit gesenktem Kopf darge-
stellt. Bei Löwen ist der aufgerissene Rachen ein Mittel, um sie als hochge-
                                                     
4  Vgl. zur Unterscheidung den Beitrag von Keel 27-54. 
5  Was dieses Lächeln, das keineswegs die Norm der Porträtkunst aller Epochen darstellt, 
ausdrücken soll, ist allerdings auch nicht klar. Wahrscheinlich soll es eine Lebenshal-
tung andeuten, wohl kaum eine Stimmung.  
6  Vgl. den Beitrag von Cornelius 136. 
7  Vgl. Keel/Schroer 32010.  
8  Vgl. dazu die Beiträge in Schroer [ed.] 2006. 
9  Vgl. den Beitrag von Lippke 165-168. 
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fährliche Tiere zu charakterisieren, die Betrachtenden sehen die furchterre-
genden Zähne und hören gleichsam das Brüllen.10 Die Körperhaltung von 
Tieren kann, auch wenn sie nicht bei der Jagd oder im Kampf dargestellt 
sind, etwas Inneres unmittelbar nach außen vermitteln. Menschen werden 
in der Kunst mit anderen Mitteln, meistens Posen und Gesten, als aggres-
siv, gefährlich oder verängstigt dargestellt. In den biblischen Texten hinge-
gen kommt die Mimik und Körperhaltung stärker zum Tragen. Sie kennen 
in Verbindung mit den Augen, die gesenkt oder gehoben sind, ein ganzes 
Spektrum von Emotionen und Befindlichkeiten, ob Niedergeschlagenheit, 
Hoffnung, Erwartung, Eifersucht oder Mordlust (Schroer/Staubli 22005: 
bes. 70-78). Texte erwiesen sich als geeignet, um menschliche Depression, 
Wut oder Freude körpersymbolisch auch mit Bezug auf die Mimik auszu-
drücken. Die Kunst verzichtet darauf und beschränkt sich stattdessen auf 
die konventionelle Darstellung von Gesten der Klage, Dominanz, Freude. 
 
 
Abb. 1 Grabmalerei aus Abd el Qurna, Grab des Userhet (Nr. 51), 
19. Dyn. (1345–1200a); Keel 51996: Abb. 428; Mekhitarian 1954: 135. 
 
 
                                                     
10  Die erwähnte Stierdarstellung findet sich in IPIAO 1, No 10; die Löwendarstellungen in 
IPIAO 1, No 9. 
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Abb. 2 Igel-Skaraboid aus Megiddo, Tell el-Mutesellim, 1. Hälfte 
des 17. Jh.a; Schroer 2008: Abb. 505; Keel/Uehlinger 52001: 
Abb. 43; Winter 21987: Abb. 376; Loud et al. 1948: Pl. 149,52. 
 
 
Abb. 3 Altsyrisches Rollsiegel aus dem Handel (Syrien oder N-Mesopotamien, 1850–1720a; 
Schroer 2008: Abb. 498; Winter 21987: Abb. 248; Keel 1984: Abb. 49; Przeworski 1926: 
172 Abb. 1. 
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 Analyzing “Emotions” in Ancient Media:  
Between Skepticism and Conceptual Autonomy 
(“Eigenbegrifflichkeit”) 
Florian LIPPKE 
This article was originally presented as an academic response to the con-
tributions by D. Bonatz and I. Cornelius (present volume). The intention is 
to add contextualizing arguments to the discussion. There is disagreement 
about whether emotions are depicted in ancient iconographic sources or 
not. Currently, the majority of scholars prefers the terms gestures and ha-
bitualized actions (that do not convey emotions?) as labels for a given im-
age. Consequently, following this argumentation one might assume: No 
emotions at all were depicted in ancient art. Against this position, it is pos-
sible to achieve productive results – that may depict emotions – by taking 
non-human emotions into account. Furthermore – as a general corrective – 
the model of Eigenbegrifflichkeit (B. Landsberger, engl. conceptual auton-
omy) is presented and integrated. The present paper argues for a strong 
skepticism considering depiction of emotions and especially their precise 
labelling. At the same time, it opts for broadening the iconographic data set 
in order to gain a deeper understanding of emotive constellations in the 
ancient world. However, anachronistic fallacies have to be avoided. 
1. Introduction 
When discussing ancient Near Eastern and Egyptian media in prehellenistic 
epochs,1 it is clear that many of our modern presuppositions cannot be tak-
en for granted as a valid basis for a historic and hence critical interpreta-
tion.2 Considering works of art from our modern 21st century routines of 
                                                     
1  See Uehlinger 2005 for an overview, as well as Frevel 2005 with worthwhile introducto-
ry remarks, furthermore Uehlinger 2001; for further aspects see Keel & Uehlinger 
62010: 453 passim; Schroer & Lippke 2014: 313; Lippke 2014: 21.26; Lippke 2015: 82 
recently de Hulster, Strawn & Bonfiglio 2015 as well as Keel & Schroer 2005; Schroer 
2008; 2011, for the basic material data. 
2  Anachronisms occur in the course of textual exegesis and iconographic interpretation 
alike. They are very often present in the course of literary or redactional criticism, e.g. 
when a diachronic hypothesis of text genesis is presented. In many of these cases the 
underlying method is not text-analyses / exegesis but merely deserves the label “Rezep-
tionsästhetik”. Antique and Oriental / Egyptian documents in text and image deserve to 
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perception can even prevent adequate analysis when, for example, modes 
of depiction (aspective3, perspective or mixed rendering) are not taken 
properly into account. The same is true with respect to iconographic con-
tent: Unable to identify the basic iconemes, numerous interpreters of an-
cient art made wrong decisions that – in consequence – resulted in mislead-
ing statements in all subsequent steps of method (iconographic analysis, 
iconologic interpretation, see in this respect Panofsky’s scheme of the 
three-part subject matter4). To lack familiarity with the reference of basic 
iconemes in iconographic sources can be just as problematic as not having 
learned the vocabulary of a new language that one would like to master.5 
One could formulate a long list of well-known misinterpretations. For 
example, André Parrot identified the bird in the Mari wall paintings6 (Fig. 
1.2) – which is obviously a dove (Fig. 3.4) – as a bee-eater (merops apias-
ter, Fig. 5), and therefore missed the broader, symbolic context of the Ishtar 
cult.7 Irmtraut Beste8 identified and described a “date palm” on a scarab 
seal (Fig. 6.7, now in Hannover’s Kestner Museum), which should actually 
be identified as an image of a winged Baal-Seth (Fig. 8.9) and with the 
typical head type of the Egyptian Seth (Fig. 10-12). This interpretation 
stands when one accounts for similar Levantine iconography. Another mis-
interpretation concerned ivory inlays that were characterized as “Hyksos 
Horses”9 (Fig. 13), but which upon proper placement and reconstruction 
depict (Fig. 14-16) clear yet fragmentary attestations of the daemon tȝ-wrt 
in upright position (see Fig. 17-20). Misinterpretations of Egyptian chariot 
horses as unicorns and Bes icons interpreted as bovine figures round out a 
colorful set of examples.10 However, these misconceptions do not result 
from the interpreters’ negligence – they arise when accessible knowledge 
                                                                                                                          
be treated in their own antique communication processes. Labels taken from modern 
discussion are to be avoided. Basic parameters in literary and iconographic communi-
cation may continue (for literary features see Hardmeier 2003; 2004), but the modern 
understanding of literature and images is not simply to be projected over three millennia 
of cultural history. 
3  Schäfer 41963; Brunner-Traut 1975; 1990; Keel 51996: 333; Schroer & Lippke 2014: 
314.343; Lippke 2011: 213. 
4  Panofsky 1939: 5-15; de Hulster, Strawn & Bonfiglio 2015: 36-38.42. 
5  However, the problem remains with respect to a vicious circle since identifying an 
iconem adequately would also include having understood the context in which it is used. 
Similar problems occur in philology and archaeology in a comparable way (for the phil-
ological impact see 4.).  
6  See Parrot 1958: 61; Keel 1992: 149.  
7  Silvia Schroer has identified the scenario of the Ishtar temple as one of the major keys to 
the symbolic symbol system(s) of the Middle Bronze age (Schroer 2008), but has also 
plausibly argued for an impact of this constellation on Iron Age finds (Schroer 2007). 
8  Beste 1979: II 167; Keel 1990: 303-305. 
9  Petrie 1931: 9; Ory 1945: 39; Weippert 1988: 244-245; Keel 1993; Schroer 2008: 90-91. 
10  See for a detailed discussion of the case studies Lippke (in preparation) in “prior 
knowledge”.  
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of the natural and cultural sphere as well as knowledge about style are not 
integrated in a proper manner. A question of method obviously arises at 
this point.11 
These observations concerning appropriate interpretations are also true 
when it comes to more complex levels of analysis. If one assumes that 
“emotions” play a central role in imagery in ancient artistic traditions, one 
might then search for a corresponding emotion in each and every icono-
graphic document.12 It is important – as Phillip Lasater has argued else-
where13 – to stress the time-dependent character of many interpretations: 
A romantic concept of antiquity is often in danger of producing romantic, 
emotionally over-emphasized reconstructions of past symbol systems in 
which the “emotional” content of artistic products tends to be overempha-
sized as well.14 To search for a corresponding emotion in each and every 
image has to be regarded as a problematic approach to ancient images: Not 
every source has to contain an “emotion,”15 nor is the triggering of emotion 
clearly part of an image’s intent (in terms of pragmatic aspects).16 Brent 
Strawn has recently illustrated just how ambivalent such a search for emo-
tions in two interrelated studies on “fear” in textual and iconographic 
sources can be.17 
                                                     
11  The methodological discussion is not well documented when it comes to Levantine Ico-
nography. Especially focusing the realm of the Biblical World and its relationship to the 
Hebrew Bible there is an academic lack of an applicable method; see however the latest 
approach by de Hulster, Strawn & Bonfiglio 2015, which offer a broad variety of select-
ed case studies. The method – present between the lines – is clearly dependent on Keel’s 
early approaches (!) on illustration / illumination of the Biblical background. However a 
clear-cut method is not found in Hulster, Stawn & Bonfiglio. 
12  The underlying question would then be, “Which emotion is presented with this particu-
lar image?” 
13  Lasater forthcoming. 
14  See Donner 1997 for an evaluation of the romantic ideas on desert motifs. 
15  Of course there are depictions which lack (from artistic rendering) any sort of “emotional 
expression”; however, in later steps one has to take into account which emotions should 
be affected with a certain image for a particular recipient (viewer). This is of course not 
a question of inherent emotive elements within an image but more a question of prag-
matic effect. As a consequence, pragmatics must play an important role for an appropri-
ate understanding. Again it must be stated that this effect could have been planned when 
creating a piece of art – but this is for the moment hard to prove with the methods in use 
and no reflecting literature on the process of crafting for early antique epochs (see 4. and 
5.). 
16  The simple appearance of a motive / iconem is not at the same time to be equated with 
the “domination” of a motive within a complex constellation of iconems. It is possible – 
via structural analyzes – to trace central themes and side aspects on many preserved 
complex iconographic attestations. Furthermore, a central topic can – from a pragmatic 
viewpoint – overlap and dominate other side constellations. 
17  Strawn 2014; 2015. The following part of the present article can also be read as a critical 
evaluation of these contributions. I thank the participants of the seminar “Text- und 
Bildwelten erschliessen” (2015 Zurich) for discussing the numerous implications.  
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A central question is, which label should be applied to a given icono-
graphic rendering?18 Considering Strawn’s presentation, one can already 
formulate an initial critique: Since there are many cognates of “fear” it is 
hard to link an image exclusively to one single lexeme.19 A second critique 
is the question of whether all 52 images that Strawn presents indeed ex-
press the idea (even better with Lasater: the concept) of fear. It is clear 
when conjecturing about the “feelings of one agent within an image” (the 
surrendering foe, the smitten enemy) one could imagine assigning “fear” to 
the mix of emotion in what is depicted. Clear evidence, however, is lack-
ing. Moreover, in nearly all attestations, the scope of all compositions (see 
later 4.) is not identical with the “surrendering / suffering / fearing” agent: 
The main topic of many presented attestations is focused on the glorious 
victory of the Pharaoh / King / Hero and has to take this Pharaoh-centrality 
(as the dominating ruler!) into proper account.20 Fear in these examples is a 
side aspect and freely assigned to the intention of the whole composition, 
although when all levels of interpretation are considered, the main focus 
should be labeled “the winner and his historic-theological propaganda of 
victory.”21 Further problems arise in Strawn’s presentation when adoration 
scenes22 are depicted in order to explain the “emotion of fear.” It is true that 
we know the interdependence of fear and adoring (fascinosum et tremen-
dum23). But from the iconographic analysis of the given objects, this idea 
would not have come to mind. There is nearly no iconographic rendering of 
fear clearly identifiable as such in the ancient Near Eastern and Egyptian 
traditions. 
In other words: It is possible to categorize the whole set of images pre-
sented by Strawn into a few categories like “cultic” or “ritual-propagan-
                                                     
18  Because there is no co-evidence of written and iconographic attestation for the above 
mentioned fear, it is difficult to prove definitively that a lexeme stands for a certain 
iconem. These co-evident cases are in general seldom. Cornelius, with his volumes on 
divine iconography 1994; 2008, has in a way the same problems to face. The icono-
graphic attestation of gods and goddesses do not often bear names. A similar problem 
arises in ethno-archaeological contexts when the designation of a certain tool has to be 
discussed. Often this is only possible when instruments and tools are labeled. I am grate-
ful to Dr. Nesina Grütter, Basel, for pointing out this aspect with spindle-objects from 
the Levant and the corresponding word pair pilakkum | plk. The parallel question would 
be, “What evidence can we take into account that an iconem and the hypothetically cor-
responding word form a matching pair in the (material and ideal) world in antiquity?” 
19  I am indebted to my college and friend Phillip Lasater, Zurich, who in the course of his 
research on the concept of fear pointed to the polysemy of fear in the Hebrew Bible and 
the different semantic options within the North-West Semitic substrate. 
20  See for this constellation Keel 1975 and Keel (forthcoming) on problems in iconogra-
phy. 
21  Strawn 2014: fig. 1.2.5.6-8.10.11.16-18.27-30.32.35.43-52 among others. 
22  Strawn 2014: fig. 2.9.12-13.19-22.42 among others. 
23  Already present with Otto 1917 (1950) and since then ever part of the controversial dis-
cussion about chances and limits of his approach.  
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distic subordination,” without attributing a single notion of fear. The under-
lying iconographic expression is far more centered on questions of world 
order and politics between heaven and earth. It is not the subject in a fearful 
situation that represents the core of all these discussed iconographic 
sources. This can be underlined by the lack of any individual character in 
the same way as one can trace the lack of nearly all individual facial fea-
tures (not to be conflated with stylistic rendering!) of royal and elite depic-
tions in Egypt and the ancient Near East in prehellenistic epochs.24 
2. A position, Its Consequences and a Reevaluation 
Taking these basic aspects into account leads to a general evaluation: In 
ancient Near Eastern and Egyptian art there are no emotions depicted.25 
This is in a way an opinio communis backed – at first glance – by many 
observations.26 As mentioned above, no explicit rendering of individual 
emotional aspects can be observed either in a positive or in a negative man-
ner. A besieged individual’s mouth and facial muscles are not rendered 
differently than those of the winner of a battle (Pharaoh, Assyrian king). In 
this respect it is absolutely plausible that most scholars emphasize the im-
portance of gestures. Many iconographic attestations convey a gesture that 
answers certain questions of interdependence / relationship and not an indi-
vidual’s emotion. A catalog of major gestures can be provided, most clearly 
in the Egyptian realm. Emma Brunner-Traut27 lists at least 12 distinct ges-
tures: Greeting (1), pleading (2), speaking (3), pointing, designating, com-
manding (4), acting with music (5), cheering, exulting in victory (6), la-
menting and mourning (7), magic warding (8), protecting and power trans-
mission (9), counting (10), dancing (11) and kissing (12). Many of these 
basic categories are easy to differentiate from each other in iconographic 
sources (Fig. 21, with some examples of major types). But already with this 
brief list it is clear that these gestures are often connected to what we now-
adays call “emotions.” Accordingly, they cannot completely be interpreted 
without the emotional / affectual context.28 In other words, understanding 
the categories discussed by Brunner-Traut requires an emotional compo-
                                                     
24  See Keel in this volume.  
25  See the contributions of Silvia Schroer and Dominik Bonatz, but on the other hand also 
the material overview by Sakkie Cornelius.  
26  Compare Bonatz in the present volume. 
27  Brunner-Traut 1977. 
28  Any other solution would be a very one-sided perception and would therefore create a 
deformed scenario of cultural history; for an integration of many aspects see the interest-
ing attempt by Snell 2011.  
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nent.29 This point creates a complex situation in which the evaluation of 
emotions in ancient icons has to find a balanced positioning.  
Already at his stage the possible solutions of interpretation, (1) “There 
are no emotions30 depicted in ancient Near Eastern and Egyptian Art,” and 
(2) “The iconographic rendering is always based on gestures which are 
employed to contribute to a higher message” are not satisfying at all. In the 
same way, appropriately understanding the intention of an iconographic 
source (somehow a “message” in terms of pragmatics) is not possible when 
the potential feelings associated with the gestures are simply neglected and 
put aside. However, reevaluation should be allowed in such a situation. It is 
therefore reasonable to hold the first introduced hypothesis (“no emotions 
at all”) over against all accessible material. In terms of method the ap-
proach would match neatly with the thoughts of René Descartes in his Dis-
cours de la méthode (1637).31 A clear-cut method would start by creating a 
tabula rasa scenario. The starting point would then be: a serious doubt 
considering depicted emotions. In other words, no emotions at all are de-
picted and there is no chance to find them in any of the ancient artworks. 
However, Descartes shows that there are options to find more and more 
certainty by consequently rethinking the whole scenario with its initial 
steps. It is therefore useful to start with a tabula rasa position for the topic 
“emotions in iconography.” But this is not the point to stop further investi-
gation, but rather to rethink the whole scenario. Descartes asks of course: 
What could be the center of the argumentation, in our case? What is the 
object of our method (“der Gegenstand unserer Methode”)?32 Similar 
thoughts can be employed in our case when we realize that all attestations 
for the “no-emotion-hypothesis” are deduced from exclusively anthropo-
morphic examples.33 
                                                     
29  Compare for other detailed observations on connected aspects the material of Cornelius 
in this present volume.  
30  As Lasater forthcoming discusses, there has been an ongoing confusion about terms like 
“emotions” “passion / affections” and “feelings”. As we can learn from Lasater’s analy-
sis, one should be very careful with the term “emotions” – in fact the usage of “feelings” 
as neutral term as well as the attested concept of “passion / affection” is much prefera-
ble. This critical notion is also true for the usage of “emotions” in this recent paper.  
31  Wohlers 2009; 2011; Recki 2005 and Husserl's reception accessible in Ströker 2012.  
32  In the same respect the differentiation as well as the relationship of the three fields 
“object” (Gegenstand), “theory” (Theorie) and “method” (Methode) is addressed. I am 
grateful to Christoph Uehlinger and Izaak de Hulster for helpful comments on these in-
terconnections.  
33  Taking Husserl and Descartes into account is not identical with opting for a strict tabula 
rasa scenario in terms of preconceptions. This would of course imply severe hermeneuti-
cal problems. The present section advocates to begin with the doubting position (no 
emotions / feelings [fn. 30] depicted) and to check it against the iconographic material. 
In so doing Descartes' method is a sort guiding line. I thank Christoph Uehlinger for ad-
dressing this point in a personal conversation.    
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3. Broadening the Set of Data from “Human” to “Humanimal” 
In many discussions of whether emotions are present or not in an icono-
graphic source, the scope is often limited to a human perspective.34 This 
focus seems plausible at first glance, since the discourse on emotion / affec-
tion-analyses is mainly tackled from an anthropological perspective. 
Broadening the data set is, on the contrary, often labeled as an implausible 
transgression. Therefore the mainstream opinion has often addressed a cer-
tain suspicion against such an approach. However Janowski35, Schroer36, 
Riede37 and Neumann-Gorsolke38 have – as outstanding examples – opted 
for a broadening of the perspective, while, still not completely integrating 
basic “humanimal” categories in their argumentation. In a popular dis-
course, the German researcher Rainer Hagencord (Institute for Theological 
Zoology)39 has initiated an even more progressive argumentation. 
That perspectives are changing in regard to data-basis, method and theo-
ry is evident from the theological and exegetical discussions over the last 
decades. New directions have been taken in order to interpret “humans” as 
“animals that belong to the human species” (better: as humanoid animals). 
One could discuss this position in terms of biological classification – king-
dom, phylum and class – as well. This change of perspectives allows one to 
increase a trans-species perception of the scenario (methodological trans-
gression of speciesʼ boundaries). In the sub-discipline of moral teaching 
Michael Rosenberger40 has opted for a clear perspective from human-
animal studies (HAS) but focuses for the time being more on general and 
only slightly literature-based examples. As a remarkable exception Julia 
Eva Wannenmacher has summed up the actual methodological conse-
quences of a trans-species41 viewpoint. 
Each model employed for the understanding of antique cultural mecha-
nisms is influenced by the scientific context in which it was developed.42 
                                                     
34  This is of course a standard situation in the theological humanities, where the worth of 
philosophical anthropology is emphasized and also used as a key element to categorize 
theological and religious thought. See the balanced presentation on biblical anthropolo-
gy edited by Frevel 2010. As a strong advocate of biblical anthropology – in a positive 
manner – Janowski’s publications on the topic could be consulted (2004; 2005; 2010; 
42013), furthermore Schroer & Staubli 2012; 2014. 
35  Janowski 1993; Janowski & Riede 1999. 
36  Keel & Staubli 2001; Schroer 2010. 
37  Riede 2002; 2005; 2012. 
38  Janowski & Gorsolke 1993. 
39  Institut für Theologische Zoologie, PTH Münster / Germany, publishing a Yearbook of 
theological zoology (Jahrbuch der Theologischen Zoologie). 
40  Rosenberger 2015. 
41  Wannenmacher uses the term non- or anti-speciesism 2015: 5.7-11.25-27.  
42  Thomas Aquinas, “Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur”, Summa Theolo-
giae, 1a, q. 75, a. 5; 3a, q. 5, “whatever is received into something is received according 
to the condition of the receiver”. 
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Anthropocentrism is for example often derived from the misconception that 
“man / mankind” is the crown of creation and therefore not at all compara-
ble with other works of creation.43  
In contemporary discourse, it is not plausible to maintain an extreme 
differentiation between “human” and “animal.” Scholars need to reconsider 
the demarcation between these groups that was employed and thought of as 
a solid basis in anthropocentric discussions of earlier centuries.44 The whole 
argumentation presented here has a clear application when the focus shifts 
from written to depicted sources. A separation of human and animal icono-
graphy is a position that also deserves a reevaluation. This is especially true 
when it comes to antique iconographic renderings in which animals were 
not generally considered of holding a subordinate position45 in comparison 
to humans. They were even seen as more capable of the connection with 
the divine sphere.46  
Considering the evidence presented so far in this article, one can admit 
that it is also legitimate to search for expressions of “emotions / feelings47” 
or similar patterns in iconographic sources depicting both humans and ani-
mals as the main agent in a scene.48 This conclusion opens up a broad range 
of data that can be used as a basis for thorough interpretation. However, 
emotion / affection-like depictions in animal iconography are not a standard 
scenario when it comes to the ancient Near East and Egypt. There are con-
siderably differing critical parameters. Firstly, there are not as many as the 
twelve physical categories employed by Brunner-Traut above. On the con-
trary, it would be misleading to talk about gestures! Gestures in animal ico-
nography are very restricted. Take for example the animal iconography of 
the Amarna epoch in which the birds open their wings to adore the sun 
(Fig. 22). Gestures with animals are almost exclusively spotted in cultic 
contexts where they act as adorers. This is also true of monkey depictions 
in Egypt (baboons) adoring the sun rise with raised arm in the dua-prayer 
position (Fig. 23).49 Other examples can hardly be called gestures at all. In 
                                                     
43  Wannenmacher 2015: 2-3. 
44  A change of perspective was employed. Animals are not humans, but humans can be 
classified as humanoid animals (see above). This is why the research field of human-
animal-studies refers to human and non-human animals, a classification that connects 
the groups rather than separating them.  
45  See for a discussion of the implications Linzey 1994: 108; Waldau 2013: 148. 
46  See for the iconographic expressions the great number of animal-based symbols in Keel 
& Schroer 2005; Schroer 2008; 2011. For a textual evaluation next to many other attes-
tations the text of Balaam Num 22-24 deserves a close reading.  
47  C.f. Lasater fn 30.  
48  Broadening the focus is a decision in the same direction as promoting a thick description 
(Geertz et al.), see also Lippke 2011: 211; Lippke 2013: 21 citing the result of Uehlinger, 
Keel, Leuenberger and others. 
49  Central questions for these attestations would be as follows: Who is imitating whom? 
Are the animals imitating human behavior and therefore are depicted in a human way or 
is the image itself a metaphorical and hence theological expression according to which 
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other words: Striking examples for undisputed animal gestures are absent in 
Egyptian iconography.  
Even more interesting in this case is the depiction of an iconographic at-
testation connected to what one might call an emotion or affection which is 
at the same time not explained by a typical gesture at all.50 These examples 
do exist, but they are quite rare.  
On the wall reliefs of certain tomb chapels (e.g. the depicted excerpt 
from the tomb of Ptahmoses, 19th dynasty, 1300–1200 BCE; see Fig. 24),51 
a priest is presented cutting the foreleg of a calf while the mother cow is 
depicted behind the cutting scene.52 The faces of both bovines are deformed 
in a way that is used to depict the loud mooing / screaming as attested in 
certain extreme situations that are connected with fear, pain or sympathy.53 
For this relief the option to label the scene as gesture is not possible, either 
for the cow or for the calf. The calf is not performing a gesture that serves 
the whole context. Sometimes it is depicted in an unaffected manner (see 
accordingly Fig. 25) but the rendering here in Fig. 24 is remarkably differ-
ent. For the mother cow seeing the slaughtering scene it is even an act of 
sympathy (suffering with another agent) sharing the pain and the fear of the 
young one. There is no gesture or function that could explain this correla-
tion if emotions / feelings play no role at all. Also “attitude” seems at this 
very point to be an implausible option. Therefore a scene is depicted that 
involves a strong character of emotion / affection and even a translation of 
feelings. But at the same time there is no given option for shortcutting the 
interpretation by a mere gesture-explanation. Perhaps the wailing in the 
sepulchral context was thought to be imposed on the sacrificial animal. If 
so, then the point raised here (emotion / feeling-like patterns that play an 
important role in images) would even be stronger.  
In other words, the goal of the depiction is not to translate the situation / 
gesture onto the animal but rather the objective would be a translation of 
the emotion present in the situation. At least it is fully plausible that the 
hypothesis of “no emotions / feelings are depicted at all” has to be reworked 
as we transgress the borders drawn by anthropocentricity. A “holistic” inte-
gration of all available data can sensitize us for rare but relevant occurrences 
                                                                                                                          
animals also praise the deities? These questions with all their nuance are not so easily 
answered. Antique text from Egypt would even document a priestly ritual imitating the 
voices of baboons in order to raise the sun each morning (oral comment by Joachim F. 
Quack, Heidelberg for the Egyptian “Book of the Temple” with its rituals).  
50  Next to the term “emotions” one could also consider the term “attitude” to be used in 
such cases. I thank Christoph Uehlinger for the clarification, see also fn 30. 
51  See for the discussion of the motive in general Keel 1980.  
52  Keel 1980: 30-32.  
53  This insight is deduced by observing animals in their natural environment. A very loud 
and intensive mooing would also require a broad opened mouth and a tongue out-
stretched. I am grateful to Hilal Sezgin for commenting on my observations at several 
occasions.  
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of emotions / affections during a process of iconographic communication. 
In the end, the structure suggested by Descartes is fully matched. After 
serious doubts and rethinking the basic situation, room can be developed 
for a better understanding of the complexity of the analyzed situation in 
which no option has to be ruled out because of limited data basis or ambiv-
alent presupposition.54 
4. Labelling with Anachronisms: How to Define the Scope? 
A second substantial discussion is the question of how to label icon-
ographic constellations in general. Some basic conclusions can already be 
drawn from controversial discussions on “how to name a deity.” If a divine 
figure is only depicted (iconographic source) and not accompanied by a 
textual / epigraphic addendum that attributes a readable name to a scene / 
constellation, it is highly hypothetical to assign a random name. Thus in the 
act of interpretation uncertainty would rise. What do we do when we as-
cribe the word “fear” or “joy” to a certain relief? As Keel55 has plausibly 
argued, images evince a kind of transculturalism. In other words, the image 
of an object, animal or human being is – within a certain frame – under-
stood even if the language spoken by the sender and the recipient are not 
the same. The main question, however, is, whether this is true for the emo-
tions / affections (or even better: for the concepts of feelings) present in an 
iconographic constellation. Serious concerns arise if a transculturalism of 
emotions / affections is used as an axiom without any further investigation. 
At least from the more intensive research in the linguistic and the philolog-
ical realm, a shift of langue can produce a variety of severe consequences. 
It is already commonplace that language influences many different spheres 
of communication. These shifts in nuance and in elementary parameters can 
– in the field of philology – be discussed in different dimensions. 
a) Within an antique time frame 
Language shifts can result in using different lexemes, different verbal struc-
tures and different syntactic solutions. As for the lexemes, apart from He-
brew epigraphy and the Hebrew Bible,56 one would not find the verb √ʿśh,57 
                                                     
54  In this regard the results of this subchapter are significant: By broadening the data-set 
the earlier hypothesis (“no emotions / attitudes”) is severely challenged. There are ex-
amples when the analysis is not restricted to the human sphere. This very restriction has 
to be labeled as one of the major unbalances in the earlier discussion.  
55  Keel 2002: 90. 
56  ʿśh is sometimes used for a diagnostic separation between the Hebrew und the Phoenici-
an substrate. However, this is on the basis of scarce epigraphical data a clearly hypothet-
ical division. 
57  Ges 18: 1018-1021, DNWSI: 890-895 and CDH VI: 569-602.  
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which means “to do, to create, to establish.”58 Crossing the border into the 
realm of the Phoenicians, this verbal nuance of “doing” or “creating” would 
rather be rendered with √pʿl59. One step onwards to the Aramean substrates 
and neither of the above examples would be used for that nuance but rather 
√ʿbd60 would fill that connotation. In the cuneiform tradition this place is 
taken by epēšum.61 If such a simple and frequently used word like “doing, 
establishing, creating” is already connected with a clear shift of meaning, 
then what should we expect from far more complex cases of cultural shifts, 
such as Egyptianizing and Syrian/Phoenician ivories62 used in the mainland 
in Palestine/Israel,63 and as far as Nimrud?64 It is hard to label the depicted 
constellations on these objects, whose times of production are separated by 
as many as 2000 years, with the same attribute (see “b.”) Other examples 
concern the shifts from West- to East-Semitic substrates. In such cases a 
clear double aspect-opposition (perfective / imperfective aspect with two 
options of expression as attested in Preexilic Hebrew),65 is confronted with 
a much more diverse range of verbal options.66 For syntactic aspects, trans-
lating languages with or without nominal clauses in their syntactical reper-
toire could be compared with finding shifts in this very respect.67 In sum, 
there are many different shifting options when it comes to transcultural / 
translingual interferences in texts.68 The danger is not being aware of these 
                                                     
58  The German dictionaries always list “tun, machen, herstellen” as the main connotations 
of this verb formation.  
59  Ges 18: 1066; DNWSI: 924-927 and DCH VI: 727-728. See for the usage of this verb 
also the Byblian inscriptions as well as the typical formula of Phoenician dedicatory in-
scriptions which almost all demonstrate the productive usage of √pʿl.   
60  Ges 18: 1519. 
61  See AHW and CAD sub verbo. 
62  In general Barnet 1935; 21975; 1982; but for the francophone discussion already Decamps 
de Mertzenfeld 1954 and in an analytic approach Winter 1976a; 1976b; 1981; 1989a; as 
well as Herrmann & Millard 2003.  
63  For the Northern corridor (Ugarit) Caubet 1992 and Gachet-Bizollon 2007; for the Phil-
istine context Ben Shlomo & Dotan 2006 as well as Dotan 2006; for Samaria Crowfoot 
& Crowfoot 1933; 1938 and for Megiddo Loud 1939. 
64  For the material collections cf. among others Herrmann 1986; 1989; 1992; 2004; 2008; 
2009; 2013 but of course the earlier publications of Mallowan 1978; 1970; 1974; see al-
so Orchard 1976; Safar & al-Iraqi 1987. 
65  Blum 2008; Bauer 1910. 
66  Von Soden 31995 as well as Gross 1976. 
67  E.g. in the case of translations from Semitic languages (Phoenician / Punic) to Latin or 
Greek where a nominal clause cannot fit into the verbal setting without a copula (e.g. 
est).  
68  This is especially a scenario with bilingual inscriptions such as the longest Phoenician 
inscription (Karatepe KAI 222), for which also a Luwian counterpart is preserved 
(Kutter 2008: 223-236). In this respect all bilingual attestations can offer us a glimpse of 
the complexity of intercultural phenomena and shifts. See also the bilingual attestations 
in the Mediterranean Koiné which contain Punic / Latin interchange. 
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changes and therefore neglecting them when dealing with images and their 
interpretation. 
b) Anachronistic connotations (language of the vassal treaties) 
One can also encounter problems when anachronistic connotations are inte-
grated via translations in modern languages. The occurrence of the expres-
sion to “love” in the vassal treaties (which could of course be interpreted as 
a romantic expression of affection, of an emotion)69 could trap the inter-
preter in a philological fallacy, inputting emotions into the Assyrian termi-
nology. However, the original meaning is “to be obedient, to be loyal” and 
is in no respect linked to the modern, romantic connotations of “love.”70 
This is also true when analyzing the attestations of love in the Hebrew Bi-
ble,71 where all the verses influenced by deuteronomic language would have 
to be addressed separately because they imitate the usage of vassal treaty 
language in their terminology. In sum, searching for an emotion in ancient 
literature can produce a deformed and inadequate result, if basic aspects of 
word usage and contextualization are anachronistically disregarded.72 The 
same seems to be true for the interpretation of images. Beginning with 
modern idioms assigned to iconographic attestations and gradually going 
back over three millennia is a recipe either for a complex confusion or for a 
dead end. 
 
The different aporias in a) and b) cannot be simply ruled out by using a 
manual and acting in a compliant way. However, there are ways to mini-
mize the dangers when looking for an appropriate interpretation. First, any 
discussion has to face the interconnection between text and image in theory 
and therefore also in the method that can be employed.73 Text and image 
both contribute to the religious symbol system, both being elements of the 
media in antique cultures. Each can impact the other whether through mis-
interpretation or cautiousness. Identifying certain presuppositions plays a 
key role in both processes of interpretation. Two points are important in 
this respect. The first was already mentioned: One should identify constel-
lations74 in texts and images and combine the results in order to identify the 
                                                     
69  In general Parpola & Watanabe 1988.  
70  Steymans 2003; 2006. 
71  Steymans 1995. 
72  Searching exclusively for the attestations of “love” in a concordance can produce com-
pletely inadequate results with neither historical nor philological outcome.  
73  Lippke forthcoming b on the relationship of methodological steps such as textual criti-
cism and quality criticism and comparable features. 
74  This identification can be regarded as the basic analytical step after iconemes are identi-
fied. The relationship of elements / iconemes has a strong advantage in comparison to 
textual sources! Thus the constellation is a decisive aspect within the communication 
process of images.  
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underlying concept(s).75 A focus on concepts can prevent a snapshot as the 
identification of single “emotions / feelings” in texts and images. The 
search for concepts is a stronger, broader and historically more appropriate 
approach than the others discussed earlier. A second, perhaps even stronger 
point was – according to the judgment of the present author – introduced 
by Benno Landsberger.76 Its real impact is realized when juxtaposed with 
the first point (conceptualizing). With Landsberger we can propose a gap 
between antique concepts and modern concepts.77 This would match per-
fectly with the aporias discussed in b). This gap can only be bridged when 
the producing culture’s expressions are not flattened by terms used in the 
21st century. This is of high importance, since an unbroken continuity of 
cultural systems over the past three millennia is highly questionable.78 
A  central concern with respect to conceptual autonomy is that the object is 
the measure (Gegenstandsangepasstheit). This is in a narrow sense only 
possible when the original language is used.79 Here aporia a) is addressed 
and taken into account. The problems of opening such a complex scenario 
are apparent. There is high need to solve such difficult scenarios but the 
data deficiency80 is a constant and severe obstacle. There are not many 
sources that supply us with text and image alike in one object, nor are there 
many accessible sources that deal explicitly with the relationship of con-
cepts and terms that are applied to these very concepts. Despite this disillu-
sioning fact there is a need to promote a “conceptual turn”81 in the research 
of ancient media. This conceptual turn cannot develop its full impact with-
out the foundation stones of Landsbergers “Eigenbegrifflichkeit” (concep-
tual autonomy).82 
                                                     
75  A concept can be defined as a constellation that is realized by certain textual, icono-
graphic or archaeological attestations. For a more definite discourse, see Lasater forth-
coming.  
76  Landberger 1926; Sallaberger 2007; Lippke 2015.  
77  Landsberger 1926: 24. 
78  See Sallaberger 2007: 64-66.  
79  This demand creates a substantial challenge to all literary and iconographic artefacts that 
are connected to more than one linguistic culture, as for example present in Zincirli 
where Phoenician, Samʾalian and Aramean attestations are present in a short sequence. 
See Tropper 1993.  
80  For the literary perspective see Blum 2005: 11 and Lippke 2013: 15-16.47. 
81  See also other turns like the linguistic turn (White), the anthropologic turn (Binford), the 
iconographic turn in biblical studies (Keel) among many others.  
82  At this point the link of conceptual turn and conceptual autonomy can only be touched 
in a most reduced way in this present manuscript. Further research would be necessary 
and further attestations are to be collected for a convincing argument.  
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5. Concluding Remarks and Prospect 
We have seen that there are problems with assigning “emotions” to images 
in general. At the same time, there are images that cannot be understood by 
gestures and ritual behavior alone, but rather that also express an emotive 
component83. These attestations were traceable once the categories of in-
cluded data (i.e., human / humanimal) were broadened. However, the deci-
sive question would be whether it is generally possible to fulfil (and per-
ceive) a gesture without an emotion woven into that gesture. While the term 
“emotion” probably needs a reframing as “feeling” (as Lasater did84) more 
in line with the concepts at play, the resulting problem is clear: How is one 
to label such feeling-related concepts once they are detected? Given the 
scarcity of data, no clear solution can be given at the moment. There are not 
enough depictions with accompanying text connected to a certain concept. 
However, it is clear that in the discussion of concepts that potentially con-
vey a notion of emotion / feeling(s) the pattern is much more complex than 
interpreters thought it to be. Since we lack the time for a thorough method-
ological approach with instruments that can be employed, one has to ad-
dress these steps. The problems arising here can only be solved when tak-





                                                     
83  Alternatively an “element of feeling”.  
84  See footnote 13. 
 ANALYZING “EMOTIONS” IN ANCIENT MEDIA 173 
 
Fig. 1. Temple wall painting depicting the Ishtar cult of Mari (Tell Hariri), Keel 2008: 













Fig. 2. Line drawing of the Mari wall painting, Schroer 2008: 434. 
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3    4       5 
 
Fig. 3-5. Excerpt from fig. 1 (Keel 2008: 19 fig. 13); photo of a dove (wikimedia foun-
dation); photo of a bee-eater (merops apiaster; wikimedia foundation). 
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Fig. 6-7. Mistaken Hannover date palm (Beste 1979); 8-12. Stamp seals 






Fig. 13. Mistaken Hyksos horse (Schroer 2008: 287). 
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Fig. 14-16. Ivory inlays from Tell el-Aǧǧul and el-Ǧisr (Keel 1993: 1-3).  
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Fig. 17-19. Stamp seals depicting t3-wrt (mistaken hyksos horse in upright posi-
tion), Keel CSAPI I-II (Azor 15, Aǧǧul 215, Balach 130). 
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Fig. 22. Birds with spread wings (often inerpreted as an adorating gesture by the non-
human creation) iconographic renderings of the Amarna culture (Keel 2007: fig. 162). 
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Fig. 23. Baboons in praying gestures at Medinat Habu (Photo: Florian Lippke). 
 
  




Fig. 25. Wailing and the constellation of cutting the leg of  a calf (bleeding) 
and a priest / adorer translocating the foreleg, Papyrus Ani (Keel 1981: 31).  
178 FLORIAN LIPPKE 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
AHW = Meissner, Bruno / von Soden, Wolfram (eds.), 1965-1981. 
Barnett, Richard D., 1935, “The Nimrud Ivories and the Art of the Phoenicians”, in: Iraq 2, 
179-210. 
Barnett, Richard D., 1982, Ancient Ivories in the Middle East and Adjacent Countries 
(Qedem 14), Jerusalem. 
Barnett, Richard D., 21975, A Catalogue of the Nimrud Ivories with Other Examples of 
Ancient Near Eastern Ivories in the British Museum, London. 
Bauer, Hans, 1910, Die Tempora im Semitischen, ihre Entstehung und ihre Ausgestaltung in 
den Einzelsprachen, Leipzig. 
Ben-Shlomo, David / Dotan, Trude, 2006, “Ivories from Philistia. Filling the Iron Age I 
Gap”: Israel Exploration Journal 56, 1-38. 
Bernd Janowski, 1993, “Auch die Tiere gehören zum Gottesbund”, in: Janowski, Bernd et 
al. (eds.), Gefährten und Feinde des Menschen. Das Tier in der Lebenswelt des alten Is-
rael, Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1-4. 
Beste, Irmtraut, 1979, Corpus antiquitatum aegyptiacarum. Lose-Blatt-Katalog ägyptischer 
Altertümer Band 2 (Kestner Museum Hannover, Lieferung 2 Skarabäen), Mainz. 
Biggs, Robert D. / Brinkman, John A. (eds.), 1964-2010, The Assyrian dictionary of the 
Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. 
Blum, Erhard, 2005, “Notwendigkeit und Grenzen historischer Exegese. Plädoyer für eine 
Alttestamentliche Exegetik”, in: Bernd Janowski (ed.), Theologie und Exegese des Alten 
Testaments, der Hebräischen Bibel. Zwischenbilanz und Zukunftsperspektiven (Stuttgar-
ter Bibelstudien 200), Stuttgart, 87-124. 
Blum, Erhard, 2008, “Das althebräische Verbalsystem. Eine synchrone Analyse”, in: Dyma, 
Oliver / Michel, Andreas (eds.), Sprachliche Tiefe – theologische Weite (Biblisch-theo-
logische Studien 91), Neukirchen-Vluyn, 91-139. 
Brunner-Traut, Emma, 1975, Art. “Aspektive”, in: Lexikon der Ägyptologie Band I, 474-
488. 
Brunner-Traut, Emma, 1977, Art. “Gesten”, in: Lexikon der Ägyptologie Band II, 573-585. 
Brunner-Traut, Emma, 1990, Frühformen des Erkennens. Am Beispiel Altägyptens, Darm-
stadt. 
CAD = Biggs, Robert D. / Brinkman, John A. (eds.), 1964-2010. 
Caubet, Annie / Poplin, François, 1992, “La place des ivoires d'Ougarit dans la production 
du Proche Orient Ancien”, in: Fitton, J. Lesley (ed.), Ivory in Greece and the Eastern 
Mediterranean from the Bronze Age to the Hellenistic Period (British Museum Occa-
sional Papers 85), London, 91-100. 
Clines, David J. A. (ed.), 1993-2011, The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, Sheffield. 
Cornelius, Izak, 1994, The Iconography of the Canaanite Gods Reshef and Baʿal. Late 
Bronze and Iron Age I Periods (c 1500–1000 BCE) (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 140), 
Freiburg CH / Göttingen. 
Cornelius, Izak, 2008, The Many Faces of the Goddess. The Iconography of the Syro-Pales-
tinian Goddesses Anat, Astarte, Qedeshet, and Asherah c. 1500–1000 BCE (Orbis Bibli-
cus et Orientalis 204), Freiburg CH / Göttingen. 
Crowfoot, John W. / Crowfoot, Grace M., 1933, “The Ivories from Samaria”, in: Palestine 
Exploration Quarterly 65, 7-26. 
Crowfoot, John W. / Crowfoot, Grace M., 1938, Early Ivories from Samaria (Samaria–
Sebaste). Reports of the Work of the Joint Expedition in 1931-1933 and of the British 
Expedition in 1935, London. 
 ANALYZING “EMOTIONS” IN ANCIENT MEDIA 179 
CSAPI = Keel, Othmar, 1995–2013, Corpus der Stempelsiegel-Amulette aus Palästina/ 
Israel. Von den Anfängen bis zur Perserzeit – Einleitungsband + Band 1-4 (Orbis Bibli-
cus et Orientalis. Series Archaeologica 10.13.29.31.33), Fribourg / Göttingen. 
DCH = Clines, David J. A. (ed.), 1993-2011. 
Decamps de Mertzenfeld, Christiane, 1954, Inventaire commenté des ivoires phéniciens et 
apparentés découverts dans le Proche-Orient, Paris. 
DNWSI = Hoftijzer, Jacob / Jongeling, Karel, 1995. 
Donner, Herbert, 182013, Hebräisches und aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte 
Testament von Wilhelm Gesenius, Berlin / Heidelberg. 
Donner, Herbert, 1997, “Die religiöse Wüstenromantik. Über eine fehlgeleitete Metapher” 
in: Drehsen, Volker et al. (eds.), Der “ganze Mensch”. Festschrift für Dietrich Rössler 
zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (Arbeiten zur Praktischen Theologie 10), Berlin, New York, 
1-12. 
Dotan, Trude, 2006, “A Decorated Ivory Lid from Tel Miqne-Ekron”, in: Gitin, Seymour et 
al. (eds.), Confronting the Past. Archaeological and Historical Essays on Ancient Israel 
in Honor of William G. Dever, Winona Lake, IN, 33-60. 
Frevel, Christian (ed.), 2005, Medien im antiken Palästina. Materielle Kommunikation und 
Medialität als Thema der Palästinaarchäologie (Forschungen zum Alten Testament, 
2. Reihe 10), Tübingen. 
Frevel, Christian (ed.), 2010, Biblische Anthropologie. Neue Einsichten aus dem Alten Tes-
tament (Quaestiones disputatae 237), Freiburg im Breisgau. 
Gachet-Bizollon, Jacqueline, 2007, Les ivoires d’Ougarit et l’art des ivoiriers du Levant au 
Bronze Récent (Ras Shamra-Ougarit 16), Paris. 
Geertz, Clifford, 1973, “Thick Description. Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture”, in: 
Geertz, Clifford (ed.), The interpretation of cultures. Selected Essays, New York, NY, 3-
30. 
Ges 18 = Donner, Herbert, 182013. 
Gross, Walter, 1976, Verbform und Funktion. Wayyiqṭol für die Gegenwart? (Arbeiten zu 
Text und Sprache im Alten Testament 1), St. Ottilien. 
Hardmeier, Christof, 2003, Textwelten der Bibel entdecken. Grundlagen und Verfahren 
einer textpragmatischen Literaturwissenschaft der Bibel (Textpragmatische Studien zur 
Literatur- und Kulturgeschichte der Hebräischen Bibel 1, Teilband 1,2). 
Herrmann, Georgina / Millard, Alan R., 2003, “Who Used Ivories in the Early First Millen-
nium BC?” in: Potts, Timothy et al. (eds.), Culture through Objects. Ancient Near East-
ern Studies in Honour of P. R. S. Moorey, Oxford, 377-402. 
Herrmann, Georgina et al., 2004, The Published Ivories from Fort Shalmaneser, Nimrud. 
A Scanned Archive of Photographs, London. 
Herrmann, Georgina, 1986, Ivories from Nimrud IV. Ivories from Room SW 37 Fort Shal-
maneser, London. 
Herrmann, Georgina, 1989, “The Nimrud Ivories, 1. The Flame and Frond School”, in: Iraq 
51, 85-109. 
Herrmann, Georgina, 1992, Ivories from Nimrud V. The Small Collection from Fort Shal-
maneser, London. 
Herrmann, Georgina, 2008, “The Ivories from Nimrud”, in: Curtis, J. E. et al. (eds.), New 
Light on Nimrud. Proceedings of the Nimrud Conference 11th – 13th March 2002, Lon-
don, 225-232. 
Herrmann, Georgina, 2009, Ivories from Nimrud VI. Ivories the North West Palace (1845-
1992), London. 
180 FLORIAN LIPPKE 
Herrmann, Georgina, 2013, Ivories from Nimrud VII. Ivories from Rooms SW11/12 and T10 
Fort Shalmaneser, London. 
Hoftijzer, Jacob / Jongeling, Karel, 1995, Dictionary of the North-West Semitic inscriptions 
Volumes 1-2 (Handbook of Oriental studies 1,21), Leiden, Köln. 
de Hulster, Izaak et al. (eds.), 2015, Iconographic Exegesis of the Hebrew Bible / Old Testa-
ment: An Introduction to its Method and Practice, Göttingen. 
Jacob, Benno, 1905, Der Pentateuch. Exegetisch-kritische Forschungen, Leipzig. 
Janowski, Bernd / Liess, Kathrin (eds.), 2009, Der Mensch im alten Israel. Neue Forschun-
gen zur alttestamentlichen Anthropologie (Herders Biblische Studien 59), Freiburg, Ba-
sel, Wien. 
Janowski, Bernd / Riede, Peter (eds.), 1999, Die Zukunft der Tiere. Theologisch, ethische 
und naturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven, Stuttgart. 
Janowski, Bernd (ed.), 2010, Hans Walter Wolff. Anthropologie des Alten Testaments, Gü-
tersloh. 
Janowski, Bernd (ed.), 2012, Der ganze Mensch. Zur Anthropologie der Antike und ihrer 
europäischen Nachgeschichte, Berlin. 
Janowski, Bernd et al. (eds.), 1993, Gefährten und Feinde des Menschen. Das Tier in der 
Lebenswelt des alten Israel, Neukirchen-Vluyn. 
Janowski, Bernd, 1999, “Auch die Tiere gehören zum Gottesbund. Gott, Mensch und Tier 
im alten Israel”, in: Janowski, Bernd / Riede, Peter (eds.), Die Zukunft der Tiere. Theo-
logisch, ethische und naturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven, Stuttgart, 3-31. 
Janowski, Bernd, 2003, “Dankbarkeit. Ein anthropologischer Grundbegriff im Spiegel der 
Toda-Psalmen”, in: Zenger, Erich (ed.), Ritual und Poesie. Formen und Orte religiöser 
Dichtung im Alten Orient, im Judentum und im Christentum (Herders Biblische Studien 
36), Berlin, New York, 91-136. 
Janowski, Bernd, 2004, “Die lebendige Statue Gottes. Zur Anthropologie der priesterlichen 
Urgeschichte”, in: Witte, Markus (ed.), Gott und Mensch im Dialog. FS O. Kaiser (Bei-
hefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 345), Berlin / New York, I 
183-214. 
Janowski, Bernd, 2005, “Der Mensch im alten Israel. Grundfragen alttestamentlicher Anth-
ropologie”: Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 102, 143-175. 
Janowski, Bernd, 2009, “Anthropologie des Alten Testament. Versuch einer Grundlegung”, 
in: Wagner, Andreas (ed.), Anthropologische Aufbrüche. Alttestamentliche und inter-
disziplinäre Zugänge zur historischen Anthropologie (Forschungen zur Religion und Li-
teratur des Alten und Neuen Testaments 232), Göttingen, 13-41. 
Janowski, Bernd, 2010, “Konstellative Anthropologie. Zum Begriff der Person im Alten 
Testament”, in: Frevel, Christian (ed.), Biblische Anthropologie. Neue Einsichten aus 
dem Alten Testament (Quaestiones disputatae 237), Freiburg im Breisgau, 64-87. 
Janowski, Bernd, 2013, “Hans Walter Wolff und die alttestamentliche Anthropologie”, in: 
Gertz, Jan C. / Oeming, Manfred (eds.), Neu aufbrechen, den Menschen zu suchen und 
zu erkennen. Symposium anlässlich des 100. Geburtstages von Hans Walter Wolff (Bib-
lisch-theologische Studien 139), Neukirchen-Vluyn, 77-112. 
Janowski, Bernd, 2014, “Anthropologie des Alten Testaments. Grundfragen – Kontexte – 
Themenfelder”: Theologische Literaturzeitung 139, 535-554. 
Janowski, Bernd, 2015, Art. “Anthropology”, in: Balentine, Samuel E. (ed.), The Oxford 
Encyclopedia of the Bible and Theology (The Oxford Encyclopedias of the Bible), Ox-
ford, New York, Vol. 1, 27-42. 
Janowski, Bernd, 42013, Konfliktgespräche mit Gott. Eine Anthropologie der Psalmen, 
Neukirchen-Vluyn. 
 ANALYZING “EMOTIONS” IN ANCIENT MEDIA 181 
Keel, Othmar / Uehlinger, Christoph, 1998, Gods, Goddesses, and Images of God in Ancient 
Israel. Translated by T. H. Trapp, Minneapolis. 
Keel, Othmar / Uehlinger, Christoph, 62010, Göttinnen, Götter und Gottessymbole. Neue 
Erkenntnisse zur Religionsgeschichte Kanaans und Israels aufgrund bislang unerschlos-
sener ikonographischer Quellen (Neuauflage mit einem Nachwort von F. Lippke), Frei-
burg CH. 
Keel, Othmar et al. (eds.), 1990, Studien zu den Stempelsiegeln aus Palästina/Israel. Die 
frühe Eisenzeit (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 100), Freiburg CH / Göttingen. 
Keel, Othmar et al., 2001, “Im Schatten Deiner Flügel”. Tiere in der Bibel und im Alten 
Orient, Freiburg CH, Göttingen. 
Keel, Othmar, 1975, “Kanaanäische Sühneriten auf ägyptischen Tempelreliefs”: Vetus 
Testamentum 25, 413-469. 
Keel, Othmar, 1980, Das Böcklein in der Milch seiner Mutter und Verwandtes im Lichte 
eines altorientalischen Bildmotivs (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 33), Freiburg CH / Göt-
tingen. 
Keel, Othmar, 1992, Das Recht der Bilder gesehen zu werden. Drei Fallstudien zur Methode 
der Interpretation altorientalischer Bilder (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 122), Freiburg 
CH / Göttingen. 
Keel, Othmar, 1993, “Hyksos Horses or Hippopotamus Deities?”: Levant 15, 208-212. 
Keel, Othmar, 1997, The Symbolism of the Biblical World. Ancient Near Eastern Iconogra-
phy and the Book of Psalms, Winona Lake, IN. 
Keel, Othmar, 51996, Die Welt der altorientalischen Bildsymbolik und das Alte Testament. 
Am Beispiel der Psalmen, Göttingen. 
Keel, Othmar, forthcoming, “Problems of Iconographic Interpretation when Starting from a 
Text: A Case Study”, (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis). 
Kutter, Juliane, 2008, Nūr-ilī. Die Sonnengottheiten in den nordwestsemitischen Religionen 
von der Spätbronzezeit bis zur vorrömischen Zeit (Alter Orient und Altes Testament 
346), Münster. 
Landsberger, Benno, 1926, “Die Eigenbegrifflichkeit der babylonischen Welt”: Islamica 2, 
355-372. 
Lasater, Phillip, forthcoming, “‘The Emotions’ in Biblical Anthropology? A Genealogy and 
Case Study with ארי”: Harvard Theological Review. 
Linzey, Andrew, 1995, Animal Theology, Campaign, IL. 
Lippke, Florian / Baur, Wolfgang, 2015, “Blick über den Tellerrand (Grundfragen). Wie die 
Archäologie religionsgeschichtliche Perspektiven eröffnet“: Welt und Umwelt der Bibel 
1, 80-83. 
Lippke, Florian, 2011, “The Southern Levant in Context. A Brief Sketch of Important Fea-
tures Related to the Religious Symbol System in the Bronze Ages”, in: Mynářová, Jana 
(ed.), Egypt and the Near East – the Crossroads. Proceedings of an International Con-
ference on the Relations of Egypt and the Near East in the Bronze Age, Prague, Septem-
ber 1–3, 2010, Oxford, 211-234. 
Lippke, Florian, 2014, “Verbindungslinien. Historische alttestamentlich-religionsgeschicht-
liche Anstöße zum Christlichen Orient anhand ausgewählter biographischer Fall-
studien”, in: Bukovec, Predrag (ed.), Christlicher Orient im Porträt – Wissenschaftsge-
schichte des Christlichen Orients und seiner Nachbarwissenschaften. Kongressakten der 
1. Tagung der RVO (4. Dezember 2010), Tübingen, Hamburg, 13-50. 
Lippke, Florian, forthcoming, “Ancient Editing and the Coherence of Traditions within the 
Book of Jeremiah and throughout the םיאיבנ”, in: Schmid, Konrad & Najman, Hindy 
182 FLORIAN LIPPKE 
(eds.), Jeremiah’s Scriptures. Production, Reception, Interaction, Transformation, Lei-
den. 
Lippke, Florian, in preparation, “Necessary prior knowledge for Pre-Hellenistic Iconogra-
phy. Case Studies”, ebo 1, 1-13. 
Loud, Gordon, The Megiddo Ivories (Oriental Institute Publications 52), Chicago. 
Magen, Ursula, 1986, Assyrische Königsdarstellungen – Aspekte der Herrschaft. Eine Typo-
logie (Baghdader Forschungen 9), Mainz. 
Machinist, Peter, 2009, “The Road Not Taken: Wellhausen and Assyriology”, in: Galil, Ger-
shon / Geller, Markham / Millard, Alan (eds.), Homeland and Exile. Biblical and An-
cient Near Eastern Studies in Honour of Bustenay Oded (Supplements to Vetus Testa-
mentum 130), Leiden, 469-532. 
Mallowan, Max E. L. / Davies, Leri G., 1970, Ivories from Nimrud II. Ivories in Assyrian 
Style, London. 
Mallowan, Max E. L. / Herrmann, Georgina, 1974, Ivories from Nimrud III. Furniture from 
SW 7 Fort Shalmaneser, London. 
Mallowan, Max E. L., 1978, The Nimrud Ivories (A Colonnade Book), London. 
Meissner, Bruno / von Soden, Wolfram (eds.), 1965-1981, Akkadisches Handwörterbuch. 
Unter Benutzung des lexikalischen Nachlasses von Bruno Meissner. 
Orchard, Jeremy J., 1967, Ivories from Nimrud I. Equestrian Bridle-Harness Ornaments, 
London. 
Ory, James, 1945/6, “A Middle Bronze Age Tomb at el-Jisr”: Quarterly of the Department 
of Antiquities of Palestine 12, 31-42. 
Otto, Rudolf, 1917, Das Heilige. Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein 
Verhältnis zum Rationalen, Breslau. 
Otto, Rudolf, 21950, The Idea of the Holy. An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the 
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, London. 
Panofsky, Erwin, 1939, “Introductory”, in: Panofsky, Erwin (ed.), Studies in Iconology. 
Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance - Mary Flexner Lectures on the Hu-
manities 1937 (Harper Torchbook 1077), New York / Oxford, 3-31. 
Parrot, André, 1958, Mission archéologique de Mari II/2. Peintures murales (Bibliothèque 
archéologique et historique 69), Paris. 
Petrie, William M. F., 1931, Ancient Gaza I, London. 
Recki, Birgit (ed.), 2005, Cassirer, Ernst. Descartes: Lehre – Persönlichkeit – Wirkung 
(Hamburger Ausgabe der Ernst Cassirer Werke 20), Hamburg. 
Riede, Peter, 2002, Im Spiegel der Tiere. Studien zum Verhältnis von Mensch und Tier im 
alten Israel (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 187), Freiburg CH / Göttingen. 
Safar, Fuad / al-Iraqi, Muyasser S., 1987, Ivories from Nimrud, Baghdad. 
Sallaberger, Walther, 2007, “Benno Landsbergers ‘Eigenbegrifflichkeit’ in wissenschafts-
geschichtlicher Perspektive”, in: Claus Wilcke et al. (eds.), Das geistige Erfassen der 
Welt im Alten Orient. Beiträge zu Sprache, Religion, Kultur und Gesellschaft, Wiesba-
den, 63-82. 
Schäfer, Heinrich, 41963, Von ägyptischer Kunst. Eine Grundlage (mit einem Nachwort von 
E. Brunner Traut), Leipzig. 
Schroer, Silvia / Keel, Othmar, 2005, Die Ikonographie Palästinas/Israels und der Alte Ori-
ent. Eine Religionsgeschichte in Bildern (Die Ikonographie Palästinas/Israels und der 
Alte Orient 1), Freiburg CH. 
Schroer, Silvia / Lippke, Florian, 2014, “Beobachtungen zu den (spät-)persischen Samaria-
Bullen aus dem Wadi ed-Daliyeh. Hellenisches, Persisches und Lokaltraditionen im 
 ANALYZING “EMOTIONS” IN ANCIENT MEDIA 183 
Grenzgebiet der Provinz Yehûd” in: Frevel, Christian et al. (eds.), A Religious “Revolu-
tion” in Yehûd? The Material Culture of the Persian Period as a Test Case (Orbis Bibli-
cus et Orientalis 267), Fribourg / Göttingen, 305-388. 
Schroer, Silvia / Staubli, Thomas, 2001, Body Symbolism of the Bible, Minnesota. 
Schroer, Silvia, 2007, “Frauenkörper als architektonische Elemente. Zum Hintergrund von 
Ps 144,12”, in: Bickel, Susanne et al. (eds.), Bilder als Quellen. Studies on ancient Near 
Eastern artefacts and the Bible inspired by the work of Othmar Keel (Images as 
sources) (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis, Sonderband), Freiburg CH / Göttingen, 425-450. 
Schroer, Silvia, 2008, Die Ikonographie Palästinas/Israels und der Alte Orient. Eine Religi-
onsgeschichte in Bildern (Die Ikonographie Palästinas/Israels und der Alte Orient 2), 
Freiburg CH. 
Schroer, Silvia, 2011, Die Ikonographie Palästinas/Israels und der Alte Orient. Eine Religi-
onsgeschichte in Bildern (Die Ikonographie Palästinas/Israels und der Alte Orient 3), 
Freiburg CH. 
Schroer, Silvia, 22013, Tiere in der Bibel, Freiburg i. Br. 
Snell, Daniel C., 2011, Religions of the Ancient Near East, New York. 
von Soden, Wolfram / Mayer, Werner R., 1995, Grundriss der akkadischen Grammatik 
(Analecta orientalia 33), Roma. 
Staubli, Thomas / Schroer, Silvia, 2014, Menschenbilder der Bibel, Ostfildern. 
Strawn, Brent A. / LeMon, Joel M., 2007, “‘Everything That Has Breath’. Animal Praise in 
Psalm 150:6 in the Light of Ancient Near Eastern Iconography”, in: Bickel, Susanne et 
al. (eds.), Bilder als Quellen. Studies on Ancient Near Eastern Artefacts and the Bible 
Inspired by the Work of Othmar Keel (Images as Sources) (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis, 
Sonderband), Freiburg CH / Göttingen, 451-485. 
Strawn, Brent A., 2014, “The Iconography of Fear: Yirʾat Yhwh (הוהי תארי) in Artistic Per-
spective”, in: de Hulster, Izaak / LeMon, Joel M. (eds.), Image, Text, Exegesis: Icono-
graphic Interpretation and the Hebrew Bible (Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament 
Studies 588), London, 91-134. 
Strawn, Brent A., 2015, “Chapter 16 ‘The Fear of the Lord’ in Two (or Three) Dimensions: 
Iconography and Yirʾat Yhwh”, in: de Hulster, Izaak et al. (eds.), Iconographic Exegesis 
of the Hebrew Bible / Old Testament: An Introduction to its Method and Practice, Göt-
tingen, 295-311. 
Ströker, Elisabeth (ed.), 2012, Husserl, Edmund. Cartesianische Meditationen (Philoso-
phische Bibliothek 664), Hamburg. 
Tropper, Josef, 1993, Die Inschriften von Zincirli. Neue Edition und vergleichende Gram-
matik des phönizischen, sam’alischen und aramäischen Textkorpus (Abhandlungen zur 
Literatur Alt-Syrien-Palästinas 6), Münster. 
Uehlinger, Christoph (ed.), 2000, Images as media. Sources for the cultural history of the 
Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 175), Freiburg 
CH / Göttingen. 
Uehlinger, Christoph, 2005, “‘Medien’ in der Lebenswelt des antiken Palästina?” in: Frevel, 
Christian (ed.), Medien im antiken Palästina. Materielle Kommunikation und Medialität 
als Thema der Palästinaarchäologie (Forschungen zum Alten Testament, 2. Reihe 10), 
Tübingen, 31-61. 
Waldau, Paul, 2013, Animal Studies. An Introduction, Oxford / New York. 
Wannenmacher, Julia, 2015, “Ambivalenzen einer Beziehung. Das Tier in der Theologie” 
in: Spannring, Reingard et al. (eds.), Disziplinierte Tiere? Perspektiven der Human-
Animal Studies für die wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen (Human-Animal Studies), Biele-
feld, 287-319. 
184 FLORIAN LIPPKE 
Weippert, Helga, 1988, Palästina in vorhellenistischer Zeit (Handbuch der Archäologie 
2/1), München. 
Winter, Irene J., 1976a, “Phoenician and North Syrian Ivory Carving in Historical Context. 
Questions of Style and Distribution”: Iraq 38, 1-22. 
Winter, Irene J., 1976b, “Carved Ivory Furniture Panels from Nimrud. A Coherent Sub-
Group of the North Syrian Style”: Metropolitan Museum Journal 11, 25-52. 
Winter, Irene J., 1981, “Is there a South Syrian Style of Ivory Carving in the Early First 
Millenium B.C.?”: Iraq 43, 101-130. 
Winter, Irene J., 1989, “North Syrian Ivories and Tell Halaf Reliefs. The Impact of Luxury 
Goods upon ‘Major’ Arts” in: Leonard, Albert Jr. / Williams, Bruce B. (eds.), Essays in 
Ancient Civilization Presented to Helene J. Kantor (Studies in Ancient Oriental Civili-
zation 47), Chicago, 321-332. 
Wohlers, Christian (ed.), 2011, Descartes, René. Meditationen, mit sämtlichen Einwänden 
und Erwiderungen (Philosophische Bibliothek 598), Hamburg. 
Wohlers, Christian (ed.), 2011a, Descartes, René. Discours de la Méthode (Philosophische 
Bibliothek 624), Hamburg. 
 
The Discourse on Emotion in Ancient Mesopotamia: 
A Theoretical Approach1 
Margaret JAQUES 
1. Introduction 
The study of the expression of emotion in ancient Mesopotamia is subject 
to the boundaries implied by a language and a culture that disappeared two 
thousand years ago. For lack of an anthropological approach to the Sumeri-
ans and the Akkadians themselves, we have to concentrate on its epiphe-
nomena, which are the texts in which they expressed these emotions. 
Through the numerous documents that the Sumerians and Akkadians left 
us, is it possible to understand and analyse their emotions, not as psycholo-
gists or anthropologists, but as historians? While this question may at first 
sight seem surprising, its stake is part of a broader contemporary research 
context.2 
We must first answer a methodological question: How is it possible to 
study emotions in ancient history? And how can we understand a subjective 
vocabulary in two extinct languages written on old, often broken, clay tab-
lets? Lacking cuneiform treatises concerned with emotion words and in the 
absence of modern global studies on the subject, we are left to gather as 
much as possible from miscellaneous words in a multiplicity of documents. 
Those words, we think, are likely to designate emotions that reflect the 
contexts in which they appear. The methodological questions are very 
pragmatical: Do particular emotions occur in good or bad situations? 
Which narrative character expresses which emotion, in what period and in 
what context? What reaction does the expression of an emotion provoke?  
                                                     
1  This article is based on my doctoral dissertation on Sumerian vocabulary of emotion 
(Jaques 2006). Sumerian words are transliterated in normal script (ki áĝ); Akkadian 
words are written in italic (râmu); "=" (in Asum. = Bakk.) should be understood as “be-
longing to the same semantic field of” or “is parallel with” rather than “signifies” or “is 
equivalent to”. Concepts of emotion with elements of meaning are indicated between 
straight quotation marks ("joy"). For English corrections, I thank Emmert Clevenstine.  
2  I have in mind here the new subfield of history known as “emotionology” and the histo-
ry of American religions. In France, one of the first to research in this domain was Fevbre, 
“La sensibilité et l’histoire: Comment reconstituer la vie affective d’autrefois” (1941: 5-
20). For ancient Mesopotamia, Oppenheim (1967) argued in his chapter “Can these 
bones live?” that in order to penetrate beneath the surface of the texts, we must search 
for “immediateness”, that is, the perception of “both the unusual and the atypical diction 
and the echoes and allusions”. Fevbre and Oppenheim each in their own way wanted to 
attempt a kind of “virtual fieldwork” as in anthropology. 
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Under these conditions, a delimitation of the field of investigation on the 
basis of our own emotional experience would only distort things by impos-
ing artificial criteria on the text. To look elsewhere, in another, completely 
different cultural environment or historical era, for similar features of what 
the discourse on emotions was in Mesopotamia, would end up not only at a 
dead-end but also at totally erroneous notions. Other approaches to emotion 
research, whether philosophical, religious, psychological, ethnological, 
historical or linguistic, are not however without interest for our study. His-
torical and ethnological analyses allow us first to set down some principles 
such as the distinction between the emotions and the (meta-)language used 
to describe emotion.3 Indeed, when an emotion appears at a given time, for 
example in Old Babylonian texts, we must ask ourselves what appears ex-
actly, whether it is a new sensitivity or a new rhetoric. The only thing that 
we are sure of is that specific language expressing a certain type of emotion 
has appeared. But this does not prove of course that this emotion was not 
felt before.  
Alain Corbin, a specialist in the study of 19th-century French thought, 
sets forth three reasons why an emotion may remain “non-said” (non-dit) in 
a given language: it is not-said because it is overly perceived (like the noise 
of cars in the street today), it is not-said because it is impossible to say (the 
word to express it does not exist) or because it is not the tradition to say it 
(for example, an emotional response to nature in an non-industrial society), 
and it is not said because it is forbidden to say it. To name an emotion is 
thus not a natural process, but an artificial creation, a cultural fact.4 To each 
culture, to each society belongs a specific vocabulary expressing a certain 
number of emotions, according to a more or less broad or a more or less 
precise perspective. In the absence of all discourse about emotion by the 
Sumerians and the Akkadians themselves, it would be difficult to interpret 
why such an emotion does not appear in their writings or why a particular 
                                                     
3  Larsen (2001: 278) distinguishes between a “discourse on emotion” and an “emotional 
discourse”. Bamberg (1997: 309) develops these two research angles. An emotional dis-
course is for him a two-fold form of discourse: a linguistic and an extralinguistic one 
(facial expression, body posture, proximity, etc.). In this view, “language and emotion 
are two concurrent, parallel systems in use, and their relationship exists in that one sys-
tem (emotion) impacts on the performance of the other (language)”. On the other hand, a 
discourse on emotion starts from the assumption that language “reflects” objects in the 
world, among them the emotions: “Language have emotion terms, and people across the 
world engage in talk about the emotions”. In this other view, “Language is a means of 
making sense of emotions”. As objects of study, it is important to distinguish between 
the study of emotions as the object of phenomenology, theology or psychology and the 
study of the discourse on emotion as the object of history and of linguistic and cultural 
anthropology. These different approaches are of course not exclusive. 
4  Lutz (1988: 209) concludes with the remark that “emotion experience (...) is more aptly 
viewed as the outcome of social relations and their corollary worldviews than as univer-
sal psychobiological entities”. We find a similar remark in Grima (1992: 6): “Emotion is 
culture.” 
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emotion is mentioned more often in reference to the relationship between 
man and god than to that between man and woman. It is, however, im-
portant to take note of these phenomena and to draw a chart as complete as 
possible of the emotions expressed and surely lived by the people of Meso-
potamia. 
The material for this study has been collected from three types of texts: 
lexical lists, royal inscriptions, and “literary” texts. The word “literary” 
must be taken in a broad sense, as it includes narrative documents as well 
as poetical texts, omens, and letters. These three types of sources do not 
have the same structure or the same goals, and the information that we ob-
tain from them is varied and complementary. The case of the lexical lists is 
special because the terms are “without context”, as would be the entries of 
a glossary without commentary. They enumerate Sumerian or Akkadian 
words, give written forms, and in bilingual lists add Akkadian, sometimes 
Hittite, translations. Their contents are gathered under a common denomi-
nator such as first names, professional names, names of objects in wood or 
of animals. The absence of a heading “emotion” poses straightaway the 
difficulty of classifying words gathered and interpreted today as “emotion 
words” of ancient cultures. For the ancient people of Mesopotamia, emo-
tions did not belong to an overarching class of psychological or cultural 
experience, but were distinct notions, apparently without any link between 
them. To pose a type "emotion" is a theoretical artifice allowing modern 
research to take place. It cannot, however, presuppose the reality of such a 
type in ancient Mesopotamia. 
There is a multiplicity of emotion words in Sumerian and Akkadian that 
scholars render with the help of conventional ad hoc translations, even if 
they are aware that the concepts of that time do not correspond to the mod-
ern equivalents. Even in modern languages, when we look at the stock of 
emotion words in a given language, often we do not find exactly corre-
sponding words in other languages: to appreciate this, it is enough to com-
pare the German word "Glück" with the English word "happiness".5 
Before one risks a definition or a classification of this vocabulary, a 
study on and around the signification of each word must also be performed. 
The first source of information on the meaning, and by far the most reliable 
one, is the immediate literary context. This implies that language is the 
obligatory way to access historical knowledge. The first step in any re-
search is to decipher and understand the texts we have at hand. In a second 
step, one can make semantic comparisons between Akkadian translations of 
Sumerian material and other Semitic languages. The Akkadian translations, 
which come either from the lexical lists or from bilingual texts, although 
contemporary with the Sumerian speakers, cannot serve as the unique basis 
                                                     
5  For the same observation concerning the English word "anger", see Harkins/Wierzbicka 
(2001: 3ff.). 
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for the attribution of meaning, because these translations are not philologi-
cal in nature, and their purpose was not to produce exact semantic equiva-
lents, but more of adequations. One can also look in other directions: 
through the study of etymology when it is possible, and on the base of 
one’s own common sense. Indeed, these steps do not produce proofs, as is 
so often the case in the study of ancient cultures, but rather highlight 
tendencies that make a researcher incline toward one manner of under-
standing rather than toward another one. These first tools provide a neces-
sary preliminary framework into which successive elements of research can 
be woven.6 
2. Classification of the Vocabulary of Emotion 
If emotions are indeed cultural, they are not invariable.7 They are a socially 
validated judgement from individuals rather than an innate category. There-
fore research has to focus on emotion words and on the domains of mean-
ing expressed by the texts associated with them. Study of the discourse on 
emotion has to concentrate on the norms of expression, which may appear 
radically different to the outside observer.  
The expression of emotions in ancient Mesopotamia can be classified 
into broad categories. In a very schematic manner and by basing oneself on 
the corpus mentioned before, we can differentiate the material into “con-
ventional expression” and “non-conventional expression”. In conventional 
discourse, an identical and recurring expression can be compared and in-
scribed in a chart almost out of context. This is the case, for example, for 
                                                     
6  Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) as a tool for cross-cultural analysis of emotion 
words is a theory developed by Wierzbicka (see Harkins/Wierzbicka 2001: 8-16). Emo-
tion words are “complex (decomposable) and culture-specific” concepts which cannot 
simply be translated into another language. To understand emotion words, “experts” 
need to understand the explanations of ordinary people. For that they have to share a 
common language made of “simple and universal words” like “good”/“bad”, “think”, 
“people”, “I”, “you” etc.  
 This tool is likely to function in fieldwork, but it meets difficulties in historical research: 
In ancient cultures, texts do not reveal all “statements of meanings” because the histo-
rian cannot reach all the layers of a society. For Pongratz-Leisten (2001: 196) “historical 
research has to be aware that the city-oriented language power creates its own dimension 
of meaning and conceives of city life as inherently superior to life in the countryside and 
in the steppe”. Also Larsen (2001: 283) “we must (...) realise that such statements reach 
us through layers of conventions and social and linguistic norms”. It is clear that in his 
research, the historian meets not historical facts but rather the conception of the world 
expressed by urban literate elite.  
7  For a review of the radical opposition between different points of view that lead to 
different theories, see the chapter “Tensions in the study of emotion” in Lutz/White 
1986: 406ff. Lutz also explains these theories in the chapter “Emotion, thought, and es-
trangement: Western discourses on feeling” (1988: 53-80). 
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the repetitive material of the royal inscriptions that are not intended to con-
vey real emotions but rather appropriate, formal expressions of feelings on 
specific occasions. In a non-conventional expression, on the other hand, 
each relationship has an interest and an importance in itself. It is appro-
priate to distinguish in these expressions between the more realistic ones 
and the more idealistic versions. The main difficulty is in fact inherent in 
the topic of the research itself precisely because emotions are cultural auto-
matisms, that is, they need not be commented on. Acquired conventions, 
norms, and habits dictate what emotion can be shown to whom and in 
which contexts. Sometimes we can find no reason for emotion. Daily life 
very largely escapes the written sources, yet emotions were lived daily by 
the ancient people of Mesopotamia. 
On the chart of words for emotions, it appears that certain terms are 
used very often, others more seldom, and some very rarely. We see an ana-
lytical frame organising itself, with on one side an abundance of data, meta-
phorical images, and descriptions, and on the other side a surprising pov-
erty of elements. One has to be aware not to fall into the trap of the “said” 
and “non-said” as mentioned by Corbin (2000), but must also be able to 
identify the norms that order their differences and to observe their modula-
tions in the documents. Different factors – for example the literary corpus 
in which a vocabulary is attested first, but also perhaps historical, religious, 
or moral aspects – can have influenced their representation systems, their 
differences, and their permanencies. Armed with these methodological 
observations, one can concentrate on the lexical question and distinguish 
eleven categories of emotion in Mesopotamia: The vocabulary of "joy", 
"anger", "love", "hate", "sadness", "fear", and different statements for 
"trouble", "compassion" and one word for "jealousy". 
Besides surmounting the difficulties of translation, it is also necessary to 
focus on the manner in which this terminology would have behaved in con-
text: Is it employed in epithets? With which agent or subject? To these two 
questions, we should add the separate study of what we might call the 
words or expressions used in closely related senses that do not belong to 
the vocabulary of emotion, like "darkness" or "twisted", which appear in 
similar contexts. 
This approach makes it possible to identify constant features. When we 
speak in terms of emotion, this implies either an isolated subject or the 
perception by an agent of a given reality. In other words, the emotion is a 
moral, aesthetic, or legal judgement about reality or a personal quality or 
shortcoming. This distinction is important as, confronted with the question 
“why is such a god, such a hero, or such a man happy?” we have the 
choice, following the grammatical construction of the sentence, between an 
incidental cause (“he is happy because of such a thing, such an event, or 
such ritual”) or a permanent nature (“he has a happy, good, optimistic na-
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ture”). This distinction can have historical or religious premises. It may also 
have historical and religious consequences. 
On the other hand, it appears during the textual analysis that the con-
texts are either individual and internal, or collective, external and ritual. 
This observation has implications that are not as simple as they may seem. 
It means that ancient Mesopotamian emotions can be seen either as a psy-
chological impression of an affect or as the expression of a social and reli-
gious norm. The latter applies in particular to terminology for joy and sad-
ness. Gary Anderson, in a book with the evocative title A Time to Cry, a 
Time to Dance (1995), studied this problematic in the Jewish religion: the 
word śimḫa "joy" can be used in the same contexts and occurrences as 
modern European terms, but like the words for "love" and "honour" in the 
Hebrew Bible, śimḫa also appears in legal texts. "Joy" can thus be pre-
scribed on certain occasions, such as sacrificial feasting or the performance 
of psalms. The rites expressing "joy" stand in precise opposition to rites of 
"mourning". 
"Joy" "Mourning" 
Eating and drinking Fasting 
Praise of God Lamentation 
Anointing with oil Putting ashes or dust on one’s head 
Festal garments Sackcloth or torn clothes 
2.1. Need, demand and the positive relationship to others: the emotions of 
"joy", "love" and "compassion" 
Observing the varieties of the data gives us the opportunity to reflect on the 
elements of continuity and rupture inside the expression of need, demand 
and positive relationship with others. "Joy" is the most representative emo-
tion in the general corpus, probably because most of the texts we possess 
have a hymnal character. To express it, the Sumerians had no fewer than 
four verbs and three substantives, corresponding to twice as many Akka-
dian equivalents (verbs and their derivatives, or idiomatic clauses). Such 
richness can be explained by the patchwork of expressions describing "joy" 
in different situations: individual or communal, isolated or relational. The 
Sumerian word ḫul2 and the Akkadian equivalent ḫadû are the terminus 
technicus for "joy" meaning in the most general manner “to be happy, to 
rejoice”. The other words express as many emotions as situations: The Su-
merian composed verb, ul te(.ĝ), for example, refers to a joy linked with 
drunkenness and euphoria: “The gods Enki (and) Ninmaḫ drink beer, their 
heart become elated (ul te(.ĝ)”8. It may also have sexual connotations: “The 
                                                     
8  Enki et Ninmaḫ Sect. II 15: dEn-ki-ke4 dNin-maḫ-e kaš im-na8-na8-ne ša3-bi ul mu-un-te. 
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god Enki became elated (ul te(.ĝ) (at the sight) of the goddess Uttu; lying in 
her crotch, he clasped her to the bosom”9. On the other hand, the composed 
verb ša3 dug3 which, according to its etymology, is a quality (dug3 “good”) 
of the heart (ša3), is used more to show the satisfaction, especially in a ju-
ridical context, for example after a debt has been repaid,10 but also for con-
tentment and well-being in general.  
There are specific collective occasions where the use of words of "joy" 
is common, the most important one being religious and royal festivities. 
The festival day is itself metaphorically called in Akkadian “day of joy” 
(ūm ḫidûtu) or “play, entertainment” (mēlultu). The texts give the principal 
aspects of festive rejoicing: banquets, prayers and praises, familial life, 
sexual relationships, music, etc. These positive aspects appear in the coun-
sels of Siduri, the ale-wife, to Gilgameš who is seeking eternal life after the 
death of his companion Enkidu.11 
Humor is attested principally in late Babylonian literature, but through-
out Sumerian and Akkadian texts we find proverbs, jokes, and word plays, 
whose goal is to make readers laugh. Humor of this sort was originally the 
creation of students, and it belonged to the school curriculum, especially 
when in the form of debates between two partners such as the Hoe and the 
Plough, the Bird and the Fish, or the Grain and the Sheep. 
"Joy" is the sign of a good and healthy relationship with gods. This 
“normal order of things” is expressed in Sumerian by the expression “to 
look on someone with a joyful eye” (igi ḫul2 bar) or “to have a luminous 
forehead” (saĝ-ki zalag). This joy, which has the magical power to heal the 
sick person, always comes from the gods’ side and is often linked to the act 
of determining a good fate: “The god An threw him (= the king) a joyful 
eye (igi ḫul2) (and) determined for him a good fate.”12 
"Love", expressed by the Sumerian ki aĝ2 (= râmu in Akkadian), is one 
of the substantives most used in the literature of all periods. The etymology 
of the Sumerian word ki aĝ2 is controversial: until recently ki was con-
sidered to mean “earth” and aĝ2 to be the verb “to measure”, so that “to 
love” would etymologically mean “to measure a piece of land”! New re-
search, especially on the written form of the word ki, have shown that in 
this case it cannot signify “earth”13. The Akkadian word râmu corresponds 
                                                     
9  Enki et Ninḫursaĝa 179-180: dEn-ki-ke4 dUttu-ra ul im-m[a]-ni-in-t[i] gaba šu im-mi-in-
dab ur2-ra-[n]a nu2-a. 
10  Muffs 1975. 
11  For the well-known discourse of Siduri to Gilgameš, see George 2003: 278-279. Tigay 
(1982: 167ff.) qualifies these recommendations as carpe diem in a chapter on “Tradi-
tional Speech Forms”. For an analysis of this passage, see Abusch 1993a: 1-14; id. 
1993b: 3-17; id. 1993c: 53-62. 
12  Hymn to Ninšubur and her city(?) A-akkil rev. 3: An-ne2 igi ḫul2-la mu-ši-in-bar nam 
dug3 mu-ši-i[n-tar] (cf. Sjöberg 1982: 72 no.4). 
13  ki “earth” has a final -0 (ki+locative = ki-‘a), whereas ki in ki aĝ2 is syllabically written: 
ki-ig, ki-ga and ki-in. 
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to the Arabic word ra’ima.14 "Love" in ancient Mesopotamia is used pri-
marily in religious contexts. To give "love" to humans is a privilege of 
gods. It is the expression of an agreement in a political and juridical con-
tractual relationship between a god and another god of lower standing or a 
human being, for example the king Šulgi: “Šulgi, (the beloved of her 
heart =) the favorite one of the goddess Ninlil.”15 
A change in this conception of the hierarchy can be observed in the royal 
hymns of Šulgi. During the third dynasty of Ur the kings were divinized. 
The name Šulgi was written from around his 10th year of reign onward with 
the determinative diĝir “god”. The kings stood on an equal level with the 
gods and they could both "love" (like a god) and "be loved" (like a king or 
a human being). This different relationship appears also in the use of the 
derivative participle ki aĝ2-(ĝa2) (= narāmu) in epithets for gods and for 
kings.  
The symmetrical opposite word for ki aĝ2 "love" is ḫul gig "to hate". ki 
aĝ2 and ḫul gig often appear in opposition in declarations of value or in 
moral judgement, for example in opposing “justice” and “iniquity”: “The 
god Sîn who loves justice, who hates iniquity”.16 The same occurrence is 
attested with the Akkadian equivalents râmu "to love" and zêru "to hate": 
“Hate evil, love justice!”17 
"Love" appears in affective contexts in the literature between gods, es-
pecially in the Love Songs for the Sacred Marriage ritual.18 In a late cele-
bration, the Akkadian râmu is attested with words for affection, tenderness 
and sexual attractiveness such as dâdu / dâdū “beloved one, dear”, inbu 
“fruit” also “sexual fullness”, kuzbu “seduction, attraction, sensuality”, 
ṣīḫtu “laugh”. The word for "love" in Akkadian seems to have changed 
from a juridical meaning to a more emotional one. 
The Sumerian word arḫuš, like its Akkadian equivalent rêmu (a word 
that has nothing to do with râmu "to love"), is used to refer to an emotion 
close to what in English might be termed our "compassion". In Sumerian 
and in Akkadian the word also means “womb”. The semantic relationship 
between "compassion" and “womb”, even if it is found elsewhere in the 
ancient Near East, is not self-evident.19 It is true that in modern culture the 
                                                     
14  See Barth 1909: 3f. and Wehr 51985: 441. 
15  Šulgi D 13: Šul-gi dNin-lil2-la2 ki aĝ2 ša3-ga-na.  
16  Lugalbanda and Ḫurrum 215-216: dSîn-e niĝ2-si-sa2-e ki aĝ2 niĝ2-erim2-e ḫul gig. 
17  BE 1/1 no. 83 rev. 24: lemutta zērma kitta rām. 
18  The Sumerian Sacred Marriage ritual is partially known from its description in the hymn 
of Iddin-Dagan and Inanna, see Römer 1965: 128-208. During the Isin dynasty and 
probably before, the probably very ancient ritual included sexual intercourse between 
the king and a priestess representing the goddess Inanna. In the 1st millennium, the mar-
riage was celebrated between the gods represented by their cult statues and no longer by 
human actors. The best known example is the marriage between the gods Marduk and 
Ṣarpānītu in Babylon, see Lapinskivi 2004 with numerous references. 
19  See Stoebe 1976: 761-768. 
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“womb” is a metaphor for maternal protection, love, and pity, but the lin-
guistic derivation from a substantive referring to a concretely defined unit 
(“a substance of constant quality”)20 to a verb describing an emotion is an 
aspect that should be clarified.  
"Compassion" is often used in divine epithets, mostly in apposition with 
the name of a goddess rather than of a god. It also appears in parallel con-
struction with words for “prayer”: “Mother of the land, who has compas-
sion, who loves veneration, who listens to prayer”.21 It is thus the gods who 
one asks for "compassion", which is often linked with appeasing divine 
anger and the topic of the “return” of the god “to his (previous) place” (ki-
bi-šè gi4), which means to his normal, positive mood toward humans. The 
compassion of the gods, once granted, is indicated by words and gestures of 
help and renewed recognition. The movement in the emotion is always 
from above to below, that is, a god always gives compassion to someone of 
an inferior standing. As a divine quality or divine favour, "compassion" can 
only be the expression of an elite. 
2.2. Principle of justice, domination, and the emotions of "anger" and 
"hate" 
"Anger" is well attested in the Mesopotamian corpus. In the Old Assyrian 
letters, the large number of expressions of anger, irritation or reproach is 
striking. The expression of such emotion is mostly judged negatively: “Alt-
hough we never made you angry, as for you – we have become non-
gentlemen in your eyes”.22 Some essential features of "gentlemanly behav-
iour" imply living up to norms of a social code that include self-control and 
politeness.23 It is very important not to cause anger, worry, or distress to 
friends or relatives. 
Not to anger the gods is a topic of mythological and religious texts. The 
god’s anger is communicated through divine omens or signs that are more 
than a warning, the germ of unhappiness already infecting the person and 
their environment with negative energy. The gods demonstrate their anger 
through a specific attitude: he “turns his face away” (igi niĝin = pānī 
suḫḫuru) and looks with an “evil eye” (igi ḫul = īnu lemuttu) also called 
                                                     
20  See Mounin 1974, 325. 
21  Sîn-iddinam to Nininsina 9: ama kalam-ma arḫuš šud3-de3 ki aĝ2 a-r[a-zu-e ĝiš tu]ku (cf. 
Hallo 1976: 209-224). 
22  TC 3, 1:23-27: matīma libbaka ula nulammin attā ana lā awīlī ina ēnīka šaknāni. 
23  The topic of self-control is found especially in letters: “Be a man! Do not let yourself 
loose to drink!” This controlled behaviour is also expected from princes: “It is with the 
servants that you began spending more than what you had and wasting! Come on, don’t 
be a baby! They only come to see you for..., for leading you astray, for the ale-house and 
the music-hall!” (ARM 1, 28 = Durand 1997, 16 no.2:11-13 and 15-19). For a study of 
the critique made by soldiers of city life as too soft and effeminate, see Lion 2003: 17f. 
194 MARGARET JAQUES 
“eye of death” (igi uš2). The evil eye can kill humans, and even gods when 
sent by a rival god. This is well illustrated by a passage in the myth of De-
scent of Inanna to the Netherworld, where Inanna, angered by the behavior 
of her lover Dumuzi, who has been indifferent to the news of her death, 
decides to hand him over to bad demons: “She (= Inanna) looked at him 
(= Dumuzi), it was the look of death (igi uš2). She spoke to him; it was the 
speech of anger. She shouted to him, it was the shout of heavy guilt: ‘How 
much longer? Take him away!’ Holy Inanna gave Dumuzi the shepherd 
into their hands (= of the demons)”.24 
The person who perceives this anger has the possibility to divert its neg-
ative effects by making a namburbi ritual (literally “its dissolving [proce-
dure]”). If the negative effects are already present, it can remove the effects 
by means of penitential prayers and rituals like the eršaḫuĝa (“lament to 
soothe the heart (of the god)”) or the diĝiršadaba (“incantation to change 
the angry heart of the god”). The end of the divine anger is signified by the 
“return of the god to his previous place” (ki-bi-še3 gi4) and by his “looking 
with a joyful eye” (igi ḫul2 bar). 
"Anger" can be justifiable when it is directed against enemies who en-
danger not only the nation but the whole cultural achievement. It represents 
morality and legitimate domination.  
The technical term for "hate" is ḫul gig. This word appears in our corpus 
in strict opposition to ki aĝ2, "to love", as a literary means to reinforce their 
opposition: “A loving heart is something that maintains the household, a 
hating heart is something that destroys the household”.25 
The Sumerian language uses two more verbs for hostility: gu2 du3 and 
gu2 bar. These verbs, composed with gu2, “back of the neck”, belong to 
physiognomic language; they are a description of a hostile attitude perhaps 
borrowed from the animal world (bristled fur). This hostility is mostly at-
tributed to the enemy.26 It is found in concrete, warlike contexts in royal 
                                                     
24  Inanna’s Descent to the Netherworld 354-358: igi mu-un-ši-in-bar igi uš2-a-ka, inim i-
ne-ne inim lipiš gig-ga, gu3 i-ne-de2 gu3 nam-tag-tag-ga, en3-še3 tum3-mu-an-ze2-en, ku3 
dInanna-ke4 su8-ba dDumu-zi-da šu-ne-ne-a in-na-šum2. 
25  SP Coll. 11.147-148 = InstrŠur. 207-208: 
 Abū Salabīkh version: ša3 ki aĝ2 niĝ2 e2 du3-du3 ša3 ḫu!(RI) gig niĝ2 e2 gul-gul  
 Old-Babylonian version: ša3 ki aĝ2 niĝ2 e2 du3-du3-u3-dam ša3 ḫul gig niĝ2 e2 gul-gul-
lu-dam (cf. Alster, vol. 1, 1997: 196). 
26  Enemies are described as barbarians who were deprived of any social code of behaviour, 
like in the Curse of Agade 155-156:  
 Gu-ti-umki uĝ3 keš2-da nu-zu, dim2-ma lu2-ulu3 ĝalga ur-e uktin / ugu2ugu4-bi 
 “The Gutians, an unbridled people, (are) of human appearance, (but) with canine rules 
and monkey’s features”. 
 As Pongratz-Leisten (2001: 195) points out “the thought-process standing behind con-
structing the image of the Other is to be characterized as a systematic thought-process of 
inversion”. She explains that the processes of de-humanization and demonization of the 
enemy enable members of a cultural group to “trivializ[e] killing inhibitions” (ibid., 208, 
227). 
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inscriptions of the Old Babylonian period: “The ones who were hostile 
against you, we shall strike them” (Akk. “We shall strike your enemies”).27 
Like "anger", ḫul gig is an ambivalent emotion in Sumerian discourse: 
when opposed to ki aĝ2 it is clearly negative, but when employed alone it is 
close to a justified anger, a legitimate hatred of a negative object (or focus) 
(it can be interpreted as “X judges Y hateful”). This is not the case for gu2 
du3 and gu2 bar, which are never employed in a moral judgement.  
The three Sumerian verbs (ḫul gig, gu2 du3, and gu2 bar) are translated 
by a single verb (zêru) in Akkadian. This difference between the concep-
tion of "hate" in Sumerian and Akkadian discourse on emotion reflects a 
cultural disagreement. zêru can describe a negative attitude and a legitimate 
negative moral judgement. In the latter sense it can appear in legal texts 
where for Meir Malul (1988: 113) it represents an act of rejection that leads 
to the dissolving of a contractual relationship.  
The Sumerian word for "jealousy" (ninim) is astonishingly rare in the 
literature.28 How can we understand that such a common emotion in mod-
ern culture as “jealousy” is attested only three times in Sumerian literature? 
One explanation should perhaps be sought in the cuneiform sign that we 
read ninim, which is a combination of the signs ŠA3 “heart” and IZI “fire” 
𒊲. This visual combination of “heart” + “fire” is reminiscent of another 
sign combination, KA “mouth” and IZI “fire” 𒅺, which writes the word 
for "anger", urgu2. In both cases, the emotion appears as a fire, burning 
respectively the heart or the mouth. The sign is thus like an illustration of 
the emotion. The cuneiform signs and many other pieces of evidence, such 
as lexical entries, tend to show a semantic relationship between "jealousy" 
and words for "anger". Thus, the distinction between "jealousy" and "an-
ger" does not correspond to today’s criteria: in fact these two notions be-
long to the same Sumerian category, that of "anger". 
2.3. Reaction facing danger and loss: the emotions of "sadness", "trouble", 
and "fear" 
The Sumerian and Akkadian languages are noteworthy for their lack of a 
specific word for "sadness". All that we find in their vocabularies are words 
describing manifestations of sadness, such as er2 “tears”, er2 šeš2/še8-še8 “to 
cry, to sob” (literally “to anoint with water-eye” as a description of the very 
act of shedding tears), a-nir “desolation”, i-si-iš “tears, lamentation, com-
plaint” and metaphorical expressions mixing expression of sadness and 
                                                     
27  Samsuiluna 7:19''-20'' (Akk. 73): lu2 gu2 mu-e-da-ab-du3-uš-a saĝ ĝiš ba-ab-ra-ra-an-de3-
en = zā‛irīka ninâr (cf. Frayne 1990: 386). 
28  See Civil 1990: 44-45. 
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words referring to rituals of lamentation (er2(-)a-ni-ra = ina bikīti u tānīḫi 
“in the tears and the desolation” is an expression referring to the lamenta-
tions in general, and er2 alone corresponds in Akkadian to taqribtum “com-
plaint of supplication” (“Bittklage”) and to pišertu  “rite of delivery” (from 
pašārum). balaĝ-a-nir-ra “the harps of desolation” and gi-er2-ra “the reed of 
tears” are musical instruments used in rituals of lamentation. What does the 
absence of a generic word for "sadness" mean? It would be ethnocentric to 
assert that ancient Mesopotamians really experienced a basic emotion "sad-
ness" but that they used different words to express it on different occasions, 
suggesting that they did not or could not generalize by giving it a single 
label the way English speakers do. All that the texts contain are facial and 
bodily expressions of sadness. Whatever might constitute an “emotional 
universal” would need to be identified in cultural terms valid for the Meso-
potamian context, not in terms of the English lexicon of emotion.29 
A first observation of the contexts where an expression of "sadness" ap-
pears can perhaps explain the absence of a category. In letters, it is not right 
to burden one’s correspondent with litanies of personal problems: “Your 
transgressions are many, and therefore worry for you is eating me up!”30 By 
contrast, litanies describing distress are characteristic of penitential prayers 
to gods. It was mostly seen as better to use an elliptical phrasing like the 
Old Assyrian standard phrase: lā libbi ilimma, “against the will of the god”, 
or more vaguely “unfortunately, sadly”. 
The semantic field covered by one word can be different from one cul-
ture to another: ša3 kuš2-u3 is a good example of a practically untranslatable 
emotion concept, rendered by Akkadian writers with malāku “to counsel” 
but clearly not equivalent to Akkadian word, still less to any English word. 
ša3 kuš2-u3 means literally “to put a strain on the heart”; it appears in con-
text of love; it is also the emotion of someone listening to music or writing 
a tablet. These usages suggest that the Sumerian word describes a kind of 
thrill, a vibration more than a “counsel”. This difference in usage of emo-
tion words is connected in some way with cultural attitudes and cultural 
identity.  
Two more words, niĝ2-me-ĝar and mud5-me-ĝar, rendered in Akkadian 
by "silence (of death)" (qūlu later also kūru), are negatively perceived. 
They never mean "quietness", which is sought by the gods in the myths of 
Atram-ḫasis or Gilgameš, but are associated with death, unhappiness, and 
prostration. Demons appear to be identified with this type of silence or can 
be the cause of it. But like many other Sumerian words, the context of this 
                                                     
29  Harkins and Wierzbicka (2001: 8) emphasize that “We cannot treat English emotion 
words such as anger as neutral, self-explanatory, and culture-independent terms by 
means of which human emotional experience in all cultures can be validly and meaning-
fully described”. 
30  Lewy, KTS 15:7-8: šillātuka mādāma u pirdātuka ētaklāni. 
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type of silence is ambivalent31 since it seems also to evoke "joy", or at least 
sometimes a positive emotion or quality: “Inanna, who like a bull gores the 
disobedient, joy(?) of the land”.32 
Many Sumerian and Akkadian emotion words are ambiguous and re-
mote from our modern conceptions. To work on understanding emotion 
words involves studying the communication in its social context, a position 
between the individual and the social world (“a culturally constituted 
self”33). Emotion concepts emerge as a kind of language of the self, a code 
about intentions, actions, and social relations. They need interpretation and 
“translation” to be communicated to others in different cultures and histori-
cal periods. 
3. Emotion as Grand Type34 
Another direction in the study of emotions is the search for points of con-
tact between these disparate elements: How can we find connections be-
tween such different concepts as "love", "hate", "trouble", "despair", "joy", 
etc., in the absence of any generic category given by the Mesopotamian 
themselves? 
We have to make a transfer from the observation of semantic data to the 
complex network of grammatical, syntactic, and stylistic constructions, that 
is, the “meta-level of the evaluation of the written construction of social 
reality”.35 The terms for emotion are submitted to the multiple word choice 
of pressure and inertia, to the dialectic proper to languages, constantly 
shaped by the tradition of communication. The second step here is induc-
tive and comparative. It is the comparison of diverse grammatical elements 
and syntactical forms that allows us not only to measure variations but also 
to catch a glimpse of the invariants of the whole. We can then make a rela-
tively autonomous abstract framework of this set, other than semantic, and 
                                                     
31  Ambivalence in emotion is not incoherence, as each culture employs a set of words or 
expressions for ambivalent emotions that cannot be rendered by a single term in another 
language.  
32  Išme-Dagan AB:6: nu-še-ga am-gin7 si-mul di mud5-me-ĝar kalam-ma. 
33  Cf. Lutz/White 1986: 417. 
34  Nissenbaum (1985: iii) subdivides the word “emotion” in “types” and “instances”: 
1) “emotion” is a grand type when it is used without plural form like the word “color”; 
2) anger and joy are emotion’s types. They are subtypes of the grand type and have a 
plural form; 3) individual having emotions at locations are instances. It is the concrete 
situation of a subject having an emotion.  
35  Cf. Pongratz-Leisten 2001: 216. Harkins and Wierzbicka (2001: 17) argue that “it is not 
only the lexicon that provides clues to the emotional universe of culture. Grammar does 
it too”. For example, they indicate that active verbs like rejoice have disappeared from 
modern English usage, giving way to passive adjectives like happy or pleased. 
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it is on this framework that we can define new categories, morpho-syntactic 
ones this time, and functions. 
In considering the problem on the basis of a new but still general 
framework, we have to introduce a reservation with regard to theories 
based on the constructions established with only one or two verbs of emo-
tion, not because they are wrong, but because we have to consider them 
with the help of a larger number of examples. The Sumerian verbs form a 
separate field because of the prefix chain that summarizes the grammatical 
structure of the sentence. The prefix chain is extremely complex but very 
interesting, particularly among agglutinating languages like Sumerian.36 
Scholars have long proposed that most Sumerian verbs of emotion had a 
comitative ({da}) construction, the comitative indicating that the verb has a 
relationship with its object.37 
Ean. 1 v 1-538 
e2-an-na-tum2, a ša3-ga šu du11-ga, dnin-ĝir2-su-ka-da, dnin-ĝir2-su, mu-da-
ḫul2 
“Ninĝirsu rejoiced over Eannatum, the seed placed in the lap of Ninĝirsu”. 
It is obvious that this assertion has to be differently qualified when applied 
on a larger scale. Verbs as common as "to love" and "to hate" for example, 
are conjugated with dative or directive infixes and/or a suffix following 
their object.39 Most of the verbs expressing "fear", except perhaps ḫu-luḫ 
“to start, to be suddenly afraid”, have a terminative ({ši}) rection express-
ing a direction toward its object. This could indicate that it does not belong 
to the strict category of emotion words. 
Some verbs with the comitative rection, however, appear also in the ab-
solutive state (unmarked construction) that gives them a factitive sense. 
More explicitly, in a comitative construction ḫul2, for example, means 
“I rejoice about someone” (mu-un-da-ḫul2-en [intransitive construction]), 
but in the absolutive unmarked state, it has the sense “I make someone 
happy” (mu-un-ḫúl-en [transitive construction]). In such sentences, the 
emotion is expressed by a transitive verb, followed by a grammatical direct 
                                                     
36  For a recent Sumerian grammar in English, see Jagersma 2011. 
37  Not all emotions have objects, for example the substantive arḫuš (= rēmu) "compassion, 
pity" is used to describe a positive quality of goddesses more than an emotion. Nissen-
baum (1985: 84) argues that “predicates involving intransitive verbs often constitute 
cases of non-relational predicates. (...) They assert states of their subject (...)”. 
38  Cf. Steible 1982, vol. 1: 123. 
39  These Sumerian verbs distinguish in their conjugation between a personal and a non-
personal object. When the object of "to love", for example, is a human, the construction 
is dative ({ra}), while when the object is the city or an ex-voto, the construction is di-
rective ({e}). This type of conjugation is characteristic of Sumerian composed verbs, cf. 
Attinger 1993: 233, 239.  
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object. These are similar to sentences with transitive verbs that describe 
actions.40 
What follows from these descriptions is that the construction of verbs 
with the comitative ({da}) seems to describe an internal emotion (“to feel 
oneself about X”) whereas the construction with dative/directive and with 
terminative would characterize an action toward an object (“to (re)act emo-
tionally toward X”). The grammar of Sumerian verbs of emotion shows at 
least two categories of constructions that could be called both internal and 
active.  
The construction of Akkadian verbs of emotion is simpler: it reflects in 
part the construction of the corresponding Sumerian verbs (ḫadû "to re-
joice" is intransitive in the basic stem, but is transitive in the D stem, a stem 
that express factitive function: muḫaddi libbi dIštar “the one who rejoices 
the heart of Ištar”). Verbs like râmu "to love" and zêru "to hate" are transi-
tive in the basic stem (ummašu irammušu attī jâti ul taramminni “his moth-
er loves him, but you do not love me”) and other stems from these two 
verbs are very rarely attested. These verbs are, as Kouwenberg (2010: 56f.) 
calls them, “fientive verbs with a stative meaning”. 
3.1. Syntactic rules of valency 
It is on the morpho-syntactic level that we explore the relationships be-
tween the constituents of the sentence in the discourse on emotion with 
particular attention turned to the variations. As Lemaréchal41 says, “syntax 
and semantics are linked because syntax imposes categorizations on reality. 
The syntax contributes to the communicating significance”.42 It is the nature 
of the constituents that largely determines the structure of a proposition. 
This structure implies a subject or an agent and, in this case, a reference to 
an object. As a judgement made about reality, the emotion leads to action 
or inertia, but the cause of the action or inertia can be either the subject or 
the object of emotion.43 
                                                     
40  Kenny (1963, 2nd ed. 2003: 138ff.) distinguish between “intensional” and “noninten-
sional” verbs, “the aim being a distinction that will include all psychological verbs under 
the heading “intensional” and all other under the heading “nonintensional”. Nissenbaum 
(1985: 24) disagrees with Kenny who “wants to avoid having to treat emotion verbs like 
action verbs and, likewise, their objects. 
41  See Lemaréchal 1989: 14. 
42  Also Sahlins 1981: 6f.: Circumstances “have no existence or effect in culture except as 
they are interpreted. And interpretation is, after all, classification within a given cate-
gory.” 
43  Nissenbaum (1985: i) describes and discusses three main theories about “emotion’s 
object directedness”: 1) An object-directed emotion is related to a real concrete item; 2) 
An object arises out of the emotional (or intentional) state alone; 3) An object contains 
the cause or the explanation of the emotion.  
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The analysis proceeds along two fully developed lines. One line treats 
the relationships between the subjects and the objects in sentences with a 
verb of emotion, for example: nārū muḫaddû libbi ilāni “The musicians 
who make the hearts of the gods rejoice”.44 The other line deals with the 
nature of verbs in a proposition containing one or many words of emotion, 
for example: lugal-bi dNin-ĝir2-su ḫul2-la tum2-mu-da “To bring joy to their 
lord Ningirsu”.45 The role of the object of an emotion in a sentence touches 
on the linguistic problem of valency and actancy.46 As Nissenbaum explains 
in her book on “focus”,47 the role of the object is mostly causal: “A simple 
theory based on this form of the condition is one that requires the object of 
the emotion to be the cause of the subject’s having the emotion” (1985: 6). 
3.2. Stylistic aspects 
One of the principal characteristics of the vocabulary of emotion in Sume-
rian is the presence of the word ša3 “heart”. The Mesopotamian conception 
of the world and the person is broadly binary, in that there is an inside (ša3 
= libbu)48 and an outside (bar = kabattu “liver”).49 The heart, in the concep-
tion of the self, is the seat of emotion and the centre of thought. The mor-
phological relationship of ša3 to the noun or the verb varies. It can be, for 
example, an “endocentric extension”, to use the terminology of Martinet.50 
An endocentric extension does not add information about the intrinsic fea-
tures of the subject’s state but imparts an emphatic sense to the noun or 
                                                     
44  YOS 1, 45 ii 29. 
45  Gudea Cyl. B ix 20. 
46  Lazard 1994. 
47  See Nissenbaum 1985; also Bamberg (1997: 309): “someone does something that causes 
someone else to become angry”. 
48  Beside ša3 “heart”, Sumerian also uses ni2(-te) and me(-te) to speak about oneself as in a 
mirror. Other words that complete this picture are ur5, which refers to lungs (often em-
ployed in parallel with ša3), and lipiš, another word meaning more or less “heart”. The 
Akkadian vocabulary is less rich in this respect than the Sumerian: it uses ramānu to de-
scribe oneself; libbu “heart” is mostly employed in expressions of emotion. 
49  The Akkadian kabattu “liver” is not a translation of Sumerian bar “outside, periphery”. 
The Sumerian opposition ša3 / bar corresponds to the Akkadian libbu / kabattu; and it is 
logically artificial, indeed wrong, to make the equation ša3 = libbu and bar = kabattu. 
50  By endocentric extension, I understand everything that adds something to a concept 
without changing its syntactic function. For example, the adjective “big” in the sentence 
“He is a man with a big heart” is an endocentric extension because it only modifies the 
word “heart” (one can say “He is a man with heart”). In the same sentence, one cannot 
replace “big heart” with “sick” (to say “He is a man with a sick heart” has no sense). 
“Sick” in this case is an exocentric extension in relationship with “heart”, because it re-
quires a transformation of the sentence’s structure (“This man has a sick heart”), see 
Martinet 1960: 131f. 
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verb.51 For example, ša3 gig lipiš gig (corresponding to Akkadian libbu with 
marāṣu “to be ill, sick”), which expresses sadness and trouble, ša3 ḫul (lib-
bu with lemēnu “to be bad”), ša3 dab(5)-ba, ša3 ib2-ba, ša3 mer-ra for anger, 
irritation and an expression only attested in Akkadian: libbu with parādum 
“to tremble, to be afraid”. Among positive emotions, ša3 ḫul2 (libbu with ḫadû) “to enjoy”, ša3 ḫuĝ (with nâḫu “to calm, to soothe”), etc. The Akka-
dian idiom combining libbu with nasāḫu “to tear out” is an expression of 
despair. In Old Assyrian letters, the common idiom lā libbi ilimma means 
litterally “against (the heart =) the will of the god” or more vaguely “sadly, 
unfortunately”. 
Other stylistic particularities are typical of certain periods, like the di-
verse formulas that are found almost exclusively in a corpus of inscriptions 
of the Old Babylonian king Warad-Sîn of Larsa. These repetitive expres-
sions make it possible to analyze similarities and variations in the grammat-
ical construction of the sentence: 
Warad-Sîn 3:35-36 
niĝ2-AK-ba-še3 dNergal diĝir-ra-na ḫe2-en-ši-ḫul2 
“May Nergal his god rejoice for what has been done!” 
Warad-Sîn 10:40-42 
niĝ2-AK-ba-še3 dNanna lugal-ĝu10 ḫe2-ma-ḫul2-e 
“May Nanna my king rejoice over me for what has been done!” 
Warad-Sîn 11:14-15 (transitive marû): 
niĝ2-AK-ĝu10-še3 ḫe2-mu-ḫul2-e 
“(Inanna) rejoices indeed over me for what I have done”.52 
Also typical of certain texts is the repetition of terms in parallel sentences 
characteristic of liturgies:  
Eršaḫunĝa to Anu 14-1653 
ša3 mer-a-zu  ki-bi-še3 de3-ra-ab-gi4-gi4 
ša3 ib2-ba-zu   ki-bi-še3 de3-ra-ab-gi4-gi4 
ša3 ib2 si-ga-a-zu  ki-bi-še3 de3-ra-ab-gi4-gi4 
                                                     
51  There are many ways to express emphasis in the Mesopotamian languages: for example 
the use of the reflexive pronoun ni2-te = ramānu to emphasize the subject of the sen-
tence, or the independent personal pronouns in Akkadian or modal clauses with the pre-
fix ši- in Sumerian used to express an emphatic assertion; cf. Jagersma 2010: 578f.  
52  Frayne 1990: 207, 216, 218. Warad-Sîn developed a very personal style with new for-
mulas in his inscriptions. The three fixed expressions found almost only there show 
grammatical variations from the standard construction of ḫul2 with the comitative: In 
Warad-Sîn 3, the conjugation of ḫul2 is intransitive with a terminative infix {ši}; in 
Warad-Sîn 10, ḫul2 is intransitive and contains the infix dative 1st. Pers. Sg. {ma}; in 
Warad-Sîn 11, the conjugation is transitive and mu-ē = me is an absolutive construc-
tion. 
53  Cf. Maul 1988: 75.  
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“May your angry heart turn back to its (former) place!  
May your furious heart turn back to its (former) place!  
May the fury of your darkened heart turn back to its (former) place!” 
It is also typical that in letters from angry senders sentences such as “you 
are my father, you are my lord” are repeated several times. Letters also 
contain oaths sworn by the gods and rhetorical questions.54 
Such constructions are well known in Arabic and in Akkadian but are 
much more difficult to find in Sumerian. Style in Sumerian texts, already 
tackled by Attinger in his grammar (1993: 315-318), would merit further 
development. 
Emotion words reflect, and pass on cultural models, and these models, 
in turn, reflect and pass on values, that is, preoccupations and frames of 
reference for the society (or speech community) within which they have 
evolved. In studies of the vocabulary of values (good/bad), and of words 
describing oneself (ni2(-te)/me(-te) = ramānu), metaphors and stylistic con-
structions are secondary to the analysis of the discourse on emotion, but 
they do raise significant interesting issues. The lexicon of words for values, 
of description of oneself and metaphors, is quite similar on the whole to the 
process observed for the words of emotion. Information gathered with a 
view to these perspectives may serve as an element of comparison with the 
lexicon of emotion words. They give researchers who are focused on “pure-
ly emotional vocabulary” access to a vocabulary that does not fit in the 
same frame but touches it closely. 
4. Conclusion 
The designation “discourse on emotion” derives from critical and theo-
retical analysis of material mainly present in Sumerian, Akkadian, and bi-
lingual literature. The texts show that a vocabulary of emotion existed in 
the languages of Mesopotamia. What are the implications of this conclu-
sion? Starting from elementary questions concerning translation that can be 
misleading as well as instructive, I have tried to understand which ideas the 
languages of Mesopotamia conveyed with a specific terminology. The path 
to discover this cultural phenomenon is difficult as one has to be careful not 
to oversimplify the picture of a cultural environment that did not corre-
spond to a modern one. The dangers that one can hardly avoid are, follow-
ing Lutz (1988: 218), of three sorts: we interpret emotion as identical to 
                                                     
54   Such analyses exist in other fields. Müller (1993) studies the phraseology and stylistic 
techniques in classical Arabic, attempting to formulate in abstract terms the repetitive 
expressions containing either a verb of emotion or all kinds of verbs – these latter being 
summarized under the heading “to do”; compare also the review of Ullmann 1995: 214-
216. 
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ours, we see them as radically opposed to ours, or we understand them as 
less numerous and less intense compared to modern emotional normality. 
The intensity of an expression of emotion can vary depending on social 
codes, as has been shown for example by Briggs (1970) and others. Emo-
tions are judgements that require social validation or negotiation to be rea- 
lized, thereby linking emotion with social structure.55 They are closely 
linked to the culture in which they are expressed, but they are not a homo-
geneous class. They can also change in the history of one cultural group, as 
Harkins and Wierzbicka have illustrated in the shift in the Shakespearian 
"wrath" to the modern "anger" which reflects the democratization of a soci-
ety and the overturning of the feudal order. Because emotions are embed-
ded in socially constructed categories, the “truth” of emotions (as of all 
subjective entities) is problematic.56 
Emotional experience is almost endlessly mediated through language. It 
is not possible to give a complete meaning list of the emotion words of the 
Mesopotamians as we are constrained by the available texts. We can only 
try to understand how and with which terms they expressed emotions, 
showing in which contexts and with which syntactic constructions they em-
ployed them. We must accept the assumption that the structure of sentences 
describing emotions reflects the structure of the world and, in particular, 
“emotion’s object-directedness”. Rather than “re-constructing” emotions, 
the historian must “de-construct” all the expressions incorporated into the 
very particular matrix of emotions in written texts and make a chart of all 
words found in the sources. Such an approach has the advantage of consid-
ering not the person who feels, but rather the discourse on emotion itself. 
To approach this discourse as an object of study is to address a cultural 
feature, and it allows a certain distance with respect to that object.  
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Emotionen in Text, Sprache und materialen Bildern 
Eine Skizze aus Sicht der Metaphernanalyse 
Andreas WAGNER 
1. Metaphernanalyse 
Wer sich auf das Stichwort Metaphernanalyse einlässt, muss zunächst klä-
ren, von welchem Theoriehintergrund und von welcher Position aus von 
Metaphern gesprochen wird. Für den vorliegenden Beitrag gehe ich von 
dem inzwischen fast schon klassisch gewordenen Metapherngrundkonzept 
von Lakoff / Johnson1 aus, das sich im Horizont der Kognitiven Forschung 
bewegt und in diesem Rahmen vielfach bearbeitet und variiert worden ist. 
Entscheidend sind dabei folgende Grundüberlegungen, die ich im Wortlaut 
von Lakoff / Johnson selbst anführen möchte:  
„Damit man sich vorstellen kann, was es für ein Konzept heißt, metapho-
risch zu sein und darüber hinaus eine Alltagshandlung zu strukturieren, be-
ginnen wir mit dem Konzept ARGUMENTIEREN und der konzeptuellen Me-
tapher ARGUMENTIEREN IST KRIEG. Diese Metapher schlägt sich in unserer 
Alltagssprache in einer Fülle von Ausdrücken nieder. 
ARGUMENTIEREN IST KRIEG: Ihre Behauptungen sind unhaltbar. / Er 
griff jeden Schwachpunkt in meiner Argumentation an. / Seine Kritik traf 
ins Schwarze. / Ich schmetterte sein Argument ab. / Ich habe noch nie eine 
Auseinandersetzung mit ihm gewonnen. / Sie sind anderer Meinung? Nun, 
schießen Sie los! / Wenn du nach dieser Strategie vorgehst, wird er dich ver-
nichten. / Er machte alle meine Argumente nieder. 
[…] Auch wenn es sich nicht um einen physischen Kampf handelt, so ist 
es doch ein verbaler Kampf; und die Argumentationsstruktur spiegelt dieses 
Kampfgeschehen – Angriff, Verteidigung, Gegenangriff usw. – wider. In 
diesem Sinne ist die konzeptuelle Metapher ARGUMENTIEREN IST KRIEG eine 
Metapher, nach der wir in unserer Kultur leben; sie strukturiert die Hand-
lungen, die wir beim Argumentieren ausführen.  
Stellen wir uns einmal eine Kultur vor, in der man den Argumentations-
vorgang nicht in kriegerischen Termini sieht, bei dem niemand gewinnt 
oder verliert, bei dem niemand an Attacke oder Verteidigung denkt, bei 
dem man weder an Boden gewinnt noch verliert. Stellen wir uns einmal 
eine Kultur vor, in der man den Argumentationsvorgang als Tanz betrach-
tet, bei dem Argumentierende als Künstler auftreten und das Ziel haben, 
sich harmonisch und ästhetisch zu präsentieren. […] Diesen Unterschied der 
                                                     
1  Lakoff / Johnson 62008. 
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Kulturen könnten wir vielleicht am neutralsten beschreiben, wenn wir sa-
gen, dass unsere Form des Diskurses in Kampfbegriffen strukturiert ist und 
ihre Diskursform in Begriffen des Tanzes.“2 
Eine konzeptuelle Metapher ist also ein Gebilde „nach der wir in unserer 
Kultur leben […], sie strukturiert die Handlungen, die wir […] ausführen“ 
(aus dem Zitat oben) und sie strukturiert das „Wissen“, die Auffassungen 
über Dinge, den gesamten epistemischen Bereich der betreffenden Kultur.  
Als Metaphern sind dabei, wenn es um sprachliche Metaphern geht, alle 
möglichen bildlichen und bildhaften Aussagen, Ausdrücke, Figuren, Wen-
dungen, Sätze, Satzteile, Metaphern, Metonymien u.v.a.m. heranzuziehen, 
die selbst keinerlei poetischen Anspruch haben müssen (siehe das Beispiel 
oben für ARGUMENTIEREN IST KRIEG) und bei denen man immer sehr 
offene Definitionen nehmen kann (so kommt es bei den Metaphern im en-
geren Sinne etwa nicht darauf an, ob sie eine Vergleichspartikel haben oder 
nicht). Diese Metaphern können in bestimmten Sprach- bzw. Textcorpora 
aufgesucht werden und als Grundlage von Metaphernanalysen dienen. 
Indem die konzeptuellen Metaphern darauf abheben, den epistemischen 
Schatz einer Sprachgemeinschaft / Kultur zu heben, dienen sie als Er-
kenntnismittel auch für das Arbeiten im historischen Bereich. Nicht zu-
letzt können mit diesem Zugriff „Mentalitäten“, „vielenteils unbewußte 
[…] Prägungen, denen Menschen unterliegen“3, erforscht werden im Sin-
ne der Historischen Anthropologie.4 Mentalitäten werden üblicherweise 
definiert als „kategoriale Formen des Denkens, die als eine Art ›histori-
scher Apriori‹ dem Denken selbst entzogen sind“, „Mentalitäten um-
schreiben kognitive, ethische und affektive Dispositionen“.5 Mentalitäten 
selbst sind nur historisch zu verstehen: „Mentalitäten wandeln sich histo-
risch, sie sind kulturell unterschiedlich. Mentalitäten sind keine Kon-
stanten, sind nicht Singular, sondern Plural.“6 Da Mentalitäten als „kate-
gorialen Formen des Denkens“, als eine Art „historische Apriori dem 
Denken selbst entzogen sind“ (Raulff, vgl. Anm. 5), sprechen sie sich 
nicht explizit aus und können daher als explizite Rede nicht aufgesucht 
werden. Mentalitäten sind „etwas, auf das Menschen keinen direkten Zu-
griff haben; sie [sind] ein weitgehend unbewußt wirkender anthropolo-
                                                     
2  Lakoff / Johnson 62008: 12-13. 
3 Wagner 22011: 59. 
4  Vgl. Tanner 22008; Wulf 2004; Winterling 2006; Conermann / von Hees, 2007; Wulf 
2012; Habermas 2012: 153-271. 
5 Raulff 1987: 9-10. Die Rede vom Denken ist schillernd; hier ist das überindividuelle 
Denken gemeint, das über individuelle und idiographisch zu interpretierende Lebens-
zeugnisse hinausgeht, das prägend für eine Sprach- oder sogar Sprachengemeinschaft 
ist. 
6 Dressel 1996: 263.  
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gischer Zustand“, wie Gernot Böhme es genannt hat.7 Trotzdem sind ge-
rade sie für die Erkundung des historischen Selbstverständnisses des 
Menschen, zu dem auch seine Gefühlswelt gehört, von grundlegender 
Wichtigkeit.8 
2. Metaphernanalyse als methodischer Zugang zur  
Erforschung von Emotionen 
Genau an dieser Stelle hat nun ein9 Zugang in der neueren historischen 
Emotionenforschung angesetzt und konzeptuelle Metaphern herausge-
arbeitet, die Aufschluss über das kulturspezifische Verständnis von Emoti-
onen10 geben: Solche Metaphernkonzepte führen zu beschreibbaren Menta-
litäten, die auch im Bereich von Emotionen, Emotionalität und dem Ver-
hältnis von Körper und Emotion prägend sind. 
Kövecses, Rolf u.a. haben das am Beispiel von neueren Sprachen erar-
beitet.11 Hier kann ich nur einige der Ergebnisse andeuten, um das Prinzip 
dieser Forschungen deutlich zu machen. In neueren Sprachen finden sich 
zum Ausdruck von Emotionen in großer Häufigkeit Metaphern, Bildaus-
drücke etc., die zur konzeptuellen Metapher des BEHÄLTERS/CONTAI-
NERS bei Emotionen im sprachlichen Bereich führen. Es gibt dabei vielfäl-
tig variierende und häufig vorkommende Formulierungen mit den Aus-
drücken unter Dampf stehen oder Platzen (vor Wut, Ärger usw.) / aus sich 
herausgehen (vor Liebe) / angefüllt sein (mit Liebe) / (Hass) unter Ver-
schluss halten / voll sein (von Liebe, Angst, Hass usw.) u.v.a.m. Alle diese 
Metaphern, bildhaften Ausdrücke usw. führen auf die hinter diesen Einzel-
wendungen stehende konzeptuelle Metapher EMOTIONEN BEFINDEN SICH 
IM BEHÄLTER/GEFÄSS/CONTAINER: 
 unter Dampf stehen → Behälter droht zu platzen 
 platzen → Behälter steht unter Druck und platzt 
 aus sich herausgehen → Behälter läuft über/aus 
 unter Verschluss halten → Emotionen befinden sich im Behälter 
mit geschlossenem Deckel 
 voll sein  → Behälter ist voll, angefüllt mit  
  Emotionen 
                                                     
7 Böhme 1985: 264; vgl. dazu auch Dressel 1996: 263-270; van Dülmen 2001: 21 schlägt 
den Begriff der „kollektiven Lebensvorstellungen“ vor. 
8 Vgl. Wagner 22011: 59-60. 
9  Es ist ein möglicher Zugang, der nicht beansprucht, dass er der einzig mögliche ist! 
10  Zur Auffassung der Emotionen als relativ-kulturspezifische und nicht universale Kon-
strukte Bender 2009: 293-310. 
11  Kövecses 1990; Rolf 1994: 131-137. 
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Die Gefäß-/Behältermetapher ist die Schlüsselmetapher für das neuzeitlich-
westliche Körper- und Emotionenverständnis, die Befunde im Deutschen 
entsprechen dem der meisten europäischen Sprachen.  
Das hinter dieser Metapher stehende Konzept bzw. die hinter dieser 
konzeptuellen Metapher stehende Mentalität setzt voraus, dass sich Emoti-
onen in unserem Innern befinden, dass sie aus uns heraus entspringen, dass 
Körper und Person die Emotionen einschließen. Ausdrücke, die zur Behäl-
termetapher zu zählen sind, finden sich bei der Verbalisierung verschie-
denster Emotionen. 
Dass wir Emotionen mit der Behältermetapher zum Ausdruck bringen, 
geschieht in aller Regel unbewusst. Die dahinterstehende Konzeption oder 
Mentalität gehört zu den unbewussten Prägungen, sie stellt eine Grösse dar, 
auf die „Menschen keinen direkten Zugriff haben“; die „ein weitgehend un-
bewußt wirkender ‚anthropologischer Zustand‘“ ist, wie oben in Abschnitt 
1 ausgeführt. 
Den Körper zum Gefäß gemacht zu haben, die Emotionen in das Innere 
verlagert zu haben, ist das Ergebnis einer über Jahrhunderte zu verfol-
genden Kulturarbeit, die Hermann Schmitz in seinem Werk „System der 
Philosophie“ eindrucksvoll beschrieben hat.12 Vor allem in den Teilbänden 
„Der Gefühlsraum“ und „Der Leib“ hat Schmitz das „eigenleibliche Spü-
ren“ einer umfassenden phänomenologischen Analyse unterzogen. Böhme 
fasst die historische Arbeit von Schmitz und den dahinterstehenden Prozess 
folgendermaßen zusammen: 
„[…] in der Philosophie- und Theoriegeschichte spiegelt sich ein zivilisato-
rischer Prozeß, in welchem die […] Erfahrungen der andrängenden Macht 
der Gefühle und des Leibes gebrochen werden zugunsten der Aus-
zeichnung, praktischen Behauptung und Selbstermächtigung eines ‚Sub-
jekts‘: dessen Leistungsstärke ist funktional darauf abgestellt, eben das An-
drängende und Durchwehende gefühlshafter und leiblicher Dynamiken zu 
‚introjizieren‘, d.h. vor allem, sie als endogene bzw. autonome Regungen zu 
verinnerlichen. Nur unter dieser Voraussetzung der ‚intrapsychischen‘ Deu-
tung können wir von einem Seeleninnenraum sprechen, der das Leibliche 
wie das Atmosphärische absorbiert.“13 
Emotionen sind nach diesem Prozess, der in Griechenland beginnt und sich 
bis in alle europäischen und an der europäischen Tradition teilhabenden 
Kulturen (daher „western pattern“) zieht, nicht mehr „Mächte, die den Füh-
lenden unwiderstehlich ergreifen und durchwirken (weswegen der Füh-
lende den Gefühlen gegenüber in eine eigentümlich exzentrische und passi-
ve Position geriet)”.14 Emotionen sind nun interiorisiert, im Gefäß des 
Körpers eingeschlossen und damit auch kontrollierbar. 
                                                     
12  Schmitz (1967) 21988; (1969) 21981 sowie (1978) 21989. 
13  Böhme 1993: 413f. 
14  Böhme 1997: 531. 
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Diese „Mentalität“ prägt die Vorstellungen, die in den kulturellen Codes 
gespeicherten Kognitionen und damit natürlich auch die Versprach-
lichungen bis heute, zumindest im „western pattern“.15 
3. Metaphern und Mentalitäten in materialen Bildern  
am Beispiel der Emotionen 
3.1 Gefäß-/Behältermetapher im „western pattern“ 
Menschliche Lebensäußerungen drücken sich nicht nur in Sprache aus, son-
dern auch vielfältig in anderen Medien, Zeichensystemen, Handlungen 
u.a.m. Es liegt daher auf der Hand, wenn ein kognitiv-mentalitätsgeschicht-
licher Ansatz gewählt ist, anzunehmen, dass Mentalitäten einen ähnlichen 
Zusammenhang mit anderen „Zeichensystem“ haben, wie er sich am Bei-
spiel der Sprache zeigen lässt.16 Uns interessieren hier nur materiale Bilder, 
die wir parallel zu sprachlichen Zeichen und Texten betrachten wollen. Die 
Grundthese, die für den vorliegenden Zusammenhang wichtig ist, lautet 
demnach: Dieselben Mentalitäten, die sich in konzeptuellen Metaphern 
ausformen, prägen nicht nur sprachliche Bilder, sondern auch materiale 
Bilder.  
 Mentalität, Konzept, Metapher  → (Zeichensystem a) – Sprache 
            → (Zeichensystem b)  – materiale Bilder 
   → (Zeichensystem …)  – … 
 
Das mag einfach klingen, würde aber bedeuten, dass man ebenso wie 
sprachliche auch materiale Bilder heranziehen kann, um Emotionen und die 
dahinterstehenden prägenden Mentalitäten zu erforschen. 
                                                     
15  Für andere Emotionskonzepte vgl. Plamper 2012 passim. 
16  Die Grundauffassung, dass sich kognitive Sachverhalte in Metaphern innerhalb ver-
schiedener Medien ausdrücken, ist von Anbeginn an ein grosser Vorteil der kognitiven 
Metaphern-Theorie von Lakoff / Johnson gewesen, auch wenn Lakoff / Johnson selbst 
ihre eigenen Studien häufig von sprachlichen Sachverhalten her entwickelt haben. Das 
Grundprinzip einer Metapher („the essence of metaphor is understanding and experien-
cing one kind of thing in terms of another“ Lakoff / Johnson 1980, 5) ist nicht auf das 
Medium Sprache beschränkt. Dies wurde schon lange gesehen und thematisiert, vgl. 
Danto 1984 und Carroll 1994. Lakoff / Johnson selbst haben es so formuliert: „Unsere 
[...] wichtigste Aussage ist die, daß die Metapher nicht nur eine Frage der Sprache ist, 
also von Worten allein.“ (Lakoff / Johnson 62008) Sie gehen davon aus, dass „mensch-
liche Denkprozesse“ bzw. „das menschliche Konzeptsystem“ (a.a.O.) metaphorisch 
strukturiert sind; nicht nur sprachliche, sondern auch alle weiteren, auch medial anderen, 
Hervorbringungen von menschlichen Lebensäusserungen sind daher von vergleichbaren 
Metaphern und Konzepten (in der Terminologie der historischen Anthropologie: Menta-
litäten) bestimmt. Alle medialen Ausformungen können daher herangezogen werden, 
um das „Konzeptsystem“ zu analysieren. 
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Abb. 2. Aus: http://www.noz.de/lokales/bramsche/artikel/478398/jana-walczyk-aus-bramsche-
und-ihr-buch-nicht-nur-fur-kinder#gallery&0&0&478398, aufgerufen am 10. April 2016. 
Ich will das zunächst am Beispiel des „western pattern“ zeigen. Hier 
gibt es, anders als im hebräisch-altorientalischen Bereich (s.u. Abschnitt 
3.2) eine ganz zentrale konzeptuelle Metapher, eben die oben kurz be-
schriebene Gefäß-/Behältermetapher. 
In der nachfolgenden kleinen Reihe von materialen Bildern lässt sich 
nun gut erkennen, dass sich die Behältermetaphervorstellung auch durch sie 
bzw. in ihnen ausdrücken lässt: 
In Abb. 1, die in einer comic-haften Zeichnung einen Menschen dar-
stellt, der von Wut oder Ärger erfasst ist, wird zu dem zeichenhaft-bild-
lichen Ausdrucksmittel gegriffen, das Platzen des Gefäßes, den Überdruck, 
unter dem der Behälter steht, so darzustellen, dass wie bei einem Dampf-
kessel oder Dampfdrucktopf der Überdruck in Form von Dampfwolken 
gezeichnet wird, die energiegeladen aus den Überdruckventilen „Ohren“ 
heraustreten: 
Noch deutlicher und noch „technischer“ auf den Gefäßsachverhalt ist das 












Abb. 1. Aus: https://forum.vodafone.de/t5/Internet-Phone/Bandbreitenengpass-
Warum/td-p/1053297, aufgerufen am 10. April 2016. 
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In Abb. 2 wird ein menschlicher Kopf in Form eines Gefäßes, eines Was-
serkessels gezeichnet. In dem begleitenden Text eines Rezipienten heißt es 
dazu: „Das Gefühl kennt jeder! Wut kocht hoch, man glaubt, gleich zu plat-
zen. Nur eine Klitzekleinigkeit noch, dann geht der Deckel hoch.“17 
Sprachliche Formulierung und bildliches Formulieren derselben konzeptu-
ellen Metapher sind hier direkt nebeneinandergesetzt. Mit Blick auf die 
konzeptuelle Metapher kann aber nun festgehalten werden, dass es wirklich 
dieselbe Metapher ist – der Mensch ist der Behälter für Emotionen –, die 
ebenso gut aus materialen Bildern wie aus Sprache zu erkennen ist! 
Diese Bildreihe lässt sich leicht fortsetzen und variieren. Im nächsten 
Bild (Abb. 3) verschmelzen die aus dem Gefäß heraustretenden Dampf-
wolken mit einer berstenden kugelförmigen Bombe (Abb. 4). Beides für 
sich sind Realisierungsvarianten derselben konzeptuellen Gefäßmetapher. 
Der Mensch ist hier anders als oben, wo der Kopf im Vordergrund stand, 
auf die kugelhafte Gefäßform reduziert, was dieselbe Deutung hervorruft 
wie eine zunächst ja gar nicht anthropomorphe zu bersten drohende Kano-
nenkugel, die aber im Kontext der Gefäßvorstellung zum stellvertretenden 
Zeichen für einen vor Emotion platzenden/berstenden Menschen wird:  
Abb. 3. Aus: http://www.julianeechternkamp.com/de/life-coaching/wut-eine-anleitung-zur- 
beherrschung-dieser-destruktiven-emotion/, aufgerufen am 10. April 2016. 
 
Abb. 4. Aus: http://www.hauptstadtlaeufer.de/tag/istaf, aufgerufen am 10. April 2016. 
                                                     
17  Über Bilder von Jana Walczyk zu finden auf der Seite: http://www.noz.de/lokales/-
bramsche/artikel/478398/jana-walczyk-aus-bramsche-und-ihr-buch-nicht-nur-fur-kinder# 
gallery&0&0&478398, aufgerufen am 10. April 2016. 
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Die Ersetzung allein des Kopfes durch eine bald berstende kugelförmige 
Bombe gibt es auch, hier noch durch affektive Gesten unterstrichen, vgl. 
Abb. 5.: 
Abb. 5. Hans-Jürgen Krahl, „Bombe, Wut, wütend, explodieren, Angestellter, Stress“, 
Datei: #22632652, Lizenz M/fotolia, aus: https://de.fotolia.com/id/22632652, aufgerufen am 
25. April 2016. 
Auch mit den Mitteln photorealistischer Darstellungen sind die Vorstel-
lungen der Gefäßmetapher einholbar, sei es, dass es um bearbeitete Bilder 
(Abb. 6) oder andere (Abb. 7) geht: Die Inszenierung vom Drinnen nach 
Draußen, vom Inneren des (unter Druck, Dampf, emotionaler Ladung etc. 
stehenden) Gefäßes zum Bersten, Entweichen und Hinausschreien dieses 
Druckes ist auf den ersten Blick erkennbar: 
 
Abb. 6. Aus: http://karrierebibel.de/wut/, aufgerufen am 10. April 2016. 
 EMOTIONEN IN TEXT, SPRACHE UND MATERIALEN BILDERN 215 
 
Abb. 7. Aus: http://www.fitforfun.de/beauty-wellness/gesundheit/wut-niedriger-
sozialer-status-macht-wuetend_aid_14489.html, aufgerufen am 10. April 2016. 
Ohne weiteres wäre es nun möglich, diese Reihe auch mit Ausgriffen in 
historische Bereiche und auch anspruchsvolle bildnerische Ausdrucks-
formen zu verlängern, vgl. Abb. 8.  
 
 
Abb. 8. Edvard Munch: Skrik / Der Schrei, 1893, Buntstift auf Karton, 
Munchmuseet / Munch-Museum, Oslo, Reg. Nr. MM.M.00122b, © Munchmuseet. 
Bei den hier angeführten Bildern und der zu erörternden methodischen 
Frage ist es zunächst aber überhaupt nicht entscheidend, welche ästheti-
schen, künstlerischen oder sonstigen Qualitäten ein materiales Bild hat, 
sondern es steht einzig die Überlegung im Raum, dass von der Analyse 
materialer Bilder her ebenfalls auf konzeptuelle Metaphern zugegangen 
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werden kann. Prinzipiell, so würde ich die These nun formulieren, ist die 
Bildanalyse auch ein möglicher Zugang zu konzeptuellen Metaphern, auch 
solchen, die im Zusammenhang mit Emotionen wichtig sind, ein Zugang, 
der sicher in je eigenen Bildkulturen und überhaupt je eigenen Gesamtkul-
turen mit je eigenen epistemisch-kognitiven Systemen usw. andere Ergeb-
nisse mit sich bringt, der aber unbeschränkt von Kultur und Epoche als 
Frage an materiale Bilder herangetragen werden kann. 
3.2 Metaphern in der Emotionenanalyse des Hebräischen bzw. des Alten 
Israel 
In verschiedenen Forschungsprojekten und Publikationen habe ich mit mei-
ner Forschungsgruppe in den letzten Jahren den Versuch unternommen, die 
metaphernorientierte Analyse für die Erforschung historischer Emotionen 
im Alten Testament/Alten Israel zu nutzen. Es ist hier nicht der Ort, aus-
führlich auf die Ergebnisse dieser Forschung einzugehen, dafür sei auf die 
entsprechenden Publikationen verwiesen.18 Aber zusammenfassend kann 
hier formuliert werden, dass sich die Ergebnisse vom Befund des „western 
pattern“ signifikant unterscheiden. Der bedeutsamste Unterschied ist in der 
Anwendung der Behältermetapher zutage getreten: Ist sie im „western pat-
tern“ die absolut häufigste und wichtigste konzeptuelle Metapher, so 
kommt sie im Alten Testament auch eingedenk mehrerer hundert analysier-
ten Belegstellen nur in ganz seltenen Ausnahmefällen vor. Sicher lässt sich 
sagen, dass sie nicht als ein häufiges oder gar zentrales Verstehenskonzept 
für die Verhältnisbestimmung von Körper/Gefäß und Emotion/Inhalt ver-
standen werden kann. Das führt auf die Spur, dass im Hebräischen andere 
Verhältnisbestimmungen für Person/Körper und Emotion entscheidend 
sind, andere konzeptuelle Metaphernbereiche vorkommen, die schluss-
endlich ein anderes Emotionengrundverständnis nahelegen als im „western 
pattern“. Bisherige Studien haben hier eine Vielfalt ergeben, es gibt wohl 
andere Bestimmungen der Körperinnen- und Körperaußengrenze, es kommt 
die Vorstellung von außen kommenden Emotionen („Geist der Eifersucht“) 
ins Spiel, möglicherweise sind die Emotionen bzw. die emotionale Sphäre, 
in die Menschen eintreten, mit den sie auslösenden Anlässen (kausal?) ver-
klammert u.a.m. Bestimmte Aspekte der Emotionen treten über die Meta-
phern deutlich in den Vordergrund: Das Heiße, Flüssige, Feurige von Zorn 
und Grimm, beim Zorn Gottes das sturmhaft Brausende, alle Dämme Ein-
reißende, über den Menschen Hereinbrechende u.a.m. Hier sind aber die 
Forschungen noch dabei, sich voranzutasten und es liegt noch etliche Ar-
beit voraus. 
                                                     
18  Wagner 22011; Wagner 2012: 27-68; Müller 2014: 219-237; Kipfer 2016: 15-79. 
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Für die zukünftige Forschung sollten aber unbedingt materiale Bilder 
einbezogen werden, die in ähnlicher Weise wie in 3.1 angeführt mit sprach-
lichen Sachverhalten übereinstimmende (oder durchaus auch eigene) kon-
zeptuelle Metaphernbereiche ausdrücken können und daher hilfreich zur 
Ergründung der kognitiv-epistemischen Strukturen sind.  
Ein erstes, allerdings negatives Ergebnis gibt es schon: Nach einer ers-
ten Durchsicht von IPIAO („Die Ikonographie Palästinas/Israels und der 
Alte Orient“) existiert eine vergleichbare Darstellung mit Elementen der 
oben beschriebenen Behälter-Metapher zum Ausdruck von Emotionen, die 
auf der Linie der in Abschnitt 3.1 angeführten Bilder liegt, nicht.19 Das liegt 
aber nun vor allem daran, dass die Behältermetapher im Emotionenkontext 
des Alten Israel nicht konstitutiv ist. Dass man aber für die eigenen, sich in 
spezifischen konzeptuellen Metaphern ausdrückenden, Emotionenkonzepte 
der altisraelitischen Kultur (und ähnlich dürfte es für die altorientalisch-
ägyptischen Kulturen sein) auch zugehörige eigene Bilddarstellungen auf 
dem Wege der Metaphernanalyse finden kann, ist m.E. methodisch möglich 
und eher wahrscheinlich als ausgeschlossen. 
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Emotion and the Ancient Arts: Visualizing,  
Materializing, and Producing States of Being* 
Karen SONIK 
1. Introduction 
In the Standard Babylonian Epic of Gilgamesh, the most famous of the 
literary narratives extant from Mesopotamia, events are driven by emotions 
so towering that they overwhelm all caution, reasoned judgment, and sensi-
ble action.1 One of the most critical episodes in the composition, on which 
all subsequent events turn, relates in intimate first person the devastation of 
the hero Gilgamesh upon the death of his closest friend and companion, 
Enkidu: 
I shall mourn Enkidu, my friend, 
like a professional mourning woman I shall lament bitterly. 
The axe at my side, in which my arm trusted, 
the sword of my belt, the shield in front of me; 
my festive garment, the girdle of my delight: 
a wicked wind has risen up against me and robbed me.  
(VIII 44-49; George 2003: 644-45) 
The hero’s grief for his dead companion, expressed both in word and tender 
deed, is as deeply affecting for the modern audience as, presumably, for the 
ancient one – even if the specific ways in which it is experienced today 
may diverge somewhat from those of the past.2 Entangled in a complex 
constellation of feelings, communicated through vivid and visceral image-
ry, Gilgamesh’s anguish reverberates through and provides the impetus for 
the remarkable events subsequently recounted in Tablets VIII-XI of the 
                                                     
*  Thanks are due to the Center for the Study of World Religions at Harvard, the Lehrstuhl 
für Altorientalistik at the Universität Würzburg, and the Tablet Room at the University 
of Pennsylvania for kindly hosting me while the thoughts in this paper were being for-
mulated and written. I am grateful also to Beate Pongratz-Leisten, Greta Van Buylaere, 
and Josh Jeffers for their thoughtful comments on this work. Sara Kipfer kindly invited 
me to contribute my thoughts on the subject of emotion in Mesopotamia and Holly 
Pittman encouraged me to take on this vast endeavor with the assurance that it would be 
interesting – she was, as always, correct. 
1  One might contrast it, in this respect, with narratives such as The Return of Lugalbanda, 
which follows a hero carefully considering his actions and their implications rather than 
acting on the basis of emotion, appetite, whim, or desire. 
2  See, for example, the discussion of the Greek hero Philoctetes in the main text below.  
220 KAREN SONIK 
epic. It is the spur driving the hero on to attempt his last, great quest: the 
vanquishing of death itself, the hated enemy that has robbed him of his 
companion and that – as Gilgamesh recognizes for what seems the first 
time3 – relentlessly stalks him also. It encompasses and is associated with: 
 
a) An initial clinging to hope and desperate denial of the implications of 
Enkidu’s failure to rouse (VIII 55-58).4 The hope is crushed and the de-
nial itself graphically and finally repudiated by the material decay of 
Enkidu’s corpse, encapsulated in the vivid image – three times repeated 
in the epic so that its visceral impact both on Gilgamesh and on the 
audience may be fully realized (X 60, 137, 237) – of the maggot drop-
ping from its nostril. 
b) A demonstration of love and tender care for what little remains – though 
this is little indeed. Gilgamesh covers Enkidu’s body, “(veiling) his face 
like a bride” (VIII 59; George 2003: 654-55);5 bitterly laments Enkidu’s 
death “like a professional mourning woman” (VIII 45; George 2003: 
654-55); and oversees the making of a glorious funerary statue of his 
dead friend (VIII 65-72). This sensitive regard is all the more striking in 
one otherwise so explicitly given to unthinking and violent action.6 
c) The shattering of Gilgamesh’s fundamental perception not only of his 
own self and place in the world but also of the very order, as established 
by the gods, of the world itself (VIII 44-49). On Enkidu’s death, Gilga-
mesh abandons both his responsibilities and (even if only temporarily) 
his status as king of Uruk,7 an alteration that is marked physically, in 
                                                     
3  In the Sumerian narratives Gilgamesh and Huwawa A (GHA) and B (GHB), Gilga-
mesh’s realization that he too will fall victim to death comes already prior to the hero’s 
quest to the Cedar Forest (this is the first quest he undertakes in the SB Gilgamesh Epic). 
See further main text below. 
4  Both the hope and the denial are even more poignantly expressed in the OB Akkadian 
epic, in which Gilgamesh refuses to give Enkidu’s body over for burial for a full seven 
days and seven nights, clinging instead to futile hope: “Maybe my friend will rise at my 
cry!” (OB VA+BM 9’; George 2003: 278-79). 
5  I am not inclined to read this as referencing a sexual relationship between the two he-
roes. While such a reading is not absolutely precluded (Mesopotamian wordplay and 
humor being what it is), the power of this sharply drawn verbal image would seem to re-
side in the sheer incongruity of this tender action by one who has hitherto occupied and 
is properly situated in an entirely different (boisterous, noisy, and violent) sphere of life.  
6  The topic of the royal demonstration (Bonatz in this volume) and repression of emotion 
(Jacquet 2012: 125-26) is one that seems ripe for further investigation in the context of 
Mesopotamia. On the topic of grief and proper demonstrations of sorrow, it is also worth 
reading more generally Jacquet 2012: 125-28. See also, albeit with reference to Classic 
Mayan imagery, the studies of Marcus 1974 and Houston 2001 on restrained, regulated, 
and calculated royal (and other) bodily expression. 
7  In this abandonment of his kingship, however temporary, Gilgamesh denies significantly 
more than social status: the institution of kingship is a divinely established one, and the 
king stands at the point of contact between humans and their gods. Gilgamesh himself, 
too, is something more than merely human, repeatedly identified as two-thirds divine 
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body and garb, as well as socially, in his willful isolation from those 
who might guide and guard him.8 More importantly, the hero embarks 
on his (futile) quest for immortality, which the gods have deliberately 
and explicitly denied to all mortals save one, the flood hero Uta-
napishti. 
d) Near crippling fear at the recognition of his own mortality (X 61-62). 
The oblivion that has claimed Enkidu – “[My friend, whom I love, has 
turned] to clay, / my friend Enkidu, whom I love, has [turned to] clay. / 
[Shall not I be like] him and also lie down, / [never to rise] again, 
through all eternity?’” (X 68-71; George 2003: 682-83) – inexorably 
awaits Gilgamesh as well (X 145-148, 245-248). The hero is described 
as “weeping bitterly as he roamed the wild” lamenting “I shall die, and 
shall I not then be like Enkidu? / Sorrow has entered my heart. / 
I became afraid of death, so go roaming the wild” (IX 2-5; George 2003: 
666-67). 
e) Physical mortification and degradation as explicit signifiers of mourning 
and memorialization, so that Gilgamesh promises to bear “the matted 
hair of mourning” and to don, presumably in place of his royal gar-
ments, a lion’s skin (VIII 90-91; George 2003: 656-57). The hero also 
endures the physical depredations of the sun and the frost, of pain and of 
utter exhaustion as he travels the wilderness alone following Enkidu’s 
death (IX 125-127; X 9, 40-52, 112-125, 212-225, 254-261). 
f) Hope again, however desperate and unlikely, and fierce determination 
that Gilgamesh himself will yet evade the fate that has overtaken En-
kidu: “‘[I am seeking] the [road] of my forefather, Uta-napišti. / He who 
stood in the assembly of the gods, and [found life,] / of death and life 
[he will tell me the secret.]’” (IX 75-77; George 2003: 670-71). 
g) Refuge – perhaps unsurprising in one possessed of such enormous ener-
gies and corporeal capacities – in relentless physical action, ceaseless 
and near-frenzied motion directed at a very real if futile end. Gilga-
                                                                                                                          
and one-third human, and as possessing “the flesh of the gods” in his body (IX 49-53, 
130; X 7, 268). His abandonment of rule, his entry into the wilderness, his physical mor-
tification and deterioration, and indeed his very quest for immortality, represent a vio-
lent dislocation in the divinely established and guarded order of things. Gilgamesh in 
nearly all the narratives recounting his exploits, and not only in the Standard Babylonian 
account of his deeds, strives against the gods themselves. 
8  Uta-napishti’s rebuke of the hero for being (performing the role of) a fool is significant 
here. Gilgamesh was born to be the king, his status marked by his physical perfection 
and accompanied by various pleasures and privileges as well as responsibilities; he has 
yet willingly assumed the trappings of a much lower rank, of one who must make do 
with “inferior food and rough clothing … Gilgameš, in his pitiful condition and ragged 
attire, looks more like fool than king and, at the same time, is behaving like a fool in 
pursuing his unattainable goal … because the fool lacks guidance in his affairs, he is not 
to blame for his predicament; the responsibility for his care lies with the king – who, by 
contrast, is proverbially well counseled” (George 2003: 504). 
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mesh’s quest for immortality,9 however quixotic and unlikely, permits 
the hero to endure the otherwise unendurable (X 63). 
 
In opening the discussion with this dense and deeply evocative account of 
Enkidu’s death and Gilgamesh’s response – which comprises, ultimately, 
only one of many such vividly colored and complex such narrative episodes 
extant from Mesopotamia – I have hoped to render several points explicit 
which are explored throughout this volume: (1) that the nascent study of 
emotion in Mesopotamia specifically, and the ancient Near East more gen-
erally, is a fruitful pursuit, with very rich and compelling source material 
on which to draw; (2) that future study of the visualization or, perhaps bet-
ter, materialization of emotions must be a multipronged pursuit, examining 
not only pictorial and verbal imagery but also, necessarily, drawing on 
extensive and thorough analyses of philological / textual and archaeological 
data (i.e. specific terms and their definitions and contexts of application; 
textual sources including but by no means limited to the narrative compo-
sitions;10 burial goods and contexts); (3) that the nuances of emotional 
                                                     
9  Barré (2001) included Gilgamesh, as he is characterized in the SB epic following the 
death of Enkidu, in his pertinent but somewhat problematic study of “wandering about” 
as a topos of depression (this latter term that would seem to require significant nuancing 
prior to its application to ancient or non-Western contexts). I am inclined here to be very 
careful in distinguishing “psychomotor agitation” as a symptom of depression (Barré 
2001: 177; see also Kruger 2005) from deliberate motion as a means coping with an oth-
erwise overwhelming emotional or other state of being: Gilgamesh’s journeying after 
the death of Enkidu is not aimless even if it is futile. Shocked and grievously wounded 
and afraid the hero might be but his identification and obsessive pursuit of a final hope 
and singular achievement, the conquest of death, permits him to survive an otherwise 
unbearable grief. Gilgamesh may perhaps be deranged – if one might strip that term of 
its pejorative connotations and nuance it as indicating a type of disarray and confusion, a 
dislocation from the established order of things – but to characterize him as depressed 
obscures the depth and complexity of his emotional and other state(s) of being. (Gilga-
mesh’s statement to the ferryman Ur-shanabi that, if he cannot cross the ocean to find 
the flood hero Uta-napishti, he will continue to traverse the wilderness, may seem to 
support Barré’s interpretation of the hero’s journey as aimless wandering. But given that 
Gilgamesh’s initial promise to enter the wilderness comes in a series of promises made 
to the dead Enkidu that the latter shall be fittingly remembered and fittingly mourned 
(VIII 84-91), this interpretation of Gilgamesh’s actions remains an ill-suited one.) 
10  See, for example, the work of Jaques (2006 and in this volume) on Sumerian and Akka-
dian. See also the call of Chaniotis and Ducrey (2013b: 13) to look for insight into an-
cient emotions not only in philosophical and dramatic works but also in “literary sources 
(historiography, medical authors, Greek and Latin poetry and oratory), inscriptions, and 
the visual arts” and, if possible, archaeological contexts (Tarlow 2000) as well. Oppen-
heim’s (1967: 2) important observation distinguishing scribal production of all sorts in 
Mesopotamia, particularly with respect to its range of emotional expressiveness, from 
the types of written productions extant from ancient polities such as Greece is worth ad-
dressing here: “Cuneiform texts … were written not by ‘authors’ but by scribes, mem-
bers of a class of well trained specialists who were bound by traditional models which 
permitted little deviation in what was to be written on that piece of clay and in what 
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states and the complexity of emotional responses, with different emotions 
frequently entangled or overlapping, often emerge or are materialized in or 
even produced by bodily or physical states and action11 – a point particular-
ly pertinent for Mesopotamia, in the context of which Cartesian dualism 
does not apply;12 and (4) that the emotions expressed or recognized by the 
ancient inhabitants of Mesopotamia, even if not identical in boundary, ex-
perience, or manifestation to our own, are yet accessible and, more im-
portantly, comprehensible to us. (The limitations of such accessibility are 
discussed further below.) 
That the emotions of the peoples of the ancient Near East, as those of 
other cultures (ancient and modern), diverge from our own is necessarily 
the case if we accept that emotions are socially and culturally mediated as 
well as biologically influenced.13 Barring the appearance of significantly 
more developed and compelling evidence than currently exists, however, 
I am not inclined to be bogged down by concerns that the humans of the 
ancient Near East were fundamentally different, biologically or otherwise, 
from humans of the contemporary world – despite the five thousand plus 
years separating us from the oldest inhabitants of the first cities. If I have a 
concern, it is that the traditional boundaries of enquiry, according to which 
Mesopotamia is grouped with Egypt and the Biblical world, are at once too 
restrictive and too broad. The nascent study of emotion in Mesopotamia 
seems one that would benefit significantly from engagement with the nu-
                                                                                                                          
form this was to be done, under the given circumstances.” Greek texts, in contrast, even 
when about the city or the government, were written by authors who were partisans: 
“this endows their writings with verve and persuasiveness, with love and hatred, through 
which not only the personality of the authors but also the conflicts and problems of their 
world emerge with a directness that touches us even today.” This is a legitimate observa-
tion – but I would argue that this should not yet preclude the analysis of the extant textu-
al sources for cases where emotional expression, however constrained or programmatic, 
is evident (i.e. Jaques 2006). It also does not preclude the analysis of the rich narrative 
sources extant from Mesopotamia, such as those pertaining to Gilgamesh, in which emo-
tional expression (love, desire, grief, anger, fear) is richly described.  
11  On the production of emotional states through bodily action and motor mimicry, see the 
expansive, multidisciplinary, and growing corpus of works including the seminal study 
of Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994; also Hurley and Chater 2005; von Scheve and 
Salmela 2014; for a summary of recent literature, see Hatfield et al. 2014. For related is-
sues considered in the context of Mesopotamia, see Delnero, forthcoming. Pertinent to 
the issue of the production of emotional states through bodily responses is the discussion 
of Ashurbanipal’s slain lions in the main text below. 
12  On Cartesian dualism and Mesopotamia, see Bahrani 2001: 41ff, 118ff; further 
Pongratz-Leisten and Sonik 2015: 11 n. 22.  
13  I prefer “mediated” to the terms “constructed” or “constituted”; the latter suggest a more 
rigid sociocultural influence on emotions than I mean to convey here. See Levenson et 
al. (2007) on most modern theories of emotion falling somewhere between extreme evo-
lutionary (emphasizing biological influences determined through natural selection) and 
extreme cultural (regarding emotion as primarily culturally influenced, meeting specific 
cultural beliefs, traditions, and values) construction. 
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merous theoretically sophisticated scholarly works on the topic pertaining 
to ancient Greece and Rome, the Middle Ages, and other ancient and more 
recent Western and non-Western cultures, as well as from engagement with 
research on Egyptian and Biblical contexts.14 (The potential benefits and 
limitations of, as well as the concerns raised by, such broader comparative 
work are addressed further below. Eurocentrism in particular has often been 
a persistent and compelling concern but in this context it is neither a singu-
lar nor homogenous one: scholars working on emotion in ancient Greece 
and Rome, for example, have emphasized, as carefully and necessarily as 
scholars working on Mesopotamia must surely do, the divergences between 
their own contexts and that of the contemporary Western world.) At the 
same time, however, the delineation of Mesopotamia’s specific system(s) of 
emotion must rely exclusively on the extant primary sources from Mesopo-
tamia. If some of the theoretical and methodological approaches applied in 
other fields of study may inspire important lines of questioning or currents 
of thought pertinent to our own, specific conclusions drawn with respect to 
other polities or cultures – regardless of geographical proximity or chrono-
logical contemporaneity – cannot be assumed to be applicable to Mesopo-
tamia. 
In undertaking the writing of this treatment of emotion, I have con-
sidered the topic primarily from the vantage point of an art historian spe-
cializing in Mesopotamia. It may surprise the reader, consequently, to find 
that pictorial imagery is specifically discussed only at the end of this chap-
ter; this has come as something of a surprise to the author as well. As the 
art historical contributions within this volume have already been summa-
rized in the introductory chapter (Kipfer in this volume) and specifically 
discussed in the accompanying responses, I have focused my attention up-
on the future of the field of study. And, upon delving into the substantial 
corpus of research on emotion in the ancient world, I am persuaded both 
that significant further insights into emotion and image in Mesopotamia 
must await further delineation of the Mesopotamian system of emotions15 
and that the still-preliminary aspects of this task, which comprise a formi-
                                                     
14  See, for example, the extremely interesting work of Winter (1994, 2000a) on India and 
Mesopotamia; also Pongratz-Leisten and Sonik (2015) on Mesopotamia, Greece, Rome, 
India, etc.; and the extremely perceptive and thoughtful work of the medievalist Caro-
line Walker Bynum (2012, 2014) considering sacral materials and materiality in India 
and Mesopotamia in work on the western Middle Ages. Several of the contributions in 
this volume (i.e. Jaques; Cornelius) have also drawn on or referenced studies of emotion 
pertaining to other (particularly ancient and non-Western) contexts. 
15  This might be compared to the (related) task of defining the sensorium or system of the 
senses of Mesopotamia and other ancient polities (i.e. McMahon 2013; Fleming 2015; 
Rendu Loisel 2015), an endeavor proceeding within the larger framework of a flourish-
ing interest in and analysis of the senses in historical, archaeological, religious, and oth-
er contexts (i.e. Houston and Taube 2000; Houston, Stuart, and Taube 2006: 134-79; 
Bennet 2001; Smith 2007; Day 2013; Hamilakis 2014; Promey 2014). 
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dable undertakings in their own right, must continue for the moment to 
occur primarily within the province of the extant texts (see caveats ex-
pressed at the end of this chapter).16 As a scholar with a longstanding inter-
est in Mesopotamia’s strikingly rich and affecting narratives and narrative 
imagery, I admit to finding the prospect of this vast endeavor a very excit-
ing one. Given these considerations, my discussion below is directed pri-
marily at addressing key terminological, theoretical, and methodological 
issues with respect to the future study of emotion in Mesopotamia across 
the full available spectrum of sources (textual, pictorial, and archaeologi-
cal), and at identifying specific research directions that may yield new in-
sights and open up productive new modes of analysis. 
2. Emotion in Cross-Cultural Perspective:  
Terminology and Methodology 
2.1. Between biology and culture: defining “emotion” for the ancient 
world 
The necessarily brief and limited explication of the passage from the SB 
Gilgamesh Epic opening this chapter17 deliberately omits any attempt to 
distinguish between such categories or conceptualizations as emotion or 
feeling, mood or sensation, affect or proto-emotion or even basic emotion.18 
                                                     
16  Kramer (1958, 1988) already emphasized an interest in Sumerian literature’s “abiding 
concern with the personality and character of the people who created any given culture, 
their psychological attitudes and emotional responses, the drives and motives that trig-
ger and inspire their conduct and behavior [italics mine]” (Kramer 1988: 205). While 
Kramer’s (1958, 1988: 205-209) preliminary discussion of love, fear, and hate requires 
further and significant nuancing (and, in some cases, challenging) – he emphasized the 
status of his own work as “only an initial and pioneer attempt to isolate and describe 
some of the psychological traits of Sumerian behavior to be corrected, modified and ex-
panded as the source material grows” (1958: 66 n.1) – it underscores the fact that the 
recognition of Mesopotamia’s extant textual corpus as a rich resource for pursuing such 
topics is by no means a new one. See also Black (1998: 55, 89, 106, 117, 165, 168) with 
respect to Sumerian poetry; Foster (2011: 122-24) with respect to Akkadian and other 
textual sources; Larsen (2001) with respect to the Old Assyrian letters; Jaques (2006 and 
in this volume) with respect to philological tools and methods for approaching emotion 
in Sumerian texts especially. 
17  This opening explication also deliberately maps English terminology onto a foreign – 
and yet, I would emphatically argue, neither utterly alien nor unknowable – context; the 
grounding of the analysis of emotions in this episode within a culturally specific under-
standing of Mesopotamia’s system(s) of emotions, perhaps refined further by time period, 
unfortunately awaits the publication of research and large-scale studies well beyond the 
scope of this chapter (see further main text below). 
18  I have particularly hesitated to discuss issues pertaining to affect here despite their rele-
vance to the current topic (on emotion and affect see esp. Leys 2011a, 2011b, 2012; 
Connolly 2011) and the significance of the so-called “affective turn” in the humanities 
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While a nuanced definition of what constitutes an emotion as opposed to, 
for example, an affect19 in Mesopotamia has the potential to be productively 
developed, the fine terminological distinctions that have been or are being 
attempted by psychologists, most still hotly contested,20 cannot in any prac-
tical or useful way be applied to the ancient contexts under study here – it is 
not yet clear, indeed, that they can be productively or even consistently 
applied to any context.  
More immediately pertinent, I would suggest, are such approaches, 
though not themselves monolithic, as have already been adopted by the 
growing number of scholars pursuing the study of emotion in other cultural 
contexts, heavily clustered to date in the fields of study of ancient Greece 
and Rome. These have typically refrained from very extensive or explicit 
definitions of emotion in favor of focusing on specific emotion terms them-
selves, and on delineating the “nature and significance of the many diver-
gences in sense, reference, extension, and connotation between the names 
of [for example] the ancient Greek pathê and their nearest equivalents in 
the lexicon of English emotion terms. Detailed research of this kind is an 
essential prerequisite [italics mine] for any account of ancient emotion” 
(Cairns 2008: 51).21 While this type of detailed research, which must be 
pursued across the full range of available source materials, is not yet so 
                                                                                                                          
and social sciences (i.e. Massumi 1995, 2002, 2015; Bennett 2005; Clough 2007; Van 
Alphen 2008; Gregg and Seigworth 2010; Leys 2011a). Even a brief treatment of such 
issues in reference to Mesopotamia’s artworks would expand this chapter far beyond its 
proper bounds and would be far better undertaken in an independent and preferably 
book-length study or edited volume. It is at least worth noting, however, O’Sullivan’s 
(2001: 125) relatively clearly articulated definition of affect as the “momen[t] of inten-
sity, a reaction in/on the body at the level of matter … the effect another body, for example 
an art object, has upon [one’s] own body and [one’s] body’s duration,” and, with spe-
cific respect to Mesopotamia, Winter’s (1998, 2007) important contributions on the af-
fective properties of style and the affective object. 
19  See, for example, Konstan’s (2015) distinction between what he terms affects, “certain 
instinctive responses” common to human beings (and some other animals), and what he 
recognizes as emotions (the Greek pathê), which he characterizes as socially constructed 
or “conditioned in significant ways by culture.” On basic emotions, see also Levenson 
2011. 
20  Some of the major issues and ongoing debates are summarized in Wagner-Durand in 
this volume. 
21  For a critique of some of the shortcomings of this necessary, if also necessarily prob-
lematic, initial approach to ancient emotion, see Cairns 2008: 51ff. Cairns’ critique, no-
tably, is specifically in reference to the seminal works of David Konstan (2001, 2005, 
2006, 2008, 2015) on Greek emotions, though the study of emotions in Greek and Roman 
contexts has seen burgeoning interest over the past decade or so; i.e. Braund and Most 
2004; Cairns and Nelis 2016; Caston 2012; Chaniotis 2012; Chaniotis and Ducrey 2013; 
Fulkerson 2013; Goldie 2010; Graver 2007; Kalimtzis 2012; Kaster 2005; Konstan 
2006; Masséglia 2015; Sternberg 2005; Sanders 2014; and Sanders et al. 2012, to cite 
just a few of the larger-scale studies. Some significant earlier studies include Padel 
1992; Stewart 1997; Harris 2001; Konstan 2001; Fortenbaugh 2002. See also the im-
portant works on emotion in the Middle Ages, including Rosenwein 1998, 2006, 2016. 
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broadly available for Mesopotamia as it is for the Classical world, a very 
important beginning has already been made on its production (i.e. Kramer 
1958, 1988; Jaques 2006; Foster 2011; Durand, Marti, and Römer 2016; 
Delnero, forthcoming; and this volume). 
The one suggestion that I would make here with specific respect to how 
emotions in Mesopotamia will ultimately be defined and understood is that 
there must be a significant emphasis on embodiment and action: in a cul-
tural context in which Cartesian dualism did not hold sway, emotion might 
well be regarded as a state of being.22 (Given the biological and physiologi-
cal aspects of emotion, this point is likely much more generally applicable.) 
The pursuit of the materialization of emotion, and by this I refer to the 
range of bodily or physiological expressions, responses, and actions associ-
ated or performed in accordance with or in response to a specific emotional 
state (whether spontaneous or prescribed), is vital to – and, I would argue, 
also inextricably intertwined with – any more specific consideration of 
emotion in the visual and other arts of Mesopotamia.23 
2.2. Methodology and source material: studying emotions across cultures 
As a starting point, then, it is useful to assume the comparative study of 
emotions may be legitimately based in “broad similarities in the range and 
nature of emotions across cultures” (Konstan 2005: 225),24 a basis that pro-
vides some justification for the use of the term emotion to encompass such 
phenomena as love, hate, and anger in other cultural contexts, even those 
that lack comparable terms or classifications.25 Simultaneously, however, it 
                                                     
22  A state of being (mind-body) is here suggested rather than a state of mind or body. This 
phrasing is also meant to encompass the potential performative aspects of emotion. See 
fn. 12 above; also see Sonik 2012a on issues pertaining to embodied identity, meta-
morphosis, and the boundaries of being in Mesopotamia. 
23  The brief discussion of emotions and inner feeling in Foster (2011: 122-24) emphasizes 
such physical responses. In discussing Akkadian word choices with respect to “happi-
ness,” for example, Foster (2011: 122) notes (1) hadû, centering on the “gratification of 
a want or a need met, a mood or disposition, a personal triumph or gain, as well as 
pleasure at the misfortune of an adversary”; (2) ri’āšum, more akin “to joy, at escaping a 
threat, or experiencing a thrill, at seeing something especially moving, or feeling a tingle 
of elaboration”; (3) elēṣu, “more physical, an experience that caused the body or spirit to 
swell and glow with pleasure.” See also the association drawn between formulations of 
feelings and manifestations of light: “The face of one who is angry is ‘dark’ … one who 
is satisfied ‘radiates’” (Charpin 2013: 65). 
24  This approach assumes, as discussed above, that differences in emotions across cultures 
are grounded not in biological differences of the peoples involved, ancient or modern, 
but in divergent social and cultural mediations (I would encompass linguistic consider-
ations under these larger categories); see further on this, for example, Konstan 2005, 
2006, 2015.  
25  In his famous study on restraining rage in the Greco-Roman world, Harris (2001) prag-
matically referred not only to anger but also to “anger-like” emotions so as not to prema-
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must be acknowledged that the boundaries, expressions, perceptions and 
receptions of, as well as (and perhaps especially) the stimuli evoking, spe-
cific emotions are likely to be the sites of very significant cultural variation 
(Konstan 2005: 227; Harris 2001: 24-25). Such variations, indeed, “may be 
systematic, in the sense that, taken together, both the inventory of basic 
emotion terms in a culture, and the specific character of the emotions in-
cluded, may reveal a coherent structure of feeling that differs in determi-
nate ways from that of other cultures” (Konstan 2005: 225). The holistic 
system that emerges “may be seen to bear a relationship to values and be-
liefs within the culture at large, which is in turn distinctive in respect to 
other societies” (Konstan 2005: 225). 
I want to underscore here the import of both the broad similarities in 
emotions across cultures – presumably grounded in common human biolo-
gy and physiology – and the culturally specific variations in their character 
and expression by considering an example presented by Konstan (2015, 
also 2006: ch. 10). He briefly but thoughtfully discusses, with specific re-
spect to physical pain and pity, the assertion of Timpanaro (1975 [1970]: 
52; apud Eagleton 2003: xiii) that “man as a biological being has remained 
essentially unchanged from the beginnings of civilization to the present; 
and those sentiments and representations which are closest to the biological 
facts of human existence [i.e. pain] have changed little.” Timpanaro’s posi-
tion was championed by Eagleton (2003: xiv) in the latter’s important vol-
ume on violence: using as exemplar the Greek hero Philoctetes (Fig. 1), 
famously ravaged by pain from a perpetually festering foot wound, Eagle-
ton memorably asserted that the question of why we (as a modern audi-
ence) feel sympathy for Philoctetes “is a pseudo-problem bred by a bogus 
historicism.”26 Konstan’s response (2015 n. 8) to Timpanaro and Eagleton 
is worth considering, and is broadly applicable to larger issues pertaining to 
the study of ancient emotion(s). While accepting pain as a universal human 
                                                                                                                          
turely or imprecisely curtail the subject of his study: multiple terms, he noted, some 
more or less synonymous and others with quite specific connotations, might be deployed 
in reference to a larger emotional phenomenon that had elements in common with and 
yet was not identical to anger as we might understand it in a contemporary western con-
text. On the subject of comparative study across cultures, Bynum’s (2014) paper pro-
vides something of a touchstone: with respect to the cross-cultural study of emotions, 
however, I am inclined to recognize continuities significant enough (in most cases) that 
concerns about pseudomorphism and related errors seem unwarranted. See further, how-
ever, the main text below. 
26  Eagleton (2003: xiv) continues, persuasively insofar as his argument goes, that “we feel 
sympathy for Philoctetes because he is in agonizing pain from his pus-swollen foot. 
There is no use pretending that his foot is a realm of impenetrable otherness which our 
modern-day notions can only grasp at the cost of brutally colonizing the past. There is 
nothing hermeneutically opaque about Philoctetes’ hobbling and bellowing.” See further 
on cross-cultural studies of pain specifically and its representation, Rey 1998; Cohen 
2000; Moscoso 2012. See also the discussion of Fuller’s (1983) position in the main text 
below. 
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phenomenon with which humans generally, modern as well as ancient, 
might sympathize,27 Konstan recognizes it also, in how it is perceived, un-
derstood, and even experienced, as a culturally mediated one: “Philoctetes’ 
description of his suffering reflects Greek notions of the self and of bodily 
sensations insofar as pain is described as an outside agent attacking the 
body … As a consequence of the interplay of nature and culture, Sopho-
cles’ experience and conception of pain [as expressed in his Philoctetes] are 
different from mine” (Budelmann 2010: 112; apud Konstan 2015 n. 8).28 
And yet, if Konstan’s point is well taken, so, too, is that of Eagleton: in 
our search for nuance and cultural (and individual) specificity, we ought 
not lose sight of the broader commonalities in human experience and phys-
iology that permit, among other things, the general translatability of many 
of our arts. I am put in mind here of an anecdote recounted by Fuller (1983: 
2-3) with respect to the Laocoön (Fig. 2),29 regarding which he demanded 
of a post-structuralist art historian, “Well then, how do we know the Laocoon 
is in pain,” and received the answer, “We know the Laocoon is in pain be-
cause we have studied the modes of production prevailing in Greece at the 
time it was made, and the signifying practices to which it gave rise.” 
Fuller’s challenge as he recounts it, “But Griselda, he’s being strangled by 
a sea monster,” was met with the wholly serious response, “Yes … but we 
have no means of knowing whether or not he’s enjoying it.” This episode 
was cited by Fuller as the impetus for his turn toward approaches and ap-
plications from science, and the consideration of precisely such biological 
and physiological commonalities among human beings across civilizations 
and cultures, in the study of art. This scholarly turn has, notably, since 
flourished and yielded numerous interesting and important, if also prob-
                                                     
27  In the interests of recognizing the extraordinary range of individually, in addition to 
culturally, shaped experience it should be noted that there are also individuals who do 
not feel physical pain (as, for example, due to congenital analgesia or nerve damage). 
28  It is worth attending to Budelmann’s (2010) larger discussion of this topic as it offers a 
nuanced view of both the divergences and commonalities of pain as presented by Sopho-
cles and pain as understood by the modern audience of Sophocles’ play. Perhaps even 
more pertinent, however, is Budelmann’s recognition (2010: 112) of translatability as a 
crucial point in his analysis: “As a consequence of the interplay between nature and cul-
ture, Sophocles’ experiences and conception of pain are different from mine … but at 
the same time eminently translatable.” One might recognize translatability also as a key 
feature of the experiences of Gilgamesh in the opening passages of this chapter. And 
yet, the translatability of the experience and conception of physical pain – and for that 
matter, of various emotions – does not excuse us from the task of both recognizing and 
elucidating the specific ways in which our own experiences (on a larger cultural or even 
more specific individual level) diverge from those of others. Explorations of larger is-
sues of translatability, empathy, and commonalities of human experience from an ar-
chaeological perspective appear in Tarlow 2000. 
29  Fuller (1983: 3-4), as Eagleton, was significantly influenced by the thinking of Timpa-
naro, and by the latter’s suggestion that much of art touches on the fundamentals of hu-
man experience: “birth, infancy, love, sexual reproduction, ageing, death, and our sense 
of smallness given the limitless of the cosmos.” 
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lematic and controversial, approaches to images and artworks, including 
those developing out of the still-nascent fields of neuroaesthetics and 
neuroarthistory. (These fields are discussed at the end of this chapter in 
brief but are certainly worthy of consideration at much greater length.)  
Konstan’s and Fuller’s sharp elucidations, from either side of the prob-
lem of engaging with the (art)works of other cultures, underscore the need 
to chart a middle course between, to put it somewhat tritely, culture and 
nature. To suggest that the works of other cultures are fundamentally inac-
cessible to us from an emotional or other vantage point is surely a fallacy; 
our capacity to appreciate and be affected by these works is grounded in 
our common humanity and human experience. But equally fallacious, in the 
study of art or any other human endeavor, is the failure to recognize or 
account for the significant socio-cultural mediation of human experience.30 
Within the discipline of art history, Michael Baxandall’s (1988; first ed. 
1972) sophisticated conceptualization of the Period Eye stands out as a 
model of the type of sensitive and multifaceted analysis that may be yielded 
by the recognition of common human physiology on the one hand and of 
sociocultural (collective) and specific individual experience on the other.31 
In pursuing the future study of emotion in the ancient Near East, then, 
our task as scholars lacking access to first-hand interactions and observa-
tions would thus seem first to be the delineation of the larger system of 
emotions as it is manifested in the material remains (texts, images, artifacts 
and their contexts) of the specific civilization under study, and of what it 
was that the inhabitants of Mesopotamia – or of any of the various other 
regions comprising the ancient Near East – meant by the various terms they 
used for emotional phenomena such as love, fear, and anger.32 Our task in 
                                                     
30  On an even more specific level, there are surely individual as well as cultural diver-
gences in the experience and perception of emotion, as well as other phenomena, a point 
already well taken by scholars working on the ancient world and its arts; see, for exam-
ple, Budelmann 2010: 112 (specifically on emotion); fn. 28 above. The psychologist 
Robert Solso (1994: 102), discussing encounters with artworks specifically, observed 
that “basic perception is fixed by physiological structures that are jointly enjoyed by all 
members of the species … [but b]oth individual psychology [including larger cultural 
experience and knowledge] and common physiology contribute to the perception of art.” 
See also, with specific respect to Mesopotamia, the discussion in Pongratz-Leisten and 
Sonik 2015: 52ff. 
31  Baxandall’s (1988; first ed. 1972) study is not without its own issues, and some of the 
criticisms lodged against it remain potent ones; for a useful summary of the Period 
Eye’s reception and critique, see Langdale 1998. And yet, it remains an extraordinarily 
powerful demonstration of the need to elucidate the sociocultural mediation of even 
seemingly universal human capacities and experiences (specifically with respect to ways 
of seeing). The failure to recognize or address this type of mediation has, most recently, 
constituted a near-fatal flaw in scholarship arising out of the developing fields of neu-
roaesthetics and neuroarthistory; it is particularly evident in some of the foundational 
studies (i.e. Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999; Zeki 1999). 
32  I do not by any means wish to suggest that the boundaries of Sumerian or Akkadian 
terms for or experiences of such emotions will correspond to those of our own, or even 
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this regard differs from that of Classical scholars in that we lack the types 
of explicit discourse on emotions extant for Greece and Rome that has been 
supplied primarily by philosophers and intellectuals such as Aristotle, Plato, 
Cicero, Seneca, and Galen. (We do possess, however, and I cannot over-
emphasize the significance of this, a very rich literary corpus from Mesopo-
tamia, as well as numerous other texts within which a striking array of 
emotions is expressed and encountered; these are ripe for such meticulous 
and compelling investigations as have been undertaken into, for example, 
the Greek epics and tragedies, as well as, more recently, into inscriptions 
and diverse other textual sources.33) Our task differs from that of Classical 
scholars also, or so I would argue, in that it is incumbent on us to open up 
sites of understanding in addition to focusing on divergences. Classical 
scholars must contend with the assumption, an incorrect one, that the emo-
tional systems of the ancient Greeks and Romans were contiguous with or 
even identical to that of the contemporary Western world (Konstan 2006: 
5),34 which itself can hardly be conceived in homogenous or monolithic 
terms. Near Eastern scholars must contend with underlying assumptions or 
fears, equally false, that we, the contemporary Western we, may have little 
or nothing in common with the peoples and cultures of the ancient Near 
East. 
If we possess different types of sources and confront different assump-
tions than scholars of the Classical world, then, we are yet well supplied 
with a very diverse array of written compositions, as well as other types of 
pictorial and archaeological evidence, that have the potential to offer sig-
nificant and nuanced insights into the conceptualization and materialization 
                                                                                                                          
that the same range of emotions will be present. But until these boundaries have been 
thoroughly defined (i.e. Kramer 1958, 1988; Jaques 2006; Foster 2011), we are limited 
to applying our own terms with their contemporary boundaries intact. 
33  See, however, the objections of Oppenheim (1967) in fn. 10 above. 
34  Konstan (2006: 5) acknowledges that it might seem somewhat peculiar to query whether 
the ancient Greeks possessed the same emotions as we do: “We respond profoundly to 
their epic and tragic poetry, laugh at their comedies, are moved by their love lyrics, and 
look to their philosophy as a model for our own. How could this be the case if their emo-
tional repertoire was in some important respect different from ours? Besides, emotions 
such as love, fear, and anger are surely basic human capacities, and their manifestations 
must be similar everywhere, whether in antiquity or today.” And yet, as he demon-
strates, emotional categories from Greek contexts (as from Aristotle’s Rhetoric) repeat-
edly cut across, collapse, disappear from, or have no equivalent in our own categories. 
One is ultimately able to delineate and understand such differences “only through a 
close examination of emotional language [italics mine] in cultures foreign to one’s own” 
(Konstan 2006: 16). With respect to now-dead foreign cultures, Mesopotamia as well as 
Greece, I would again underscore the need for an initial model of a system of emotions 
constructed through a meticulous, sensitive, and multifaceted consideration of the extant 
written sources directly or indirectly addressing pertinent topics (see further, however, 
my caveats on the implications for the pictorial sources and their analysis with respect to 
emotion in the main text below).  
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of emotions in the Near East. What we are lacking, for the moment, is a 
density of: 
 
1) Large-scale, meticulously thorough, and multifaceted explorations of 
specific emotions across a range of extant contexts (written, pictorial, 
archaeological) that have provided the necessary foundations for the 
study of emotion in other fields of study. These include for the Classical 
world, as just a small sampling, studies of honor and shame (Cairns 
1993); anger-like emotions and their restraint (Braund and Most: 2004; 
Harris 2001; Konstan 2008); remorse (Fulkerson 2013); pity (Sternberg 
2005); and envy and jealousy (Konstan and Rutter 2003; Caston 2012; 
Sanders 2014). Initial studies with respect to Mesopotamia include the 
preliminary and relatively brief but foundational treatments of Kramer 
(1958, 1988) and the extensive philological approaches to and analyses 
of emotion in Sumerian sources especially that have been outlined by 
Jaques (2006 and in this volume). 
2) Smaller and more intensive studies examining the deployment of par-
ticular emotions in narrower and more delimited corpora of written 
compositions (i.e. the contributions in Chaniotis 2012a; Chaniotis and 
Ducrey 2013a; also Chaniotis 2012b, 2013). Some pertinent studies for 
Mesopotamia, albeit often dealing with emotion and feeling obliquely or 
peripherally in the course of pursuing other topics, should be noted here 
as they will form necessary foundations for future work on emotion. On 
fear, for example, see Geller 1999: 49-55, Stol 1999: 61-65; on grief, 
see Cohen 2005: 15-24, 48-50, Delnero, forthcoming, Jacobsen 1980, 
Jacques 2012, Valk 2016; on love, see Harris 2000: passim, Nissinen 
2001, Westenholz 1995; and on anger, see Durand, Marti, and Römer 
2016, Fox 1995, Hirsch 1967. Important translations of primary source 
material vital to future researches also exist (i.e. Sefati 1998 [love poet-
ry]; Cohen 1988 [grief and lamentation]; Oshima 2014 [suffering, asso-
ciated with various emotional states]); George 2003 and Foster 2005 
[epic poetry]). 
3) Opportunities to examine the substantial corpus of pictorial and ar-
chaeological data potentially relevant to refining a Mesopotamian sys-
tem of emotions alongside a fully fleshed model of such a system con-
structed through analysis of the texts. (Such opportunities, however, will 
surely become available in light of the below.) 
 
With an existing foundation of expansive published primary source mate-
rial that is ripe for explicit and systematic analysis, of a number of studies 
at least obliquely touching on emotions and emotional expression, and of a 
range of new publications directly addressing one or more specific emotion 
in Mesopotamia – including the current volume, the recent edited volume 
of Durand, Marti, and Römer (2016) on divine anger and repentance, and a 
forthcoming study by Delnero on the Sumerian laments and emotional con-
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tagion – however, the development of emotion as a subject of critical interest 
for Mesopotamia, and for Near Eastern studies more generally, is clearly 
underway.  
3. Future Research Directions 
The contributions contained within this volume on visualizing emotion in 
the ancient Near East have provided a significant service in assessing the 
contemporary state of the field, and in exploiting our current knowledge of 
both emotions and images in the Near East. I would suggest, as the field 
gains ground, several directions for future research that are likely to prove 
productive. 
3.1. Comparative research 
While recognizing that individual cultures operate on the basis of distinct 
systems of emotions, necessarily so if we accept that emotions are socially 
and culturally mediated, it would seem incumbent on future researchers to 
examine the ways in which scholars have grappled with the delineation and 
conceptualization of emotions in other cultures. There is an extensive, mul-
tifaceted, and rapidly expanding corpus of scholarship on emotion in con-
temporary foreign contexts (i.e. Desjarlais 1992; Lynch 1990; Gregg 2005: 
90-133; Marks 1995; Matsumoto 1996; Sundararajan 2015)35 as well as in 
ancient ones (see above). The latter corpus, importantly, encompasses a 
dense, diverse, and expanding number of works on pictorial representations 
of emotion and on body language, gesture, and nonverbal communication 
in both image and text (i.e. Aldrete 1999; Bodiou et al. 2006; Brilliant 
1963; Bremmer and Roodenburg 1991; Cairns 2005; Graf 1991; Gruber 
1980; Masséglia 2013, 2015; McNiven 2000; Oakley 2005; O’Sullivan 
2011).36 The pictorial studies among this group, if underpinned by founda-
tions constructed by thorough and meticulous text-based research expliat-
ing their pertinent cultural contexts, are neither constricted by nor subervient 
to these foundations. 
                                                     
35  Worth looking to also, and highlighting the developing significance of emotion as a 
multifaceted field of enquiry with diverse implications, are Reddy (2001), Plamper 
(2015 [2012]), Röttger-Rössler and Markowitsch (2009), Corrigan’s (2004, 2008) vol-
umes on emotion and religion, and numerous specialized studies including Miller (1998) 
on disgust and Moscoso (2012) on pain. 
36  With specific respect to the ancient Near East, a number of smaller scale and more 
specific studies on gesture and body language have been published in addition to 
Gruber’s (1980) rather monumental cross-cultural study on non-verbal communication: 
on Mesopotamia (especially Assyria) see also, for example, Magen 1986; Goldman 
1990; Fox 1995; Cifarelli 1998; Bonatz 2002 and in this volume. 
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This type of comparative work offers, for one, insight into the numerous 
theoretical, methodological, and other obstacles that have already been 
encountered, deliberately or unthinkingly ignored, or successfully navi-
gated in the attempt to delineate emotions – and their materializations – in 
other foreign cultural contexts. It also has the potential to suggest larger 
research directions and issues that have not yet been identified in the con-
text of our own field of study (i.e. Chaniotis and Ducrey 2013b: 11ff.). 
And, most vitally, if also least directly, it functions as an important mecha-
nism of cognitive dilation, enabling a significantly expanded recognition of 
the enormous array of possibilities and ways of viewing, constructing, and 
experiencing the world: as such, it may facilitate the type of Peleus-like 
dexterity, albeit here cognitive rather than physical, necessary to grapple 
with so protean and Thetis-like a problem as elucidating emotion in a for-
eign and dead cultural context. 
All this is not, by any means, to suggest that Near Eastern scholars may 
find in such comparative researches specific answers or precise approaches 
or methodologies that may be mapped, unmediated, onto their own fields or 
contexts of study. But it is to reiterate that the value we acknowledge in 
looking beyond Mesopotamia to, for example, Egypt and the Biblical world 
(and while these may possess many things in common with Mesopotamia, 
they are also characterized by significant major and minor divergences) 
might be – particularly for a subject such as emotion, for which a dense 
corpus of research exists with respect to other regions, ancient and modern 
– rather more broadly recognized. 
3.2. Delineation of a system of emotion(s) in socio-cultural context 
In looking ahead to the further development of research on emotion in the 
ancient Near East, a primary impediment, if by no means an insurmount-
able one, with respect to analyzing pictorial as well as written sources is the 
ongoing dearth of large-scale, nuanced, and numerous studies of specific 
emotions across a very broad range of extant contexts (though see various 
of the sections in Jaques 2006, and the chapters by Charpin, Marti, Ziegler, 
Cohen, Anthonioz, and Durand in Durand, Marti, and Römer 2016) that 
would permit the modeling of a comprehensive system of emotion in Mes-
opotamia.37 
The contributions in the present volume have explored both the sorts of 
broad cross-cultural similarities in emotion that permit scholars to produc-
tively study the phenomenon in foreign contexts and the sorts of socially 
and culturally specific divergences that continue to render this endeavor 
                                                     
37  A start on this enormous task has been made; for some of the initial studies with respect 
to Mesopotamia, see fns. 16, 23 above. 
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such a slippery, challenging, and interesting field of study. As a necessary 
next step, then, in seeking to identify and understand in more nuanced and 
consistent ways than are currently possible, specific pictorial and verbal 
expressions of fear, anger, joy, grief, etc., it is incumbent on us to identify 
the boundaries of individual emotions in the polities or cultures under con-
sideration and to develop, insofar as possible from the extant sources, an 
understanding of the larger system of emotion at work in any one region – 
in some cases perhaps even limited further by time period – of the ancient 
Near East. Significant further insights into more narrowly constructed and 
defined pictorial considerations, as into the role of the specific social status, 
gender, age, and situational or display context of a particular figural repre-
sentation or image on the expression or communication of emotion, also 
await the construction of such a system(s).38 In the furthering of this partic-
ular pursuit, it would seem extremely important not to elide the boundaries 
between the various polities of the ancient Near East (as, for example, those 
between Mesopotamia and Egypt or Mesopotamia and the various polities 
of the Levant), or to begin from the assumption that geographical conti-
guity is associated with any very significant continuity in system of emo-
tion. 
It may seem that the burden of this type of research falls most heavily 
on philologists and text-based scholars. And indeed – at least for the mo-
ment – this is the case. The contributions in this volume, in assessing and 
exploiting to the extent possible our current capabilities with respect to 
emotion and images across a range of Near Eastern contexts, have under-
scored the need, as a requisite next step, to construct thoroughly detailed, 
multifaceted, and meticulously explored models of the specific systems of 
emotions operative within the polities or cultures under study. Until such 
models have been constructed, we are by necessity constrained to discuss-
ing emotion in the most general terms and, moreover, to bluntly seeking 
our own conceptualization of emotion(s) within foreign contexts without 
accounting for significant and culturally specific divergences. (The literary 
case study from the SB Gilgamesh Epic that opens this chapter is precisely 
such a blunt approach, even if it is included primarily to highlight both the 
need, and the availability of rich source material, for more specific and 
nuanced approaches.)  
All this is absolutely not a call to privilege the textual sources over the 
pictorial ones, nor an assertion that the written sources will explain the 
visual ones, nor even a suggestion that pictorial sources do not and will not 
supply significant additional dimensions to our understanding of emotion in 
Mesopotamia beyond those already outlined in this volume. In this regard, 
the development of Classical scholarship on emotion is worth raising again 
here: the analysis of images and objects may be underpinned by and often 
                                                     
38  See, for example, the recent studies of Masséglia 2013, 2015 on the Greek world. 
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proceeds alongside or in cooperation with the results of textual research but 
it is neither subordinate to nor constrained or directed by the latter. 
3.3. Emotion and the ancient Arts: where we go from here 
With specific respect to future work on images/objects/artworks and emo-
tions, two primary avenues of research present themselves and are dis-
cussed in brief below: (1) the emotional “content” of artworks; (2) the emo-
tions evoked by artworks. (A third clear and interrelated avenue of re-
search, albeit one beyond the specific purview of this chapter, pertains to 
the affective operations of artworks, literary and pictorial, with respect to 
the ancient and to a modern audience.39) While distinguished here to facili-
tate the illumination of certain specific issues pertaining to each, these ave-
nues of research are in many respects intertwined so that examination of 
any one will serve also to some degree to elucidate the others. 
3.3.1. Emotional content 
With respect to analyzing and identifying the emotional content of specific 
pictorial compositions, the emotions with which specific scenes or figures 
were imbued and/or the emotions these were designed to convey to the 
viewer, art historians have long recognized the need to look beyond the 
face. This is true not only for Mesopotamian art (i.e. Bonatz in this volume) 
but also, importantly, for other more familiar forms of Western as well as 
non-Western art.  
On a particularly dark and dreary December afternoon in Berlin this past 
winter, I found myself at the Bode Museum for the first time in many years 
and spent several hours wandering through the galleries. I had been deep in 
thought that day about the nature and effects of emotions and the success 
and failure of their control, and was at once disconcerted, compelled, and 
repulsed as I walked through the collections and encountered expression-
less face after expressionless face, even on figures otherwise physically or 
emotionally stricken – even in scenes otherwise depicting horrors (Figs. 3-
4). This phenomenon, characteristic of much earlier and even some later 
arts of the Middle Ages, was intriguingly taken up by Sauerländer (2006: 
4), who noted that facial expression had moral dimensions in medieval 
philosophy and theology:  
The passionate physiognomy was regarded simply as sinful, and in the 
realm of sin there can be no order. According to the eighth-century Anglo-
Saxon scholar Alcuin, ‘The face should be orderly, the lips should not be 
                                                     
39  See further on this fns. 18, 19 above. 
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distorted, no immeasured opening should extend the mouth, nor should the 
eyebrows be raised or cast down.’ Nearly four hundred years later, the theo-
logian Hugh of Saint Victor (1096-1141) wrote, ‘The face is the mirror of 
discipline which must be guarded the more because what appears as the sign 
of sin on the face cannot be concealed.’40  
It is perhaps worth considering this phenomenon of expressionless or se-
rene faces in earlier medieval art in juxtaposition with what Sauerländer 
(2006: 9-10) refers to as the “Gothic grin,” appearing by about 1250 CE, 
first on the faces of the blessed in medieval art but soon thereafter also on a 
range of other types of faces. The signification of this “grin” remains 
somewhat complex: it might signal the happiness of the blessed but is also 
used, for example, to signify female gentility (Sauerländer 2006: 10). Facial 
expression, whether present or absent, is by no means easily correlated with 
any particular state of mind or body but may also be intimately tied into 
social status or position, or function as another type of social, political, or 
cultural marker. 
With specific respect to Mesopotamia, it is certainly worth exploring 
further, then, the socially and culturally specific contexts within and rea-
sons for the relative expressionlessness of various types of faces, as well as 
considering technical and other factors (these do not seem to be deeply 
rooted in any artisanal incapacity)41 limiting the representation or visualiza-
tion of specific expressions: 
(1) Mesopotamia’s extant artworks were intended to act in numerous 
and multifaceted ways in and on the world: much of the pictorial corpus, 
more specifically, belongs to the category of Machtkunst (official art), de-
signed to serve the ideological and other ends of the polity and ruling author-
                                                     
40  Little (2006: xv) noted that the majority of the heads appearing in the 2006-2007 Metro-
politan Museum of Art exhibition “Set in Stone,” to which Sauerländer’s essay was an 
accompaniment, were similarly expressionless as they belonged primarily to holy fig-
ures or to the personifications of religious concepts, and so might be regarded as “visual 
representations of a serene state or transcendent happiness.” It is not only holy figures 
that may be represented with this peculiar expressionlessness: a study by Ambrose 
(2011: 4) elucidates the dearth of facial or even bodily expression of the damned on the 
early twelfth century Conques Tympanum as based in a conceptualization of “eternal 
suffering in terms of a profound loss of bodily control.” More intriguingly, he explores 
medieval understandings of pain and suffering as impressive rather than expressive: “the 
body serves primarily as a vehicle to transmit pain to the soul.” See also, on other ap-
proaches to the medieval face and emotional expression or lack thereof, Little and 
Maines 2007; Brilliant 2007; Dale 2007; Gertsman 2010. On the emotional complexity 
of the Pietà, and the range of meanings potentially communicated by Mary’s facial ex-
pression (or lack thereof) and gestures in the various extant pictorial representations of 
the subject, see see Forsyth 1953; Eriksson 2016. 
41  Leys (2010) offers useful insight into the difficulties involved in capturing facial expres-
sions conveying very specific emotions, even in photographs, and into unresolved ques-
tions on the universality of such facial expressions in her compelling study on fear as a 
scientific object. 
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ity.42 We should understand this category of art object as rigorously con-
trolled and carefully formulated. This did not preclude its innovation, or the 
development of striking visual forms of significant interest to the viewer, 
but it ensured (in great part) that the emotional and other content of official 
images was very specifically prescribed in service to particular ends.43 
(2) Individual figures depicted in two-dimensional (official) pictorial 
representation are almost exclusively depicted in profile. Certain types of 
figures may occasionally be depicted frontally, as specific goddesses from 
the third millennium BCE (Asher-Greve 2003) and monsters (Sonik 
2013c), a mode of representation that may have altered the nature of their 
interaction with or effects upon the viewer but that does not typically seem 
to have been exploited to communicate any great nuance in the specific 
emotional states of the individual figures so represented. It is worth consid-
ering an image such as that of Nergal slaying the (en face) Cyclops (George 
2012), in which the physical pain of the Cyclops is communicated not by 
its facial expression but by the bowing of its body, a sort of hunching over 
its belly as Nergal’s sword penetrates its midsection (Fig. 5). 
(3) Narrative pictorial compositions, offering frameworks within which 
emotional content might be elaborated and conveyed to, as well as fully 
understood by, the viewer are relatively rare in Mesopotamia’s visual arts 
until the complex historical and battle relief narratives of the early to mid-
first millennium BCE Neo-Assyrian palaces (Winter 1981, 1985; Sonik 
2014). Those narrative compositions that do survive to the present day typ-
ically belong to the category of official art: figures are typically rendered in 
profile, and gesture seems to have been developed as the primary means of 
expressing and perhaps also evoking any emotion (i.e. Fox 1995; Cifarelli 
1998; Bonatz 2002). 
(4) Many of the extant examples of popular visual art, or of images 
straddling the line between official and popular or domestic (Sonik 2014) – 
within which expressions of emotional and other personal states of being 
might be (and are) more varied – are miniature or quite small in scale and 
so do not permit the effective exploitation of the face as a site or medium of 
expression. 
(5) Even the extant popular arts, moreover, do not escape a significant 
degree of deliberate and strictured formulation. This is not a criticism; the 
pictorial formulas employed and deliberately deployed in the arts of Meso-
potamia preclude neither significant variation in nor the encapsulation and 
communication of an impressive density and array of meanings (Sonik 
                                                     
42  That much of Mesopotamia’s official art functions to ideological (Ross 2005) or reli-
gious (Ornan 2005: 8-9) ends does not preclude its possession of other significant as-
pects or roles (aesthetic, religious, etc.); see Winter 1995, 2002; Sonik 2014.  
43  See the useful studies on emotional expression and restraint in the context of Mayan art: 
Marcus 1974; Miller 1983; Houston 2001; Houston, Stuart, and Taube 2006: 180-201; 
also fn. 6 above. 
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2014, 2015).44 The formulation referenced is due in part to the modes of 
production employed for the popular arts, which include (for the terracotta 
plaques and some of the figurines) mass replication through the use of 
molds. 
All of the above is not to say that faces hold no interest for us at all. 
Some faces, as have been variously discussed in this volume, appear to be 
more benign than serene or expressionless – though I would not, without 
significantly more support than is available, interpret these as conveying 
any specific emotional states. One might look to the phenomenon of the 
“Archaic smile” characteristic of Greek sculpture during the eponymous 
Archaic Period (ca. 700-480 BCE) for an example of a widely deployed 
seemingly benign facial expression that is not yet associated with any very 
specific emotion (Fig. 6).45 Instead, I would suggest we might find it pro-
ductive to explore the juxtaposition of faces and bodies, with specific re-
spect on the one hand to those faces and bodies belonging to figures con-
stitutive of Self (the gods, the king, his soldiers, and his people) and on the 
other to the faces and bodies belonging to figures constitutive of the Other 
(various monstrous figures, wild animals, and human enemies). This is only 
an initial model to consider, and certainly one pointed to by my own re-
searches (Sonik 2013b), but it is one that yields immediate if still limited 
results. In various combat scenes, for example, one might note that the se-
rene faces of figures belonging to the category of Self (mouths are closed, 
facial musculature is smooth and unruffled) are combined with bodies in 
action and yet neither straining nor disordered: musculature is defined and, 
often, impressive but never overtaxed or even exerted to the point of bend-
ing or bowing the body. The faces and bodies of Others, particularly mon-
strous Others, are worth attending to in both the monumental and the minor 
arts of Mesopotamia (i.e. Cifarelli 1998). Faces may be depicted with 
mouths open, sometimes with articulating tongues; bodies may be turned 
away from combat, suggestive of impending defeat or rout, or may be 
straining, contorted, or disordered in futile resistance (Figs. 7-8).46 If intri-
guing, it is worth noting that this type of study is not likely to yield any 
very significant insight into the very specific emotional states of being of 
                                                     
44  This is true, too, of the literary arts: the various Chaoskampf narratives extant from 
Mesopotamia, for example, may share a common framework and superficial plot and yet 
vary significantly in their nuances and ultimate implications; see, for example, specifi-
cally on Enuma elish, Sonik 2008, 2009, 2012b, 2013a. 
45  A detailed consideration of the Archaic smile, its derivation, its variations, and the range 
of its possible and plausible significations is presented in Stieber 2004: 49-55. 
46  The juxtaposition of ordered (rulers, Self) with disordered (corpses, enemies, Others) 
bodies is notable also in contexts beyond those of the ancient Near East (see fns. 6, 43 
above) and often deployed to specific ideological or even propagandistic ends. See also 
the arts of ancient Greece, as the red-figure “Antaios Krater” by Euphronios (Louvre 
G103) depicting Herakles, his face serene, wrestling with Antaios, overmastered and 
gritting his teeth. 
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the participants involved in the action: for that, as various of the contribu-
tions in this volume have noted, we must look instead to bodies and to 
compositions. 
The study of the body and, more specifically pertinent to the topic of 
this chapter, of non-verbal communication in the ancient arts has been of 
longstanding interest to scholars, with a particular concentration of im-
portant studies focusing on Classical and medieval contexts (i.e. Aldrete 
1999; Brilliant 1963; Cairns 2005; Corbeill 2004; Masséglia 2015). While 
the topic has been and must be pursued through written sources (i.e. Gruber 
1980; Boegenhold 1999; Bremmer and Roodenberg 1991) as well as pic-
torial or visual ones, this is a particular field of study in which the close 
consideration of images is vital.  
Pictorial representations of the body in Mesopotamia necessarily di-
verge in numerous respects from those of, for example, ancient Greece: the 
types of naturalism that characterized the visual arts of the latter were only 
briefly exploited in Mesopotamia (Sonik 2015: 162-64) for reasons that 
(again) had little to do with any lack in artistic or artisanal virtuosity (Win-
ter 1998). And yet studies such as that of Masséglia (2015) on Body Lan-
guage in Hellenistic Art and Society present practical models for research 
into of nonverbal communication that might be adapted and nuanced for 
specific application across various contexts in the ancient Near East.47 She 
divides her analysis into three parts:  
 
1) Posture (Masséglia 2015: 6), denoting “the overall arrangement of the 
body … [and] encompass[ing] considerations such as body weight and 
relationships of relaxation and tension with the body.” In compositional 
groups, this often provides “the greatest insight into interpersonal rela-
tionships and relative social status.” Of the three categories of analysis, 
this may seem the least relevant to any study of Mesopotamia’s visual 
arts, in which bodies are typically conventionally rather than nat-
uralistically rendered. And yet it would be erroneous to dismiss it whol-
ly as a point of study: one need only consider the taut musculature of 
Gudea’s bared and powerful right arm (Fig. 9), juxtaposed with the dec-
orously covered features of his otherwise rather block-like and sedately 
posed body in his numerous royal sculptures (Winter 1989), to be re-
minded that internal relationships between the physical features of indi-
vidual figures in Mesopotamia’s pictorial contexts are worth regarding.48 
                                                     
47  A substantial treatment of nonverbal communication as verbally expressed in Semitic 
languages and textual contexts (Akkadian, Biblical Hebrew, Ugaritic) was published al-
ready by Gruber in 1980. 
48  Questions of physical coherence, and specifically of the incorporation and juxtaposition 
of disparate features in a single body, are worth pursuing rather further as they have sig-
nificant implications also for the numerous Mischwesen or, better, Zwischenwesen 
(Sonik 2013b) so prominently featured in Mesopotamia’s visual and literary arts. 
 EMOTION AND THE ANCIENT ARTS 241 
2) Gesture (Masséglia 2015: 6-7), denoting “a discrete bodily motif, usu-
ally of the hands and arms, independent from the rest of the body.” Of 
the three categories discussed here, that of gesture has been the most in-
tensively exploited to date with respect to Mesopotamia’s (especially 
Assyria’s) pictorial arts (Gruber 1980; Magen 1986; Goldman 1990; 
Fox 1995; Cifarelli 1998; Bonatz 2002 and in this volume) though much 
remains to be done. In seeking to understand both the emotional states 
of represented figures within the frame of their compositions and larger 
contexts, as well the emotional effects they were intended to produce 
within the viewer, we must indeed often look to the position of the arms 
and hands. It is worth noting that the emphasis on hands rather than 
faces as meaningful sites of communication – of narrative or action, 
content, and emotion – is by no means unique to the visual arts of Meso-
potamia. Important studies on gesture in the Middle Ages, for example, 
include those of Althoff 2010; Barasch 1976, 1987a; Gombrich 1978, 
1982; and Maguire 1977. 
3) Body actions (Masséglia 2015: 7), denoting “those arrangements of the 
body which communicate a narrative.” Of the three elements Masséglia 
identifies of body language, body actions may be the most deliberately 
contrived by the artist or artisan and yet are invaluable in elucidating 
“the relationship between social group and social function: it is clear 
from the distribution of body actions that certain individuals were con-
sidered suitable for certain narratives, and others not” (ibid.). Relevant 
here are not only those explicit narrative compositions from Mesopo-
tamia that primarily convey historical or battle accounts but also certain 
iconic representations or specific display poses adopted by kings and by 
gods (where the latter are anthropomorphically rendered). Particularly 
worth analyzing is the mastery pose, which sees defeated or subjugated 
enemies or servants located beneath the foot of the mastering deity and 
which is known both from text and image (Westenholz 2000; Sonik 
2015: 155ff., 177ff.). 
 
I am inclined to separate out from the above categories – though there may 
well be overlap with one or the other of these depending on context – and 
highlight as a significant point of investigation also the extant representa-
tions (verbal and pictorial) of bodily emissions such as blood, semen, vom-
it, and tears. The circumstances under which these are produced and rec-
orded may not necessarily be bound up in or associated with the explicit 
expression of emotion but a systematic analysis of these circumstances is at 
minimum likely to yield important related information.49 
                                                     
49  While this thought was set in train by one of lions spewing blood or bile in the famous 
orthostat reliefs of Ashurbanipal (Strommenger and Hirmer 1962: fig. 250), it is tears as 
material and sensible signifiers of specific states of being that seem a particularly press-
ing topic to pursue. Even a cursory survey of the contexts (albeit all textual) in which 
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As a final note on “body language,” the significance of the contexts – 
public or private; domestic or official; legal (Charpin 2010: 43-52), medical 
(Scurlock and Andersen 2005: 431, 610; Wiggermann 1992: 72, 112), 
mythological (Sonik 2014), ritual and worship (Ornan 2005: 76-90, 118ff.), 
warfare (Bahrani 2001: 125-29), and specific landscapes (Collins 2006) – 
in which bodies pose, gesture, or undertake action, and in which the objects 
bearing these bodies are displayed or erected, can hardly be overlooked. 
Systematically defining and understanding such contexts in Mesopotamia 
specifically is complicated both by the fact that two (or more) contexts may 
interpenetrate in unexpected or unfamiliar ways and, again, by the fact that 
contexts delineated in written compositions may be rendered unrecog-
nizable in or even significantly diverge from those emphasized in pictorial 
sources. Nevertheless, this remains an important next frontier in the schol-
arship on the body in Mesopotamia, and on embodied emotional and other 
states of being. 
3.3.2. Emotional evocation and the production of emotional states of be-
ing 
If we recognize art as, at minimum, a social medium relying on the pres-
ence of the audience (Masséglia 2015: 6) or even, and particularly so with 
respect to Mesopotamia (as in the case of the ṣalmu), possessed of some 
degree of agency and personhood (Gell 1998: 126ff.; Pongratz-Leisten and 
Sonik 2015: 12; Sonik 2015: 162ff.) in its own right, any investigation of 
emotion and art (visual, literary, performing) must necessarily consider the 
interaction between the artwork and the beholder. 
It is unsurprisingly difficult, at a distance of several millennia, to recon-
struct the types of emotional responses that individual (art)works would 
have produced in the ancient audience or beholder. The famous example of 
Ashurbanipal’s gorgeously executed lion-hunt reliefs (Fig. 10) offers a case 
in point: was the audience actually intended to sympathize with the dead, 
dying, and suffering beasts as they spew blood or bile; collapse in ago-
                                                                                                                          
weeping and tears occur yields striking results: in the Sumerian Inana and Dumuzid cy-
cle, the hapless Dumuzid weeps and the sun god Utu accepts his tears and aids the shep-
herd (i.e. Dumuzid’s Dream ll. 174, 200, 235; Dumuzid and Geshtinana l. 33); tears are 
wept by various figures – including the hero Gilgamesh, his companion Enkidu, the 
flood hero Uta-napishti, and the goddess Ishtar – across the range of Sumerian and Ak-
kadian Gilgamesh narratives (George 2003: 141, 197, 205, 217, 291, 365, 456, 474, 565, 
623, 637, 639, 713, 723); Ereshkigal, queen of the netherworld, sheds tears in the Akka-
dian Nergal and Ereshkigal; and the king himself (hopefully) sheds tears during the 
akitu or New Year’s festival (Bidmead 2004: 78ff.). Significant studies on tears in other 
historical (especially medieval), socio-cultural, and religious contexts include those of 
Barasch 1987b; Patton and Hawley 2005; and Gertsman 2012. With respect to bodily 
emissions more generally in Mesopotamia, the extant corpus of medical texts (Scurlock 
and Andersen 2005) seems especially worth exploiting. 
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nized, contorted, and disturbingly human sprawls; or drag their broken 
bodies onwards in some futile and forlorn hope of escape and survival 
(Strommenger and Hirmer 1962: figs. 249-250, 255; Amiet 1980: figs. 127, 
624-631; Barnett and Forman 1960: figs. 67-75)? Or, as the lions were 
representatives of the dangerous and chaotic wilderness, enemies to be 
rightfully destroyed, did their devastation evoke pleasurable satisfaction?50 
The answer, I suspect, lies somewhere in between these two possibilities.  
On the one hand, the artists of Mesopotamia do not refrain, even in the 
most exquisitely rendered of works, from depicting the mutilation or 
scourging of the enemy, suggesting that some degree of satisfaction and 
pleasure was taken in such subject matter: the Early Dynastic Period (ca. 
2450 BCE) Stele of the Vultures depicts the disembodied heads of the van-
quished at the mercy of the scavengers; the Neo-Assyrian palace reliefs 
depict the flaying, impalement, and other mutilation of defeated enemies. 
On the other hand, the specific physical contortions of Ashurbanipal’s lions, 
and the near human appearance of their bodies while splayed in suffering or 
death, seems to enable a disturbing physical resonance with, as well as 
empathetic response to, their pain. Freedberg and Gallese (2007: 197), ex-
ploring the functioning of bodily empathy and mirror neurons with respect 
to artworks in an early and important entry in the burgeoning field of 
neuroaesthetics, argued that: 
For instance, in the case of Michelangelo’s Prisoners, [the beholders’] re-
sponses often take the form of a felt activation of the muscles that appear to 
be activated within the sculpture itself, as if in perfect consonance with Michel-
angelo’s intention of showing his figures struggle to free themselves from 
their material matrix … physical empathy easily transmutes into a feeling of 
empathy for the emotional consequences of the ways in which the body is 
damaged or mutilated. Even when the image contains no overt emotional 
component, a sense of bodily resonance can arise. These are all instances in 
which beholders might find themselves automatically simulating the emo-
tional expression, the movement or even the implied movement within the 
representation. Simulation occurs not only in response to figurative works 
but also in response to the experience of architectural forms, such as a 
twisted Romanesque column.51 
While work on art and mirror neurons is ongoing, and while the mecha-
nisms through which images of pain and other emotions evoke empathy in 
the viewer remain contested and in need of significant further study and 
                                                     
50  It is by no means an accident that the contorted poses of the dead lions mirror the con-
torted poses of dead human enemies in the Neo-Assyrian palace reliefs; see, for exam-
ple, Barnett and Forman 1960: figs. 110-116. 
51  See further Freedberg 2006, 2008; Gallese 2011. For a nuanced consideration of some of 
Freedberg and Gallese’s claims, see Schott 2015. See also Mallgrave (2015) on architec-
ture and embodied mirror mechanisms. 
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refinement (Schott 2015), I am inclined to suggest at least the possibility 
that a physical or bodily resonance with Ashurbanipal’s twisted, agonized, 
and broken lions might have precipitated, for the ancient viewer as well as 
for the modern one, a degree of emotional empathy. This and other ap-
proaches currently under development in the fields of neuroaesthetics and 
neuroarthistory – even if still too frequently reductive and contested – offer 
potential alternate entry points into the emotional states that ancient art-
works did or could (and continue to) evoke or produce in their beholders.52 
As a last note on the subject of exploring at least general emotional 
states evoked or produced by the artworks of Mesopotamia, the existing 
scholarship on aesthetics, light, and masterworks is an important resource. 
In her corpus of work on the subject, Winter (1994, 1995, 1999, 2002, 
2003, 2012) catalogues the types of emotional reactions elicited by positive 
viewing experiences of artful works: these include joy, delight, admiration, 
and awe. It is the specific audience involved, notably, that determines the 
nature of the reactions recorded (Winter 1995: 2577):  
When the gods are the primary recipients of temple-building projects and of 
votive objects, they constitute the intended audience of the work. Their re-
sponse is described in terms of direct gratification: joy, pleasure, delight … 
However formulaic the phrases may be, the link between seeing and becom-
ing joyful brings clearly into focus the delight associated with the experi-
ence of works [italics mine]. Admiration or awe is the other positive re-
sponse to an object … When ‘the people’ stand before a major work, they 
react to its qualities and overall effect as spectators rather than as primary 
recipients. The same temple or artifact that was greeted with joy by the gods 
evokes intense admiration when scrutinized by individual. 
Winter (2002: 11) further outlines the positive attributes – “well-
ornamented,” possessed of “good form,” “grace,” “vitality,” and “luminosi-
ty,” “light and/or radiance;” and the wielding of “awesome power” – that, 
where possessed by a material, an artwork, an architectural structure, or a 
monument in Mesopotamia, may produce not only a positive viewing expe-
rience but also a positive emotional and even physical response. In an ac-
count preserved on the famous ninth century BCE Sun God Tablet of the 
Babylonian king Nabu-apla-iddina (ca. 888-855 BCE), it is reported that 
the king’s face “beamed in exultation” and that “his spirit rejoiced” (Woods 
2004: 85; Charpin 2013: 65; also CAD s.v. râšu 1a; elēṣu 1a)53 upon be-
holding a clay model of the image of the sun god Shamash. 
Negative viewing experiences, if somewhat more amorphous and di-
verse in their consequences than positive ones, are similarly worth exam-
                                                     
52  Many of these approaches may fall under the larger umbrella of studies on emotional 
contagion; see also the work of Delnero (forthcoming) on the deliberate production of 
specific emotional states in the beholder, as grief, through practices like lamentation. 
53  See further fn. 23 above; also Sonik 2015: 179-80. 
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ining. This chapter opened with a passage from the SB Gilgamesh Epic in 
which the hero’s grief – and all of the associated entangled emotions – were 
precipitated by a material, sensible encounter. It was only when Gilgamesh 
saw the maggot drop from the nostril of Enkidu’s corpse that he accepted 
the reality of Enkidu’s death, and the new functioning of Enkidu’s body as 
a marker of absence rather than presence. It is significant that a similar 
sight, a sensible encounter with death, not only elicits similar feelings of 
grief and dismay but also precipitates the main action, the hero’s extraordi-
nary journey to the Cedar Forest, in the early second millennium BCE Su-
merian narrative Gilgamesh and Huwawa A.  
Speaking to the sun god Utu, from whom he seeks permission and pat-
ronage for his journey, Gilgamesh demands that the god attend to his words 
using phrasing that demands a similar attendance on the part of the audi-
ence. He then shares a near ekphrastic vision of what he has seen and his 
emotional and other responses to this sight: “Utu, I have something to say 
to you – a word in your ear! / I greet you – please pay attention! / In my 
city people are dying, and hearts are full of distress. / People are lost – that 
fills me with dismay. / I craned my neck over the city wall: / corpses in the 
water make the river almost overflow. That is what I see” (GHA ll. 21-26; 
ETCSL).54 These sights, notably, precipitate not only rather entangled emo-
tional states – dismay and grief, desire and ambition, fear and even resigna-
tion – but also tangible (if also somewhat tangled) actions. The death that 
he sees disturbs Gilgamesh but also moves him to attempt a great quest, 
one that will establish the longevity of his name and fame beyond the too-
narrow confines of his lifetime: “Since a man cannot pass beyond the final 
end of life, / I want to set off into the mountains [this references his forth-
coming journey to the Cedar Forest, where he will encounter and slay the 
monstrous guardian Huwawa], to establish my renown there. / Where re-
nown can be established there, I will establish my renown; / and where no 
renown can be established there, I shall establish the renown of the gods.”   
(GHA ll. 30-33; ETCSL). 
It is worth reiterating here that the questions and lines of investigation 
introduced above will not necessarily produce direct insights into indi-
vidual pictorial or even textual compositions. Images and texts diverge in 
numerous respects and may often be deployed to different ends in Mesopo-
tamia (Winter 1985; Sonik 2014). And yet a comprehensive and multi-
pronged investigation exploring even peripheral points in the extant sources 
is required if we are to delineate the system (or systems) of Mesopotamian 
emotion, on the basis of which more specific studies drawing on the writ-
ten, pictorial, and material sources may be developed. 
                                                     
54  On the gaze, vision, and concentrated viewing in Mesopotamia, see further Winter 
2000b; Dicks 2012; Sonik 2013b. 
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4. Conclusion 
To close, the approaches and avenues of future research that have been 
outlined in this chapter are not intended to cast light solely on the subject of 
emotion; the illumination of emotional states of being may indeed emerge 
only partially, slowly, and as a peripheral byproduct of some of these inves-
tigations. Precluded as we are from conducting ethnographic work among 
the ancient inhabitants of Mesopotamia, however, these are the tools that 
we can reach as we begin to map out the Mesopotamian system(s) of emo-
tion. And, given the vast and increasing bodies of written, pictorial, and 




Fig. 1. The Greek hero Philoctetes on the Isle of Lemnos. Marble relief by 
Antonio Lombardo (ca. 1510-1515). © Victoria and Albert Museum, London. 
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Fig. 2. Drawing of the Laocoön in red chalk on paper by Filippo 
Agricola (ca. 1800-1857). © Victoria and Albert Museum, London. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Saint Firmin holding his head. Limestone sculpture from Amiens, 
France (ca. 1225-1275). The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. 
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Fig. 4. Arrest of Christ. Limestone sculpture from Amiens, France 
(ca. 1264-1288). The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Nergal and the Cyclops. Larsa period (ca. 19th-18th century 
BCE) Clay Plaque from Khafaje (George 2012: Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 6. Marble head of youth with slight smile. Late Archaic to early Classical 
(Transitional) period (ca. 490 BCE). The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Hero battling monster. Neo-Assyrian cylinder seal (Strommenger and Hirmer 1962: 
190a). 
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Fig. 8. Drawing of alabaster relief panel from the Temple of Ninurta at 




Fig. 9. Diorite sculpture of Gudea (ca. 2090 BCE). 
The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. 
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Fig. 10. A lion-hunt relief of Ashurbanipal from the North Palace at Nineveh (ca. 645-635 
BCE). (Woolley 1961: 186). 
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On Ancient Pictorial Representations of Emotion: 
Concluding Comments with Examples from Egypt 
John BAINES 
Background 
In addressing emotion and its display, this thought-provoking volume tack-
les an important difficulty in understanding the art of the ancient Near East, 
and indeed its civilizations as a whole.1 The authors gather a wide range of 
evidence and approach it from a variety of perspectives, while alternate 
methods and discussions are offered by contributors who comment on 
chapters by others. Theoretical studies in the last part supplement the visual 
chapters with a detailed discussion of emotion in Mesopotamian texts and a 
brief exploration of the contribution that research on metaphor may be able 
to make to analyzing ancient visual sources. The book’s chapters raise nu-
merous issues that prompt further reflection, and hopefully research, as 
well as situating the problem of identifying emotions in visual materials – 
and more widely in human behavior – in previous scholarship. 
In this epilogue I present some thoughts stimulated by reading the chap-
ters, reflecting on nature of the problem, and thinking about how one might 
extend some questions. I was not present at the conference session from 
which most chapters derive, and the majority of contributors focus on 
Western Asia rather than my specialism of Egypt, so I bring something of 
an outsider’s perspective to the discussion. This difference in perspective is 
significant because Egyptian images and compositions can raise distinctive 
issues. Most of my examples are drawn from Egyptian art, with some rather 
remote comparisons from western tradition.2 It would be useful to draw the 
art of other civilizations into future discussions, for example that of the 
Maya, whose visual treatment of emotion has been most valuably discussed 
                                                     
1  I am very grateful to Sara Kipfer for inviting me to contribute an essay composed after 
sight of the rest of the chapters. Some of what I say resumes discussions I have pub-
lished in the last few years, especially Baines 2013: 102-111, 138-144; 2015. Here I pre-
sent additional arguments and illustrations, giving few references, too many of them 
self-citations. I owe a great deal to Robert Bagley and Angela McDonald, who read a 
draft at very short notice and offered comments, argument, parallels, objections, and 
clarifications. See also McDonald (forthcoming). 
2  See the very useful article of Alexandra Verbovsek (2011). 
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by Stephen Houston (2001). From a slightly different perspective, emotion 
is now seen as vital to all areas of archaeology because human beings, as its 
prime subject, are fundamentally emotional, not least in their entanglement 
in the material world.3 
As several contributors remark, “emotion” as a general term is relatively 
modern. The same applies to a number of the abstractions used in the study 
of premodern cultures, and of features within them, as well as in many oth-
er intellectual domains. A relevant comparison is with the near-modernity 
of the term “art” as it is now used. The absence of a word does not signify 
the absence of a phenomenon, not least because language covers only parts 
of the experienced world and only a part of human thought.  
I believe that neither “emotion” nor “art” needs to be legitimized as an 
analytical term, although for detailed research they will need to be defined 
and circumscribed (I do not enter into the question, discussed by several 
contributors, of whether distinct basic emotions can be identified and clas-
sified). Experience of feelings or affect and interest in the aesthetic are 
intrinsic to being human. In earlier centuries the terms “feeling”, “senti-
ment”, and “affect” were similar in semantic range to “emotion” although 
not isomorphic with it. “Affect” is attested in English in a parallel usage by 
1400 (Oxford English Dictionary online, s.v. affect, n.). The others too are 
old. Demarcation of these areas of subjectivity, both of humans and of oth-
er animals, has long been part of people’s reflection on the world and on 
their place and action in it, surely far longer than any surviving record of 
language, since writing appeared only a little more than five thousand years 
ago. In any case, language is only a partial representation of emotion, 
which is a holistic phenomenon embedded in individuals, in society, and in 
the material world. One is therefore justified in seeking evidence of thought 
about, and representation of, emotion in any suitably specific source, how-
ever ancient.  
Pictorial representation has existed for tens of thousands of years, and 
for much of that time it could have depicted emotion or affect in a variety 
of ways, for example through groupings and associations of figures. Occur-
rences of such depictions are difficult to identify, however, and still more 
difficult to demonstrate convincingly enough to attract a consensus among 
scholars. As contributors note, emotions can be rendered through facial 
expression, pose and gesture, composition and scene content, combinations 
of these, and no doubt more besides. Some of these signifiers, such as par-
ticular gestures, can be specific to a culture, even to a culture’s pictures. In 
the case of Egypt, written captions are a vital component. Facial expression 
can be used to depict emotion only when the scale and manner of execution 
of the image are detailed enough for relevant features to be recognizable. 
Identifying the emotion intended may require cultural understanding, and 
                                                     
3  See e.g. Gosden 2004. 
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several chapters consider the question of how far signals of emotion are 
cross-culturally valid. Those who commissioned, executed, and saw images 
would have been a small and knowledgeable group who possessed shared 
understandings of their meanings, for example when they evoked narratives 
and their protagonists’ emotions. Means for representing emotion could 
thus be subtle and indirect. Provided that feelings were considered to be 
valid parts of the content of scenes, informed viewers are likely to have 
perceived emotion in contexts that are opaque to modern viewers or, to put 
the point more strongly, to have known that in the lived or imagined con-
text of a scene the figures or the composition would express emotion. It is 
not easy to learn enough about an ancient culture to approach seeing what a 
viewer saw. 
Here western tradition, particularly Christian forms partly inherited 
from classical and Byzantine antiquity, can get in the way. Fundamental 
motifs of Christian art focus on emotions, the most obvious example being 
the Crucifixion. Representations of grief in that context recur across periods 
and styles, in varying levels of schematism and “realism”. Relatively little 
in ancient Near Eastern or classical art, or in the art of many other tradi-
tions, has such a strong concentration on emotions of the protagonists. In 
seeking to identify renderings of emotion, scholars may also be uncon-
sciously influenced by the modern sense that “good news is not news”. 
Figures without visible emotion, perhaps especially of suffering, may seem 
to be too bland and without purpose – even though a scene of cruelty in-
flicted by indifferent-seeming figures can have a more powerful impact 
than something that is more overt in expression. I argue below that impass-
iveness has positive connotations that become comprehensible in particular 
through considerations of context and hierarchy.  
A rather different question from those mentioned is: whose emotions is 
the interpreter concerned with, ones that the figures within a composition 
communicate to one another, or ones that the patron and the creator intend-
ed to arouse in the viewer? An image might affect a viewer – including a 
modern viewer – emotionally whether or not its creator intended it to do so. 
Modern people focus on faces, and psychological experiments suggest that 
we are hard-wired to do so. Cartoons and caricatures exploit this propensity 
to communicate through faces. A corollary for the present argument is that 
pictorial traditions that show impassive faces and favor whole bodies as 
loci of meaning are prone to misinterpretation by modern viewers who 
expect emotion to be expressed in the face. Such reasoning, however, can 
only have limited import, because less elaborate images in ancient tradi-
tions use similar approaches to those of modern caricature. In later sections 
I suggest that powerful factors gave preference to communication through 
whole bodies while social conventions restricted the expression of emotion 
on both elite faces and bodies. 
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The broadest implication of these points is that viewers cannot help at-
taching meanings to images, including emotional ones, and creators seek to 
influence those meanings. Patrons and artists in antiquity can hardly have 
thought otherwise. Essentially the same applies to artistic traditions that are 
primarily ornamental, because these too necessarily rely on interaction 
between image and viewer; they may not seek to convey pain but many 
surely aim to achieve responses of awe and wonder. These considerations 
bring out some of the difficulties involved in searching for and interpreting 
representations of emotion in ancient art. In the present essay I focus on 
what patron, artist, and the small additional audience envisaged by them are 
likely to have understood as expressing emotion. Our responses to their 
images need to be pruned down as far as possible to what is plausible for an 
ancient context. 
Limitations and possibilities: Egyptian examples 
Two points alluded to above are crucial. First, there may be reasons for not 
expecting to find overt indications of emotion in pictorial compositions. 
Second, we may not be in a position easily to identify such indications 
where they are present.  
As to the first point, the large majority of works surviving from antiqui-
ty have a formal, often public character in which the rendering of emotion 
would probably be seen as out of place (I return to this below). For elite 
individuals if less for kings, images in the forms that survive in significant 
numbers were very costly.4 The material was mostly produced for tombs or 
other places where it would ideally remain available for all time. Moreover, 
representation was in some sense creation: to create an enduring image of 
suffering would need to offer some perpetual advantage, and it would be 
inappropriate to show the tomb owner, as chief beneficiary, in distress. 
While vast numbers of “scenes of daily life” (a designation that needs to be 
within quotation marks) survive from ancient Egypt, the nexus of their 
meaning is in the interplay between the small-scale genre motifs in many 
sub-registers and large-scale figures of the patron, typically a tomb-owner 
and often accompanied by his family, who is shown in repose (Fig. 2). To 
depict suffering among the small-scale figures was acceptable in a few 
contexts, but hardly otherwise. Royal monuments were presented as up-
holding the integrity of world order and thus provided a setting for depict-
ing adversity so long as it was properly countered. 
An analogy for the “scenes of daily life” can be drawn with treatments 
in 16th-17th century Netherlandish genre painting.5 Such paintings graced 
                                                     
4  Images on furniture and fabrics might have been equally costly, but hardly any survive 
to be studied. Compare, however, the painted box of Tutankhamun (Fig. 9). 
5  See e.g. Franits 2004. 
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the rooms of elite houses, whose inhabitants in a sense completed the com-
positions by their presence with the images around them, although unlike 
Egyptian patrons they often did not assert a claim to ownership of what was 
shown. Members of the Netherlandish elite were depicted, for example in 
portraits, richly dressed and in a static demeanor that might be compared 
with Egyptian statuary, or with the figures of owners within large Egyptian 
compositions. The repose in portraits of the Netherlandish elites contrasts 
with the range of activities of figures from the lower orders in their genre 
paintings. Earlier works often caricature the lives of peasants, while some 
later ones include images of abject living that throw the privileged life of 
the elite into relief. When emotion in shown in a patron or major subject, as 
in the “Laughing Cavalier” of Frans Hals (1624; in fact slightly smiling), 
this has traditionally been seen as a significant innovation. All this could as 
well be said of Egyptian works, but scholars have tended to focus not on 
the contrasts of demeanor between elites and subordinates but on the re-
stricted display of elite emotion. One reason is perhaps that family bonds 
are prominent in Egyptian art, with spouses often touching each other and 
children holding on to some part of a parent’s body or accoutrements, and 
this display of contact may be felt to conflict with the impassivity of faces. 
Yet it is likely to have been thought inappropriate, even unseemly, to show 
on the face what was indicated quite clearly in another way, and the same 
quite probably applied in a Netherlandish context. In Jan van Eyck’s Ar-
nolfini wedding portrait of 1434 (Fig. 1), a married couple hold hands but 
have expressionless faces; the work’s meanings are expressed in other 
ways.6 
Another reason for underestimating the display of elite emotion in 
Egyptian works might be that such content is expressed in ways that are 
difficult to recognize or are not simply visual. The content of most compo-
sitions is positive, and emotions of pain and suffering, which tend to be 
more easily identified than contentment, are seldom to be expected, again 
in part for reasons of permanence. The captions to “scenes of daily life” in 
tombs often mention the happiness of the owner/patron, both where he is 
actively hunting in the marshes and in the much more frequent examples 
where he (very occasionally she) observes but does not participate. In Old 
Kingdom (third millennium) examples these things are said to be “exceed-
ingly good to see”, or the owner is “seeing all the perfectly delightful things 
that are done throughout the land” (Fig. 2). While he watches his facial 
expression is neutral, as is his pose except where he relaxes by lounging on 
his walking stick, but the informed viewer knows that a major purpose of 
the whole is pleasure. Although the setting is in the countryside, it can be 
                                                     
6  The interpretation of those meanings is not surprisingly controversial. For a relatively 
recent proposal that the wife was deceased, see Koster 2003. 
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luxurious, with a richly colored tent as a shelter against sun and wind.7 
A temporary structure can also be the setting for an elaborate performance 
of music and dance.8 Numerous scenes extend the pleasurable aspect to 
subordinate figures, some of whom may be elaborately dressed, or a harvest 
scene may be accompanied by music while the workers exchange witty 
banter.9 Their pleasure is presumably depicted for the owner’s benefit, but 
it is shown as meaningful within the groups, as well as being made the 
more convincing by details such as variations among registers of language 
in the captions. If one is to summarize the content of such compositions, its 
core is the tomb owner’s exalted presence and pleasure at what he observes. 
The banquets depicted in New Kingdom tombs, especially of the 15th 
century BCE, show some relevant motifs among the elite participants. For 
example, drunkenness is mentioned and sometimes depicted by such arti-
fices as decorously vomiting figures, or where servants attend to the needs 
of seated men with cleaning cloths, reviving concoctions, and a steadying 
hand around the head (Fig. 3). Here too, humor leavens compositions that 
may at first glance seem rigid. These scenes are striking because a number 
of them show the living and the dead together, a context that might seem 
inappropriate for the elements of levity that are nevertheless clearly identi-
fiable,10 especially through the captions, which complement and enhance 
the visual content. There was no need to make pleasure explicit in the fig-
ures and their expressions: the viewer could supply it, and the writing spells 
it out. 
It is much rarer for scenes to show pain and distress, and these are al-
most always limited to inferiors. I give a few examples. A man brought 
before a 5th dynasty tomb owner (ca. 2350 BCE), perhaps for defaulting on 
rent, is held in a painful pose and has his mouth open in complaint11 – open 
mouths being exceptional in human figures, as in many artistic traditions. 
The scene is on the exterior of a tomb and balanced by one of hunting wild 
cattle; the combination clearly asserts order, type-casting the suffering man 
as a troublemaker. A case that is harder to interpret is given by a pair of 
groups in a set of registers of bread- and beer-making in the roughly con-
temporaneous tomb of Niankhkhnum and Khnumhotep (Fig. 4). In the low-
er register a woman has to nurse a baby while at the same time tending a 
bread oven, shielding her face from the heat with her more or less free hand 
(the baby is offered no such protection). In the register above, a child clings 
                                                     
7  See e.g. Wild 1966: pl. 135, reproducing a mid-19th century copy by Emile Prisse 
d’Avennes made when more painted detail was identifiable. 
8  E.g. tomb of Ti: Baines 2014: 25 fig. 2. 
9  Compare Vernus 2009-10. 
10  Baines 2014: 10, 30 fig. 7. 
11  Baines 2009-10: 129, with fig. 4. Compare the administrators, one of them stripped of 
his clothes, who are arraigned before scribes in the tomb of Ti from the same period: 
Wild 1966: pl. 178. 
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to a woman while she kneels and grinds grain on a stone. These groups are 
in a “domestic” context, and the women’s difficulties could be understood 
either as routine or as showing sympathetically the troubles of young moth-
ers earning their keep.12 Their facial expressions offer no guide to their 
feelings and no easy cue to the viewer. Strikingly, this tomb includes one of 
the few cases where a woman has a less than idealized face: the wife of 
Niankhkhnum is shown with heavy features, a fleshy jaw, and little bodily 
ornament, whereas the damaged parallel figure of his probable twin’s wife 
has a finely carved face and large amounts of jewelry.13 This distinction can 
hardly be said to express emotion, but it is strongly individualized, with 
only one of the two figures conventionally beautiful and luxurious. 
In 12th dynasty tombs (ca. 1950-1770 BCE) an extensive range of mal-
treatments is shown, most of them probably of estate staff; malnourished 
and crippled desert herdsmen are also depicted.14 The suffering figures 
depicted on the large and high decorated walls are often too small for de-
tails to be easily visible, but the physical, and presumably emotional, im-
pact on the sufferers is clear. For this period textual sources of two types 
complement such images of humiliation. The first type is literary instruc-
tions, some possibly of the early New Kingdom, which reveal much of elite 
attitudes to subordinates. They also offer an in places pessimistic view of 
the burdens of a king’s role, spelling out often dismissive attitudes that fit 
with the tomb images. For royalty, very individual faces of statues of kings 
Senwosret III (Fig. 5) and Amenemhat III of the late 12th dynasty that have 
over-large ears (a feature appearing already a couple of generations earlier) 
and furrowed brows and are thought by many scholars to show care and 
worry appropriate to a divided society with troublesome lower orders. Ro-
land Tefnin suggested that the treatment of the ears and eyes alludes to the 
king’s duty to be attentive to his subjects and strenuously vigilant on their 
behalf.15 The careworn facial types of the kings may be idealizations that 
show them as mature individuals with heavy responsibilities, comple-
menting the much more widespread youthful ideal, which is retained on the 
bodies of the statues below their heads. A pair of relief figures on a lintel of 
Senwosret III from Medamud near Thebes renders the two different ideals, 
confirming that they are complementary.16 Whatever the precise meaning 
of the royal type, its facial renderings were quickly disseminated to elite 
statuary, in which the range of bodily types was wider.17 There too it may 
                                                     
12  On meanings of such actions in the domestic context, see also Roth 2002. 
13  Moussa / Altenmüller 1977: pls 46-47; Harpur / Scremin 2010: 306-307. 
14  Treated in detail by Margaret Maitland (2015), who also analyzes implications of liter-
ary texts for these questions. 
15  Tefnin 1992. 
16  Louvre E 13983, cited by Tefnin (see previous note) and best reproduced in Drioton and 
Du Bourguet 1965: [174]-[175] fig. 38. 
17  For an outstanding group of examples, see Habachi 1985. 
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signify responsibility and age, but how far specific emotions are involved is 
not clear.  
The second textual source relevant to images of humiliation is the 
unique 11th dynasty stela of the Theban “scribe–sculptor” – the content of 
the text would fit with his being a relief sculptor and painter – Irtisen, 
which is also discussed by Cornelius in his chapter in this book (reign of 
Nebhepetre Mentuhotep, ca. 2000, a century or more earlier than the mate-
rial just mentioned).18 This text employs rare and unparalleled phraseology, 
and its interpretation is far from assured. The obscurity is probably in part 
deliberate. The protagonist asserts that “I know every secret of hieroglyphs 
(the less widely used script) and the conduct of festivals. (As for) every 
magical spell, I have equipped (myself) with it, without any of it passing 
me by”. A few lines below he says “No one is outstanding in any of this 
except for me alone, together with my eldest bodily son, whom the god has 
decreed to excel in it for him …”. Thus, the skills and knowledge involved 
in making pictorial representations are at least partly magical, subject to 
rules of secrecy, and handed down from father to son. Since representation 
was a form of creation and ended with a ritual performance, that is logical, 
and it provides powerful reasons for the absence of parallels for the text: 
knowledge of this sort was not public, divulging it could rob it of power, 
and it was not easily understood. The exceptional character of the text ren-
ders its description of images of suffering and communication among fig-
ures all the more important.  
Irtisen’s summary of his skills includes the statement that he knows how 
to render “the prostration of a single victim, the gaze of an eye at its fellow 
(presumably the person the eye is facing within the picture), the striking of 
fear before captives”. These clauses can perhaps be matched in reliefs of 
the same reign from Gebelein, a little south of Thebes, in which sub-
registers that were subject to less strict conventions than the main area 
above have very unusual depictions of the king about to smite captives. In 
one case the victim is pinioned at full length alongside the king and raises a 
beseeching hand (Fig. 6). In the other the victim’s head shrinks down onto 
his torso (Fig. 7). Further figures lined up behind him are presumably terri-
fied by what awaits them, but their poses and facial expressions are neutral. 
The pinioning of the body and the shrinking head, which have few paral-
lels, seem to match Irtisen’s text well. A later instance of the cringing head 
is a figure of a bare-breasted woman prisoner about to be despatched by 
queen Nefertiti on a relief probably deriving from el-Amarna (Fig. 8; ca. 
1340 BCE). Thus, this treatment, which is at the limit of Egyptian represen-
tational conventions, was not unique. Moreover, more vivid and extreme 
examples of cringing and other distortions, again straining normal conven-
                                                     
18  See E. Delange, in Wildung 2000: 60-63; Fischer-Elfert 2002. See now also Bryan 2017, 
with some valuable new interpretations and an excellent color photograph. The mono-
graphic treatment of Winfried Barta 1970 is unsatisfactory. 
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tions, can be found on the painted box of Tutankhamun from about a dec-
ade later, which bears a pair of battle scenes and another of celebratory 
hunts (Fig. 9). These examples suggest that the range of expression and 
acceptable informality employed in the freer medium of paint on smaller 
objects may have been wider, as is also the case, for example, with some 
genres of coffin painting. By contrast, the enemies in the standard scenes 
showing the king about to slaughter them en masse are distinguished from 
normal representation principally by a full-face figure at the center. This 
convention too signals their not belonging within proper order, but it does 
not render emotion clearly. 
The “gaze of an eye” referred to by Irtisen has no obvious counterpart 
between the flanking mentions of figures dominating and instilling fear in 
others, and I cannot point to a relevant pictorial element among similar 
compositions. It would be reasonable for the figures behind the one about 
to be executed in fig. 7 to be gazing at each other and hence terrified. Al-
ternatively, if the order of mentions of poses is not significant, one can 
imagine the phrase as referring to facing pairs of figures of equal and high 
iconographic status, as in the very common scenes of king and deity, some 
of which show them embracing (see Zwickel, p. 103 with fig. 21). In dif-
ferent groupings a smaller subordinate can be shown on a sub-register at 
eye level with a major figure so that he faces him, and their communication 
may be partly comparable. Be this as it may, if the other groupings that 
Irtisen mentions are correctly identified, they refer to extreme emotions and 
are rather different. As is probably to be expected, they do not focus on 
facial expression but on pose and composition. Although, as Cornelius 
observes, examples of mourning women with semi-hieroglyphic indications 
of tears are known from the New Kingdom, they too hardly involve distor-
tion of the face (see pp. 128, 134, figs. 2, 7). Similarly, the face of a rare 
late 18th dynasty relief figure that shows strong indications of age and in-
dividuality (Fig. 10), as well as holding out his hand with its heavily lined 
palm in a vivid gesture, has a neutral eye.  
Thus, in most examples the body and groupings, rather than the face, 
carry the emotional charge. As mentioned above, the same also applies to 
representations of maturity on figures other than the king. The fatter type of 
older man, a form that exhibits much variation, is likely to convey wisdom 
and thus mental states, but the rendering of related ideas on faces is known 
primarily from statuary. 
Like other aspects discussed above, this exploitation of the body for 
communication is broadly human. “Body language” is fundamental to so-
cial interaction as well as being to a large extent culturally specific. Be-
cause it is more easily perceived from a distance and at a small scale than 
facial expression, its representation is well suited to large compositions. It 
should be drawn into any larger study of the depiction of emotion, in which 
it will be necessary to ask how far bodily communication displays con-
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scious emotion or has different focuses of interest. Egyptian art, like a 
number of other traditions, has a strong focus on the body, and in that re-
spect contrasts for example with much East Asian art, and to some extent 
with Mesopotamian art. This promising area of research cannot be taken 
further in this essay. 
Another element of context should, however, be considered here. It 
would only be appropriate to depict painful emotions if they enhanced the 
meaning of compositions. In tombs it would probably be unseemly to cre-
ate a suffering figure of core elite status. The two thematic contexts where 
strong emotions could easily be seen as positive are in the suffering of en-
emies – often captioned as foreign rulers – on royal monuments asserting 
order over the forces of disorder, and in contexts where conventions were 
temporarily abrogated and different ones could apply, primarily in mourn-
ing and funerals, of which numerous examples are known on elite monu-
ments. Christina Riggs valuably observes that mourning figures can trans-
gress bounds of pictorial conventions, as in a papyrus scene where the wid-
ow’s dress spills over the register line of a composition (Fig. 11).19 
As contributors to this book note, exceptions outside the contexts of 
royal triumph and funeral rituals cluster in the Amarna period under Akhe-
naten (mid 14th century BCE). At that time there was a deliberate, in some 
cases rather literal-minded reversal of many conventions of composition 
and rules of visual decorum,20 an instance being images of the king and 
queen mourning the death of one of their daughters.21 About a decade later, 
successors to these departures from convention are found in the tomb of the 
general Horemheb at Saqqara. The scenes in this tomb include content re-
lated to the defeat of enemies: rows of prisoners, harassed by finely-dressed 
Egyptian handlers, are represented in exquisite but caricature-like detail, 
with exaggerated ethnic features, lined and scarified faces, and on some 
expressions of worry and distress.22 A few singled out, almost like speci-
mens, for special attention and presentation, and they are rendered at a 
larger scale than their handlers. Horemheb later became king, and these 
compositions almost assert a claim to the throne.  
Context and decorum are relevant also to the depiction of non-human 
animal emotion, a category addressed by more than one contributor to this 
volume. I agree with them that it is wrong to posit that the Egyptians per-
ceived a fundamental difference between the emotions of humans and other 
animals. Indeed, the biggest interpretive risk here is that people will read an 
emotional empathy similar to today’s popular perceptions into the behavior 
and gesture of depicted animals (see also below). Focusing on the clearest 
markers for emotion in images of animals may mitigate that difficulty a 
                                                     
19  Riggs 2013: 157. 
20  Brief statement: Baines 1985: 280. 
21  Martin 1989b: 43 fig. 8, pls 26-28; pp. 46-47 figs 11-12, pls 63, 68, 69. 
22  Martin 1989a: pls 78-93. 
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little. Broadly they are comparable with those for human beings, being 
focused around the opening of the mouth, distinctive poses, and inter-
actions with others. Zwickel illustrates a paradigmatic example from the 
late 5th dynasty tomb of Ti (ca. 2350 BCE), where a peasant is carrying 
across a ford a calf that looks back toward the mother cow, who returns the 
gaze and has her mouth open in complaint or consolation (p. 101 with fig. 
17).23 The communication between cow and calf is likely to relate to sepa-
ration and potential loss, while being exploited by the herdsmen to encour-
age the herd to cross the water. Another, recurring bovine group shows a 
cow whose calf has had a foreleg amputated as part of a human funeral 
ritual. It is generally assumed that the lowing of the cow and calf would 
contribute to the noise of lamentation, in addition to other likely sym-
bolism. Very often their distress is rendered visible by open mouths, raised 
heads, and grouping (compare Cornelius p. 130 with fig. 4). Drops of blood 
from the amputation can also be shown. In Fig. 11 the short stump of the 
amputated leg ends in a large smudge indicating the wound, a very rare 
treatment that again is outside normal conventions. 
This evidence suggests that depictions of the suffering of animals could 
be valued both as conveying emotion and as showing how they participated 
– against their will – in rituals, presenting highly charged motifs that are 
very rare in images of human beings and render the meaning of scenes 
more explicit. Such treatments could add immediacy in other contexts, for 
example scenes of an animal giving birth.24 A vast amount of animal be-
havior is shown in third millennium tomb scenes, including play, aggres-
sion, pain, and distress, much of it conveyed by mouths, tongues, poses, 
and groupings; significant amounts of this could be termed emotional. 
I return to some related questions in the final section.  
Image, performance, and context 
Issues relating to the status of emotions in performances are raised in dis-
cussions of scenes depicted in temples, tombs, and in later periods on cof-
fins and stelae. Rituals surrounding death, processions to the tomb, and 
burial constitute one major category of such performances. Examples of 
rituals that are less freighted with subjective meanings include the numer-
ous third millennium processions of figures representing estates bringing 
produce for the tomb owner. Scholars sometimes ask whether in the former 
                                                     
23  Wild 1953: pls 81, 114. 
24  See e.g. Wild 1953: pl. 92A (sticking out tongue); Harpur / Scremin 2008: 179 (dam-
aged); note also the young beasts straining at their tethers in the sub-register above, 
through which the mother cow’s horn breaks. For the tongue of a startled bull that is be-
ing lassoed, see 103. Many relevant details of animal behavior are excellently presented 
in Harpur / Scremin 2008, 2010, and other books in their series. 
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case the feelings that may be identified in the scenes should be seen as per-
sonal emotion or as performance. For two reasons I believe that this ques-
tion is not helpful.  
First and more simply, a good performance convinces, so that the view-
er cannot tell, and may not wish to tell, whether the emotion is acted or 
experienced. The same is very often true of the principal actors, whether in 
a religious ritual or in theatrical acting. Moreover, the role of participants in 
rituals such as weddings and funerals can shift seamlessly between per-
forming and feeling; part of the aim of the event is to arouse and channel 
emotions. Both participants and bystanders can be caught up emotionally, 
and both groups are shown in some Egyptian representations of funerals.25 
The biography of an elite woman of the Ptolemaic period (2nd century 
BCE) states that “all of Memphis” attended her funeral, which was a joyous 
event celebrating a good and long life.26 The character of the emotion in-
volved in the rituals following a death can vary greatly.  
Second, in many ways images constitute performances: they create 
something that conveys a coherent meaning of its own that may or may not 
relate to what could happen in the world but nevertheless brings something 
into being. In a sense images of rituals are therefore performances of per-
formances – a point that applies as well to the Arnolfini portrait (Fig. 1) as 
to ancient art. Egyptian temple scenes are performances, in their case meta-
phorical ones: they are nearly abstract in character and do not depict actions 
that could occur, because in real rituals the gods would be tended in the 
form of small statues while the performer would be a priest who was nei-
ther the king nor someone acting his part. They constitute or perform some-
thing visually. The rituals are the core performances to which such images 
relate, and their depiction at a great remove from any reality is given an 
appearance as perfect and static as possible, in keeping with the sacrality 
and importance of what they present. Depiction of emotion is in many ways 
irrelevant to such a context, but the extensive captions to temple reliefs of 
the Graeco-Roman period in particular include much exchange of emotions 
such as love and joy on the part of the king and deities as protagonists.27 
Performance, like emotion, is not determined solely by culture; it is part 
of being human, and it also occurs throughout the animal world. People 
compose themselves for images, and those who create images take account 
of this behavior. Most photographs of groups of people do not show things 
simply happening but render performances, however brief. To use an ex-
ample mentioned earlier, people prefer not to be shown with their mouths 
open, unless it be in today’s convention of a smile with perfect teeth. The 
French photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson (1908-2004) went to great 
                                                     
25  E.g. a funeral procession on a late 18th dynasty relief in Berlin: Baines 2013: 240 
fig. 60. 
26  Vittmann 1995: 292. 
27  See e.g. Winter 1968. 
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lengths to catch his subjects unawares, so that what his photographs show 
is not what their subjects intended. It is as if he performed for them by sup-
pressing their performances. 
Drawn, painted, and carved images are all the more likely to show a per-
formed figure because they are created over a longer time, generally require 
more resources, and involve consensus between patron and executant. 
A figure standing at rest, dressed in symbolically significant clothing and 
holding insignia of office or status, is a created fiction that enacts its sub-
ject’s identity. Any specific or transitory emotion does not belong in such a 
context. Exceptions to these patterns do not alter the point that many an-
cient images, perhaps a significant proportion of pictorial images alto-
gether, should be understood, among other things, as performances. Where 
emotions that are performed are shown, this does not render them any the 
less emotions: while it should clarify matters not to ask whether depicted 
figures might be understood as experiencing feelings or as only displaying 
them, the issue of when and whether feelings are thought of as being pre-
sent in images and groupings remains significant. I suggest that it will be 
more productive to look at scenes and compositions, rather than single fig-
ures, to advance the understanding of related issues.  
The audience for performances, which affects what is shown, can be in-
ternal to the composition, can consist primarily of its viewers, or can be 
both. The viewing public may be as small as the patron and executants, but 
is generally at least a little larger. Even the vast numbers of ancient works 
that were partly or completely invisible after they were created and set up 
had some human audience, for example during a funeral, as well as ad-
dressing imagined audiences among deities or in the next world. These 
present and imagined publics brought with them constraints of proper com-
portment in the performed and depicted contexts, in which expression of 
emotion would be regulated so as to contribute positively to the whole. 
Even among the “scenes of daily life” mentioned earlier, few lack any pub-
lic character within the composition, not least because of the near-universal 
presence of the figure of the viewing patron. His role is in itself a perfor-
mance that consists of “seeing” and “delighting”, not participating or ex-
pressing visible emotion.  
Discussion and conclusion 
Perhaps the salient conclusion emerging from the topics considered above 
is that patterns of representation of emotion, and particularly of suffering, 
are organized hierarchically. The higher the status of a figure, the less like-
ly it is to exhibit emotion. Major figures are typically impassive. Strong 
emotions or adverse experience can be indicated for less important people, 
but in general only where such details – for they are at the level of detail in 
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most compositions – contribute to a positive overall message. The most 
vivid representations of emotion may be on animals, but hierarchy is visible 
there too: unless it is hunting, a dog belonging to a major figure is normally 
at rest, forming part of the impassive group. In Egyptian art of earlier peri-
ods the principal exception to these characterizations is again in hunting 
scenes, among which those depicting the owner as actively involved are 
largely reserved to royalty and people of the highest status. In addition to 
their symbolic assertion of order, these compositions convey a strong mes-
sage of pleasure and, in marsh scenes, of an idyll. Yet such scenes are also 
split in their treatment of their subject matter: with significant exceptions, 
the killing of birds, fish, and in desert contexts mammals, is generally 
shown as completed, so that emotion is not directly at stake.28 In this re-
spect Egyptian art contrasts with Neo-Assyrian, where the direct confron-
tation of royal hunter and prey is a major theme, as Zwickel notes (p. 102 
with fig. 20). In both civilizations the introduction of the chariot provided a 
potent new locus of display while altering conventions of elite representa-
tion relatively little. Such conventions are satirized in the scene from the 
“Turin Erotic Papyrus”, illustrated by Zwickel (p. 105 with fig. 31), of a 
couple having sex, the woman crouching on a chariot and the man with his 
mouth open in a way that is to me more suggestive of singing a song than 
crying out.  
An important aspect of the representation of emotion in non-human an-
imals, and in particular groups of them, is the imputation of human emo-
tions: people implicitly or explicitly expect other species, especially domes-
ticated ones, to communicate, both to humans and among themselves, in 
similar ways to humans and to be comprehensible to them. They also dis-
place their own emotions onto other animals. Displacement contributes 
powerfully to what images of animals do in art, not least by making it pos-
sible to represent behavior that would otherwise be outside the acceptable 
range for humans. The Egyptians clearly used this strategy of displacement 
in the images of cow and calf mentioned above, and in hunting scenes the 
elite protagonist’s aggression is often expressed through his dogs while his 
own figure is impassive. 
Closely related to the impassivity of major human figures is a general 
avoidance of the ephemeral. Emotions that are manifest in people’s faces 
are fleeting, and they may have been unsuitable to be depicted for that rea-
son among others. Indications of age and experience that are also uncom-
mon, as well as being confined to a few periods, probably do not represent 
emotion but rather an achieved state, as is suggested notably by the pres-
ence of both youthful and mature ideals for a king in a single relief. The 
setting of an image might imply emotion, for example in statues of kings in 
                                                     
28  Contrast the hunting of an ibex in the 18th dynasty Theban tomb of Qenamun, an image 
that was copied in antiquity: Baines 2013: 88-89, with references. 
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a devotional pose that were set up in temples (Fig. 5), but in such cases the 
pose is more explicit and often more eloquent than the face.29 The impas-
sivity of rulers and elites is attested in many artistic traditions, and it has a 
clear ideological value, not just in images but also in elite behavior. Mas-
tery of others is displayed in mastery of oneself. 
Whereas major figures are mostly shown in static poses, minor figures 
are much more freely rendered and often form groups. When order is as-
serted, its adverse impact on those perceived to threaten it can be depicted, 
but those who enforce order hardly ever show emotion on their faces. 
Groups give a key to thinking about the depiction of emotion: whereas 
western tradition tends to focus on facial expression, many cues to identify-
ing emotion in Egypt – and plausibly in many traditions – are in connec-
tions among figures. Other cues are in poses and in activities, as for exam-
ple in gestures of celebration. It is probably less productive to focus on 
faces and individual figures than on body language (briefly mentioned 
above), groups, and their interactions. 
A concept that can usefully span the hierarchy from royalty and major 
figures, through subordinates, to animals and enemies, is decorum. This 
pervasive organizing principle of Egyptian art excludes the representation 
of strong emotion by deities and royalty; the depiction of Akhenaten and 
Nefertiti mourning, mentioned above, flouts this norm. On elite figures 
such emotions are displayed only in particular cases, notably on widows, 
whose images in funeral scenes are often distinguished from those of large 
groups of mourners. As discussed, emotion is shown more freely on subor-
dinate figures, but still only when what they show contributes to positive 
overall meanings.  
Comparable meanings extend beyond human and other animal society 
to the settled landscape and the world of nature. Places such as cities and 
necropoleis evoked strong emotions, both positive and negative, that can be 
attributed with some confidence for images of the latter. For cities, a unique 
relief of the reign of Ramesses II (ca. 1279-1213 BCE) in a damaged con-
text on the exterior wall of the Luxor temple shows a destroyed city and 
landscape devoid of animate life (Fig. 12).30 From its context on the wall 
this must represent an enemy location, so that it fits with the general pattern 
that situates extremes of violence and loss in the non-Egyptian world, but 
the absence from the composition of anything living goes further than other 
examples in depicting desolation: hardly any Egyptian art that is not pure 
pattern is without human or animal life. Ideologically, such desolation is 
                                                     
29  In addition to Fig. 5, see for example Wildung 2000: no. 57 (Amenemhat III, ca. 1780 
BCE). It is symptomatic of this issue that, although numerous standing and praying stat-
ues are known, illustrations are not common because scholars and publishers are inter-
ested in faces rather than bodies. 
30  See Wreszinski 1923-35: pl. 65; Bianchi 1997; Phelps 2009. 
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outside the living and ordered world. The depicted desolation carries an 
emotional charge that is in keeping with wider ideology.  
 The patterning of Egyptian visual representations of emotion is thus 
part of the wider configuration of experience of the ordered cosmos, as well 
as of regions beyond its narrower definition that are seen ideologically as 
disordered. Such a patterning is very unlikely to be restricted to Egypt,31 
and its implications would be worth pursuing. Image worlds express and 
contribute to enacting the order of complex societies and their inequalities. 
Research on how emotion is represented thus offers one of many ways into 
interpreting conceptions of world order. In the Egyptian case, the higher up 
the hierarchy one goes, the less strong emotion is displayed; stronger ex-
pression is confined to a few contexts and to inferior orders of humans and 
animals, as well as of the cultural and natural world. To some extent, overt 
emotion threatens equilibrium and disturbs achieved order, in a pattern that 
reinforces the organization of an unequal society. Similar patterns can sure-






























Fig. 1. Jan van Eyck, Wedding of Giovanni Arnolfini and his wife (1434); 
oil painting. London, National Gallery. Courtesy National Gallery. 
                                                     
31  For the wider Near Eastern ideological context, compare Liverani 1990, esp. 33-43. 




Fig. 2. Tomb of Ptahhotep II at Saqqara, offering chapel, north wall, east section. Late 5th 
dynasty. From Harpur and Scremin (2008: 356), with kind permission from Yvonne Harpur. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Tomb of Tetiky at Thebes (TT 15), main vaulted chamber, north wall, upper register, 
left section, detail. Early 18th dynasty (ca. 1500 BCE). After Davies (1925: pl. iv). 
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Fig. 4. Tomb of Niankhkhnum and Khnumhotep at Saqqara, room II, short west wall, 
upper registers, details. Late 5th dynasty. After Moussa and Altenmüller (Moussa/ 
Altenmüller 1977: pl. 23); for details, compare Harpur and Scremin (2010: 71-78). 
 
Fig. 5. Three statues of Senwosret III (ca. 1830 BCE) in a pose of prayer, from 
the mortuary temple complex of Nebhepetre Mentuhotep at Deir el-Bahari. 
Granodiorite. British Museum EA684, EA685, EA686 Courtesy British Museum.  




Fig. 6 and 7. Two relief blocks of reliefs from a temple of Nebhepetre 
Mentuhotep (11th dynasty) at Gebelein, details of base registers. Ca. 2000 

















Fig. 8. Limestone relief of Queen Nefertiti about to smite a female 
captive, detail; probably reused at el-Ashmunein from el-Amarna. Ca. 
1340 BCE, Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 63.260. Courtesy of museum. 
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Fig. 9. Tutankhamun defeats Asian enemies. Painted wooden box of Tutankhamun from the 
antechamber of his tomb in the Valley of the Kings, “northern” long side, detail. Excava-
tor’s no. 21. Cairo, Egyptian Museum JE 61467. After Davies / Gardiner (1962: pl. I). 




Fig. 10. Limestone relief fragment showing an old man reaching out his left hand. Prove-
nance unknown. Late 18th dynasty, ca. 1330 BCE. Brooklyn Museum 47.120.1. See Rief-
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Fig. 11. Detail of vignette showing “Opening of the Mouth” and mourning 
rituals in the Book of the Dead papyrus of Hunefer from Thebes. Early 19th 
dynasty, ca. 1275 BCE. British Museum EA 9901/5. Courtesy of museum. 
 
Fig. 12. Scene of a foreign city and adjacent landscape, Luxor temple, west exterior wall, north 
section; reign of Ramesses II (ca. 1279-1213 BCE). After Wreszinski (1923-35 pl. 65).  
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Zu diesem Buch 
Die historische Emotionsforschung ist ein wichtiges interdisziplinäres 
Forschungsfeld. Nicht zuletzt die Auseinandersetzungen mit Fragen um 
biologisch fundierte Universalien und soziokulturell bedingte Partikula-
rität und Relativität spielen dabei eine Rolle. Konzeptuelle Inkongruen-
zen zwischen heutigen Begriffen von Emotion und den Emotionskon-
zeptionen der Antike machen deutlich, dass Gefühle eine Geschichte 
haben und doch grundsätzlich zum Menschsein als solchem gehören. 
Das Medium Bild eröffnet andere Möglichkeiten transkultureller Unter-
suchung als das Medium Sprache. Es kann deshalb einen wichtigen Bei-
trag leisten, um besser zu verstehen, wie im Alten Orient mit Emotionen 
umgegangen wurde: Werden auf Bildern aus Mesopotamien, der Levan-
te und Ägypten in Gestik, Körperhaltung, Gesichtsausdruck etc. Emotio-
nen wiedergegeben, und wenn ja, wie? Welche Bedeutung und welchen 
Stellenwert hat die Wiedergabe von Emotionen in der visuellen Kommu-
nikation? 
Die Beiträge im ersten Teil des Bandes gehen anhand von ausgewählten 
Beispielen der Frage nach, ob und wie in der altorientalischen Kunst 
Emotionen dargestellt werden. Die Lösungsansätze sind kontrovers: Der 
These, es handle sich in keinem Fall um eine Visualisierung von Emotio-
nen, sondern um kulturelle Rollen beziehungsweise rituelle Inszenie-
rungen, steht die Annahme gegenüber, dass sich hinter nonverbalen 
Ausdrucksformen durchaus Emotionen verbergen und lediglich das spe-
zifische Methodenrepertoire gesucht werden muss, um die bildlichen 
Darstellungen angemessen zu deuten. 
Der zweite Teil des Bandes enthält fünf theoretische Reflexionen aus 
komparatistischer, linguistischer und kunsthistorischer Perspektive. Mit 
dieser breit angelegten interdisziplinären Diskussion – Assyriologie, 
Ägyptologie, Archäologie und alttestamentlicher Wissenschaft – bietet 
der Sammelband, der aus einem Workshop anlässlich der 61. Rencontre 
Assyriologique Internationale in Bern und Genf im Juni 2015 hervorge-
gangen ist, einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Forschungspositionen 
zu diesem wichtigen Thema. 
About this book 
The history of emotion is an important interdisciplinary research field, 
not least because it touches fundamental questions about the distinction 
between psychobiology-based universals and socio-cultural, path-de-
pendent and thus relative peculiarities. Conceptual incongruities between 
what is today understood as emotion and various views on emotions in 
antiquity should not distract from the fact that, while emotions do have a 
history, they substantially belong to all human experience as such. 
Visual media and images open perspectives for transcultural research 
that differ from the testimony of texts. Their study can thus make a major 
contribution to a better understanding of emotions in the Ancient Near 
East. How where gestures, body postures, facial expressions etc. visual-
ized in images from Mesopotamia, the Levant and Egypt and what role 
does the visualization play in communicating emotions? 
The first part of the present volume takes concrete examples as a starting 
point and discusses the fundamental question whether or not emotions 
were represented and can thus be studied in Ancient Near Eastern art. 
Approaches and arguments are controversial: Some authors argue that 
there are no visualizations of emotions, but only of cultural roles and 
ritual embodiments. Their view is contrasted by other contributors, who 
assume that one may detect non-verbal expressions hiding emotions in 
visual respresentations and that it is crucial to specify the appropriate 
tools and methodologies to interpret them in an adequate way.  
The second part offers five additional theoretical reflexions from com-
parative, linguistic and art-historical perspectives. With such a broad in-
terdisciplinary approach including Assyriology, Egyptology, Near Eastern 
archaeology and Hebrew Bible/Old Testament studies, the volume offers 
a large panorama of the most important research positions on a funda-
mental topic.
The book results from workshop discussions held in June 2015 during 
the 61st Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale at Bern and Geneva. 
Contributors include John Baines, Dominik Bonatz, Izak Cornelius, Mar-
garet Jaques, Othmar Keel, Sara Kipfer, Florian Lippke, Silvia Schroer, An-
dreas Wagner, Elisabeth Wagner-Durand, and Wolfgang Zwickel.
